AdamSmithalsodiffersfromHumenolessinhistheoryofthecauseofthebeautywhichresultsfromaperceptionofutilitythaninhistheoryoftheplaceassignabletoutilityintheprincipleofmoralapprobation。
　　AccordingtoHume，theutilityofanyobjectisasourceofpleasurefromitssuggestionoftheconveniencyitisintendedtopromote，fromitsfitnesstoproducetheendintendedbyit。AdamSmithmaintains，ratherbywayofsupplementthanofcontradiction，thatthefitnessofathingtoproduceitsend，orthehappyadjustmentofmeanstotheattainmentofanyconvenienceorpleasureisoftenmoreregardedthantheendorconvenienceitself，andhegivesseveralinstancestoillustratetheoperationofthisprinciple。
　　Forinstance，amancomingintohisroomandfindingallthechairsinthemiddle，willperhapsbeangrywithhisservantandtakethetroubletoplacethemallwiththeirbackstothewall，forthesakeofthegreaterconvenienceofhavingthefloorfreeanddisengaged。Butitismorethearrangementthantheconveniencewhichhereallycaresfor，sincetoattaintheconvenienceheputshimselftomoretroublethanhecouldhavesufferedfromthewantofit，seeingthatnothingwaseasierforhimthantohavesatdownatonceononeofthechairs，whichisprobablyallhedoeswhenhislabourisover。
　　Thesameprincipleappliestothepursuitofriches，undercircumstanceswhichimplymuchmoretroubleandvexationthanthepossessionofthemcaneverobviate。Thepoorman'sson，cursedwithambition，whoadmirestheconvenienceofapalacetolivein，ofhorsestocarryhim，andofservantstowaitonhim，sacrificesarealtranquillityforacertainartificialandelegantreposehemayneverreach，tofindatlastthat"wealthandgreatnessaremeretrinketsoffrivolousutility，nomoreadaptedforprocuringeaseofbodyortranquillityofmind，thanthetweezer-casesoftheloveroftoys。"Indeed，thereisnootherrealdifferencebetweenthemthanthattheconveniencesof。theonearesomewhatmoreobservablethanthoseoftheother。Thepalaces，gardens，orequipageofthegreatareobjectsofwhichtheconveniencystrikeseveryone；theirutilityisobvious；andwereadilyenjoybysympathythesatisfactiontheyarefittedtoafford。
　　Buttheconveniencyofatoothpickorofanail-cutter，beinglessobvious，itislesseasytoenterintothesatisfactionoftheirpossessor。Theyarelessreasonableobjectsofvanitythanwealthandgreat-ness，andlesseffectuallygratifyman'sloveofdistinction。Toamanwhohadtolivealoneonadesolateisland，itmightbeamatterofdoubt，"whetherapalace，oracollectionofsuchsmallconveniencesasarecommonlycontainedinatweezer-case，wouldcontributemosttohishappinessandenjoyment。"
　　Thefactthattherichandthegreataresomuchtheobjectofadmirationisduenotsomuchtoanysuperioreaseorpleasuretheyaresupposedtoenjoy，astothenumberlessartificialandelegantcontrivancestheypossessforpromotingsucheaseandpleasure。Thespectatordoesnotimagine"thattheyarereallyhappierthanotherpeople，butheimaginesthattheypossessmoremeansofhappiness。Anditistheingeniousandartfuladjustmentofthosemeanstotheendforwhichtheywereintended，thatistheprincipalsourceofhisadmiration。"
　　Again，thesoleuseandendofallconstitutionsofgovernmentistopromotethehappinessofthosewholiveunderthem。Butfromthisloveofartandcontrivance，weoftencometovaluethemeansmorethantheend，andtobeeagertopromotethehappinessofourfellows，lessfromanysympathywiththeirsufferingsorenjoymentthanfromawishtoperfectandimproveabeautifulsystem。Menofthegreatestpublicspirithaveoftenbeenmenofthesmallesthumanity，likePetertheGreat；andifapublic-spiritedmanencouragesthemendingofroads，itisnotcommonlyfromafellow-feelingwithcarriersandwaggonerssomuchasfromaregardtothegeneralbeautyoforder。
　　Thisadmitshoweverofapracticalapplication，forifyouwishtoimplantpublicvirtueinamandevoidofit，youwilltellhiminvainofthesuperioradvantagesofawell-governedstate，ofthebetterhomes，thebetterclothing，orthebetterfood。Butifyoudescribethegreatsystemofgovernmentwhichprocurestheseadvantages，explainingtheconnexionsandsubordinationsoftheirseveralparts，andtheirgeneralsubserviencytothehappinessoftheirsociety；ifyoushowthepossibilityofintroducingsuchasystemintohisowncountry，orofremovingtheobstructionstoit，andsettingthewheelsofthemachineofgovernmenttomovewithmoreharmonyandsmoothness，youwillscarcefailtoraiseinhimthedesiretohelptoremovetheobstructions，andtoputinmotionsobeautifulandorderlyamachine。Itislesstheresultsofapoliticalsystemthatcanmovehimthanthecontemplationofaningeniousadjustmentofmeanstoends。
　　CHAPTERXIII。THERELATIONOFADAMSMITH'STHEORYTOOTHERSYSTEMS
　　OFMORALITY。
　　ThelongestandperhapsthemostinterestingdivisionofAdamSmith'streatiseisthatinwhichhereviewstherelationofhisowntheorytothatofothersystemsofmoralphilosophy。Forlikeallwritersonthesamedifficultsubject，hefindsbutaverypartialattainmentoftruthinanysystemoutsidehisown，andclaimsforthelatteracomprehensivesurveyofallthephenomena，whichhispredecessorshadonlygraspedsinglyandindetail。Everysystemofmorality，everytheoryoftheoriginofourmoralsentiments，hasbeenderived，hethinks，fromsomeoneorotheroftheprinciplesexpoundedbyhimself。And"astheyarealloftheminthisrespectfoundeduponnaturalprinciples，theyarealloftheminsomemeasureintheright。Butasmanyofthemarederivedfromapartialandimperfectviewofnature，therearemanyofthemtooinsomerespectsinthewrong。"
　　I。Thuswithregard，first，tothenatureofVirtue，allthedifferenttheories，whetherinancientorinmoderntimes，may，AdamSmiththinks，bereducedtothree，accordingastheymakeittoconsistinPropriety，Prudence，orBenevolence:orinotherwords，accordingastheyplaceitinthepropergovernmentanddirectionofallouraffectionsequally，whetherselfishorsocial；inthejudiciouspursuitofourownprivateinterestandhappinessbytherightdirectionoftheselfishaffectionsalone；orinthedisinterestedpursuitofthehappinessofothersunderthesoledirectionofthebenevolentaffections。
　　AdamSmith'sowntheorydifferedfromallthese，inthatittookaccountofallthesethreedifferentaspectsofvirtuetogether，andgavenoexclusivepreferencetoanyoneofthem。WithPlato，Aristotle，andtheStoics，whomadevirtuetoconsistinproprietyofconduct，orinthesuitablenessofthemotiveofactiontotheobjectwhichexcitesit，orwithsuchmodernsystemsasthoseofLordShaftesburyorClarke，whodefinedvirtueasmaintainingaproperbalanceoftheaffectionsandpassions，orasactingaccordingtotherelationsortothetruthofthings，hesofaragreedastoregardsuchproprietyasconstitutingoneelementinourapprobationofvirtue；
　　buthemaintainedthatthispropriety，thoughanessentialingredientineveryvirtuousaction，wasnotalwaystheonlyone。Proprietycommandedapprobation，andimproprietydisapprobation，buttherewereotherqualitieswhichcommandedahigherdegreeofesteemorblame，andseemedtocallforrewardorpunishmentrespectively。Suchwerebeneficentorviciousactions，inwhichsomethingwasrecognizedbesidesmereproprietyorimpropriety，andraisedfeelingsstrongerthanthoseofmereapprovalordislike，andthatwastheirtendencytoproducegoodorbadresults。Moreover，noneofthesystemswhichplacedvirtueinaproprietyofaffectiongaveanymeasurebywhichthatproprietymightbeascer-tained，norcouldsuchameasurebefoundanywherebutinthesympatheticfeelingsoftheimpartialandwell-informedspectator。
　　Plato，Aristotle，andtheStoics，onlyregarded，intheiraccountofvirtue，thatpartofitwhichconsistsinproprietyofconduct。AccordingtoPlato，thesoulwascomposedofthreedifferentfacultiesreason，passion，andappetite；andthathigherformofjusticewhichconstitutesperfectvirtuewasnothingmorethanthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfineditselftoitspropersphere，withoutencroachinguponthatofanyother，andperformeditsofficewithpreciselythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbelongedtoit。Inotherwords，thisjustice，thelastandgreatestofthecardinalvirtues，andthatwhichcomprehendedalltheothers，meantthatexactandperfectproprietyofconduct，thenatureofwhichhasbeenalreadydiscussed。NearlythesameaccountofvirtuewasgivenbyAristotle，whodefineditasthehabitofmoderationinaccordancewithrightreason；
　　bywhichhemeantarightaffectionofmindtowardsparticularobjects，asinbeingneithertoomuchnortoolittleaffectedbyobjectsoffear。
　　AndtheStoicssofarcoincidedwithPlatoandAristotleastoplaceperfectvirtue，orrectitudeofconduct，inaproperchoiceorrejectionofdifferentobjectsandcircumstancesaccordingastheywerebynaturerenderedmoreorlesstheobjectsofourdesireoraversion。Inthisproprietyofthemindtowardsexternalthingsconsistedthelifeaccordingtonature，orinotherwords，thevirtuousconductoflife。
　　Nolessincompletethansystemswhichplacedvirtueinproprietyalonewerethosesystemswhichplaceditinprudence，orinaprudentialregardformerepersonalwelfare。SuchwerethesystemsoftheCyrenaicsandEpicureansinancienttimes，andofwriterslikeHobbesandMandevilleinmoderntimes。
　　AccordingtoEpicurus，thegoodnessorbadnessofanythingwasultimatelyreferabletoitstendencytoproducebodilypleasureorpain。Thuspowerandrichesweredesirableasgoodthings，fromtheirtendencytoprocurepleasure，whilsttheevilofthecontraryconditionslayintheircloseconnexionwithpain。Honourandreputationwereofvalue，becausetheesteemofotherswasofsomuchimportancetoprocureuspleasureandtodefendusfrompain。Andinthesamewaytheseveralvirtueswerenotdesirablesimplyforthemselves，butonlybyreasonoftheirintimateconnexionwithourgreatestwell-being，easeofbodyandtranquillityofmind。Thustemperancewasnothingbutprudencewithregardtopleasure，thesacrificeofapresentenjoymenttoobtainagreateroneortoavoidagreaterpain。Couragewasnothingbutprudencewithregardtodangerorlabour，notgoodinitself，butonlyasrepellentofsomegreaterevil。Andjusticetoowasnothingbutprudencewithregardtoourneighbours，ameanscalculatedtoprocuretheiresteem，andtoavoidthefearthatwouldflowfromtheirresentment。
　　AdamSmith'sfirstreplytothistheoryis，thatwhatevermaybethetendencyoftheseveralvirtuesorvices，thesentimentswhichtheyexciteinothersaretheobjectsofamuchmorepassionatedesireoraversionthanalltheirothercon-sequences；thattobe-amiableandtheproperobjectofesteemisofmorevaluetousthanalltheeaseandsecuritywhichloveoresteemcanprocureus:andthattobeodious，ortheproperobjectofcontempt，orindignationismoredreadfulthanallwecansufferinourbodyfromhatred，contempt，orindignation；andthatthereforeourdesireoftheonecharacterandouraversiontotheothercannotarisefromregardtotheeffectswhicheitherofthemislikelytoproduceonthebody。
　　Secondly，thereisoneaspectofnaturefromwhichtheEpicureansystemderivesitsplausibility。"BythewisecontrivanceoftheAuthorofnature，virtueisuponallordinaryoccasions，evenwithregardtothislife，realwisdom，andthesurestandreadiestmeansofobtainingbothsafetyandadvantage。"Thesuccessorfailureofourundertakingsmustverymuchdependonthegoodorbadopinionentertainedofus，andonthegeneraldispositionofotherstoassistoropposeus。Hencethetendencyofvirtuetopromoteourinterestandofvicetoobstructit，undoubtedlystampsanadditionalbeautyandproprietyupontheone，andafreshdeformityandimproprietyupontheother。Andthustemperance，magnanimity，justiceandbeneficence，cometobeapprovedof，notonlyundertheirpropercharacters，butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostrealprudenceandthehighestwisdom；
　　whilstthecontraryvicescometobedisapprovedof；notonlyundertheirpropercharacters，butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostshort-sightedfollyandweakness。Sothattheconducivenessofvirtuetohappinessisonlysecondary，andsotospeakaccidentaltoitscharacter；itisnotitsfirstrecommendationtoourpursuitofit。
　　Butifthetheorieswhichresolvedvirtueintoproprietyorprudencewerethusone-sided，theremainingtheorythatbestrepresentedbyHutchesonwasnolessso，whichmadevirtuetoconsistsolelyinbenevolence，orinadisinterestedregardtothegoodofothersorthepublicgenerally。SofarindeeddidHutchesoncarrythistheory，thatheevenrejectedasaselfishmotivetovirtuousactionthepleasureofself-approbation，"thecomfortableapplauseofourownconsciences，"holdingthatitdiminishedthemeritofanybenevolentaction。Theprincipleofself-lovecouldneverbevirtuousinanydegree，anditwasmerelyinnocent，notgood，whenitledamantoactfromareasonableregardtohisownhappiness。
　　Severalreasonsseem，indeed，atfirstsight，tojustifytheidentificationofvirtuewithbenevolence。Itisthemostagreeableofalltheaffections。
　　Itisrecommendedtousbyadoublesympathy，andwefeelittobetheproperobjectofgratitudeandreward。Evenitsweaknessoritsexcessisnotverydisagreeabletous，asistheexcessofeveryotherpassion。
　　Andasitthrowsapeculiarcharmovereveryactionwhichproceedsfromit，sothewantofitaddsapeculiardeformitytoactionsindicativeofdisregardtothehappinessofothers。Oursensetooofthemeritofanyactionisjustsofarincreasedordiminishedaccordingaswefindthatbenevolencewasorwasnotthemotiveoftheaction。If，forinstance，anactsupposedtoproceedfromgratitudeisfoundtoproceedfromthehopeofsomefreshfavour，allitsmeritisgone；andsoifanactionattributedtoaselfishmotiveisfoundtohavebeenduetoabenevolentone，oursenseofitsmeritisallthemoreenhanced。Andlastly，inalldisputesconcerningtherectitudeofconduct，thepublicgood，orthetendencyofactionstopromotethegeneralwelfare，hasalwaysbeenthestandardofreference，thatbeingaccountedmorallygoodwhichtendstopromotehappiness，andthatbadorwrongwhichtendstothecontraryresult。
　　ThesereasonsledHutchesontotheconclusion，thatanactwasmeritoriousinproportiontothebenevolenceevidencedbyit；hencethatthevirtueofanactionwasproportionedtotheextentofhappinessittendedtopromote，sothattheleastvirtuousaffectionwasthatwhichaimednofurtherthanatthehappinessofanindividual，asason，abrother，orafriend，whilstthemostvirtuouswasonewhichembracedasitsobjectthehappinessofallintelligentbeings。Theperfectionofvirtueconsistedthereforeindirectingallouractionstopromotethegreatestpossiblegood，andinsubjectingallinferioraffectionstothedesireofthegeneralhappinessofmankind。
　　ThefirstdefectwhichAdamSmithfindsinthistheoryofhisformerteacheris，thatitfailstoexplainsufficientlyourapprobationoftheinferiorvirtuesofprudence，temperance，constancy，andfirmness。Justasothertheorieserredinregardingsolelytheproprietyorimproprietyofconduct，andindisregardingitsgoodorbadtendency，sothissystemerredbydisregardingaltogetherthesuitablenessofaffectionstotheirexcitingcause，andattendingonlytheirbeneficientorhurtfuleffects。
　　Inthesecondplace，aselfishmotiveisnotalwaysabadone。Self-lovemayoftenbeavirtuousmotivetoaction。Everymanisbynaturefirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare；andbecauseheisfittertotakecareofhimselfthanofanyotherperson，itisright。thatheshoulddoso。Regardtoourownprivatehappinessandinterestmayconstituteverylaudablemotivesofaction。Thehabitsofeconomy，industry，discretion，attention，andapplicationofthought，thoughcultivatedfromself-interestedmotives，areneverthelesspraiseworthyqualities，anddeservetheesteemandapprobationofeverybody。Ontheotherhand，carelessnessandwantofeconomyareuniversallydisapprovedof，notasproceedingfromawantofbenevolence，butfromawantofaproperattentiontotheobjectsofself-interest。
　　Andastothestandardofrightandwrongbeingfrequentlythetendencyofconducttothewelfareordisorderofsociety，itdoesnotfollowthataregardtosocietyshouldbethesolevirtuousmotiveofaction，butonlythatinanycompetitionitoughttocastthebalanceagainstallothermotives。
　　Itwas，again，ageneraldefectofeachofthethreetheorieswhichdefinedvirtueaspropriety，prudence，orbenevolence，thattheytendedtogiveabiastothemindtosomeprinciplesofactionbeyondtheproportionthatisduetothem。Thustheancientsystems，whichplacedvirtueinpropriety，insistedlittleonthesoftandgentlevirtues，ratherregardingthemasweaknessestobeexpungedfromthebreast，whiletheylaidchiefstressonthegravervirtuesofself-command，fortitude，andcourage。Andthebenevolentsystem，whileencouragingthemildervirtuesinthehighestdegree，wentsofarastodenythenameofvirtuetothemorerespectablequalitiesofthemind，callingthemmerely"moralabilities，"unworthyoftheapprobationbestowedonrealvirtue。Neverthelessthegeneraltendencyofeachofthesesystemswastoencouragethebestandmostlaudablehabitsofthemind，anditwerewellforsocietyifmankindregulatedtheirconductbythepreceptsofanyoneofthem。
　　Thisgeneralgoodtendencyofthesethreetheoriesleadsourauthortoclassifybyitself，andtotreatinadistinctchapter，asystemwhich，hesays，destroysaltogetherthedistinctionbetweenvirtueandvice，andofwhichthetendencyconsequentlyiswhollypernicious，andthatisthesystem，whichhedesignatesastheLicentiousSystem，expoundedbyMandevilleintheFableoftheBees。
　　AdamSmithconsidersthatthissystem，"whichoncemadesomuchnoiseintheworldcouldneverhaveimposeduponsogreatanumberofpersons，norhaveoccasionedsogeneralalarmamongthosewhoarethefriendsofbetterprinciples，haditnotinsomerespectsbordereduponthetruth。"
　　Mandevillesfamousdefinitionofthemoralvirtuesas"thepoliticaloffspringwhichflatterybegotuponpride，"wasbasedontheassumptionthatmoralitywasnotnaturaltoman，butwastheinventionofwisemen，who，bygivingthetitleofnobletopersonscapableofself-denialandofpreferringthepublicinteresttotheirown，wonmankindgenerally，throughthissubtleflattery，towhattheychosetodenominatevirtue。
　　Hencewhatevermendidfromasenseofpropriety，orfromaregardtowhatwaspraiseworthy，theyreallydidfromaloveofpraise，fromprideorvanity。Thisloveofpraisewasoneofthestrongestofmansselfishaffections，andthefoundationoftheloveofhonour。Inconductapparentlythemostdisinterested，thisselfishmotivewaspresent。Ifamansacrificedhisowninteresttothatofhisfellows，heknewthathisconductwouldbeagreeabletotheirself-love，andthattheywouldnotfailtoexpresstheirsatisfactionbybestowingonhimselfthemostextravagantpraises。Thepleasurehewouldderivefromthissourcecounterbalancedtheinterestheabandonedtoprocureit。Henceallpublicspirit，orpreferenceofpublictoprivateinterestwasamerecheatandimpositiononmankind。
　　Thefallacyofthissystemlies，accordingtoAdamSmith，inasophisticaluseofthewordvanityinitsapplicationtoaremoteaffinitythatprevailsbetweentworeallyverydifferentthings。Todesirepraiseforqualitieswhicharenotpraise-worthyinanydegree，orforqualitiespraiseworthyinthemselvesbutunpossessedbytheindividualconcerned，isvanityproper；
　　butthisfrivolousdesireforpraiseatanypriceisverydifferentfromthedesireofrenderingour-selvestheproperobjectsofhonourandesteem，orofacquiringhonourandesteembyreallydeservingthem。Theaffinitybetweentheseverydifferentdesires，ofwhichMandevillemadesomuchuse，layinthefactthatvanityaswellastheloveoftruegloryaimsatacquiringesteemandapprobation；butthedifferenceconsistsinthis，thatthedesireoftheoneisunjustandridiculous，whilethatoftheotherisjustandreasonable。
　　Thereisalsoanaffinitybetweentheloveofvirtueandtheloveoftrueglory，whichgivesacertainspeciousnesstoMandeville'stheory。
　　Forthereisacloseconnexionbetweenthedesireofbecomingwhatishonourableandestimable，whichistheloveofvirtue，andthedesireofactualhonourandesteem，whichistheloveoftrueglory。Theybothhaveandhereinliestheirsuperficialresemblancetovanitysomereferencetothesentimentsofothers。Evenintheloveofvirtuethereisstillsomereference，ifnottowhatis，yettowhatinreasonandproprietyoughttobe，theopinionofothers。Themanofthegreatestmagnanimity，whodesiresvirtueforitsownsake，andismostindifferentabouttheactualopinionsofmankind，isstilldelightedwiththethoughtsofwhatthoseopinionsoughttobe，andwiththeconsciousnessthatthoughhemayneitherbehonourednorapplauded，heisyettheproperobjectofhonourandapplause。
　　AnotherfeatureofMandeville'ssystemwastodenytheexistenceofanyself-denialordisinterestednessinhumanvirtueofanykind。Thuswherevertemperancefellshortofthemostasceticabstinence，hetreateditasgrossluxury；andallourpretensionstoself-denialwerebased，notontheconquest，butontheconcealedindulgence，ofourpassions。
　　Herethefallacylayinrepresentingeverypassionaswhollyvicious，whichissoinanydegreeandinanydirection。Therearesomeofourpassionswhichhavenoothernamesthanthosewhichmarkthedisagreeableandoffensivedegree，theybeingmoreapttoattractnoticeinthisdegreethaninanyother。Itisnotthereforetodemolishtherealityofsuchavirtueastemperance，toshowthatthesameindulgenceofpleasurewhichwhenunrestrainedisregardedasblameable，isalsopresentwhenthepassionisrestrained。
　　Thevirtueinsuchcasesconsists，notinanentireinsensibilitytotheobjectsofpassion，butintherestraintofournaturaldesireofthem。
　　Thesamefallacyunderliesthefamousparadoxthat"privatevicesarepublicbenefits，"andthatitisnotthegood，buttheevilqualitiesofmen，whichleadtogreatness。Byusingthewordluxury，asitwasusedinthefashionableasceticismofhistime，asineveryrespectevil，itwaseasyforMandevilletoshowthatfromthisevilalltradeandwealthandprosperityflowed，andthatwithoutitnosocietycouldflourish。"If；"
　　AdamSmithreplies，"theloveofmagnificence，atastefortheelegantartsandimprovementsofhumanlife；forwhateverisagreeableindress，furniture，orequipage；forarchitecture，statuary，painting，andmusic，istoberegardedasluxury，sensuality，andostentation，eveninthosewhosesituationallows，withoutanyinconvenieney，theindulgenceofthosepassions，itiscertainthatluxury，sensuality，andostentationarepublicbenefits。"Ifeverythingistobereprobatedasluxurywhichexceedswhatisabsolutelynecessaryforthesupportofhumannature，"thereisviceevenintheuseofacleanshirt，orofaconvenienthabitation。'Hencethewholepointoftheparadoxrestsonalooseantunscientificuseofthewordluxury。
　　II。Toturnnowtotheothergreatquestionofethics，tothenatureofmoralapprobation，anditssourceinthemind。
　　Asthedifferenttheoriesofthenatureofvirtuemayallbereducedtothree，soallthedifferenttheoriesconcerningtheoriginofmoralapprobationmaybereducedtoasimilarnumber。Self-love，reason，andsentiment，arethethreedifferentsourceswhichhavebeenassignedfortheprincipleofmoralapprobation。Accordingtosome，weapproveordisapproveofourownactionsandofthoseofothersfromself-loveonly，orfromsomeviewoftheirtendencytoourownhappinessordisadvantage；accordingtoothers，wedistinguishwhatisfitorunfit，bothinactionsandaffections，byreason，orthesamefacultybywhichwedistinguishtruthfromfalsehood；
　　andaccordingtoyetathirdschool，thedistinctionisaltogethertheeffectofimmediatesentimentandfeeling，arisingfromthepleasureordisgustwithwhichcertainactionsoraffectionsinspireus。
　　AccordingtoAdamSmith，therewasagainsometruthineachofthesetheories，buttheyeachfellshortofthatcompletenessofexplanationwhichwasthemeritofhisownpeculiarsystem。
　　Theself-lovetheory，bestexpoundedbyHobbesandMandeville，reducedtheprincipleofapprobationtoaremoteperceptionofthetendencyofconductuponpersonalwell-being；andthemeritofvirtueordemeritofviceconsistedintheirrespectivelyservingtosupportordisturbsociety，thepreservationofwhichwassonecessarytothesecurityofindividualexistence。
　　Tothisourauthorobjects，thatthisperceptionofthegoodeffectsofvirtueenhancesindeedourappreciationofit，butthatitdoesnotcauseit。Whentheinnumerableadvantagesofacultivatedandsociallifeoverasavageandsolitaryonearedescribed，andthenecessityofvirtuepointedoutforthemaintenanceoftheone，andthetendencyofvicetoreproducetheother，thereaderischarmedwiththenoveltyoftheobservation；
　　"heseesplainlyanewbeautyinvirtueandanewdeformityinvice，whichhehadnevertakennoticeofbefore；andiscommonlysodelightedwiththediscovery，thatheseldomtakestimetoreflectthatthispoliticalview，havingneveroccurredtohiminhislifebefore，cannotpossiblybethegroundofthatapprobationanddisapprobationwithwhichhehasalwaysbeenaccustomedtoconsiderthosedifferentqualities。"
　　Intheapplicationoftheself-lovetheorytoourpraiseorblameofactionsorconductinpasttimeasofthevirtueofCatoorofthevillanyofCatilinetherewasonlyanimaginary，notanactual，referencetoself；
　　andinpraisingorblaminginsuchcaseswethoughtofwhatmighthavehappenedtous，hadwelivedinthosetimes，orofwhatmightstillhappentousifinourowntimeswemetwithsuchcharacters。Theideawhichtheauthorsofthistheory"weregropingabout，butwhichtheywereneverabletounfolddistinctly，wasthatindirectsympathywhichwefeelwiththegratitudeorresentmentofthosewhoreceivedthebenefitorsufferedthedamageresultingfromsuchoppositecharacters。"
　　Istheprincipleofsympathythenaselfishprinciple？Issympathywiththesorroworindignationofanotheranemotionfoundedonself-love，becauseitarisesfrombringingthecaseofanotherhometooneself；andthenconceivingofone'sownfeelingsinthesamesituation？
　　Theanswertothisquestionisimportant，andisbestgiverinAdamSmith'sownwords，ashehimselfadmitsthatthewholeaccountofhumannaturewhichdeducesallsentimentsandaffectionsfromself-love，seemstohavearisen"fromsomeconfusedmisapprehensionofthesystemofsympathy。"
　　Hisanswer，whichisasfollows，willperhapsnotbethoughtcompletelysatisfactory:"Thoughsympathyisveryproperlysaidtoarisefromanimaginarychangeofsituationswiththepersonprincipallyconcerned，yetthisimaginarychangeisnotsupposedtohappentomeinmyownpersonandcharacter，butinthatofthepersonwithwhomIsympathize。WhenI
　　condolewithyouforthelossofyouronlyson，inordertoenterintoyourgriefIdonotconsiderwhatI，apersonofsuchacharacterandprofession，shouldsufferifIhadason，andifthatsonwasunfortunatelytodie；
　　butIconsiderwhatIshouldsufferifIwasreallyyou；andInotonlychangecircumstanceswithyou，butIchangepersonsandcharacters。Mygrief；therefore，isentirelyuponyouraccount，andnotintheleastuponmyown。Itisnot，therefore，intheleastselfish。Howcanthatberegardedasaselfishpassion，whichdoesnotariseevenfromtheimaginationofanythingthathasbefallen，orthatrelatestomyself；inmyownproperpersonorcharacter，butisentirelyoccupiedaboutwhatrelatestoyou？"
　　Yetifareferencetoselfbethefundamentalfactofsympathy，itwouldseemthatthisisequivalenttomakingareferencetoselfthefoundationofallmoralsentiment；asinHobbes'explanationofpity，thatitisgriefforthecalamityofanother，arisingfromtheimaginationofthelikecalamitybefallingoneself。AnditisremarkablethatthesamepassageofPolybiuswhichhasbeenthoughttobeananticipationofthetheoryofsympathy，shouldhavealsobeenquotedbyflume，asshowingthatPolybiusreferredalloursentimentsofvirtuetoaselfishorigin。
　　Nexttothetheorywhichfoundedmoralapprobationinself-love，comesthatwhichfoundeditinreason。ThistheoryoriginatedintheoppositiontothedoctrineofHobbes，whomadethelawsofthecivilmagistratethesoleultimatestandardsofjustandunjust，ofrightandwrongimplyingtheconsequence，thattherewasnonaturaldistinctionbetweenrightandwrong，butthattheywerethearbitrarycreationsoflaw。Cudworthtaught，that，antecedenttoalllaworpositiveinstitution，therewasafacultyofthemindwhichdistinguishedmoralqualitiesinactionsandaffections，andthatthisfacultywasreason；thesamefacultythatdistinguishedtruthfromfalsehood，thusalsodistinguishingrightfromwrong。Itbecamethereforethepopulardoctrine，whenthecontroversywithHobbeswasatitsheight，thattheessenceofvirtueandvicedidnotconsistintheconformityornonconformityofactionswiththelawofasuperior，butintheirconformityornonconformitywithreason；andreasonthuscametobeconsideredastheoriginalsourceofallmoralapprobation。
　　InthistheoryalsoAdamSmithrecognizessomeelementsoftruth。"Thatvirtueconsistsinconformitytoreasonistrueinsomerespects；andthisfacultymayveryjustlybeconsideredas，insomesense，thesourceandprincipleofmoralapprobationanddisapprobation，andofallsolidjudgmentsconcerningrightandwrong。"Inductiontooisoneoftheoperationsofreason，anditisbyinductionandexperiencethatthegeneralrulesofmoralityareformed。Theyareestablishedinductively，fromtheobservationinanumberofparticularcasesofwhatispleasingordispleasingtoourmoralfaculties。Soitisbyreasonthatwediscoverthosegeneralrulesofjusticebywhichweoughttoregulateouractions；andbythesamefacultyweformthosemoreindeterminateideasofwhatisprudent，decent，generous，ornoble，accordingtowhichweendeavourtomodelourconduct。Andasitisbythesegeneralrules，soformedbyaninductionofreason，thatwemostregulateourmoraljudgments，whichwouldbeveryvariableiftheydependedmerelyuponfeelingandsentiment，virtuemaysofarbesaidtoconsistinconformitytoreason，andsofarmayreasonbeconsideredasthesourceofmoralapprobation。
　　Thisadmission，however，isaverydifferentthingfromthesuppositionthatourfirstperceptionsofrightandwrongcanbederivedfromreason。
　　Thesefirstperceptions，uponwhichfromanumberofparticularcasesthegeneralrulesofmoralityarefounded，mustbetheobjectofanimmediatesouseandfeeling，notofreason。"Itisbyfindinginavastvarietyofinstancesthatonetenorofconductconstantlypleasesinacertainmanner，andthatanotherasconstantlydispleasesthemind，thatweformthegeneralrulesofmorality。Butreasoncannotrenderanyparticularobjecteitheragreeableordisagreeabletothemindforitsownsake。Reasonmayshowthatthisobjectisthemeansofobtainingsomeotherwhichisnaturallyeitherpleasingordispleasing，andinthismannermayrenderiteitheragreeableordisagreeableforthesakeofsomethingelse；butnothingcanbeagreeableordisagreeableforitsownsake，whichisnotrenderedsuchbyimmediatesenseandfeeling。Ifvirtue，therefore，ineveryparticularinstance，necessarilypleasesforitsownsake，andifviceascertainlydispleasesthemind，itcannotbereason，butimmediatesenseandfeelingwhichinthismannerreconcilesustotheoneandalienatesusfromtheother。"
　　Thereremainedthereforethetheorieswhichmadesentimentorfeelingtheoriginalsourceofmoralapprobation；andthebestexpositionofthistheorywasthatgivenbyHutchesoninhisdoctrineoftheMoralSense。
　　Iftheprincipleofapprobationwasfoundedneitheronself-lovenoronreason，theremustbesomefacultyofapeculiarkind，withwhichthehumanmindwasendowedtoproducetheeffectinquestion。Suchafacultywasthemoralsenseaparticularpowerofperceptionexertedbythemindattheviewofcertainactionsandaffections，bywhichthosethataffectedthemindagreeablywereimmediatelystampedwiththecharactersofright，laudable，andvirtuous，whilethosethataffecteditotherwisewereimmediatelystampedwiththecharactersofwrong，blameable，andvicious。
　　Thismoralsensewassomewhatanalagoustoourexternalsenses；forasexternalbodies，byaffectingoursensesinacertainway，seemedtopossessthedifferentqualitiesofsound，taste，smell，orcolour，sothevariousaffectionsofthemind，bytouchingthemoralsenseinacertainway，appearedtopossessthedifferentqualitiesofrightorwrong，ofvirtueorofvice。Themoralsensetoowasareflexinternalsense，asdistinctfromadirectinternalsense；thatistosay，astheperceptionofbeautywasareflexsensepresupposingthedirectsensewhichperceivedobjectsandcolours，sotheperceptionofthebeautyordeformityofpassionsandaffectionswasareflexsensepresupposingtheperceptionbyadirectinternalsenseoftheseveralpassionsandaffectionsthemselves。Otherreflexsensesofthesamekindwere，apublicsense，bywhichwesympathizewiththehappinessormiseryofourfellows；asenseofshameandhonour；
　　andasenseofridicule。
　　Oneconsequenceofthisanalogybetweenthemoralsenseandtheexternalsenses，andaconsequencedrawnbyHutchesonhimself，wasthatourmoralfacultiesthemselvescouldnotbecalledvirtuousorvicious，morallygoodormorallyevil；forthequalitiesofanyobjectofsensecannotbeappliedtothesenseitself。Anobjectmayhavethequalityofblackorwhite，butthesenseofseeingisnotblacknorwhite；andinthesameway，thoughanactionorsentimentmayappeargoodorbad，thequalitiesofgoodnessorbadnesscannotattachtothemoralfacultywhichperceivessuchqualitiesinnature。
　　AdamSmithobjectstothis，thatwedorecognizesome-thingmorallygoodincorrectmoralsentiments，andthatwedoconsideramanworthyofmoralapprobationwhosepraiseandblamearealwaysaccuratelysuitedtothevalueorworthlessnessofconduct。Ifwesawaman"shoutingwithadmirationandapplauseatabarbarousandunmeritedexecution，whichsomeinsolenttyranthadordered，"weshouldbesurelyjustifiedincallingsuchbehaviourvicious，andmorallyevilinthehighestdegree，thoughitexpressednothingbutadepravedstateofthemoralfaculties。Thereisnoperversionofsentimentoraffectionweshouldbemoreaversetoenterinto，orrejectwithgreaterdisapprobation，thanoneofthiskind；
　　andsofarfromregardingsuchastateofmindasmerelystrange，andnotatallviciousorevil，weshouldratherregardit"astheverylastandmostdreadfulstageofmoraldepravity。"
　　Norarethedifficultieslessifwefoundtheprincipleofmoralapprobation，notuponanysenseanalogoustotheexternalsenses，butuponsomepeculiarsentiment，intendedforsuchapurpose；ifwesay，forinstance，thatasresentmentmaybecalledasenseofinjuries，orgratitudeasenseofbenefits，soapprobationanddisapprobation，asfeelingsoremotionswhichariseinthemindontheviewofdifferentactionsandcharacters，maybecalledasenseofrightandwrong，oramoralsense。
　　Forifapprobationanddisapprobationwere，likegratitudeorresentment，anemotionofaparticularkind，distinctfromeveryother，whatevervariationseitherofthemmightundergoweshouldexpectthemtoretainclearlymarkedanddistinguishablegeneralfeatures；justasinallthevariationsoftheemotionofanger，itiseasytodistinguishthesamegeneralfeatures。
　　Withregardtoapprobationitisotherwise，fortherearenocommonfeaturesrunningthroughallmanifestationsofmoralapproval，orthecontrary。