"Theapprobationwithwhichweviewatender，delicate，andhumanesentiment，isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat，daring，andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay，upondifferentoccasions，beperfectandentire；butwearesoftenedbytheoneandweareelevatedbytheother，andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。And，inthesameway，ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnoresemblancetoourcontemptformeannessofspirit。
　　ByhisowntheoryAdamSmiththinksthatthisdifferenceinthecharacterofapprobationismoreeasilyexplained。Itisbecausetheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveofaredifferentwhentheyarehumaneanddelicatefromwhattheyarewhentheyaregreatanddaring，andbecauseourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththesedifferentemotions，thatourfeelingofapprobationwithregardtotheonesentimentissodifferentfromwhatitiswithregardtotheother。
　　Moreover，notonlyarethedifferentpassionsandaffectionsofthehumanmindapprovedordisapprovedasmorallygoodorevil，buttheapprobationordisapprobationitselfismarkedwiththesamemoralattributes。Themoralsensetheorycannotaccountforthisfact；andtheonlyexplanationpossibleis，that，inthisinstanceatleast，thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentimentsbetweenthepersonjudgingandthepersonjudgedconstitutesmoralapprobationorthecontrary。Whentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofanotherpersoncoincideswithourown，weapproveofhisapprobationasinsomemeasuremorallygood；andso，onthecontrary，whenhissentimentsdifferfromourown，wedisapproveofthemasmorallywrong。
　　Ifapeculiarsentiment，distinctfromeveryother，werereallythesourceoftheprincipleofapprobation，itisstrangethatsuchasentiment"shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeofasnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Theword`moralsense'isofverylateformation，andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue……Theword`conscience'doesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes，indeed，theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty，andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablytoitsdirections。Whenlove，hatred，joy，sorrow，gratitude，resentment，withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple，havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogetthemtitlestoknowthemby，isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheededthatafewphilosophersexceptednobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit？"
　　Inoppositionthentothetheorywhichderivesmoralapprobationfromapeculiarsentiment，AdamSmithreducesithimselftofoursources，insomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。"First，wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent；secondly，weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions；thirdly，weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact；andlastofall，whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety，theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutilitynotunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。"
　　CHAPTERXIV。REVIEWOFTHEPRINCIPALCRITICISMSOFADAMSMITH'S
　　THEORY。
　　Theresultoftheprecedingchapter，inwhichtherelationofAdamSmith'stheorytootherethicaltheorieshasbeendefined，isthatitisatheoryinwhichallthatistrueinthe"selfish"systemofHobbesorMandeville，inthe"benevolent"systemofHutcheson，orinthe"utilitarian"systemofHume，isadoptedandmadeuseof，toformasystemquitedistinctfromanyoneofthem。Itseekstobridgeovertheirdifferences，byavoidingtheone-sidednessoftheirseveralprinciples，andtakingawiderviewofthefactsofhumannature。Itistherefore，properlyspeaking，anEclectictheory，ifbyeclecticismbeunderstood，notamerecommixtureofdifferentsystems，butadiscriminateselectionoftheelementsoftruthtobefoundinthemseverally。
　　TheethicalwriterswhomostinfluencedAdamSmithwereundoubtedlyHumeandHutcheson，inthewayofagreementanddifferencethathasbeenalreadyindicated。DugaldStewarthasalsodrawnattentiontohisobligationstoButler。8ItwouldbeinterestingtoknowwhetherheeverreadHartley'sObservationsonMan，aworkwhich，publishedin1749thatis，sometenyearsbeforehisownwouldhavemateriallyassistedhisargument。ForAdamSmith'saccountofthegrowthofconscienceofasenseofduty，isinrealitycloselyconnectedwiththetheorywhichexplainsitsoriginbytheworkingofthelawsofassociation。
　　Fromourexperienceoftheconstantassociationbetweentheactsofothersandpleasurableorpainfulfeelingsofourown，accordingaswesympathizeornotwiththem，comesthedesireofourselvescausinginotherssimilarpleasurable，andavoidingsimilarpainful，emotionsorinotherwords，thatdesireofpraiseandaversiontoblamewhich，refinedandpurifiedbyreferencetoanimaginaryandidealspectatorofourconduct，growstobeaconscientiousanddisinterestedloveofvirtueanddetestationofvice。Therulesofmoralconduct，formedastheyarebygeneralizationfromparticularjudgmentsofthesympatheticinstinct，orfromanumberofparticularassociationsofpleasurableandpainfulfeelingswithparticularacts，arethemselvesdirectlyassociatedwiththatloveofpraiseorpraise-worthinesswhichoriginatesinourlongingforthesamesympathyfromothermenwithregardtoourselvesthatweknowtobepleasurableintheconverserelation。Theword"association"isneveronceusedbyAdamSmith，butitisimpliedateverystepofhistheory，andformsreallyasfundamentalafeatureinhisreasoningasitdoesinthatofthephilosopherwhowasthefirsttoinvestigateitslawsintheirapplicationtothefactsofmorality。
　　Thisis，perhaps，internalevidenceenoughthatAdamSmithneversawHartley'swork。9
　　Butthewriterwho，perhaps，asmuchasanyothercontributedtotheformationofAdamSmith'sideas，seemstohavebeenPope，whoinhisEveryonMananticipatedmanyoftheleadingthoughtsintheTheoryofMoralSentiments。Thepointsofresemblancebetweenthepoetandthephilosopherarefrequentandobvious。Thereisinboththesameconstantappealtonature，andtothewisdomdisplayedinherlaws；thesamereferencetoself-loveasthebasisofthesocialvirtuesandbenevolence；thesameidentificationofvirtuewithhappiness；andthesamedepreciationofgreatnessandambitionasconducivetohumanfelicity。
　　AdamSmith'ssimpletheoryofhappiness，forinstance，readslikeacommentaryonthetextsuppliedbyPopeinthelines，"Reason'swholepleasure，allthejoysofsense，LieinthreewordsHealth，Peace，andCompetence。"
　　Saidinprose，thesameteachingisconveyedbythephilosopher:"Whatcanbeaddedtothehappinessofthemanwhoisinhealth，whoisoutofdebt，andhasaclearconscience？"
　　Or，totakeanotherinstance。AdamSmith'saccountoftheorderinwhichindividualsarerecommendedbynaturetoourcareispreciselythesameasthatgivenbyPope。Saystheformer:"Everymanisfirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare，"and，afterhimself，hisfriends，hiscountry，ormankindbecomebydegreestheobjectofhissympathiesSosaidPopebeforehim"Godlovesfromwholetoparts:buthumansoulMustrisefromindividualtothewhole。
　　Self-lovebutservesthevirtuousmindtowake，Asthesmallpebblestirsthepeacefullake；
　　Thecentremoved，acirclestraightsucceedsAnotherstill，andstillanotherspreads；
　　Friend，parent，neighbour，firstitwillembrace；
　　Hiscountrynext；andnextallhumanrace。"
　　Toturnnowfromthetheoryitselftothecriticismsuponit:itmayperhapsbesaid，thatiftheimportanceofanethicaltheoryinthehistoryofmoralphilosophymaybemeasuredbytheamountofcriticismexpendeduponit，AdamSmith'sTheoryofMoralSentimentsmusttakeitsplaceimmediatelyafterHume'sEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals。
　　TheshorterobservationsonitbyLordKamesandSirJamesMackintoshbearwitnesstothegreatinterestthatattachedtoit，nolessthanthelongercriticismsofDr。Brown，DugaldStewart，orJouffroy，theFrenchmoralphilosopher。Thevariousobjectionsraisedbythesewriters，allofwhomhaveapproacheditwiththatimpartialacutenesssocharacteristicofphilosophersinregardtotheoriesnottheirown，willbestservetoillustratewhathavebeenconsideredtheweakpointsinthegeneraltheoryproposedbyAdamSmith。Butinfollowingthemaincurrentofsuchcriticism，itisonlyfairthatweshouldtryinsomemeasuretoholdthescalesbetweenthecriticsandtheirauthor，andtoweighthevalueoftheargumentsthathavebeenactuallyadvancedontheonesideandthatseemcapableofbeingadvancedontheother。
　　Firstofall，itissaidthattheresolutionofallmoralapprobationintosympathyreallymakesmoralitydependentonthementalconstitutionofeachindividual，andsosetsupavariablestandard，atthemercyofpersonalinfluencesandlocalcustom。AdamSmithsaysexpresslyindeed，thatthereisnoothermeasureofmoralconductthanthesympatheticapprobationofeachindividual。"Everyfacultyinonemanisthemeasurebywhichhejudgesofthelikefacultyiuanother；"andashejudgesofothermen'spowerofsightorhearingbyreferencetohisown，sohejudgesoftheirlove，resentment，orothermoralstates，byreferencetohisownconsciousnessofthoseseveralaffections。
　　Isnotthistodestroythefixedcharacterofmorality，andtodepriveitasProtagoras，theGreeksophist，depriveditlongagoinhissimilarteachingthatmanwasthemeasureofallthingsofitsmostennoblingqualities，itseternityandimmutability？Isitnottoreducetherulesofmoralitytothelevelmerelyoftherulesofetiquette？Isitnottomakeourstandardofconductdependentmerelyontheideasandpassionsofthosewehappentolivewith？DoesitnotjustifyBrown'schiefobjectiontothesystemofsympathy，thatitfixesmorality"onabasisnotsufficientlyfirm"？
　　AdamSmith'sanswertothismighthavebeen，thattheconsiderationofthebasisofmoralitylaybeyondthescopeofhisinquiry，andthat，ifheexplainedtheprincipleofmoralapprobationbythelawsofsympathyheappealedto，thefactscommandedacceptance，whatevertheconsequencesmightbe。Hewouldhavereassertedconfidently，thatnocaseofapprobationoccurredwithoutatacitreferencetothesympathyoftheapprover；andthatthefeelingofapprobationorthecontraryalwaysvariedexactlywiththedegreeofsympathyorantipathyfeltfortheagent。Therefore，ifasamatteroffacteverycaseofsuchapprobationimpliedareferencetothefeelingsoftheindividualpersonapproving，thenthosefeelingswerethesourceofmoraljudgment，howevervariableorrelativemoralitymightthusbemadetoappear。
　　Hewouldalsohavedeniedthattheconsequenceofhistheorydidreallyinanywayweakenthebasisofmorality，ordepriveitofitsobligatorypoweroverourconduct。Theassertionofsuchaconsequencehasbeenperhapsthemostpersistentobjectionraisedagainsthissystem。SirJamesMackintosh，forinstance，makesthecriticism，that"thesympathieshavenothingmoreofanimperativecharacterthananyotheremotions。Theyattractorrepel，likeotherfeelings，accordingtotheirintensity。If，then，thesympathiescontinueinmaturemindstoconstitutethewholeofconscience，itbecomesutterlyimpossibletoexplainthecharacterofcommandandsupremacy，whichisattestedbytheunanimousvoiceofmankindto
　　belongtothatfaculty，andtoformitsessentialdistinction。"10Butas，ofallAdamSmith'scritics，Jouffroyhasbeentheonewhohasurgedthisargumentwiththegreatestforce，itwillbebesttofollowhisreasoning，beforeconsideringtheforceoftheobjection。
　　Accordingtohim，nomoremoralauthoritycanattachtotheinstinctofsympathythancanattachtoanyotherinstinctofournature。Thedesireofsympathy，beingsimplyaninstinct，canhavenoclaimtoprevailovertheimpulsesofourotherinstincts，whenevertheyhappentocomeintoconflict，thansuchasisfoundedonitspossiblegreaterstrength。Forinstance，theinstinctofself-loveoftencomesintoconflictwith，andoftenprevailsover，theinstinctofsympathy，themotiveofself-interestwell-understoodbeingthussuperiortooursympatheticimpulsesbothinfactandbyright。Ifthenthereisasuperiorityintheinstinctofsympathyaboveallourotherinstincts，itmustcomefromajudgmentofreason，decisiveofitstitle；butsincesuchdecisionofreasonimpliesareferencetosomeruleotherandhigherthaninstinct，ourmotiveinpreferringtheinspirationsofinstinctivesympathytoallotherimpulsesmustbederivedfromthishighermotive，or，inotherwords，fromreasonandnotfrominstinct。
　　Hence，sincethesympatheticinstinctbearsnosignsofanauthoritysuperiortothatofotherinstincts，thereisnorealauthorityinthemotivewhich，accordingtoAdamSmith，impelsustorightconduct。Insteadofprovingthattheinstinctofsympathyisthetruemoralmotive，AdamSmithdescribestrulyandbeautifullythecharacteristicsofthismoralmotive，andthengratuitouslyattributesthemtotheinstinctofsympathy。Buthefailstoapplytorulesofconductfoundeduponsuchaninstinct，thatwhichisthespecialcharacteristicofthemoralmotive，namely，thatitaloneisobligatoryalonepresentsus，asanendtobepursued，anendwhichoughttobepursued，asdistinctfromotherendssuggestedbyothermotives，whichmaybepursuedornotasweplease。"Amongallpossiblemotives，themoralmotivealoneappearstousasonethatoughttogovernourconduct。"
　　JouffroyappliesthesamereasoningtoAdamSmith'sexplanationofourmoralideas，those，forexample，ofRightandDuty。Forifthemotiveofsympathybearswithitnoauthority，itisevidentthatitcannotexplainideasbothofwhichimplyandinvolveamotiveofobligation。
　　Ifdutyisobediencetorulesofconductthathavebeenproducedbysympathy，andtheserulesareonlygeneralizationsofparticularjudgmentsofinstinctivesympathy，itisplainthattheauthorityoftheserulescanbenogreaterthanthatofthejudgmentswhichoriginallygaverisetothem。Ifitisequallyadutytoobeytheinstinctastoobeytherulesitgivesriseto，itissuperfluoustoexplaindutyasasenseoftheauthorityoftheserules，seeingthatitisalreadyinvolvedintheprocessoftheirformation。
　　Andifagainitcanneverbeadutytoobeytheinstinct，becauseneitheritsdirectionnorthedesireofsympathywhichimpelsustofollowitcaneverbeobligatory，itcannonethemorebeadutytoobeytheruleswhicharefoundedupontheinstinct。Theauthorityofthemoralrulesorprinciplesofconductstandsorfallswiththeauthorityoftheinstinct；forifthelattercanenforceobligationtoacertaindegree，itcanenforceitinalldegrees；andifitcannotenforceittothisdegree，thenitcannotinany。ItisthereforeJouffroy'sconclusion，that"thereisnot，inthesystemofSmith，anysuchthingasamorallaw；anditisincompetenttoexplainourideasofduty，ofright，andofallothersuchideasasimplythefactofobligation。"11
　　Thequestionthenis，Howfarissuchcriticismwell-founded？Howfarisitrelevanttothesubject-matterofAdamSmith'streatise？
　　AdamSmithmighthaverepliedtoJouffroy'sobjectionsbyaskingwhether，puttingasidethequestionofthesoundnessofhistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation，anytheorythataccountedfortheapprobationdidnotipsofactoaccountfortheobligation。Hemighthavesaidthat，ifheshowedwhyonecourseofconductwasregardedasgoodandanotherasbad，heimplicitlyshowedwhyonecoursewasfelttoberightandtheothertobewrongwhyitwasfelt，thatonecourseoughttobefollowedandtheothercourseoughttobeavoided。Forthefeelingofauthorityandobligationisinvolvedinthefactofapprobation。AsithasbeenwellputbyBrown，"Theveryconceptionsoftherectitude，theobligation，theapprovablenessofcertainactionsareinvolvedinthefeelingoftheapprobationitself。
　　Itisimpossibleforustohavethefeeling，andnottohavethese……
　　Toknowthatweshouldfeelourselvesunworthyofself-esteem，andobjectsratherofself-abhorrence，ifwedidnotactinacertainmanner，istofeelthemoralobligationtoactinacertainmanner，asitistofeelthemoralrectitudeoftheactionitself。Wearesoconstitutedthatitisimpossibleforus，incertaincircumstances，nottohavethisfeeling；
　　andhavingthefeeling，wemusthavethenotionsofvirtue，obligation，merit。"12
　　Moreover，AdamSmithexpresslypointedoutthatthedifferencebetweenmoralapprobationandapprobationofallotherkindslayintheimpossibilityofourbeingasindifferentaboutconductasaboutotherthings，becauseconduct，eitherdirectlyorbyourimagination，affectedourselves；sothattheadditionalstrengththusconferredonthefeelingofmoralapprobationwasquitesufficienttoaccountforthatfeelingoftheimperativeandobligatoryforcewhichinculcatesobediencetomoralrules。Ifthereisnoauthorityinaninstinctperse，itmayneverthelessbesoconstitutedandmaysooperatethatthestrictestsenseofdutymayultimatelygrowfromitanduponit。Theobligationisnonethelessrealbecauseitcanbeaccountedfor；noraretheclaimsofdutyanythelesssubstantialbecausetheyarecapableofbeingtracedtosohumbleabeginningasaninstinctivedesireforthesympathyofourfellows。
　　Itmaythereforebesaid，onbehalfofAdamSmith，thatitisnottoweakenthebasisofmorality，northeauthorityofconscience，totraceeitherofthemtotheirsourcesinsentimentsofsympathy，originallyinfluencedbypleasureandpain。Theobligatorynatureofmoralrulesremainsafact，whichnotheoryoftheirorigincanalterormodify；justasbenevolentaffectionsremainfactsofourmoralbeing，irrespectiveoftheirpossiblesuperstructureoninstinctsofself-interest。Ifcon-scienceisexplicableasakindofgeneralizationorsummaryofmoralsympathies，formedbytheobservationofthedistributionofpraiseorblameinanumberofparticularinstancesandbypersonalexperienceofmanyyears，itsinfluenceneedbenonethelessgreatnoritscontrolanythelessauthoritativethanifitwereprovedtodemonstrationtobeaprimaryprincipleofourmoralconsciousness。
　　ItisalsonecessarytorememberthatAdamSmithcarefullyrestrictedthefeelingofobligationtotheonesinglevirtueofjustice，andthroughouthistreatiseavoidedgenerallytheuseofwordswhich，like"right"and"wrong，"seemtosuggesttheideaofobligation。Bytheuseofthewords"proper"and"improper，"or"meritorious，"asappliedtosentimentsandconduct，heseemstohavewishedtoconveytheideathathedidregardmoralityasrelativetotime，place，andcircumstance，astoacertainextentduetocustomandconvention，andnotasabsolute，eternal，orimmutable。
　　Properlyspeaking，justice，ortheabstinencefrominjurytoothers，was，heheld，theonlyvirtuewhich，asmenhadarighttoexactitfromus，itwasourdutytopractisetowardsthem。Theconsciousnessthatforcemightbeemployedtomakeusactaccordingtotherulesofjustice，butnotaccordingtotherulesofanyothervirtues，suchasfriendship，charity，orgenerosity，wasthesourceofthestricterobligationfeltbyusinreferencetothevirtueofjustice。"Wefeelourselves，"hesaid，"tobeinapeculiarmannertied，bound，andobligedtotheobservationofjustice，"whilstthepracticeoftheothervirtues"seemstobeleftinsomemeasuretoourownchoice。""Inthepracticeoftheothervirtues，ourconductshouldratherbedirectedbyacertainkindofpropriety，byacertaintasteforaparticulartenorofconduct，thanbyanyregardtoapreciseruleormaxim；"butitisotherwisewithregardtojustice，alltherulesofwhichareprecise，definite，andcertain，andaloneadmitofnoexception。