andintheexplanationwhichhehimselfelaborated，hethoughtthatsomepartorotherofhissystemembracedandcoincidedwithwhateverwastrueinthedifferenttheoriesofhispredecessors。
　　CHAPTERII。THEPHENOMENAOFSYMPATHY。
　　Thephenomenaofsympathyorfellow-feelingshow，accordingtoAdamSmith，thatitisoneoftheoriginalpassionsofhumannature。Weseeitintheimmediatetransfusionofanemotionfromonemantoanother，whichisantecedenttoanyknowledgeonourpartofthecausesofanotherman'sgrieforjoy。Itisaprimaryfactorofourconstitutionashumanbeings，asisshownintheinstinctivewithdrawalofourlimbsfromthestrokeweseeaimedatanother。Itisindeedsomethingalmostphysical，asweseeinthetendencyofamobtotwisttheirbodiessimultaneouslywiththemovementsofarope-dancer，orinthetendencyofsomepeopleonbeholdingsoreeyestofeelasorenessintheirown。
　　Sympathyoriginatesintheimagination，whichalonecanmakeusenterintothesensationsofothers。Ourownsenses，forinstance，cannevertellusanythingofthesufferingsofamanontherack。Itisonlybyimaginingourselvesinhisposition，bychangingplaceswithhiminfancy，bythinkingwhatourownsensationswouldbeinthesameplight，thatwecometofeelwhatheendures，andtoshudderatthemerethoughtoftheagoniesbefeels。Butananalogousemotionspringsup，whatevermaybethenatureofthepassion，inthepersonprincipallyaffectedbyit；andwhetheritbejoyorgrief，gratitudeorresentment，thatanotherfeels，weequallyenterasitwereintohisbody，andinsomedegreebecomethesamepersonwithhim。Theemotionofaspectatoralwayscorrespondstowhat，bybringingthecaseofanotherhometohimself，heimaginesshouldbethatother'ssentiments。
　　Butalthoughsympathyisthusaninstantaneousemotion，andtheexpressionofgrieforjoyinthelooksorgesturesofanotheraffectuswithsomedegreeofasimilaremotion，fromtheirsuggestionofageneralideaofhisbadorgoodfortune，therearesomepassionswithwhoseexpressionnosympathyarisestilltheirexcitingcauseisknown。Suchapassionisanger，forinstance。Whenwewitnessthesignsofangerinamanwemorereadilysympathizewiththefearorresentmentofthoseendangeredbyitthanwiththeprovokedmanhimself。Thegeneralideaofprovocationexcitesnosympathywithhisanger，forwecannotmakehispassionourowntillweknowthecauseofhisprovocation。Evenoursympathywithjoyorgriefisveryimperfect，tillweknowthecauseofit:infact，sympathyarisesnotsomuchfromtheviewofanypassionasfromthatofthesituationwhichexcitesit。Henceitisthatweoftenfeelforanotherwhathecannotfeelhim-self，
　　thatpassionarisinginourownbreastfromthemereimaginationwhicheventherealityfailstoarouseinhis。Wesometimes，forinstance，blushfortherudenessofanotherwhoisinsensibleofanyfaulthimself，becausewefeelhowashamedweshouldhavefelthadhisconductandsituationbeenours。Oursorrow，again，foranidiotisnoreflectionofanysentimentofhis，wholaughsandsings，andisunconsciousofhismisery；norisoursympathywiththedeadduetoanyotherconsiderationthantheconceptionofourselvesasdeprivedofalltheblessingsoflifeandyetconsciousofourdeprivation。Tothechangeproduceduponthemwejoinourownconsciousnessofthatchange，ourownsenseofthelossofthesunlightofhumanaffections，andhumanmemory，andthensympathizewiththeirsituationbysovividlyimaginingitourown。
　　Butwhatevermaybethecauseofsympathy，thereisnodoubtofthepleasurewhichtheconsciousnessofaconcordoffeelingproduces，andofthepainwhicharisesfromasenseofitsabsence。Somehaveaccountedforthisbytheprincipleofself-love，bysayingthattheconsciousnessofourownweaknessandourneedoftheassistanceofothersmakesustorejoiceintheirsympathyasanearnestoftheirassistance，andtogrieveintheirindifferenceasasignoftheiropposition。Butboththepleasureandpainarefeltsoinstantaneously，anduponsuchfrivolousoccasions，thatitisimpossibletoexplainthemasarefinementofself-love。Forinstance，wearemortifiedifnobodylaughsatourjests，andarepleasediftheydo；notfromanyconsiderationofself-interest，butfromaninstinctiveneedandlongingaftersympathy。
　　Neithercanthefact，thatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisacauseofpleasure，andthewantofitacauseofpain，beaccountedforentirelybytheadditionalzestwhichthejoyofotherscommunicatestoourown，orbythedisappointmentwhichtheabsenceofitcauses。Thesympathyofotherswithourownjoymay，indeed，enliventhatjoy，andsogiveuspleasure；buttheirsympathywithourgriefcouldgiveusnopleasure，ifitsimplyenlivenedourgrief。Sympathy，however，whilstitenlivensjoy，alleviatesgrief，andsogivespleasureneithercase，bythemerefactofthecoincidenceofmutualfeeling。
　　Thesympathyofothersbeingmorenecessaryforusingriefthaninjoy，wearemoredesiroustocommunicatetoothersourdisagreeablepassionsthanouragreeableones。"Theagreeablepassionsofloveandjoycansatisfyandsupporttheheartwithoutanyauxiliarypleasure。Thebitterandpainfulemotionsofgriefandresentmentmorestronglyrequirethehealingconsolationofsympathy。"Hencewearelessanxiousthatourfriendsshouldadoptourfriendshipsthanthattheyshouldenterintoourresentments，anditmakesusmuchmoreangryiftheydonotenterintoourresentmentsthaniftheydonotenterintoourgratitude。
　　Butsympathyispleasurable，andtheabsenceofitdistressing，notonlytothepersonsympathizedwith，buttothepersonsympathizing。Weareourselvespleasedifwecansympathizewithanother'ssuccessoraffliction，anditpainsusifwecannot。Theconsciousnessofaninabilitytosympathizewithhisdistress，ifwethinkhisgriefexcessive，givesusevenmorepainthanthesympatheticsorrowwhichthemostcompleteaccordancewithhimcouldmakeusfeel。
　　SucharethephysicalandinstinctivefactsofsympathyuponwhichAdamSmithfoundshistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobationandourmoralideas。Beforeproceedingwiththisdevelopmentofhistheory，itisworthnoticingagainitsclosecorrespondencewiththatofHume，wholikewisetracedmoralsentimentstoabasisofphysicalsympathy。"Whereverwego，"
　　saysHume，"whateverwereflectonorconverseabout，everythingstillpresentsuswiththeviewofhumanhappinessormisery，andexcitesinourbreastasympatheticmovementofpleasureoruneasiness。"Censureorapplauseare，then，theresultoftheinfluenceofsympathyuponoursentiments。
　　Ifthenaturaleffectsofmisery，suchastearsandcriesandgroans，neverfailtoinspireuswithcompassionanduneasiness，"canwebesupposedaltogetherinsensibleorindifferenttowardsitscauses，whenamaliciousortreacherouscharacterandbehaviourarepresentedtous？"
　　CHAPTERIII。MORALAPPROBATION，ANDTHEFEELINGOFPROPRIETY。
　　Havinganalyzedthefactsofsympathy，andshownthatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisadirectcauseofpleasuretous，andthewantofitacauseofpain，AdamSmithproceedstoshowthattheamountofpleasureorpainfeltbyonemanintheconductorfeelingsofanotheristhemeasureofhisapprobationorthecontrary。Thesentimentsofanyonearejustandproper，orthereverse，accordingastheycoincideornotwiththesentimentsofsomeoneelsewhoobservesthem。Hisapprobationvarieswiththedegreeinwhichhecansympathizewiththem，andperfectconcordofsentimentmeansperfectapprobation。
　　JustasamanwhoadmiresthesamepoemorpicturethatIdo，orlaughsatthesamejoke，allowsthejusticeofmyadmirationormirth，sohe，whoentersintomyresentment，andbybringingmyinjurieshometohimselfsharesmyfeelings，cannotbuttherebyapproveofthemasjustandproper。
　　Accordingashissympatheticindignationfailstocorrespondtomine，accordingashiscompassionfallsshortofmygrief，according，inshort，tothedegreeofdisproportionhemayperceivebetweenmysentimentsandhis，doeshefeelstrongerorweakerdisapprovalofmyfeelings。
　　Moralapprobationadmitsofthesameexplanationasintellectualapprobation。
　　Forjustastoapproveordisapproveoftheopinionsofothersisnothingmorethantoobservetheiragreementordisagreementwithourown，sotoapproveordisapproveoftheirfeelingsandpassionsissimplytomarkasimilaragreementordisagreementexistingbetweenourownandtheirs。
　　Consequentlythesentimentsofeachindividualarethestandardandmeasureofthecorrectnessofanother's，anditishardlypossibleforustojudgeofanother'sfeelingsbyanyothercanonthanthecorrespondentaffectioninourselves。Theonlymeasurebywhichonemancanjudgeofthefacultyofanotherisbyhisownfacultyofthelikekind。Aswejudgeofanother'seyesight，hearing，orreason，bycomparisonwithourowneyesight，hearing，orreason，sowecanonlyjudgeofanother'sloveorresentmentbyourownloveorourownresentment。If，uponbringingthecaseofanotherhometoourselves，wefindthatthesentimentswhichitproducesinhimcoincideandtallywithourown，wenecessarilyap-proveofhisasproportionedandsuitabletotheirobjects，whileifotherwise，wenecessarilydisapproveofthemasextravagantandoutofproportion。
　　Since，then，onepointofviewineverymoraljudgmentisthe"suitableness"
　　whichanyaffectionoftheheartbearstothecauseorobjectwhichexcitesit，theproprietyorimproprietyoftheaction，whichresultsfromsuchaffection，dependsentirelyontheconcordordissonanceoftheaffectionwiththatfeltsympatheticallybyaspectator。HencethatpartofmoralapprobationwhichconsistsinthesenseoftheProprietyofasentimenttoitscausesay，ofangertoitsprovocation，arisessimplyfromtheperceptionofacoincidencebetweenthesentimentofthepersonprimarilyaffectedbyitandthatofthespectatorwho，byforceofimagination，putshimselfintheother'splace。
　　Letustake，forinstance，asaconcretecase，theexhibitionoffortitudeundergreatdistress。Whatisthesourceofourapprobationofit？Itistheperfectcoincidenceofanother'sfirmnesswithourowninsensibilitytohismisfortunes。Byhismakingnodemandonusforthathigherdegreeofsensibilitywhichwefindtoourregretthatwedonotpossess，heeffectsamostperfectcorrespondencebetweenhissentimentsandours，whichcausesustorecognizetheperfectproprietyof'hisconduct。Theadditionalelementwhichraisesourfeelingofmereapprobationintooneofadmiration，isthewonderandsurprisewefeelatwitnessingadegreeofself-commandfarabovethatusuallymetwithamongmankind。
　　Thereare，however，severalfactswhichmodifyoursenseoftheproprietyorimproprietyofanotherperson'ssentimentsbytheirconcordordisagreementwithourown，andwhichitisimportanttonotice。
　　Firstofall，itisonlywhentheobjectswhichexciteanysentimentbearsomedirectrelationtothepersonprimarilyaffectedbythesentimentortoourselvesassympatheticallyaffectedbyit，thatanymoraljudgmentofhissentimentarisesonourpart。Forinstance，"thebeautyofaplain，thegreat-nessofamountain，theornamentsofabuilding，theexpressionofapicture，thecompositionofadiscourse，theconductofathirdperson……allthegeneralsubjectsofscienceandtaste，arewhatweandourcompanionsregardashavingnopeculiarrelationtoeitherofus。"Thereisnooccasionforsympathy，orforanimaginarychangeofsituations，inordertoproduce，withregardtosuchthings，themostperfectharmonyofsentimentsandaffections。Wherethereissuchharmony，weascribetoamangoodtasteorjudgment，butrecognizenodegreeofmoralpropriety。
　　Butitisotherwisewithanythingwhichmorecloselyaffectsus。Amisfortuneorinjurytoanotherisnotregardedbyhimandbyusfromthesamepointofviewasapoemorpictureare，fortheformercannotbutmorecloselyaffecthim。Henceacorrespondenceoffeelingismuchmoredifficultandmuchmoreimportantwithregardtomatterswhichnearlyconcernhim，thanwithregardtomatterswhichconcernneitherhimnorus，andarereallyindifferenttoouractualinterests。Wecaneasilybearwithdifferenceofopinioninmattersofspeculationortaste；butweceasetobebearabletooneanother，ifhehasnofellow-feelingformymisfortunesormygriefs；
　　orifhefeelseithernoindignationatmyinjuriesornonethatbearsanyproportiontomyresentmentofthem。
　　Thiscorrespondenceoffeeling，then，beingatthesametimesodifficultofattainmentandyetsopleasurablewhenattained，twooperationscomeintoplay:theeffortonourpart，asspectators，toenterintothesentimentsandpassionsofthepersonprincipallyconcerned，andtheeffortonhispartalsotobringhissentimentsintounisonwithours。Whilstwestrivetoassume，inimagination，hissituation，hestrivestoassumeours，andtobringdownhisemotionstothatdegreewithwhichweasspectatorscansympathize。Consciousasheisthatoursympathymustnaturallyfallshortoftheviolenceofhisown，andlongingashedoesforthatreliefwhichhecanonlyderivefromacompletesympathyoffeeling，heseekstoobtainamoreentireconcordbyloweringhispassiontothatpitchwhichheissensiblethatwecanassume。Doeshefeelresentmentorjealousy，hewillstrivetotoneitdowntothepointatwhichwecanenterintoit。Andbythusbeingledtoimaginehowhehimselfwouldbeaffected，wereheonlyaspectatorofhisownsituation，heisbroughttoabatetheviolenceofhisoriginalpassion。Sothatinasortofmeeting-pointofsympathyliesthepointofperfectpropriety，ashasbeenshowninthecaseoftheproprietyoffortitude。
　　Onthistwofoldtendencyofourmoralnaturetwodifferentsetsofvirtuesarebased。Onourefforttosympathizewiththepassionsandfeelingsofothersarefoundedthegentlervirtuesofcondescension，toleration，andhumanity；whilstthesternervirtuesofself-denialandself-commandarefoundedonourefforttoattuneourpassionstothatpitchofwhichotherscanapprove。Inaunionofthesetwokindsofvirtuesinfeelingmuchforothersandlittleforourselves，inrestrainingourselfishandindulgingourbenevolentaffectionsconsiststhehighestperfectionofwhichhumannatureiscapable。
　　Buthowdowepassfromaperceptionoftheproprietyofthesegoodqualitiestoaperceptionoftheirvirtue，forproprietyandvirtuemeandifferentthings？Theansweris，thatproprietyofsentimentwhich，whendisplayedintheusualdegree，meetswithourapprobationmerely，callsforouradmirationandbecomesvirtuouswhenitsurprisesusbyanunusualmanifestationofit。Admirationis"approbation，heightenedbywonderandsurprise。""Virtueisexcellence，somethinguncommonlygreatandbeautiful，whichrisesfarabovewhatisvulgarandordinary。"Thereisnovirtueintheordinarydisplayofthemoralqualities，justasintheordinarydegreeoftheintellectualqualitiestherearenoabilities。
　　Forsensibilitytobeaccountedhumanityitmustexceedwhatispossessedbythe"rudevulgarofmankind；"and，inlikemanner，forself-commandtoamounttothevirtueoffortitude，itmustbemuchmorethantheweakestofmortalsiscapableofexerting。
　　Thereare，infact，twodifferentstandardsbywhichweoftenmeasurethedegreeofpraiseorblameduetoanyaction，oneconsistingintheideaofcompleteproprietyorperfection，incomparisonwithwhichallhumanactionmusteverappearblameable，andtheotherconsistinginthatapproachtosuchperfectionofwhichthemajorityofmenarecapable。Justinthesamewayasaworkofartmayappearverybeautifulwhenjudgedbythestandardofordinaryperfection，andappearfulloffaultswhenjudgedbythestandardofabsoluteperfection，soamoralactionorsentimentmayfrequentlydeserveapplausethatfallsshortofanidealvirtue。
　　Ithavingthusbeenshownthattheproprietyofanysentimentliesinameeting-pointbetweentwodifferentsympathies，orinasortofcompromisebetweentwodifferentaspectsof'thesamepassion，itisevidentthatsuchproprietymustlieinacertainmediocrityormeanstatebetweentwoextremes，orinjustthatamountofpassionintowhichanimpartialspectatorcanenter。Thatgrieforresentment，forexample，isproperwhicherrsneitheronthesideofexcessorofdefect，whichisneithertoomuchnortoolittle。Theimpartialspectator，beingunableeithertoenterintoanexcessofresentmentortosympathizewithitsdeficiency，blamestheoneextremebycallingit"fury，"andtheotherbycallingit"wantofspirit。"
　　OnthispointitisnoticeablethatAdamSmith'stheoryofProprietyagrees，ashesayshimself，"prettyexactly"withAristotle'sdefinitionofVirtue，asconsistinginameanorbetweentwoextremesofexcessordefect。Forin-stance，courage，accordingtoAristotle，liesinthemeanstatebetweentheoppositevicesofcowardiceandrashness。Frugalityisasimilaravoidanceofbothavariceandprodigality，andmagnanimityconsistsinavoidingtheextremesofeitherarroganceorpusillanimity。AndasalsocoincidentineveryrespectwithhisowntheoryofPropriety，AdamSmithclaimsPlato'saccountofvirtuegivenintheRepublic，whereitisshowntoconsistinthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfinesitselftoitsproperspherewithoutencroachingonthatofanyother，andperformsitsproperofficewithexactlythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbynaturebelongstoit。
　　Butitisobviousthatthemeanstateorpointofproprietymustbedifferentindifferentpassions，lyingnearertotheexcessinsomeandnearertothedefectinothers。Anditwillbefoundthatthedecencyorindecencyofgivingexpressiontoourpassionsvariesexactlyinproportiontothegeneraldispositionofmankindtosympathizewiththem。
　　Toillustratetheapplicationofthisprinciple，AdamSmithdividesallhumanpassionsintofivedifferentclasses。ThesearethePassionswhichtaketheiroriginfromthebody，thosewhichtaketheiroriginfromaparticularturnoftheimagination，theunsocialPassions，thesocialPassions，andtheselfishPassions。AndwhateverdoubtsmaybefeltastothetruthofAdamSmith'sgeneraltheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation，thereisnodoubtoftheinterestwhichattachestohisaccountoftheinfluenceofoursympathiesinconditioningthenatureofourmoralsentiments。
　　1。Tobeginwiththepassionswhichhavetheiroriginfromthebody。Thebodilypassions，suchashungerandthirst，beingpurelypersonal，failtoexciteanygeneralsympathy，andinproportiontotheimpossibilityofsuchsympathyistheimproprietyorindecencyofanystrongexpressionofthem。Therealoriginofourdisliketosuchpassionswhenwewitnesstheminothers，therealreasonwhyanystrongexpressionsofthemaresodisagreeable，isnotthefactthatsuchpassionsarethosewhichweshareincommonwiththebrutesforwealsosharewiththemnaturalaffectionandgratitude，butsimplythefactthatwecannotenterintothem，thattheyareinsufficienttocommandoursympathies。
　　Withthepassionswhicharisefromtheimaginationitisotherwisethanwithpassionswhichoriginatefromthebody。Forinstance，adisappointmentinloveorambitioncallsforthmoresympathythanthegreatestbodilyevil，forourimaginationlendsitselfmorereadilytosympathizewiththemisfortunesaffectingtheimaginationsofothers，thanispossibleinthecaseofthesufferingsoftheirbodies。Ourimaginationmouldsitselfmoreeasilyupontheimaginationofanotherthanourbodilyframecanbeaffectedbywhataffectshis。Thuswecanreadilysympathizewithamanwhohaslosthisfortune，forheonlysuffersinhisimagination，notinhisbody；andwecanfancy，justashedoes，thelossofdignity，theneglectofhisfriends，thecontemptfromhisenemies，thedependence，want，andmiserywhichhehimselfforeseesinstoreforhim。Thelossofalegisamorerealcalamitythanthelossofamistress；butwhilstitwouldberidiculoustofoundatragedyontheformerloss，thelattermisfortunehasgivenrisetomanyafineplay。Merepainnevercallsforthanylivelysympathy，andforthatreasontherewerenogreaterbreachesofdecorumcommittedintheplaysoftheGreeks，thanintheattempttoexcitecompassionbytherepresentationofphysicalagonies，asinthecriesofPhiloctetes，5orthetorturesofHippolytusandHercules。Itisonthislittlesympathywhichwefeelwithbodilypainthatisfoundedtheproprietyofconstancyandpatienceinitsendurance。