,Thisself-commandisverydifferentatdifferenttimes。Amaninhealthpossessesmoreofitthanonelanguishingwithsickness。Wearemoremasterofourthoughtsinthemorningthanintheevening:Fasting,thanafterafullmeal。Canwegiveanyreasonforthesevariations,exceptexperience?Wherethenisthepower,ofwhichwepretendtobeconscious?Istherenothere,eitherinaspiritualormaterialsubstance,orboth,somesecretmechanismorstructureofparts,uponwhichtheeffectdepends,andwhich,beingentirelyunknowntous,rendersthepowerorenergyofthewillequallyunknownandincomprehensible?
  Volitionissurelyanactofthemind,withwhichwearesufficientlyacquainted。Reflectuponit。Consideritonallsides。Doyoufindanythinginitlikethiscreativepower,bywhichitraisesfromnothinganewidea,andwithakindofF/IAT\,imitatestheomnipotenceofitsMaker,ifImaybeallowedsotospeak,whocalledforthintoexistenceallthevariousscenesofnature?Sofarfrombeingconsciousofthisenergyinthewill,itrequiresascertainexperienceasthatofwhichwearepossessed,toconvinceusthatsuchextraordinaryeffectsdoeverresultfromasimpleactofvolition。
  Thegeneralityofmankindneverfindanydifficultyinaccountingforthemorecommonandfamiliaroperationsofnature——suchasthedescentofheavybodies,thegrowthofplants,thegenerationofanimals,or
  thenourishmentofbodiesbyfood:Butsupposethat,inallthesecases,theyperceivetheveryforceorenergyofthecause,bywhichitisconnectedwithitseffect,andisforeverinfallibleinitsoperation。Theyacquire,bylonghabit,suchaturnofmind,that,upontheappearanceofthecause,theyimmediatelyexpectwithassuranceitsusualattendant,andhardlyconceiveitpossiblethatanyothereventcouldresultfromit。Itisonlyonthediscoveryofextraordinaryphaenomena,suchasearthquakes,pestilence,andprodigiesofanykind,thattheyfindthemselvesatalosstoassignapropercause,andtoexplainthemannerinwhichtheeffectisproducedbyit。Itisusualformen,insuchdifficultiestohaverecoursetosomeinvisibleintelligentprinciple[18]
  astheimmediatecauseofthateventwhichsurprisesthem,andwhich,theythink,cannotbeaccountedforfromthecommonpowersofnature。Butphilosophers,whocarrytheirscrutinyalittlefarther,immediatelyperceivethat,eveninthemostfamiliarevents,theenergyofthecauseisasunintelligibleasinthemostunusual,andthatweonlylearnbyexperiencethefrequentC/ONJUNCTION\ofobjects,withoutbeingeverabletocomprehendanythinglikeC/ONNEXION\betweenthem。Here,then,manyphilosophersthinkthemselvesobligedbyreasontohaverecourse,onalloccasions,tothesameprinciple,whichthevulgarneverappealtobutincasesthatappearmiraculousandsupernatural。Theyacknowledgemind
  andintelligencetobe,notonlytheultimateandoriginalcauseofallthings,buttheimmediateandsolecauseofeveryeventwhichappearsinnature。Theypretendthatthoseobjectswhicharecommonlydenominated,areinrealitynothingbut;andthatthetrueanddirectprincipleofeveryeffectisnotanypowerorforceinnature,butavolitionoftheSupremeBeing,whowillsthatsuchparticularobjectsshouldforeverbeconjoinedwitheachother。Insteadofsayingthatonebilliard-ballmovesanotherbyaforcewhichithasderivedfromtheauthorofnature,itistheDeityhimself,theysay,who,byaparticularvolition,movesthesecondball,beingdeterminedtothisoperationbytheimpulseofthefirstball,inconsequenceofthosegenerallawswhichhehaslaiddowntohimselfinthegovernmentoftheuniverse。Butphilosophersadvancingstillintheirinquiries,discoverthat,aswearetotallyignorantofthepoweronwhichdependsthemutualoperationofbodies,wearenolessignorantofthatpoweronwhichdependstheoperationofmindon
  body,orofbodyonmind,norareweable,eitherfromoursensesorconsciousness,toassigntheultimateprincipleinonecasemorethanintheother。Thesameignorance,therefore,reducesthemtothesameconclusion。TheyassertthattheDeityistheimmediatecauseoftheunionbetweensoulandbody;andthattheyarenottheorgansofsense,which,beingagitatedbyexternalobjects,producesensationsinthemind;butthatitisaparticularvolitionofouromnipotentMaker,whichexcitessuchasensation,inconsequenceofsuchamotionintheorgan。Inlikemanner,itisnotanyenergyinthewillthatproduceslocalmotioninourmembers:ItisGodhimself,whoispleasedtosecondourwill,initselfimpotent,andtocommandthatmotionwhichweerroneouslyattributetoourownpowerandefficacy。Nordophilosophersstopatthis
  conclusion。Theysometimesextendthesameinferencetotheminditself,initsinternaloperations。OurmentalvisionorconceptionofideasisnothingbutarevelationmadetousbyourMaker。Whenwevoluntarilyturnourthoughtstoanyobject,andraiseupitsimageinthefancy,itisnotthewillwhichcreatesthatidea:ItistheuniversalCreator,whodiscoversittothemind,andrendersitpresenttous。
  Thus,accordingtothesephilosophers,everythingisfullofGod。Notcontentwiththeprinciple,thatnothingexistsbutbyhiswill,thatnothingpossessesanypowerbutbyhisconcession:Theyrobnature,andallcreatedbeings,ofeverypower,inordertorendertheirdependenceontheDeitystillmoresensibleandimmediate。Theyconsidernotthat,bythistheory,theydiminish,insteadofmagnifying,thegrandeurofthoseattributes,whichtheyaffectsomuchtocelebrate。ItarguessurelymorepowerintheDeitytodelegateacertaindegreeofpowertoinferiorcreaturesthantoproduceeverythingbyhisownimmediatevolition。
  Itarguesmorewisdomtocontriveatfirstthefabricoftheworldwithsuchperfectforesightthat,ofitself,andbyitsproperoperation,itmayserveallthepurposesofprovidence,thanifthegreatCreatorwereobligedeverymomenttoadjustitsparts,andanimatebyhisbreathallthewheelsofthatstupendousmachine。
  Butifwewouldhaveamorephilosophicalconfutationofthistheory,perhapsthetwofollowingreflectionsmaysuffice:
  ,itseemstomethatthistheoryoftheuniversalenergyandoperationoftheSupremeBeingistooboldevertocarryconvictionwithittoaman,sufficientlyapprizedoftheweaknessofhumanreason,andthenarrowlimitstowhichitisconfinedinallitsoperations。Thoughthechainofargumentswhichconducttoitwereeversological,theremustariseastrongsuspicion,ifnotanabsoluteassurance,thatithascarriedusquitebeyondthereachofourfaculties,whenitleadstoconclusionssoextraordinary,andsoremotefromcommonlifeandexperience。Wearegotintofairyland,longerewehavereachedthelaststepsofourtheory;andtherewehavenoreasontotrustourcommonmethodsofargument,ortothinkthatourusualanalogiesandprobabilitieshaveanyauthority。Ourlineistooshorttofathomsuchimmenseabysses。Andhoweverwemayflatterourselvesthatweareguided,ineverystepwhichwetake,byakindofverisimilitudeandexperience,wemaybeassuredthatthisfanciedexperiencehasnoauthoritywhenwethusapplyittosubjectsthatlieentirelyoutofthesphereofexperience。
  Butonthisweshallhaveoccasiontotouchafterwards。[19]
  ,Icannotperceiveanyforceintheargumentsonwhichthistheoryisfounded。Weareignorant,itistrue,ofthemannerinwhichbodiesoperateoneachother:Theirforceorenergyisentirelyincomprehensible:
  Butarewenotequallyignorantofthemannerorforcebywhichamind,eventhesuprememind,operateseitheronitselforonbody?Whence,Ibeseechyou,doweacquireanyideaofit?Wehavenosentimentorconsciousnessofthispowerinourselves。WehavenoideaoftheSupremeBeingbutwhatwelearnfromreflectiononourownfaculties。Wereourignorance,therefore,agoodreasonforrejectinganything,weshouldbeledintothatprincipleofdenyingallenergyintheSupremeBeingasmuchasinthegrossestmatter。Wesurelycomprehendaslittletheoperationsofoneasoftheother。Isitmoredifficulttoconceivethatmotionmayarisefromimpulsethanthatitmayarisefromvolition?Allweknowisourprofoundignoranceinbothcases。[20]
  PARTII。
  B/UT\tohastentoaconclusionofthisargument,whichisalreadydrawnouttotoogreatalength:Wehavesoughtinvainforanideaofpowerornecessaryconnexioninallthesourcesfromwhichwecouldsupposeittobederived。Itappearsthat,insingleinstancesoftheoperationofbodies,wenevercan,byourutmostscrutiny,discoveranythingbutoneeventfollowinganother,withoutbeingabletocomprehendanyforceorpowerbywhichthecauseoperates,oranyconnexionbetweenitanditssupposedeffect。Thesamedifficultyoccursincontemplatingtheoperationsofmindonbody——whereweobservethemotionofthelattertofollowuponthevolitionoftheformer,butarenotabletoobserve
  orconceivethetiewhichbindstogetherthemotionandvolition,ortheenergybywhichthemindproducesthiseffect。Theauthorityofthewilloveritsownfacultiesandideasisnotawhitmorecomprehensible:Sothat,uponthewhole,thereappearsnot,throughoutallnature,anyoneinstanceofconnexionwhichisconceivablebyus。Alleventsseementirelylooseandseparate。Oneeventfollowsanother;
  butwenevercanobserveanytiebetweenthem。Theyseem,butnever。Andaswecanhavenoideaofanythingwhichneverappearedtoouroutwardsenseorinwardsentiment,thenecessaryconclusionseemstobethatwehavenoideaofconnexionorpoweratall,andthatthesewordsareabsolutely,withoutanymeaning,whenemployedeitherinphilosophicalreasoningsorcommonlife。
  Buttherestillremainsonemethodofavoidingthisconclusion,andonesourcewhichwehavenotyetexamined。
  Whenanynaturalobjectoreventispresented,itisimpossibleforus,byanysagacityorpenetration,todiscover,orevenconjecture,withoutexperience,whateventwillresultfromit,ortocarryourforesightbeyondthatobjectwhichisimmediatelypresenttothememoryandsenses。Evenafteroneinstanceorexperimentwherewehaveobservedaparticulareventtofollowuponanother,wearenotentitledtoformageneralrule,orforetellwhatwill
  happeninlikecases;itbeingjustlyesteemedanunpardonabletemeritytojudgeofthewholecourseofnaturefromonesingleexperiment,howeveraccurateorcertain。Butwhenoneparticularspeciesofeventhasalways,inallinstances,beenconjoinedwithanother,wemakenolongeranyscrupleofforetellingoneupontheappearanceoftheother,andofemployingthatreasoning,whichcanaloneassureusofanymatteroffactorexistence。Wethencalltheoneobject,;theother,。Wesupposethatthereissomeconnexionbetweenthem;somepowerintheone,bywhichitinfalliblyproducestheother,andoperateswiththegreatestcertaintyandstrongestnecessity。
  Itappears,then,thatthisideaofanecessaryconnexionamongeventsarisesfromanumberofsimilarinstanceswhichoccuroftheconstantconjunctionoftheseevents;norcanthatideaeverbesuggestedbyanyoneoftheseinstances,surveyedinallpossiblelightsandpositions。Butthereisnothinginanumberofinstances,differentfromeverysingleinstance,whichissupposedtobeexactlysimilar;exceptonly,thatafterarepetitionofsimilarinstances,themindiscarriedbyhabit,upontheappearanceofoneevent,toexpectitsusualattendant,andtobelievethatitwillexist。Thisconnexion,therefore,whichweinthemind,thiscustomarytransitionoftheimaginationfromoneobjecttoits
  usualattendant,isthesentimentorimpressionfromwhichweformtheideaofpowerornecessaryconnexion。Nothingfartherisinthecase。Contemplatethesubjectonallsides;youwillneverfindanyotheroriginofthatidea。Thisisthesoledifferencebetweenoneinstance,fromwhichwecanneverreceivetheideaofconnexion,andanumberofsimilarinstances,bywhichitissuggested。Thefirsttimeamansawthecommunicationofmotionbyimpulse,asbytheshockoftwobilliard-balls,hecouldnotpronouncethattheoneeventwas:Butonlythatitwaswiththeother。Afterhehasobservedseveralinstancesofthisnature,hethenpronouncesthemtobe。Whatalterationhashappenedtogiverisetothisnewideaof?Nothingbutthathenowtheseeventstobeinhisimagination,andcanreadilyforetelltheexistenceofonefromtheappearanceoftheother。Whenwesay,therefore,
  thatoneobjectisconnectedwithanother,wemeanonlythattheyhaveacquiredaconnexioninourthought,andgiverisetothisinference,bywhichtheybecomeproofsofeachother'sexistence:Aconclusionwhichissomewhatextraordinary,butwhichseemsfoundedonsufficientevidence。Norwillitsevidencebeweakenedbyanygeneraldiffidenceoftheunderstanding,orscepticalsuspicionconcerningeveryconclusionwhichisnewandextraordinary。Noconclusionscanbemoreagreeabletoscepticismthansuchasmakediscoveriesconcerningtheweaknessandnarrowlimitsofhumanreasonandcapacity。
  Andwhatstrongerinstancecanbeproducedofthesurprisingignoranceandweaknessoftheunderstandingthanthepresent。Forsurely,iftherebeanyrelationamongobjectswhichitimportstoustoknowperfectly,itisthatofcauseandeffect。Onthisarefoundedallourreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactorexistence。Bymeansofitaloneweattainanyassuranceconcerningobjectswhichareremovedfromthepresenttestimonyofourmemoryandsenses。Theonlyimmediateutilityofallsciences,istoteachus,howtocontrolandregulatefutureeventsbytheircauses。Ourthoughtsandenquiriesare,therefore,everymoment,employedaboutthisrelation:Yetsoimperfectaretheideaswhichweformconcerningit,thatitisimpossibletogiveanyjustdefinitionofcause,exceptwhatisdrawnfromsomethingextraneousandforeigntoit。Similarobjectsarealwaysconjoinedwithsimilar。Ofthiswehaveexperience。
  Suitablytothisexperience,therefore,wemaydefineacausetobe。Orinotherwords。
  Theappearanceofacausealwaysconveysthemind,byacustomarytransition,totheideaoftheeffect。Ofthisalsowehaveexperience。Wemay,therefore,suitablytothisexperience,formanotherdefinitionofcause,andcallit,。Butthoughboththesedefinitionsbedrawnfromcircumstancesforeigntothecause,wecannotremedythisinconvenience,orattainanymoreperfectdefinition,whichmaypointoutthatcircumstancesinthecause,whichgivesitaconnexionwithitseffect。Wehavenoideaofthisconnexion,norevenanydistantnotionwhatitiswedesiretoknow,whenweendeavourataconceptionofit。Wesay,
  forinstance,thatthevibrationofthisstringisthecauseofthisparticularsound。Butwhatdowemeanbythataffirmation?Weeithermean。Wemayconsidertherelationofcauseandeffectineitherofthesetwolights;butbeyondthese,wehavenoideaofit。
  Torecapitulate,therefore,thereasoningsofthissection:Everyideaiscopiedfromsomeprecedingimpressionorsentiment;andwherewecannotfindanyimpression,wemaybecertainthatthereisnoidea。Inallsingleinstancesoftheoperationofbodiesorminds,thereisnothingthatproducesanyimpression,norconsequentlycansuggestanyideaofpowerornecessaryconnexion。Butwhenmanyuniforminstancesappear,andthesameobjectisalwaysfollowedbythesameevent;wethenbegintoentertainthenotionofcauseandconnexion。
  Wethenanewsentimentorimpression,towit,acustomaryconnexioninthethoughtorimaginationbetweenoneobjectanditsusualattendant;andthissentimentistheoriginalofthatideawhichweseekfor。Forasthisideaarisesfromanumberofsimilarinstances,andnotfromanysingleinstance,itmustarisefromthatcircumstance,inwhichthenumberofinstancesdifferfromeveryindividualinstance。Butthiscustomaryconnexionortransitionoftheimaginationistheonlycircumstanceinwhichtheydiffer。Ineveryotherparticulartheyarealike。Thefirstinstancewhichwesawofmotioncommunicatedbytheshockoftwobilliardballstoreturntothisobviousillustrationisexactlysimilartoanyinstancethatmay,atpresent,occurtous;exceptonly,thatwecouldnot,atfirst,one
  eventfromtheother;whichweareenabledtodoatpresent,aftersolongacourseofuniformexperience。Iknownotwhetherthereaderwillreadilyapprehendthisreasoning。Iamafraidthat,shouldImultiplywordsaboutit,orthrowitintoagreatervarietyoflights,itwouldonlybecomemoreobscureandintricate。Inallabstractreasoningsthereisonepointofviewwhich,ifwecanhappilyhit,weshallgofarthertowardsillustratingthesubjectthanbyalltheeloquenceandcopiousexpressionintheworld。Thispointofviewweshouldendeavourtoreach,andreservetheflowersofrhetoricforsubjectswhicharemoreadaptedtothem。
  I/T\mightreasonablybeexpectedinquestionswhichhavebeencanvassedanddisputedwithgreateagerness,sincethefirstoriginofscience,andphilosophy,thatthemeaningofalltheterms,atleast,shouldhavebeenagreeduponamongthedisputants;andourenquiries,inthecourseoftwothousandyears,beenabletopassfromwordstothetrueandrealsubjectofthecontroversy。Forhoweasymayitseemtogiveexactdefinitionsofthetermsemployedinreasoning,andmakethesedefinitions,notthemeresoundofwords,theobjectoffuturescrutinyandexamination?Butifweconsiderthemattermorenarrowly,weshallbeapttodrawaquiteoppositeconclusion。Fromthiscircumstancealone,thatacontroversyhasbeenlongkeptonfoot,andremainsstillundecided,wemaypresumethatthereissomeambiguityintheexpression,andthatthedisputantsaffixdifferentideastothetermsemployedinthecontroversy。
  Forasthefacultiesofthemindaresupposedtobenaturallyalikeineveryindividual;otherwisenothingcouldbemorefruitlessthantoreasonordisputetogether;itwereimpossible,ifmenaffixthesameideastotheirterms,thattheycouldsolongformdifferentopinionsofthesamesubject;especiallywhentheycommunicatetheirviews,andeachpartyturnthemselvesonallsides,insearchofargumentswhichmaygivethemthevictoryovertheirantagonists。Itistrue,ifmenattemptthediscussionofquestionswhichlieentirelybeyondthereachofhumancapacity,suchasthoseconcerningtheoriginofworlds,ortheeconomyoftheintellectualsystemorregionofspirits,theymaylongbeattheairintheirfruitlesscontests,andneverarriveatanydeterminateconclusion。Butifthequestionregardanysubjectofcommonlifeandexperience,nothing,onewouldthink,couldpreservethedisputesolongundecidedbutsomeambiguousexpressions,whichkeeptheantagonistsstillatadistance,andhinderthemfromgrapplingwitheachother。
  Thishasbeenthecaseinthelongdisputedquestionconcerninglibertyandnecessity;andtosoremarkableadegreethat,ifIbenotmuchmistaken,weshallfind,thatallmankind,bothlearnedandignorant,havealwaysbeenofthesameopinionwithregardtothissubject,andthatafewintelligibledefinitionswouldimmediatelyhaveputanendtothewholecontroversy。Iownthatthisdisputehasbeensomuchcanvassedonallhands,andhasledphilosophersintosuchalabyrinthofobscuresophistry,thatitisnowonder,ifasensiblereaderindulgehiseasesofarastoturnadeafeartotheproposalofsuchaquestion,fromwhichhecanexpectneitherinstructionorentertainment。
  Butthestateoftheargumenthereproposedmay,perhaps,servetorenewhisattention;asithasmorenovelty,promisesatleastsomedecisionofthecontroversy,andwillnotmuchdisturbhiseasebyanyintricateorobscurereasoning。
  Ihope,therefore,tomakeitappearthatallmenhaveeveragreedinthedoctrinebothofnecessityandofliberty,accordingtoanyreasonablesense,whichcanbeputontheseterms;andthatthewholecontroversy,hashithertoturnedmerelyuponwords。Weshallbeginwithexaminingthedoctrineofnecessity。
  Itisuniversallyallowedthatmatter,inallitsoperations,isactuatedbyanecessaryforce,andthateverynaturaleffectissopreciselydeterminedbytheenergyofitscausethatnoothereffect,insuchparticularcircumstances,couldpossiblyhaveresultedfromit。Thedegreeanddirectionofeverymotionis,bythelawsofnature,prescribedwithsuchexactnessthatalivingcreaturemayassoonarisefromtheshockoftwobodiesasmotioninanyotherdegreeordirectionthanwhatisactuallyproducedbyit。Wouldwe,therefore,formajustandpreciseideaof,wemustconsiderwhencethatideaariseswhenweapplyittotheoperationofbodies。
  Itseemsevidentthat,ifallthescenesofnaturewerecontinuallyshiftedinsuchamannerthatnotwoeventsboreanyresemblancetoeachother,buteveryobjectwasentirelynew,withoutanysimilitudetowhateverhadbeenseenbefore,weshouldnever,inthatcase,haveattainedtheleastideaofnecessity,orofaconnexionamongtheseobjects。Wemightsay,uponsuchasupposition,thatoneobjectoreventhasfollowedanother;notthatonewasproducedbytheother。Therelationofcauseandeffectmustbeutterlyunknowntomankind。Inferenceandreasoningconcerningtheoperationsofnaturewould,fromthatmoment,beatanend;andthememoryandsensesremaintheonlycanals,bywhichtheknowledgeofanyrealexistencecouldpossiblyhaveaccesstothemind。Ouridea,therefore,ofnecessityandcausationarisesentirelyfromtheuniformityobservableintheoperationsofnature,wheresimilarobjectsareconstantlyconjoinedtogether,andthemindisdeterminedbycustomtoinfertheonefromtheappearanceoftheother。Thesetwocircumstancesformthewholeofthatnecessity,whichweascribetomatter。Beyondtheconstantofsimilarobjects,andtheconsequentfromonetotheother,wehavenonotionofanynecessityorconnexion。
  Ifitappear,therefore,thatallmankindhaveeverallowed,withoutanydoubtorhesitation,thatthesetwocircumstancestakeplaceinthevoluntaryactionsofmen,andintheoperationsofmind;itmustfollow,thatallmankindhaveeveragreedinthedoctrineofnecessity,andthattheyhavehithertodisputed,merelyfornotunderstandingeachother。
  Astothefirstcircumstance,theconstantandregularconjunctionofsimilarevents,wemaypossiblysatisfyourselvesbythefollowingconsiderations:Itisuniversallyacknowledgedthatthereisagreatuniformityamongtheactionsofmen,inallnationsandages,andthathumannatureremainsstillthesame,initsprinciplesandoperations。Thesamemotivesalwaysproducethesameactions:Thesameeventsfollowfromthesamecauses。
  Ambition,avarice,self-love,vanity,friendship,generosity,publicspirit:Thesepassions,mixedinvariousdegrees,anddistributedthroughsociety,havebeen,fromthebeginningoftheworld,andstillare,thesourceofalltheactionsandenterprises,whichhaveeverbeenobservedamongmankind。Wouldyouknowthesentiments,inclinations,andcourseoflifeoftheG/REEKS\andR/OMANS\?StudywellthetemperandactionsoftheF/RENCH\andE/NGLISH\:Youcannotbemuchmistakenintransferringtotheformer
  oftheobservationswhichyouhavemadewithregardtothelatter。Mankindaresomuchthesame,inalltimesandplaces,thathistoryinformsusofnothingneworstrangeinthisparticular。Itschiefuseisonlytodiscovertheconstantanduniversalprinciplesofhumannature,byshowingmeninallvarietiesofcircumstancesandsituations,andfurnishinguswithmaterialsfromwhichwemayformourobservationsandbecomeacquaintedwiththeregularspringsofhumanactionandbehaviour。Theserecordsofwars,intrigues,factions,andrevolutions,aresomanycollectionsofexperiments,bywhichthepoliticianormoralphilosopherfixestheprinciplesofhisscience,inthesamemannerasthephysicianornaturalphilosopherbecomesacquaintedwiththenatureofplants,minerals,andotherexternalobjects,bytheexperimentswhichheformsconcerningthem。Noraretheearth,water,andotherelements,examinedby
  A/RISTOTLE\,andH/IPPOCRATES\,moreliketothosewhichatpresentlieunderourobservationthanthemendescribedbyP/OLYBIUS\andT/ACITUS\aretothosewhonowgoverntheworld。
  Shouldatraveller,returningfromafarcountry,bringusanaccountofmen,whollydifferentfromanywithwhomwewereeveracquainted;men,whowereentirelydivestedofavarice,ambition,orrevenge;whoknewnopleasurebutfriendship,generosity,andpublicspirit;weshouldimmediately,fromthesecircumstances,detectthefalsehood,andprovehimaliar,withthesamecertaintyasifhehadstuffedhisnarrationwithstoriesofcentaursanddragons,miraclesandprodigies。Andifwewouldexplodeanyforgeryinhistory,wecannotmakeuseofamoreconvincingargument,thantoprove,thattheactionsascribedtoanypersonaredirectlycontrarytothecourseofnature,andthatnohumanmotives,insuchcircumstances,couldeverinducehimtosuchaconduct。TheveracityofQ/UINTUS\
  C/URTIUS\isasmuchtobesuspected,whenhedescribesthesupernaturalcourageofA/LEXANDER\,bywhichhewashurriedonsinglytoattackmultitudes,aswhenhedescribeshissupernaturalforceandactivity,bywhichhewasabletoresistthem。Soreadilyanduniversallydoweacknowledgeauniformityinhumanmotivesandactionsaswellasintheoperationsofbody。
  Hencelikewisethebenefitofthatexperience,acquiredbylonglifeandavarietyofbusinessandcompany,inordertoinstructusintheprinciplesofhumannature,andregulateourfutureconduct,aswellasspeculation。Bymeansofthisguide,wemountuptotheknowledgeofmen'sinclinationsandmotives,fromtheiractions,expressions,andevengestures;andagaindescendtotheinterpretationoftheiractionsfromourknowledgeoftheirmotivesandinclinations。Thegeneralobservationstreasuredupbyacourseofexperience,giveustheclueofhumannature,andteachustounravelallitsintricacies。
  Pretextsandappearancesnolongerdeceiveus。Publicdeclarationspassforthespeciouscolouringofacause。Andthoughvirtueandhonourbeallowedtheirproperweightandauthority,thatperfectdisinterestedness,sooftenpretendedto,isneverexpectedinmultitudesandparties;seldomintheirleaders;
  andscarcelyeveninindividualsofanyrankorstation。Butweretherenouniformityinhumanactions,andwereeveryexperimentwhichwecouldformofthiskindirregularandanomalous,itwereimpossibletocollectanygeneralobservationsconcerningmankind;andnoexperience,howeveraccuratelydigestedbyreflection,wouldeverservetoanypurpose。Whyistheagedhusbandmanmoreskilfulinhiscallingthantheyoungbeginnerbutbecausethereisacertainuniformityintheoperationofthesun,rain,andearthtowardstheproductionofvegetables;andexperienceteachestheoldpractitionertherulesbywhichthisoperationisgovernedanddirected。
  Wemustnot,however,expectthatthisuniformityofhumanactionsshouldbecarriedtosuchalengthasthatallmen,inthesamecircumstances,willalwaysactpreciselyinthesamemanner,withoutmakinganyallowanceforthediversityofcharacters,prejudices,andopinions。Suchauniformityineveryparticular,isfoundinnopartofnature。Onthecontrary,fromobservingthevarietyofconductindifferentmen,weareenabledtoformagreatervarietyofmaxims,whichstillsupposeadegreeofuniformityandregularity。
  Arethemannersofmendifferentindifferentagesandcountries?Welearnthencethegreatforceofcustomandeducation,whichmouldthehumanmindfromitsinfancyandformitintoafixedandestablishedcharacter。Isthebehaviourandconductoftheonesexveryunlikethatoftheother?Isitthencewebecomeacquaintedwiththedifferentcharacterswhichnaturehasimpresseduponthesexes,andwhichshepreserveswithconstancyandregularity?Aretheactionsofthesamepersonmuchdiversifiedinthedifferentperiodsofhislife,frominfancytooldage?Thisaffordsroomformanygeneralobservationsconcerningthegradualchangeofoursentimentsandinclinations,andthedifferentmaximswhichprevailinthedifferentagesofhumancreatures。Eventhecharacters,whicharepeculiartoeachindividual,haveauniformityintheirinfluence;otherwiseouracquaintancewiththepersonsandourobservationoftheirconductcouldneverteachustheirdispositions,orservetodirectourbehaviourwithregardtothem。
  Igrantitpossibletofindsomeactions,whichseemtohavenoregularconnexionwithanyknownmotives,andareexceptionstoallthemeasuresofconductwhichhaveeverbeenestablishedforthegovernmentofmen。Butifwewouldwillinglyknowwhatjudgmentshouldbeformedofsuchirregularandextraordinaryactions,wemayconsiderthesentimentscommonlyentertainedwithregardtothoseirregulareventswhichappearinthecourseofnature,andtheoperationsofexternalobjects。Allcausesarenotconjoinedtotheirusualeffectswithlikeuniformity。Anartificer,whohandlesonlydeadmatter,maybedisappointedofhisaim,aswellasthepolitician,whodirectstheconductofsensibleandintelligentagents。
  Thevulgar,whotakethingsaccordingtotheirfirstappearance,attributetheuncertaintyofeventstosuchanuncertaintyinthecausesasmakesthelatteroftenfailoftheirusualinfluence;thoughtheymeetwithnoimpedimentintheiroperation。Butphilosophers,observingthat,almostineverypartofnature,thereiscontainedavastvarietyofspringsandprinciples,whicharehid,byreasonoftheirminutenessorremoteness,find,thatitisatleastpossiblethecontrarietyofeventsmaynotproceedfromanycontingencyinthecause,butfromthesecretoperationofcontrarycauses。Thispossibilityisconvertedintocertaintybyfartherobservation,whentheyremarkthat,uponanexactscrutiny,acontrarietyofeffectsalwaysbetraysacontrarietyofcauses,andproceedsfromtheirmutualopposition。Apeasantcangivenobetterreasonforthestoppingofanyclockorwatchthantosay
  thatitdoesnotcommonlygoright:Butanartisteasilyperceivesthatthesameforceinthespringorpendulumhasalwaysthesameinfluenceonthewheels;butfailsofitsusualeffects,perhapsbyreasonofagrainofdust,whichputsastoptothewholemovement。Fromtheobservationofseveralparallelinstances,philosophersformamaximthattheconnexionbetweenallcausesandeffectsisequallynecessary,andthatitsseeminguncertaintyinsomeinstancesproceedsfromthesecretoppositionofcontrarycauses。
  Thus,forinstance,inthehumanbody,whentheusualsymptomsofhealthorsicknessdisappointourexpectation;
  whenmedicinesoperatenotwiththeirwontedpowers;whenirregulareventsfollowfromanyparticularcause;thephilosopherandphysicianarenotsurprisedatthematter,norareevertemptedtodeny,ingeneral,thenecessityanduniformityofthoseprinciplesbywhichtheanimaleconomyisconducted。Theyknowthatahumanbodyisamightycomplicatedmachine:Thatmanysecretpowerslurkinit,whicharealtogetherbeyondourcomprehension:Thattousitmustoftenappearveryuncertaininitsoperations:Andthatthereforetheirregularevents,whichoutwardlydiscoverthemselves,canbenoproofthatthelawsofnaturearenotobservedwiththegreatestregularityinitsinternaloperationsandgovernment。
  Thephilosopher,ifhebeconsistent,mustapplythesamereasoningtotheactionsandvolitionsofintelligentagents。Themostirregularandunexpectedresolutionsofmenmayfrequentlybeaccountedforbythosewhoknoweveryparticularcircumstanceoftheircharacterandsituation。A
  personofanobligingdispositiongivesapeevishanswer:
  Buthehasthetoothache,orhasnotdined。Astupidfellowdiscoversanuncommonalacrityinhiscarriage:Buthehasmetwithasuddenpieceofgoodfortune。Orevenwhenanaction,assometimeshappens,cannotbeparticularlyaccountedfor,eitherbythepersonhimselforbyothers;weknow,ingeneral,thatthecharactersofmenare,toacertaindegree,inconstantandirregular。Thisis,inamanner,theconstantcharacterofhumannature;thoughitbeapplicable,inamoreparticularmanner,tosomepersonswhohavenofixedrulefortheirconduct,butproceedinacontinuedcourseofcapriceandinconstancy。Theinternalprinciplesandmotivesmayoperateinauniformmanner,notwithstandingtheseseemingirregularities;inthesamemannerasthewinds,rain,cloud,andothervariationsoftheweatheraresupposedtobegovernedbysteadyprinciples;thoughnoteasilydiscoverablebyhumansagacityandenquiry。
  Thusitappears,notonlythattheconjunctionbetweenmotivesandvoluntaryactionsisasregularanduniformasthatbetweenthecauseandeffectinanypartofnature;butalsothatthisregularconjunctionhasbeenuniversallyacknowledgedamongmankind,andhasneverbeenthesubjectofdispute,eitherinphilosophyorcommonlife。Now,asitisfrompastexperiencethatwedrawall
  concerningthefuture,andasweconcludethatobjectswillalwaysbeconjoinedtogetherwhichwefindtohavealwaysbeenconjoined;itmayseemsuperfluoustoprovethatthisexperienceduniformityinhumanactionsisasourcewhencewedrawinferencesconcerningthem。Butinordertothrowtheargumentintoagreatervarietyoflightsweshallalsoinsist,thoughbriefly,onthislattertopic。
  Themutualdependenceofmenissogreatinallsocietiesthatscarceanyhumanactionisentirelycompleteinitself,orisperformedwithoutsomereferencetotheactionsofothers,whicharerequisitetomakeitanswerfullytheintentionoftheagent。Thepoorestartificer,wholaboursalone,expectsatleasttheprotectionofthemagistrate,toensurehimtheenjoymentofthefruitsofhislabour。Healsoexpectsthat,whenhecarrieshisgoodstomarket,andoffersthematareasonableprice,heshallfindpurchasers,andshallbeable,bythemoneyheacquires,toengageotherstosupplyhimwiththosecommoditieswhicharerequisiteforhissubsistence。Inproportionasmenextendtheirdealings,andrendertheirintercoursewithothersmorecomplicated,
  theyalwayscomprehend,intheirschemesoflife,agreatervarietyofvoluntaryactions,whichtheyexpect,fromthepropermotives,toco-operatewiththeirown。Inalltheseconclusionstheytaketheirmeasuresfrompastexperience,inthesamemannerasintheirreasoningsconcerningexternalobjects;andfirmlybelievethatmen,aswellasalltheelements,aretocontinue,intheiroperations,thesamethattheyhaveeverfoundthem。A
  manufacturerreckonsuponthelabourofhisservantsfortheexecutionofanyworkasmuchasuponthetoolswhichheemploys,andwouldbeequallysurprisedwerehisexpectationsdisappointed。Inshort,thisexperimentalinferenceandreasoningconcerningtheactionsofothersenterssomuchintohumanlifethatnoman,whileawake,iseveramomentwithoutemployingit。Havewenotreason,therefore,toaffirmthatallmankindhavealwaysagreedinthedoctrineofnecessityaccordingtotheforegoingdefinitionandexplicationofit?
  Norhavephilosophersevenentertainedadifferentopinionfromthepeopleinthisparticular。For,nottomentionthatalmosteveryactionoftheirlifesupposesthatopinion,thereareevenfewofthespeculativepartsoflearningtowhichitisnotessential。Whatwouldbecomeof,hadwenotadependenceontheveracityofthehistorianaccordingtotheexperiencewhichwehavehadofmankind?Howcouldbeascience,iflawsandformsofgovernmenthadnotauniforminfluenceuponsociety?Wherewouldbethefoundationof,ifparticularcharactershadnocertainordeterminatepowertoproduceparticularsentiments,andifthesesentimentshadnoconstantoperationonactions?Andwithwhatpretencecouldweemployouruponanypoetorpoliteauthor,ifwecouldnotpronouncetheconductandsentimentsofhisactorseithernaturalorunnaturaltosuchcharacters,andinsuchcircumstances?Itseemsalmostimpossible,therefore,toengageeitherinscienceoractionofanykindwithoutacknowledgingthedoctrineofnecessity,andthisfrommotivetovoluntaryactions,fromcharacterstoconduct。
  Andindeed,whenweconsiderhowaptlyandevidencelinktogether,andformonlyonechainofargument,weshallmakenoscrupletoallowthattheyareofthesamenature,andderivedfromthesameprinciples。A
  prisonerwhohasneithermoneynorinterest,discoverstheimpossibilityofhisescape,aswellwhenheconsiderstheobstinacyofthegaoler,asthewallsandbarswithwhichheissurrounded;and,inallattemptsforhisfreedom,choosesrathertoworkuponthestoneandironoftheone,thanupontheinflexiblenatureoftheother。Thesameprisoner,whenconductedtothescaffold,foreseeshisdeathascertainlyfromtheconstancyandfidelityofhisguards,asfromtheoperationoftheaxeorwheel。Hismindrunsalongacertaintrainofideas:Therefusalofthesoldierstoconsenttohisescape;theactionoftheexecutioner;theseparationoftheheadandbody;bleeding,convulsivemotions,anddeath。
  Hereisaconnectedchainofnaturalcausesandvoluntaryactions;butthemindfeelsnodifferencebetweentheminpassingfromonelinktoanother:Norisitlesscertainofthefutureeventthanifitwereconnectedwiththeobjectspresenttothememoryorsenses,byatrainofcauses,cementedtogetherbywhatwearepleasedtocallanecessity。Thesameexperiencedunionhasthesameeffectonthemind,whethertheunited
  objectsbemotives,volition,andactions;orfigureandmotion。Wemaychangethenameofthings;buttheirnatureandtheiroperationontheunderstandingneverchange。
  Wereaman,whomIknowtobehonestandopulent,andwithwhomIliveinintimatefriendship,tocomeintomyhouse,whereIamsurroundedwithmyservants,Irestassuredthatheisnottostabmebeforeheleavesitinordertorobmeofmysilverstandish;andInomoresuspectthiseventthanthefallingofthehouseitself,whichisnew,andsolidlybuiltandfounded————Somayasuddenearthquakearise,andshakeandtumblemyhouseaboutmyears。Ishallthereforechangethesuppositions。IshallsaythatIknowwithcertaintythatheisnottoputhishandintothefireandholdittheretillitbeconsumed:Andthisevent,IthinkIcanforetellwiththesameassurance,asthat,ifhethrowhimselfoutatthewindow,andmeetwithnoobstruction,hewillnotremainamomentsuspendedintheair。Nosuspicionofanunknownfrenzycangivetheleastpossibilitytotheformerevent,whichissocontrarytoalltheknownprinciplesofhumannature。AmanwhoatnoonleaveshispursefullofgoldonthepavementatCharing-Cross,mayaswellexpectthatitwillflyawaylikeafeather,asthathewillfindituntouchedanhourafter。
  Aboveonehalfofhumanreasoningscontaininferencesofasimilarnature,attendedwithmoreorlessdegreesofcertaintyproportionedtoourexperienceoftheusualconductofmankindinsuchparticularsituations。
  Ihavefrequentlyconsidered,whatcouldpossiblybethereasonwhyallmankind,thoughtheyhaveever,withouthesitation,acknowledgedthedoctrineofnecessityintheirwholepracticeandreasoning,haveyetdiscoveredsuchareluctancetoacknowledgeitinwords,andhaverathershownapropensity,inallages,toprofessthecontraryopinion。
  Thematter,Ithink,maybeaccountedforafterthefollowingmanner。Ifweexaminetheoperationsofbody,andtheproductionofeffectsfromtheircauses,weshallfindthatallourfacultiescannevercarryusfartherinourknowledgeofthisrelationthanbarelytoobservethatparticularobjectsaretogether,andthatthemindiscarried,bya,fromtheappearanceofonetothebeliefoftheother。Butthoughthisconclusionconcerninghumanignorancebetheresultofthestrictestscrutinyofthissubject,menstill
  entertainastrongpropensitytobelievethattheypenetratefartherintothepowersofnature,andperceivesomethinglikeanecessaryconnexionbetweenthecauseandtheeffect。Whenagaintheyturntheirreflectionstowardstheoperationsoftheirownminds,andnosuchconnexionofthemotiveandtheaction;theyarethenceapttosuppose,thatthereisadifferencebetweentheeffectswhichresultfrommaterialforce,andthosewhicharisefromthoughtandintelligence。Butbeingonceconvincedthatweknownothingfartherofcausationofanykindthanmerelytheofobjects,andtheconsequentofthemindfromonetoanother,andfindingthatthese
  twocircumstancesareuniversallyallowedtohaveplaceinvoluntaryactions;wemaybemoreeasilyledtoownthesamenecessitycommontoallcauses。Andthoughthisreasoningmaycontradictthesystemsofmanyphilosophers,inascribingnecessitytothedeterminationsofthewill,weshallfind,uponreflection,thattheydissentfromitinwordsonly,notintheirrealsentiment。Necessity,accordingtothesenseinwhichitisheretaken,hasneveryetbeenrejected,norcanever,Ithink,berejectedbyanyphilosopher。Itmayonly,perhaps,bepretendedthatthemindcanperceive,intheoperationsofmatter,somefartherconnexionbetweenthecauseandeffect;andconnexionthathasnotplaceinvoluntaryactionsofintelligentbeings。