MORALLAWS。
　　Theactivefacultyofthehumanmind，asthefacultyofdesireinitswidestsense，isthepowerwhichmanhas，throughhismentalrepresentations，ofbecomingthecauseofobjectscorrespondingtotheserepresentations。Thecapacityofabeingtoactinconformitywithhisownrepresentationsiswhatconstitutesthelifeofsuchabeing。
　　Itistobeobserved，first，thatwithdesireoraversionthereisalwaysconnectedpleasureorpain，thesusceptibilityforwhichiscalledfeeling。Buttheconversedoesnotalwayshold;fortheremaybeapleasureconnected，notwiththedesireofanobject，butwithamerementalrepresentation，itbeingindifferentwhetheranobjectcorrespondingtotherepresentationexistornot。Andsecond，thepleasureorpainconnectedwiththeobjectofdesiredoesnotalwaysprecedetheactivityofdesire;norcanitberegardedineverycaseasthecause，butitmayaswellbetheeffectofthatactivity。Thecapacityofexperiencingpleasureorpainontheoccasionofamentalrepresentationiscalled"feeling，"becausepleasureandpaincontainonlywhatissubjectiveintherelationsofourmentalactivity。Theydonotinvolveanyrelationtoanobjectthatcouldpossiblyfurnishaknowledgeofitassuch;theycannotevengiveusaknowledgeofourownmentalstate。Forevensensations，*consideredapartfromthequalitieswhichattachtothemonaccountofthemodificationsofthesubject—as，forinstance，inreferencetored，sweet，andsuchlike—arereferredasconstituentelementsofknowledgetoobjects，whereaspleasureorpainfeltinconnectionwithwhatisredorsweetexpressabsolutelynothingthatisintheobject，butmerelyarelationtothesubject。Andforthereasonjuststated，pleasureandpainconsideredinthemselvescannotbemorepreciselydefined。Allthatcanbefurtherdonewithregardtothemismerelytopointoutwhatconsequencestheymayhaveincertainrelations，inordertomaketheknowledgeofthemavailablepractically。
　　*Thesensibilityasthefacultyofsensemaybedefinedbyreferencetothesubjectivenatureofourrepresentationsgenerally。Itistheunderstandingthatfirrefersthesubjectiverepresentationstoanobject;italonethinksanythingbymeansoftheserepresentations。
　　Now，thesubjectivenatureofourrepresentationsmightbeofsuchakindthattheycouldberelatedtoobjectssoastofurnishknowledgeofthem，eitherinregardtotheirformormatter—intheformerrelationbypureperception，inthelatterbysensationproper。
　　Inthiscase，thesense—faculty，asthecapacityforreceivingobjectiverepresentations，wouldbeproperlycalledsenseperception。Butmerementalrepresentationfromitssubjectivenaturecannot，infact，becomeaconstituentofobjectiveknowledge，becauseitcontainsmerelytherelationoftherepresentationstothesubject，andincludesnothingthatcanbeusedforattainingaknowledgeoftheobject。Inthiscase，then，thisreceptivityofthemindforsubjectiverepresentationsiscalledfeeling。Itincludestheeffectoftherepresentations，whethersensibleorintellectual，uponthesubject;anditbelongstothesensibility，althoughtherepresentationitselfmaybelongtotheunderstandingorthereason。
　　Thepleasurewhichisnecessarilyconnectedwiththeactivityofdesire，whentherepresentationoftheobjectdesiredaffectsthecapacityoffeeling，maybecalledpracticalpleasure。Andthisdesignationisapplicablewhetherthepleasureisthecauseortheeffectofthedesire。Ontheotherhand，thatpleasurewhichisnotnecessarilyconnectedwiththedesireofanobject，andwhich，therefore，isnotapleasureintheexistenceoftheobject，butismerelyattachedtoamentalrepresentationalone，maybecalledinactivecomplacency，ormerecontemplativepleasure。Thefeelingofthislatterkindofpleasureiswhatiscalledtaste。Hence，inasystemofpracticalphilosophy，thecontemplativepleasureoftastewillnotbediscussedasanessentialconstituentconception，butneedonlybereferredtoincidentallyorepisodically。Butasregardspracticalpleasure，itisotherwise。Forthedeterminationoftheactivityofthefacultyofdesireorappetency，whichisnecessarilyprecededbythispleasureasitscause，iswhatproperlyconstitutesdesireinthestrictsenseoftheterm。Habitualdesire，again，constitutesinclination;andtheconnectionofpleasurewiththeactivityofdesire，insofarasthisconnectionisjudgedbytheunderstandingtobevalidaccordingtoageneralruleholdinggoodatleastfortheindividual，iswhatiscalledinterest。Hence，insuchacase，thepracticalpleasureisaninterestoftheinclinationoftheindividual。Ontheotherhand，ifthepleasurecanonlyfollowaprecedingdeterminationofthefacultyofdesire，itisanintellectualpleasure，andtheinterestintheobjectmustbecalledarationalinterest;forweretheinterestsensuous，andnotbasedonlyuponpureprinciplesofreason，sensationwouldnecessarilybeconjoinedwiththepleasure，andwouldthusdeterminetheactivityofthedesire。Whereanentirelypureinterestofreasonmustbeassumed，itisnotlegitimatetointroduceintoitaninterestofinclinationsurreptitiously。However，inordertoconformsofarwiththecommonphraseology，wemayallowtheapplicationoftheterm"inclination"eventothatwhichcanonlybetheobjectofan"intellectual"pleasureinthesenseofahabitualdesirearisingfromapureinterestofreason。Butsuchinclinationwouldhavetobeviewed，notasthecause，butastheeffectoftherationalinterest;andwemightcallitthenon—sensuousorrationalinclination（propensiointellectualis）。Further，concupiscenceistobedistinguishedfromtheactivityofdesireitself，asastimulusorincitementtoitsdetermination。Itisalwaysasensuousstateofthemind，whichdoesnotitselfattaintothedefinitenessofanactofthepowerofdesire。
　　Theactivityofthefacultyofdesiremayproceedinaccordancewithconceptions;andinsofarastheprinciplethusdeterminingittoactionisfoundinthemind，andnotinitsobjectitconstitutesapoweractingornotactingaccordingtoliking。Insofarastheactivityisaccompaniedwiththeconsciousnessofthepoweroftheactiontoproducetheobject，itformsanactofchoice;ifthisconsciousnessisnotconjoinedwithit，theactivityiscalledawish。
　　Thefacultyofdesire，insofarasitsinnerprincipleofdeterminationasthegroundofitslikingorpredilectionliesinthereasonofthesubject，constitutesthewill。Thewillisthereforethefacultyofactivedesireorappetency，viewednotsomuchinrelationtotheaction—whichistherelationoftheactofchoice—asratherinrelationtotheprinciplethatdeterminesthepowerofchoicetotheaction。Ithas，initself，properlynospecialprincipleofdetermination，butinsofarasitmaydeterminethevoluntaryactofchoice，itisthepracticalreasonitself。