HithertonocitizenhasshownanydispositiontoexposehishonorandhislifeinordertobecomethePresidentoftheUnitedStates;becausethepowerofthatofficeistemporary，limited，andsubordinate。Theprizeoffortunemustbegreattoencourageadventurersinsodesperateagame。Nocandidatehasasyetbeenabletoarousethedangerousenthusiasmorthepassionatesympathiesofthepeopleinhisfavor，fortheverysimplereasonthatwhenheisattheheadoftheGovernmenthehasbutlittlepower，butlittlewealth，andbutlittleglorytoshareamongsthisfriends;andhisinfluenceintheStateistoosmallforthesuccessortheruinofafactiontodependupontheelevationofanindividualtopower。
　　Thegreatadvantageofhereditarymonarchiesis，thatastheprivateinterestofafamilyisalwaysintimatelyconnectedwiththeinterestsoftheState，theexecutivegovernmentisneversuspendedforasingleinstant;andiftheaffairsofamonarchyarenotbetterconductedthanthoseofarepublic，atleastthereisalwayssomeonetoconductthem，wellorill，accordingtohiscapacity。InelectiveStates，onthecontrary，thewheelsofgovernmentceasetoact，asitwere，oftheirownaccordattheapproachofanelection，andevenforsometimeprevioustothatevent。Thelawsmayindeedacceleratetheoperationoftheelection，whichmaybeconductedwithsuchsimplicityandrapiditythattheseatofpowerwillneverbeleftvacant;but，notwithstandingtheseprecautions，abreaknecessarilyoccursinthemindsofthepeople。
　　Attheapproachofanelectiontheheadoftheexecutivegovernmentiswhollyoccupiedbythecomingstruggle;hisfutureplansaredoubtful;hecanundertakenothingnew，andthehewillonlyprosecutewithindifferencethosedesignswhichanotherwillperhapsterminate。"Iamsonearthetimeofmyretirementfromoffice，"saidPresidentJeffersononthe21stofJanuary，1809
　　（sixweeksbeforetheelection），"thatIfeelnopassion，Itakenopart，Iexpressnosentiment。Itappearstomejusttoleavetomysuccessorthecommencementofthosemeasureswhichhewillhavetoprosecute，andforwhichhewillberesponsible。"
　　Ontheotherhand，theeyesofthenationarecentredonasinglepoint;allarewatchingthegradualbirthofsoimportantanevent。Thewidertheinfluenceoftheexecutivepowerextends，thegreaterandthemorenecessaryisitsconstantaction，themorefatalisthetermofsuspense;andanationwhichisaccustomedtothegovernment，or，stillmore，oneusedtotheadministrativeprotectionofapowerfulexecutiveauthoritywouldbeinfalliblyconvulsedbyanelectionofthiskind。IntheUnitedStatestheactionoftheGovernmentmaybeslackenedwithimpunity，becauseitisalwaysweakandcircumscribed。*u[Footnoteu:[This，however，maybeagreatdanger。TheperiodduringwhichMr。Buchananretainedoffice，aftertheelectionofMr。Lincoln，fromNovember，1860，toMarch，1861，wasthatwhichenabledthesecedingStatesoftheSouthtocompletetheirpreparationsfortheCivilWar，andtheExecutiveGovernmentwasparalyzed。Nogreaterevilcouldbefallanation。—Translator’sNote。]]
　　OneoftheprincipalvicesoftheelectivesystemisthatitalwaysintroducesacertaindegreeofinstabilityintotheinternalandexternalpolicyoftheState。Butthisdisadvantageislesssensiblyfeltiftheshareofpowervestedintheelectedmagistrateissmall。InRometheprinciplesoftheGovernmentunderwentnovariation，althoughtheConsulswerechangedeveryyear，becausetheSenate，whichwasanhereditaryassembly，possessedthedirectingauthority。IftheelectivesystemwereadoptedinEurope，theconditionofmostofthemonarchicalStateswouldbechangedateverynewelection。InAmericathePresidentexercisesacertaininfluenceonStateaffairs，buthedoesnotconductthem;thepreponderatingpowerisvestedintherepresentativesofthewholenation。Thepoliticalmaximsofthecountrydependthereforeonthemassofthepeople，notonthePresidentalone;andconsequentlyinAmericatheelectivesystemhasnoveryprejudicialinfluenceonthefixedprinciplesoftheGovernment。ButthewantoffixedprinciplesisanevilsoinherentintheelectivesystemthatitisstillextremelyperceptibleinthenarrowspheretowhichtheauthorityofthePresidentextends。
　　TheAmericanshaveadmittedthattheheadoftheexecutivepower，whohastobearthewholeresponsibilityofthedutiesheiscalledupontofulfil，oughttobeempoweredtochoosehisownagents，andtoremovethematpleasure:thelegislativebodieswatchtheconductofthePresidentmorethantheydirectit。Theconsequenceofthisarrangementis，thatateverynewelectionthefateofalltheFederalpublicofficersisinsuspense。Mr。
　　QuincyAdams，onhisentryintooffice，dischargedthemajorityoftheindividualswhohadbeenappointedbyhispredecessor:andIamnotawarethatGeneralJacksonallowedasingleremovablefunctionaryemployedintheFederalservicetoretainhisplacebeyondthefirstyearwhichsucceededhiselection。ItissometimesmadeasubjectofcomplaintthatintheconstitutionalmonarchiesofEuropethefateofthehumblerservantsofanAdministrationdependsuponthatoftheMinisters。ButinelectiveGovernmentsthisevilisfargreater。Inaconstitutionalmonarchysuccessiveministriesarerapidlyformed;
　　butastheprincipalrepresentativeoftheexecutivepowerdoesnotchange，thespiritofinnovationiskeptwithinbounds;thechangeswhichtakeplaceareinthedetailsratherthanintheprinciplesoftheadministrativesystem;buttosubstituteonesystemforanother，asisdoneinAmericaeveryfouryears，bylaw，istocauseasortofrevolution。Astothemisfortuneswhichmayfalluponindividualsinconsequenceofthisstateofthings，itmustbeallowedthattheuncertainsituationofthepublicofficersislessfraughtwithevilconsequencesinAmericathanelsewhere。ItissoeasytoacquireanindependentpositionintheUnitedStatesthatthepublicofficerwholoseshisplacemaybedeprivedofthecomfortsoflife，butnotofthemeansofsubsistence。
　　IremarkedatthebeginningofthischapterthatthedangersoftheelectivesystemappliedtotheheadoftheStateareaugmentedordecreasedbythepeculiarcircumstancesofthepeoplewhichadoptsit。Howeverthefunctionsoftheexecutivepowermayberestricted，itmustalwaysexerciseagreatinfluenceupontheforeignpolicyofthecountry，foranegotiationcannotbeopenedorsuccessfullycarriedonotherwisethanbyasingleagent。Themoreprecariousandthemoreperilousthepositionofapeoplebecomes，themoreabsoluteisthewantofafixedandconsistentexternalpolicy，andthemoredangerousdoestheelectivesystemoftheChiefMagistratebecome。ThepolicyoftheAmericansinrelationtothewholeworldisexceedinglysimple;foritmayalmostbesaidthatnocountrystandsinneedofthem，nordotheyrequiretheco—operationofanyotherpeople。Theirindependenceisneverthreatened。Intheirpresentcondition，therefore，thefunctionsoftheexecutivepowerarenolesslimitedbycircumstancesthanbythelaws;andthePresidentmayfrequentlychangehislineofpolicywithoutinvolvingtheStateindifficultyordestruction。
　　Whatevertheprerogativesoftheexecutivepowermaybe，theperiodwhichimmediatelyprecedesanelectionandthemomentofitsdurationmustalwaysbeconsideredasanationalcrisis，whichisperilousinproportiontotheinternalembarrassmentsandtheexternaldangersofthecountry。FewofthenationsofEuropecouldescapethecalamitiesofanarchyorofconquesteverytimetheymighthavetoelectanewsovereign。InAmericasocietyissoconstitutedthatitcanstandwithoutassistanceuponitsownbasis;nothingistobefearedfromthepressureofexternaldangers，andtheelectionofthePresidentisacauseofagitation，butnotofruin。
　　ModeOfElectionSkilloftheAmericanlegislatorsshowninthemodeofelectionadoptedbythem—Creationofaspecialelectoralbody—Separatevotesoftheseelectors—CaseinwhichtheHouseofRepresentativesiscalledupontochoosethePresident—ResultsofthetwelveelectionswhichhavetakenplacesincetheConstitutionhasbeenestablished。
　　Besidesthedangerswhichareinherentinthesystem，manyotherdifficultiesmayarisefromthemodeofelection，whichmaybeobviatedbytheprecautionofthelegislator。Whenapeoplemetinarmsonsomepublicspottochooseitshead，itwasexposedtoallthechancesofcivilwarresultingfromsomartialamodeofproceeding，besidesthedangersoftheelectivesysteminitself。ThePolishlaws，whichsubjectedtheelectionofthesovereigntothevetoofasingleindividual，suggestedthemurderofthatindividualorpreparedthewaytoanarchy。
　　IntheexaminationoftheinstitutionsandthepoliticalaswellassocialconditionoftheUnitedStates，wearestruckbytheadmirableharmonyofthegiftsoffortuneandtheeffortsofman。Thenationpossessedtwoofthemaincausesofinternalpeace;itwasanewcountry，butitwasinhabitedbyapeoplegrownoldintheexerciseoffreedom。Americahadnohostileneighborstodread;andtheAmericanlegislators，profitingbythesefavorablecircumstances，createdaweakandsubordinateexecutivepowerwhichcouldwithoutdangerbemadeelective。
　　Itthenonlyremainedforthemtochoosetheleastdangerousofthevariousmodesofelection;andtheruleswhichtheylaiddownuponthispointadmirablycorrespondtothesecuritieswhichthephysicalandpoliticalconstitutionofthecountryalreadyafforded。Theirobjectwastofindthemodeofelectionwhichwouldbestexpressthechoiceofthepeoplewiththeleastpossibleexcitementandsuspense。Itwasadmittedinthefirstplacethatthesimplemajorityshouldbedecisive;butthedifficultywastoobtainthismajoritywithoutanintervalofdelaywhichitwasmostimportanttoavoid。Itrarelyhappensthatanindividualcanatoncecollectthemajorityofthesuffragesofagreatpeople;andthisdifficultyisenhancedinarepublicofconfederateStates，wherelocalinfluencesareapttopreponderate。Themeansbywhichitwasproposedtoobviatethissecondobstaclewastodelegatetheelectoralpowersofthenationtoabodyofrepresentatives。Thismodeofelectionrenderedamajoritymoreprobable;forthefewertheelectorsare，thegreateristhechanceoftheircomingtoafinaldecision。Italsoofferedanadditionalprobabilityofajudiciouschoice。Itthenremainedtobedecidedwhetherthisrightofelectionwastobeentrustedtoalegislativebody，thehabitualrepresentativeassemblyofthenation，orwhetheranelectoralassemblyshouldbeformedfortheexpresspurposeofproceedingtothenominationofaPresident。TheAmericanschosethelatteralternative，fromabeliefthattheindividualswhowerereturnedtomakethelawswereincompetenttorepresentthewishesofthenationintheelectionofitschiefmagistrate;andthat，astheyarechosenformorethanayear，theconstituencytheyrepresentmighthavechangeditsopinioninthattime。Itwasthoughtthatifthelegislaturewasempoweredtoelecttheheadoftheexecutivepower，itsmemberswould，forsometimebeforetheelection，beexposedtothemanoeuvresofcorruptionandthetricksofintrigue;whereasthespecialelectorswould，likeajury，remainmixedupwiththecrowdtillthedayofaction，whentheywouldappearforthesolepurposeofgivingtheirvotes。
　　ItwasthereforeestablishedthateveryStateshouldnameacertainnumberofelectors，*vwhointheirturnshouldelectthePresident;andasithadbeenobservedthattheassembliestowhichthechoiceofachiefmagistratehadbeenentrustedinelectivecountriesinevitablybecamethecentresofpassionandofcabal;thattheysometimesusurpedanauthoritywhichdidnotbelongtothem;andthattheirproceedings，ortheuncertaintywhichresultedfromthem，weresometimesprolongedsomuchastoendangerthewelfareoftheState，itwasdeterminedthattheelectorsshouldallvoteuponthesameday，withoutbeingconvokedtothesameplace。*wThisdoubleelectionrenderedamajorityprobable，thoughnotcertain;foritwaspossiblethatasmanydifferencesmightexistbetweentheelectorsasbetweentheirconstituents。Inthiscaseitwasnecessarytohaverecoursetooneofthreemeasures;eithertoappointnewelectors，ortoconsultasecondtimethosealreadyappointed，ortodefertheelectiontoanotherauthority。Thefirsttwoofthesealternatives，independentlyoftheuncertaintyoftheirresults，werelikelytodelaythefinaldecision，andtoperpetuateanagitationwhichmustalwaysbeaccompaniedwithdanger。Thethirdexpedientwasthereforeadopted，anditwasagreedthatthevotesshouldbetransmittedsealedtothePresidentoftheSenate，andthattheyshouldbeopenedandcountedinthepresenceoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives。Ifnoneofthecandidateshasamajority，theHouseofRepresentativesthenproceedsimmediatelytoelectaPresident，butwiththeconditionthatitmustfixupononeofthethreecandidateswhohavethehighestnumbers。*x[Footnotev:AsmanyasitsendsmemberstoCongress。Thenumberofelectorsattheelectionof1833was288。（See"TheNationalCalendar，"1833。）]
　　[Footnotew:TheelectorsofthesameStateassemble，buttheytransmittothecentralgovernmentthelistoftheirindividualvotes，andnotthemereresultofthevoteofthemajority。]
　　[Footnotex:InthiscaseitisthemajorityoftheStates，andnotthemajorityofthemembers，whichdecidesthequestion;sothatNewYorkhasnotmoreinfluenceinthedebatethanRhodeIsland。ThusthecitizensoftheUnionarefirstconsultedasmembersofoneandthesamecommunity;and，iftheycannotagree，recourseishadtothedivisionoftheStates，eachofwhichhasaseparateandindependentvote。ThisisoneofthesingularitiesoftheFederalConstitutionwhichcanonlybeexplainedbythejarofconflictinginterests。]
　　Thusitisonlyincaseofaneventwhichcannotoftenhappen，andwhichcanneverbeforeseen，thattheelectionisentrustedtotheordinaryrepresentativesofthenation;andeventhentheyareobligedtochooseacitizenwhohasalreadybeendesignatedbyapowerfulminorityofthespecialelectors。Itisbythishappyexpedientthattherespectwhichisduetothepopularvoiceiscombinedwiththeutmostcelerityofexecutionandthoseprecautionswhichthepeaceofthecountrydemands。
　　ButthedecisionofthequestionbytheHouseofRepresentativesdoesnotnecessarilyofferanimmediatesolutionofthedifficulty，forthemajorityofthatassemblymaystillbedoubtful，andinthiscasetheConstitutionprescribesnoremedy。
　　Nevertheless，byrestrictingthenumberofcandidatestothree，andbyreferringthemattertothejudgmentofanenlightenedpublicbody，ithassmoothedalltheobstacles*ywhicharenotinherentintheelectivesystem。
　　[Footnotey:Jefferson，in1801，wasnotelecteduntilthethirty—sixthtimeofballoting。]
　　Intheforty—fouryearswhichhaveelapsedsincethepromulgationoftheFederalConstitutiontheUnitedStateshavetwelvetimeschosenaPresident。TenoftheseelectionstookplacesimultaneouslybythevotesofthespecialelectorsinthedifferentStates。TheHouseofRepresentativeshasonlytwiceexerciseditsconditionalprivilegeofdecidingincasesofuncertainty;thefirsttimewasattheelectionofMr。Jeffersonin1801;thesecondwasin1825，whenMr。QuincyAdamswasnamed。
　　*z[Footnotez:[GeneralGrantisnow（1874）theeighteenthPresidentoftheUnitedStates。]]
　　CrisesOfTheElectionTheElectionmaybeconsideredasanationalcrisis—Why？—
　　Passionsofthepeople—AnxietyofthePresident—Calmwhichsucceedstheagitationoftheelection。
　　IhaveshownwhatthecircumstancesarewhichfavoredtheadoptionoftheelectivesystemintheUnitedStates，andwhatprecautionsweretakenbythelegislatorstoobviateitsdangers。
　　TheAmericansarehabituallyaccustomedtoallkindsofelections，andtheyknowbyexperiencetheutmostdegreeofexcitementwhichiscompatiblewithsecurity。Thevastextentofthecountryandthedisseminationoftheinhabitantsrenderacollisionbetweenpartieslessprobableandlessdangeroustherethanelsewhere。Thepoliticalcircumstancesunderwhichtheelectionshavehithertobeencarriedonhavepresentednorealembarrassmentstothenation。
　　Nevertheless，theepochoftheelectionofaPresidentoftheUnitedStatesmaybeconsideredasacrisisintheaffairsofthenation。Theinfluencewhichheexercisesonpublicbusinessisnodoubtfeebleandindirect;butthechoiceofthePresident，whichisofsmallimportancetoeachindividualcitizen，concernsthecitizenscollectively;andhowevertriflinganinterestmaybe，itassumesagreatdegreeofimportanceassoonasitbecomesgeneral。ThePresidentpossessesbutfewmeansofrewardinghissupportersincomparisontothekingsofEurope，buttheplaceswhichareathisdisposalaresufficientlynumeroustointerest，directlyorindirectly，severalthousandelectorsinhissuccess。
　　PoliticalpartiesintheUnitedStatesareledtorallyroundanindividual，inordertoacquireamoretangibleshapeintheeyesofthecrowd，andthenameofthecandidateforthePresidencyisputforwardasthesymbolandpersonificationoftheirtheories。
　　Forthesereasonspartiesarestronglyinterestedingainingtheelection，notsomuchwithaviewtothetriumphoftheirprinciplesundertheauspicesofthePresident—electastoshowbythemajoritywhichreturnedhim，thestrengthofthesupportersofthoseprinciples。
　　Foralongwhilebeforetheappointedtimeisathandtheelectionbecomesthemostimportantandtheall—engrossingtopicofdiscussion。Theardoroffactionisredoubled;andalltheartificialpassionswhichtheimaginationcancreateinthebosomofahappyandpeacefullandareagitatedandbroughttolight。
　　ThePresident，ontheotherhand，isabsorbedbythecaresofself—defence。HenolongergovernsfortheinterestoftheState，butforthatofhisre—election;hedoeshomagetothemajority，andinsteadofcheckingitspassions，ashisdutycommandshimtodo，hefrequentlycourtsitsworstcaprices。Astheelectiondrawsnear，theactivityofintrigueandtheagitationofthepopulaceincrease;thecitizensaredividedintohostilecamps，eachofwhichassumesthenameofitsfavoritecandidate;thewholenationglowswithfeverishexcitement;theelectionisthedailythemeofthepublicpapers，thesubjectofprivateconversation，theendofeverythoughtandeveryaction，thesoleinterestofthepresent。Assoonasthechoiceisdetermined，thisardorisdispelled;andasacalmerseasonreturns，thecurrentoftheState，whichhadnearlybrokenitsbanks，sinkstoitsusuallevel:*abutwhocanrefrainfromastonishmentatthecausesofthestorm。
　　[Footnotea:[Notalways。TheelectionofPresidentLincolnwasthesignalofcivilwar。—Translator’sNote。]]
　　ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartIII
　　Re—electionOfThePresidentWhentheheadoftheexecutivepowerisre—eligible，itistheStatewhichisthesourceofintrigueandcorruption—Thedesireofbeingre—electedthechiefaimofaPresidentoftheUnitedStates—DisadvantageofthesystempeculiartoAmerica—Thenaturalevilofdemocracyisthatitsubordinatesallauthoritytotheslightestdesiresofthemajority—There—electionofthePresidentencouragesthisevil。
　　ItmaybeaskedwhetherthelegislatorsoftheUnitedStatesdidrightorwronginallowingthere—electionofthePresident。
　　Itseemsatfirstsightcontrarytoallreasontopreventtheheadoftheexecutivepowerfrombeingelectedasecondtime。
　　Theinfluencewhichthetalentsandthecharacterofasingleindividualmayexerciseuponthefateofawholepeople，incriticalcircumstancesorarduoustimes，iswellknown:alawpreventingthere—electionofthechiefmagistratewoulddeprivethecitizensofthesurestpledgeoftheprosperityandthesecurityofthecommonwealth;and，byasingularinconsistency，amanwouldbeexcludedfromthegovernmentattheverytimewhenhehadshownhisabilityinconductingitsaffairs。
　　Butiftheseargumentsarestrong，perhapsstillmorepowerfulreasonsmaybeadvancedagainstthem。Intrigueandcorruptionarethenaturaldefectsofelectivegovernment;butwhentheheadoftheStatecanbere—electedtheseevilsrisetoagreatheight，andcompromisetheveryexistenceofthecountry。
　　Whenasimplecandidateseekstorisebyintrigue，hismanoeuvresmustnecessarilybelimitedtoanarrowsphere;butwhenthechiefmagistrateentersthelists，heborrowsthestrengthofthegovernmentforhisownpurposes。Intheformercasethefeebleresourcesofanindividualareinaction;inthelatter，theStateitself，withallitsimmenseinfluence，isbusiedintheworkofcorruptionandcabal。Theprivatecitizen，whoemploysthemostimmoralpracticestoacquirepower，canonlyactinamannerindirectlyprejudicialtothepublicprosperity。Butiftherepresentativeoftheexecutivedescendsintothecombat，thecaresofgovernmentdwindleintosecond—rateimportance，andthesuccessofhiselectionishisfirstconcern。Alllawsandallthenegotiationsheundertakesaretohimnothingmorethanelectioneeringschemes;placesbecometherewardofservicesrendered，nottothenation，buttoitschief;andtheinfluenceofthegovernment，ifnotinjurioustothecountry，isatleastnolongerbeneficialtothecommunityforwhichitwascreated。
　　ItisimpossibletoconsidertheordinarycourseofaffairsintheUnitedStateswithoutperceivingthatthedesireofbeingre—electedisthechiefaimofthePresident;thathiswholeadministration，andevenhismostindifferentmeasures，tendtothisobject;andthat，asthecrisisapproaches，hispersonalinteresttakestheplaceofhisinterestinthepublicgood。Theprincipleofre—eligibilityrendersthecorruptinfluenceofelectivegovernmentstillmoreextensiveandpernicious。
　　InAmericaitexercisesapeculiarlyfatalinfluenceonthesourcesofnationalexistence。Everygovernmentseemstobeafflictedbysomeevilwhichisinherentinitsnature，andthegeniusofthelegislatorisshownineludingitsattacks。A
　　Statemaysurvivetheinfluenceofahostofbadlaws，andthemischieftheycauseisfrequentlyexaggerated;butalawwhichencouragesthegrowthofthecankerwithinmustprovefatalintheend，althoughitsbadconsequencesmaynotbeimmediatelyperceived。
　　Theprincipleofdestructioninabsolutemonarchiesliesintheexcessiveandunreasonableextensionoftheprerogativeofthecrown;andameasuretendingtoremovetheconstitutionalprovisionswhichcounterbalancethisinfluencewouldberadicallybad，evenifitsimmediateconsequenceswereunattendedwithevil。Byaparityofreasoning，incountriesgovernedbyademocracy，wherethepeopleisperpetuallydrawingallauthoritytoitself，thelawswhichincreaseoraccelerateitsactionarethedirectassailantsoftheveryprincipleofthegovernment。
　　ThegreatestproofoftheabilityoftheAmericanlegislatorsis，thattheyclearlydiscernedthistruth，andthattheyhadthecouragetoactuptoit。Theyconceivedthatacertainauthorityabovethebodyofthepeoplewasnecessary，whichshouldenjoyadegreeofindependence，without，however，beingentirelybeyondthepopularcontrol;anauthoritywhichwouldbeforcedtocomplywiththepermanentdeterminationsofthemajority，butwhichwouldbeabletoresistitscaprices，andtorefuseitsmostdangerousdemands。Tothisendtheycentredthewholeexecutivepowerofthenationinasinglearm;theygrantedextensiveprerogativestothePresident，andtheyarmedhimwiththevetotoresisttheencroachmentsofthelegislature。
　　Butbyintroducingtheprincipleofre—electiontheypartlydestroyedtheirwork;andtheyrenderedthePresidentbutlittleinclinedtoexertthegreatpowertheyhadvestedinhishands。
　　Ifineligibleasecondtime，thePresidentwouldbefarfromindependentofthepeople，forhisresponsibilitywouldnotbelessened;butthefavorofthepeoplewouldnotbesonecessarytohimastoinducehimtocourtitbyhumoringitsdesires。Ifre—eligible（andthisismoreespeciallytrueatthepresentday，whenpoliticalmoralityisrelaxed，andwhengreatmenarerare），thePresidentoftheUnitedStatesbecomesaneasytoolinthehandsofthemajority。Headoptsitslikingsanditsanimosities，hehastenstoanticipateitswishes，heforestallsitscomplaints，heyieldstoitsidlestcravings，andinsteadofguidingit，asthelegislatureintendedthatheshoulddo，heiseverreadytofollowitsbidding。Thus，inordernottodeprivetheStateofthetalentsofanindividual，thosetalentshavebeenrenderedalmostuseless;andtoreserveanexpedientforextraordinaryperils，thecountryhasbeenexposedtodailydangers。
　　FederalCourts*b[Footnoteb:Seechap。VI，entitled"JudicialPowerintheUnitedStates。"ThischapterexplainsthegeneralprinciplesoftheAmericantheoryofjudicialinstitutions。SeealsotheFederalConstitution，Art。3。See"TheFederalists，"Nos。
　　78—83，inclusive;andaworkentitled"ConstitutionalLaw，"beingaviewofthepracticeandjurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，byThomasSergeant。SeeStory，pp。134，162，489，511，581，668;andtheorganiclawofSeptember24，1789，inthe"CollectionoftheLawsoftheUnitedStates，"byStory，vol。i。
　　p。53。]
　　PoliticalimportanceofthejudiciaryintheUnitedStates—
　　Difficultyoftreatingthissubject—Utilityofjudicialpowerinconfederations—WhattribunalscouldbeintroducedintotheUnion—Necessityofestablishingfederalcourtsofjustice—
　　Organizationofthenationaljudiciary—TheSupremeCourt—Inwhatitdiffersfromallknowntribunals。
　　IhaveinquiredintothelegislativeandexecutivepoweroftheUnion，andthejudicialpowernowremainstobeexamined;butinthisplaceIcannotconcealmyfearsfromthereader。TheirjudicialinstitutionsexerciseagreatinfluenceontheconditionoftheAnglo—Americans，andtheyoccupyaprominentplaceamongstwhatareprobablycalledpoliticalinstitutions:inthisrespecttheyarepeculiarlydeservingofourattention。ButIamatalosstoexplainthepoliticalactionoftheAmericantribunalswithoutenteringintosometechnicaldetailsoftheirconstitutionandtheirformsofproceeding;andIknownothowtodescendtotheseminutiaewithoutwearyingthecuriosityofthereaderbythenaturalaridityofthesubject，orwithoutriskingtofallintoobscuritythroughadesiretobesuccinct。Icanscarcelyhopetoescapethesevariousevils;forifIappeartoolengthytoamanoftheworld，alawyermayontheotherhandcomplainofmybrevity。Butthesearethenaturaldisadvantagesofmysubject，andmoreespeciallyofthepointwhichIamabouttodiscuss。
　　Thegreatdifficultywas，nottodevisetheConstitutiontotheFederalGovernment，buttofindoutamethodofenforcingitslaws。Governmentshaveingeneralbuttwomeansofovercomingtheoppositionofthepeopletheygovern，viz。，thephysicalforcewhichisattheirowndisposal，andthemoralforcewhichtheyderivefromthedecisionsofthecourtsofjustice。
　　Agovernmentwhichshouldhavenoothermeansofexactingobediencethanopenwarmustbeverynearitsruin，foroneoftwoalternativeswouldthenprobablyoccur:ifitsauthoritywassmallanditscharactertemperate，itwouldnotresorttoviolencetillthelastextremity，anditwouldconniveatanumberofpartialactsofinsubordination，inwhichcasetheStatewouldgraduallyfallintoanarchy;ifitwasenterprisingandpowerful，itwouldperpetuallyhaverecoursetoitsphysicalstrength，andwouldspeedilydegenerateintoamilitarydespotism。Sothatitsactivitywouldnotbelessprejudicialtothecommunitythanitsinaction。
　　Thegreatendofjusticeistosubstitutethenotionofrightforthatofviolence，andtoplacealegalbarrierbetweenthepowerofthegovernmentandtheuseofphysicalforce。Theauthoritywhichisawardedtotheinterventionofacourtofjusticebythegeneralopinionofmankindissosurprisinglygreatthatitclingstothemereformalitiesofjustice，andgivesabodilyinfluencetotheshadowofthelaw。Themoralforcewhichcourtsofjusticepossessrenderstheintroductionofphysicalforceexceedinglyrare，andisveryfrequentlysubstitutedforit;butifthelatterprovestobeindispensable，itspowerisdoubledbytheassociationoftheideaoflaw。
　　Afederalgovernmentstandsingreaterneedofthesupportofjudicialinstitutionsthananyother，becauseitisnaturallyweakandexposedtoformidableopposition。*cIfitwerealwaysobligedtoresorttoviolenceinthefirstinstance，itcouldnotfulfilitstask。TheUnion，therefore，requiredanationaljudiciarytoenforcetheobedienceofthecitizenstothelaws，andtorepealtheattackswhichmightbedirectedagainstthem。
　　Thequestionthenremainedastowhattribunalsweretoexercisetheseprivileges;weretheytobeentrustedtothecourtsofjusticewhichwerealreadyorganizedineveryState？orwasitnecessarytocreatefederalcourts？ItmayeasilybeprovedthattheUnioncouldnotadaptthejudicialpoweroftheStatestoitswants。TheseparationofthejudiciaryfromtheadministrativepoweroftheStatenodoubtaffectsthesecurityofeverycitizenandthelibertyofall。Butitisnolessimportanttotheexistenceofthenationthattheseseveralpowersshouldhavethesameorigin，shouldfollowthesameprinciples，andactinthesamesphere;inaword，thattheyshouldbecorrelativeandhomogeneous。Noone，Ipresume，eversuggestedtheadvantageoftryingoffencescommittedinFrancebyaforeigncourtofjustice，inordertosecuretheimpartialityofthejudges。TheAmericansformonepeopleinrelationtotheirFederalGovernment;butinthebosomofthispeoplediverspoliticalbodieshavebeenallowedtosubsistwhicharedependentonthenationalGovernmentinafewpoints，andindependentinalltherest;whichhavealladistinctorigin，maximspeculiartothemselves，andspecialmeansofcarryingontheiraffairs。ToentrusttheexecutionofthelawsoftheUniontotribunalsinstitutedbythesepoliticalbodieswouldbetoallowforeignjudgestopresideoverthenation。Nay，more;notonlyiseachStateforeigntotheUnionatlarge，butitisinperpetualoppositiontothecommoninterests，sincewhateverauthoritytheUnionlosesturnstotheadvantageoftheStates。ThustoenforcethelawsoftheUnionbymeansofthetribunalsoftheStateswouldbetoallownotonlyforeignbutpartialjudgestopresideoverthenation。
　　[Footnotec:Federallawsarethosewhichmostrequirecourtsofjustice，andthoseatthesametimewhichhavemostrarelyestablishedthem。ThereasonisthatconfederationshaveusuallybeenformedbyindependentStates，whichentertainednorealintentionofobeyingthecentralGovernment，andwhichveryreadilycededtherightofcommandtothefederalexecutive，andveryprudentlyreservedtherightofnon—compliancetothemselves。]
　　Butthenumber，stillmorethanthemerecharacter，ofthetribunalsoftheStatesrenderedthemunfitfortheserviceofthenation。WhentheFederalConstitutionwasformedtherewerealreadythirteencourtsofjusticeintheUnitedStateswhichdecidedcauseswithoutappeal。Thatnumberisnowincreasedtotwenty—four。TosupposethataStatecansubsistwhenitsfundamentallawsmaybesubjectedtofour—and—twentydifferentinterpretationsatthesametimeistoadvanceapropositionalikecontrarytoreasonandtoexperience。
　　TheAmericanlegislatorsthereforeagreedtocreateafederaljudiciarypowertoapplythelawsoftheUnion，andtodeterminecertainquestionsaffectinggeneralinterests，whichwerecarefullydeterminedbeforehand。TheentirejudicialpoweroftheUnionwascentredinonetribunal，whichwasdenominatedtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。But，tofacilitatetheexpeditionofbusiness，inferiorcourtswereappendedtoit，whichwereempoweredtodecidecausesofsmallimportancewithoutappeal，andwithappealcausesofmoremagnitude。ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtarenamedneitherbythepeoplenorthelegislature，butbythePresidentoftheUnitedStates，actingwiththeadviceoftheSenate。Inordertorenderthemindependentoftheotherauthorities，theirofficewasmadeinalienable;anditwasdeterminedthattheirsalary，whenoncefixed，shouldnotbealteredbythelegislature。*dItwaseasytoproclaimtheprincipleofaFederaljudiciary，butdifficultiesmultipliedwhentheextentofitsjurisdictionwastobedetermined。