Therateofinterestis,attimes,affectedmoreorless
  permanentlybycircumstances,thoughnotoffrequent,yetof
  occasionaloccurrence,whichtendtoaltertheproportionbetween
  theclassofinterest—receivingandthatofprofit—receiving
  capitalists。Twocausesofthisdescription,operatingin
  contraryways,havemanifestedthemselvesoflateyears,andare
  nowproducingconsiderableeffectsinEngland。Oneis,thegold
  discoveries。Themassesofthepreciousmetalswhichare
  constantlyarrivingfromthegoldcountries,are,itmaysafely
  besaid,whollyaddedtothefundsthatsupplytheloanmarket。
  Sogreatanadditionalcapital,notdividedbetweenthetwo
  classesofcapitalists,butaggregatedbodilytothecapitalof
  theinterest—receivingclass,disturbsthepre—existingratio
  betweenthetwo,andtendstodepressinterestrelativelyto
  profit。Anothercircumstanceofstillmorerecentdate,but
  tendingtothecontraryeffect,isthelegalizationof
  joint—stockassociationswithlimitedliability。Theshareholders
  intheseassociations,nowsorapidlymultiplying,aredrawn
  almostexclusivelyfromthelendingclass;fromthosewhoeither
  lefttheirdisposablefundsindeposit,tobelentoutby
  bankers,orinvestedtheminpublicorprivatesecurities,and
  receivedtheinterest。Totheextentoftheirsharesinanyof
  thesecompanies(withthesingleexceptionofbankingcompanies)
  theyhavebecometradersontheirowncapital;theyhaveceased
  tobelenders,andhaveeven,inmostcases,passedovertothe
  classofborrowers。Theirsubscriptionshavebeenabstractedfrom
  thefundswhichfeedtheloanmarket,andtheythemselveshave
  becomecompetitorsforashareoftheremainderofthosefunds:
  ofallwhich,thenaturaleffectisariseofinterest。Andit
  wouldnotbesurprisingif,foraconsiderabletimetocome,the
  ordinaryrateofinterestinEnglandshouldbearahigher
  proportiontothecommonrateofmercantileprofit,thanithas
  borneatanytimesincetheinfluxofnewgoldsetin。(3*)
  Thedemandforloansvariesmuchmorelargelythanthe
  supply,andembraceslongercyclesofyearsinitsaberrations。A
  timeofwar,forexample,isaperiodofunusualdraftsonthe
  loanmarket。TheGovernment,atsuchtimes,generallyincursnew
  loans,andastheseusuallysucceedeachotherrapidlyaslongas
  thewarlasts,thegeneralrateofinterestiskepthigherinwar
  thaninpeace,withoutreferencetotherateofprofit,and
  productiveindustryisstintedofitsusualsupplies。Duringpart
  ofthelastwarwithFrance,theGovernmentcouldnotborrow
  undersixpercent,andofcourseallotherborrowershadtopay
  atleastasmuch。Nordoestheinfluenceoftheseloans
  altogetherceasewhentheGovernmentceasestocontractothers;
  forthosealreadycontractedcontinuetoaffordaninvestmentfor
  agreatlyincreasedamountofthedisposablecapitalofthe
  country,whichifthenationaldebtwerepaidoff,wouldbeadded
  tothemassofcapitalseekinginvestment,and(independentlyof
  temporarydisturbance)couldnotbut,tosomeextent,permanently
  lowertherateofinterest。
  ThesameeffectoninterestwhichisproducedbyGovernment
  loansforwarexpenditure,isproducedbythesuddenopeningof
  anynewandgenerallyattractivemodeofpermanentinvestment。
  Theonlyinstanceofthekindinrecenthistoryonascale
  comparabletothatofthewarloans,istheabsorptionofcapital
  intheconstructionofrailways。Thiscapitalmusthavebeen
  principallydrawnfromthedepositsinbanks,orfromsavings
  whichwouldhavegoneintodeposit,andwhichweredestinedtobe
  ultimatelyemployedinbuyingsecuritiesfrompersonswhowould
  haveemployedthepurchasemoneyindiscountsorotherloansat
  interest:ineithercase,itwasadraftonthegeneralloan
  fund。Itis,infact,evident,thatunlesssavingsweremade
  expresslytobeemployedinrailwayadventure,theamountthus
  employedmusthavebeenderivedeitherfromtheactualcapitalof
  personsinbusiness,orfromcapitalwhichwouldhavebeenlent
  topersonsinbusiness。Inthefirstcase,thesubtraction,by
  cripplingtheirmeans,obligesthemtobelargerborrowers;in
  thesecond,itleaveslessforthemtoborrow;ineithercaseit
  equallytendstoraisetherateofinterest。
  4。Ihave,thusfar,consideredloans,andtherateof
  interest,asamatterwhichconcernscapitalingeneral,in
  directoppositiontothepopularnotion,accordingtowhichit
  onlyconcernsmoney。Inloans,asinallothermoney
  transactions,Ihaveregardedthemoneywhichpasses,onlyasthe
  medium,andcommoditiesasthethingreallytransferred——the
  realsubjectofthetransaction。Andthisis,inthemain,
  correct:becausethepurposeforwhich,intheordinarycourseof
  affairs,moneyisborrowed,istoacquireapurchasingpowerover
  commodities。Inanindustriousandcommercialcountry,the
  ulteriorintentioncommonlyis,toemploythecommoditiesas
  capital:buteveninthecaseofloansforunproductive
  consumption,asthoseofspendthrifts,oroftheGovernment,the
  amountborrowedistakenfromapreviousaccumulation,which
  wouldotherwisehavebeenlenttocarryonproductiveindustry;
  itis,therefore,somuchsubtractedfromwhatmaycorrectlybe
  calledtheamountofloanablecapital。
  Thereis,however,anotunfrequentcase,inwhichthe
  purposeoftheborrowerisdifferentfromwhatIhavehere
  supposed。Hemayborrowmoney,neithertoemployitascapital
  nortospenditunproductively,buttopayapreviousdebt。In
  thiscase,whathewantsisnotpurchasingpower,butlegal
  tender,orsomethingwhichacreditorwillacceptasequivalent
  toit。Hisneedisspecificallyformoney,notforcommoditiesor
  capital。Itisthedemandarisingfromthiscause,whichproduces
  almostallthegreatandsuddenvariationsoftherateof
  interest。Suchademandformsoneoftheearliestfeaturesofa
  commercialcrisis。Atsuchaperiod,manypersonsinbusinesswho
  havecontractedengagements,havebeenpreventedbyachangeof
  circumstancesfromobtainingintimethemeansonwhichthey
  calculatedforfulfillingthem。Thesemeanstheymustobtainat
  anysacrifice,orsubmittobankruptcy;andwhattheymusthave
  ismoney。Othercapital,howevermuchofittheymaypossess,
  cannotanswerthepurposeunlessmoneycanfirstbeobtainedfor
  it;while,onthecontrary,withoutanyincreaseofthecapital
  ofthecountry,amereincreaseofcirculatinginstrumentsof
  credit(betheyofaslittleworthforanyotherpurposeasthe
  boxofonepoundnotesdiscoveredinthevaultsoftheBankof
  Englandduringthepanicof1825)willeffectuallyservetheir
  turnifonlytheyareallowedtomakeuseofit。Anincreased
  issueofnotes,intheformofloans,isallthatisrequiredto
  satisfythedemand,andputanendtotheaccompanyingpanic。But
  although,inthiscase,itisnotcapital,orpurchasingpower,
  thattheborrowerneeds,butmoneyasmoney,itisnotonlymoney
  thatistransferredtohim。Themoneycarriesitspurchasing
  power,withitwhereveritgoes;andmoneythrownintotheloan
  marketreallydoes,throughitspurchasingpower,turnoveran
  increasedportionofthecapitalofthecountryintothe
  directionofloans。Thoughmoneyalonewaswanted,capital
  passes;anditmaystillbesaidwithtruththatitisbyan
  additiontoloanablecapitalthattheriseoftherateof
  interestismetandcorrected。
  Independentlyofthis,however,thereisarealrelation,
  whichitisindispensabletorecognise,betweenloansandmoney。
  Loanablecapitalisallofitintheformofmoney。Capital
  destineddirectlyforproductionexistsinmanyforms;but
  capitaldestinedforlendingexistsnormallyinthatformalone。
  Owingtothiscircumstance,weshouldnaturallyexpectthatamong
  thecauseswhichaffectmoreorlesstherateofinterest,would
  befoundnotonlycauseswhichactthroughcapital,butsome
  causeswhichact,directlyatleast,onlythroughmoney。
  Therateofinterestbearsnonecessaryrelationtothe
  quantityorvalueofthemoneyincirculation。Thepermanent
  amountofthecirculatingmedium,whethergreatorsmall,affects
  onlyprices;nottherateofinterest。Adepreciationofthe
  currency,whenithasbecomeanaccomplishedfact,affectsthe
  rateofinterestinnomannerwhatever。Itdiminishesindeedthe
  powerofmoneytobuycommodities,butnotthepowerofmoneyto
  buymoney。Ifahundredpoundswillbuyaperpetualannuityof
  fourpoundsayear,adepreciationwhichmakesthehundredpounds
  worthonlyhalfasmuchasbefore,haspreciselythesameeffect
  onthefourpounds,andcannotthereforealtertherelation
  betweenthetwo。Thegreaterorsmallernumberofcounterswhich
  mustbeusedtoexpressagivenamountofrealwealth,makesno
  differenceinthepositionorinterestsoflendersorborrowers,
  andthereforemakesnodifferenceinthedemandandsupplyof
  loans。Thereisthesameamountofrealcapitallentand
  borrowed;andifthecapitalinthehandsoflendersis
  representedbyagreaternumberofpoundssterling,thesame
  greaternumberofpoundssterlingwill,inconsequenceofthe
  riseofprices,benowrequiredforthepurposestowhichthe
  borrowersintendtoapplythem。
  Butthoughthegreaterorlessquantityofmoneymakesin
  itselfnodifferenceintherateofinterest,achangefroma
  lessquantitytoagreater,orfromagreatertoaless,mayand
  doesmakeadifferenceinit。Supposemoneytobeinprocess
  ofdepreciationbymeansofaninconvertiblecurrency,issuedby
  agovernmentinpaymentofitsexpenses。Thisfactwillinnoway
  diminishthedemandforrealcapitalonloan;butitwill
  diminishtherealcapitalloanable,because,thisexistingonly
  intheformofmoney,theincreaseofquantitydepreciatesit。
  Estimatedincapital,theamountofferedisless,whilethe
  amountrequiredisthesameasbefore。Estimatedincurrency,the
  amountofferedisonlythesameasbefore,whilethemount
  required,owingtotheriseofprices,isgreater。Eitherway,
  therateofinterestmustrise。Sothatinthiscaseincreaseof
  currencyreallyaffectstherateofinterest,butinthecontrary
  waytothatwhichisgenerallysupposed;byraising,notby
  loweringit。
  Thereversewillhappenastheeffectofcallingin,or
  diminishinginquantity,adepreciatedcurrency。Themoneyinthe
  handsoflenders,incommonwithallothermoney,willbe
  enhancedinvalue,thatis,therevillbeagreateramountof
  realcapitalseekingborrowers;whiletherealcapitalwantedby
  borrowerswillbeonlythesameasbefore,andthemoneymount
  less:therateofinterest,therefore,willtendtofall。
  Wethusseethatdepreciation,merelyassuch,whilein
  processoftakingplace,tendstoraisetherateofinterest:and
  theexpectationoffurtherdepreciationaddstothiseffect;
  becauselenderswhoexpectthattheirinterestwillbepaidand
  theprincipalperhapsredeemed,inalessvaluablecurrencythan
  theylent,ofcourserequirearateofinterestsufficientto
  coverthiscontingentloss。
  Butthiseffectismorethancounteractedbyacontraryone,
  whentheadditionalmoneyisthrownintocirculationnotby
  purchasesbutbyloans。InEngland,andinmostothercommercial
  countries,thepapercurrencyincommonuse,beingacurrency
  providedbybankers,isallissuedinthewayofloans,except
  thepartemployedinthepurchaseofgoldandsilver。Thesame
  operation,therefore,whichaddstothecurrencyalsoaddstothe
  loans:thewholeincreaseofcurrencyinthefirstinstance
  swellstheloanmarket。Consideredasanadditiontoloansit
  tendstolowerinterest,morethaninitscharacterof
  depreciationittendstoraiseit;fortheformereffectdepends
  ontheratiowhichthenewmoneybearstothemoneylent,while
  thelatterdependsonitsratiotoallthemoneyincirculation。
  Anincrease,therefore,ofcurrencyissuedbybanks,tends,while
  theprocesscontinues,tobringdownortokeepdowntherateof
  interest。Asimilareffectisproducedbytheincreaseofmoney
  arisingfromthegolddiscoveries;almostthewholeofwhich,as
  alreadynoticed,is,whenbroughttoEurope,addedtothe
  depositsinbanks,andconsequentlytothemountofloans;and
  whendrawnoutandinvestedinsecurities,liberatesan
  equivalentamountofotherloanablecapital。Thenewly—arrived
  goldcanonlygetitselfinvested,inanygivenstateof
  business,byloweringtherateofinterest;andaslongasthe
  influxcontinues,itcannotfailtokeepinterestlowerthan,all
  othercircumstancesbeingsupposedthesame,wouldotherwisehave
  beenthecase。
  Astheintroductionofadditionalgoldandsilver,whichgoes
  intotheloanmarket,tendstokeepdowntherateofinterest,so
  anyconsiderableabstractionofthemfromthecountryinvariably
  raisesit;evenwhenoccurringinthecourseoftrade,asin
  payingfortheextraimportationscausedbyabadharvest,orfor
  thehigh—pricedcottonwhich,undertheinfluenceoftheAmerican
  civilwar,wasimportedfromsomanypartsoftheworld。The
  moneyrequiredforthesepaymentsistakeninthefirstinstance
  fromthedepositsinthehandsofbankers,andtothatextent
  starvesthefundthatsuppliestheloanmarket。
  Therateofinterest,then,dependsessentiallyand
  permanentlyonthecomparativeamountofrealcapitalofferedand
  demandedinthewayofloan;butissubjecttotemporary
  disturbancesofvarioussorts,fromincreaseanddiminutionof
  thecirculatingmedium;whichderangementsaresomewhat
  intricate,andsometimesindirectoppositiontofirst
  appearances。Allthesedistinctionsareveiledoverand
  confounded,bytheunfortunatemisapplicationoflanguagewhich
  designatestherateofinterestbyaphrase("thevalueof
  money")whichproperlyexpressesthepurchasingpowerofthe
  circulatingmedium。Thepublic,evenmercantile,habitually
  fanciesthateaseinthemoneymarket,thatis,facilityof
  borrowingatlowinterest,isproportionaltothequantityof
  moneyincirculation。Notonly,therefore,arebanknotes
  supposedtoproduceeffectsascurrency,whichtheyonlyproduce
  asloans,butattentionishabituallydivertedfromeffects
  similarinkindandmuchgreaterindegree,whenproducedbyan
  actiononloanswhichdoesnothappentobeaccompaniedbyany
  actiononthecurrency。
  Forexample,inconsideringtheeffectproducedbythe
  proceedingsofbanksinencouragingtheexcessesofspeculation,
  animmenseeffectisusuallyattributedtotheirissuesofnotes,
  butuntiloflatehardlyanyattentionwaspaidtothemanagement
  oftheirdeposits;thoughnothingismorecertainthanthattheir
  imprudentextensionsofcredittakeplacemorefrequentlyby
  meansoftheirdepositsthanoftheirissues。"Thereisno
  doubt,"saysMr。Tooke,(4*)"thatbanks,whetherprivateorjoint
  stock,may,ifimprudentlyconducted,ministertoanundue
  extensionofcreditforthepurposeofspeculations,whetherin
  commodities,orinovertradinginexportsorimports,orin
  buildingorminingoperations,andthattheyhavesoministered
  notunfrequently,andinsomecasestoanextentruinousto
  themselves,andwithoutultimatebenefittothepartiestowhose
  viewstheirresourcesweremadesubservient。"But,"supposingall
  thedepositsreceivedbyabankertobeincoin,ishenot,just
  asmuchastheissuingbanker,exposedtotheimportunityof
  customers,whomitmaybeimpolitictorefuse,forloansor
  discounts,ortobetemptedbyahighinterest?andmayhenotbe
  inducedtoencroachsomuchuponhisdepositsastoleavehim,
  undernotimprobablecircumstances,unabletomeetthedemandsof
  hisdepositors?Inwhatrespect,indeed,wouldthecaseofa
  bankerinaperfectlymetalliccirculation,differfromthatofa
  Londonbankeratthepresentday?Heisnotacreatorofmoney,
  hecannotavailhimselfofhisprivilegeasanissuerinaidof
  hisotherbusiness,andyettherehavebeenlamentableinstances
  ofLondonbankersissuingmoneyinexcess。"
  Inthediscussions,too,whichhavebeenforsomanyyears
  carriedonrespectingtheoperationsoftheBankofEngland,and
  theeffectsproducedbythoseoperationsonthestateofcredit,
  thoughfornearlyhalfacenturythereneverhasbeena
  commercialcrisiswhichtheBankhasnotbeenstrenuouslyaccused
  eitherofproducingorofaggravating,ithasbeenalmost
  universallyassumedthattheinfluenceofitsactswasfeltonly
  throughtheamountofitsnotesincirculation,andthatifit
  couldbepreventedfromexercisinganydiscretionastothatone
  featureinitsposition,itwouldnolongerhaveanypowerliable
  toabuse。Thisatleastisanerrorwhich,aftertheexperience
  oftheyear1847,wemayhopehasbeencommittedforthelast
  time。Duringthatyearthehandsofthebankwereabsolutely
  tied,initscharacterofabankofissue;butthroughits
  operationsasabankofdeposititexercisedasgreatan
  influence,orapparentinfluence,ontherateofinterestandthe
  stateofcredit,asatanyformerperiod;itwasexposedtoas
  vehementaccusationsofabusingthatinfluence;andacrisis
  occurred,suchasfewthatprecededithadequalled,andnone
  perhapssurpassed,inintensity。
  5。Beforequittingthegeneralsubjectofthischapter,I
  willmaketheobviousremark,thattherateofinterest
  determinesthevalueandpriceofallthosesaleablearticles
  whicharedesiredandbought,notforthemselves,butforthe
  incomewhichtheyarecapableofyielding。Thepublicfunds,
  sharesinjoint—stockcompanies,andalldescriptionsof
  securities,areatahighpriceinproportionastherateof
  interestislow。Theyaresoldatthepricewhichwillgivethe
  marketrateofinterestonthepurchasemoney,withallowancefor
  alldifferencesintheriskincurred,orinanycircumstanceof
  convenience。Exchequerbills,forexample,usuallysellata
  higherpricethanconsols,proportionallytotheinterestwhich
  theyyield;because,thoughthesecurityisthesame,yetthe
  formerbeingannuallypaidoffatparunlessrenewedbythe
  holder,thepurchaser(unlessobligedtosellinamomentof
  generalemergency),isinnodangeroflosinganythingbythe
  resale,exceptthepremiumhemayhavepaid。
  Thepriceofland,mines,andallotherfixedsourcesof
  income,dependsinlikemannerontherateofinterest。Land
  usuallysellsatahigherprice,inproportiontotheincome
  affordedbyit,thanthepublicfunds,notonlybecauseitis
  thought,eveninthiscountry,tobesomewhatmoresecure,but
  becauseideasofpoweranddirtyareassociatedwithits
  possession。Butthesedifferencesareconstant,ornearlyso;and
  inthevariationsofprice,landfollows,caeterisparibus,the
  permanent(thoughofcoursenotthedaily)variationsoftherate
  ofinterest。Wheninterestislow,landwillnaturallybedear;
  wheninterestishigh,landwillbecheap。Thelastlongwar
  presentedastrikingexceptiontothisrule,sincethepriceof
  landaswellastherateofinterestwasthenremarkablyhigh。
  Forthis,however,therewasaspecialcause。Thecontinuanceof
  averyhighaveragepriceofcornformanyyears,hadraisedthe
  rentoflandevenmorethaninproportiontotheriseofinterest
  andfallofthesellingpriceoffixedincomes。Haditnotbeen
  forthisaccident,chieflydependentontheseasons,landmust
  havesustainedasgreatadepreciationinvalueasthepublic
  funds:whichitprobablywoulddo,wereasimilarwartobreak
  outhereafter;tothesignaldisappointmentofthoselandlords
  andfarmerswho,generalizingfromthecasualcircumstancesofa
  remarkableperiod,solongpersuadedthemselvesthatastateof
  warwaspeculiarlyadvantageous,andastateofpeace
  disadvantageous,towhattheychosetocalltheinterestsof
  agriculture。
  NOTES:
  1。Supra,bookii,ch。xv。section1。
  2。Idonotincludeinthegeneralloanfundofthecountrythe
  capitals,largeastheysometimesare,whicharehabitually
  employedinspeculativelybuyingandsellingthepublicfundsand
  othersecurities。Itistruethatallwhobuysecuritiesadd,for
  thetime,tothegeneralamountofmoneyonloan,andlowerpro
  tantotherateofinterest。ButasthepersonsIspeakofbuy
  onlytosellagainatahigherprice,theyarealternatelyinthe
  positionoflendersandofborrowers:theiroperationsraisethe
  rateofinterestatonetime,exactlyasmuchastheyloweritat
  another。Likeallpersonswhobuyandsellonspeculation,their
  functionistoequalize,nottoraiseorlower,thevalueofthe
  commodity。Whentheyspeculateprudently,theytemperthe
  fluctuationsofprice;whenimprudently,theyoftenaggravate
  them。
  3。Tothecauseofaugmentationintherateofinterest,
  mentionedinthetext,mustbeaddedanother,forciblyinsisted
  onbytheauthorofanablearticleintheEdinburghReviewfor
  January,1865;theincreasedandincreasingwillingnesstosend
  capitalabroadforinvestment。Owingtothevastlyaugmented
  facilitiesofaccesstoforeigncountries,andtheabundant
  informationincessantlyreceivedfromthem,foreigninvestments
  haveceasedtoinspiretheterrorthatbelongstotheunknown;
  capitalflows,withoutmisgiving,toanyplacewhichaffordsan
  expectationofhighprofit;andtheloanmarketofthewhole
  commercialworldisrapidlybecomingone。Therateofinterest,
  therefore,inthepartoftheworldoutofwhichcapitalmost
  freelyflows,cannotanylongerremainsomuchinferiortothe
  rateelsewhere,asithashithertobeen。
  4。InquiryintotheCurrencyPrinciple,ch。xiv。
  ThePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomybyJohnStuartMillBook3:DistributionChapter24
  OftheRegulationofaConvertiblePaperCurrency1。Thefrequentrecurrenceduringthelasthalfcenturyofthepainfulseriesofphenomenacalledacommercialcrisis,hasdirectedmuchoftheattentionbothofeconomistsandofpracticalpoliticianstothecontrivingofexpedientsforaverting,orattheleast,mitigatingitsevils。AndthehabitwhichgrewupduringtheeraoftheBankrestriction,ofascribingallalternationsofhighandlowpricestotheissuesofbanks,hascausedinquirersingeneraltofixtheirhopesofsuccessinmoderatingthosevicissitudes,uponschemesfortheregulationofbanknotes。Aschemeofthisnature,afterhavingobtainedthesanctionofhighauthorities,sofarestablisheditselfinthepublicmind,astobe,withgeneralapprobation,convertedintoalaw,attherenewaloftheCharteroftheBankofEnglandin1844:andtheregulationisstillinforce,thoughwithagreatabatementofitspopularity,andwithitsprestigeimpairedbythreetemporarysuspensions,ontheresponsibilityoftheexecutive,theearliestlittlemorethanthreeyearsafteritsenactment。Itisproperthatthemeritsofthisplanfortherelationofaconvertiblebanknotecurrencyshouldbehereconsidered。BeforetouchinguponthepracticalprovisionsofSirRobertPeel’sActof1844,Ishallbrieflystatethenature,andexaminethegrounds,ofthetheoryonwhichitisfounded。
  Itisbelievedbymany,thatbanksofissueuniversally,ortheBankofEnglandinparticular,haveapowerofthrowingtheirnotesintocirculation,andtherebyraisingprices,arbitrarily;
  thatthispowerisonlylimitedbythedegreeofmoderationwithwhichtheythinkfittoexerciseit;thatwhentheyincreasetheirissuesbeyondtheusualmount,theriseofprices,thusproduced,generatesaspiritofspeculationincommodities,whichcarriespricesstillhigher,andultimatelycausesareactionandrecoil,mountinginextremecasestoacommercialcrisis;andthateverysuchcrisiswhichhasoccurredinthiscountrywithinmercantilememory,hasbeeneitheroriginallyproducedbythiscause,orgreatlyaggravatedbyit。Tothisextremelengththecurrencytheoryhasnotbeencarriedbytheeminentpoliticaleconomistswhohavegiventoamoremoderateformofthesametheorythesanctionoftheirnames。ButIhavenotoverstatedtheextravaganceofthepopularversion;whichisaremarkableinstancetowhatlengthsafavouritetheorywillhurry,nottheclosetstudentswhosecompetencyinsuchquestionsisoftentreatedwithsomuchcontempt,butmenoftheworldandofbusiness,whopiquethemselvesonthepracticalknowledgewhichtheyhaveatleasthadampleopportunitiesofacquiring。Notonlyhasthisfixedideaofthecurrencyastheprimeagentinthefluctuationsofprice,madethemshuttheireyestothemultitudeofcircumstanceswhich,byinfluencingtheexpectationofsupply,arethetruecausesofalmostallspeculations,andofalmostallfluctuationsofprice;butinordertobringaboutthechronologicalagreementrequiredbytheirtheory,betweenthevariationsofbankissuesandthoseofprices,theyhaveplayedsuchfantastictrickswithfactsanddatesaswouldbethoughtincredible,ifaneminentpracticalauthorityadnottakenthetroubleofmeetingthem,onthegroundofmerehistory,withanelaborateexposure。Irefer,asallconversantwiththesubjectmustbeaware,toMrTooke’sHistoryofPrices。TheresultofMrTooke’sinvestigationswasthusstatedbyhimself,inhisexaminationbeforetheCommons’CommitteeontheBankCharterquestionin1832;andtheevidencesofitstandrecordedinhisbook:"Inpointoffact,andhistorically,asfarasmyresearcheshavegone,ineverysignalinstanceofariseorfallofprices,theriseorfallhaspreceded,andthereforecouldnotbetheeffectof,anenlargementorcontractionofthebankcirculation。"
  Theextravaganceofthecurrencytheorists,inattributingalmosteveryriseorfallofpricestoanenlargementorcontractionoftheissuesofbanknotes,hasraisedup,byreaction,atheorytheextremeoppositeoftheformer,ofwhich,inscientificdiscussion,themostprominentrepresentativesareMrTookeandMrFullarton。Thiscounter—theorydeniestobanknotes,solongastheirconvertibilityismaintained,anypowerwhateverofraisingprices,andtobanksanypowerofincreasingtheircirculation,exceptasaconsequenceof,andinproportionto,anincreaseofthebusinesstobedone。ThislaststatementissupportedbytheunanimousassurancesofallthecountrybankerswhohavebeenexaminedbeforesuccessiveParliamentaryCommitteesonthesubject。Theyallbeartestimonythat(inthewordsofMrFullarton(1*))"theamountoftheirissuesisexclusivelyregulatedbytheextentoflocaldealingsandexpenditureintheirrespectivedistricts,fluctuatingwiththefluctuationsofproductionandprice,andthattheyneithercanincreasetheirissuesbeyondthelimitswhichtherangeofsuchdealingsandexpenditureprescribes,withoutthecertaintyofhavingtheirnotesimmediatelyreturnedtothem,nordiminishthem,butatanalmostequalcertaintyofthevacancybeingfilledupfromsomeothersource。"fromthesepremisesitisarguedbyMrTookeandMrFullarton,thatbankissues,sincetheycannotbeincreasedinamountunlesstherebeanincreaseddemand,cannotpossiblyraiseprices;cannotencouragespeculation,noroccasionacommercialcrisis;andthattheattempttoguardagainstthatevilbyanartificialmanagementoftheissueofnotes,isofnoeffectfortheintendedpurpose,andliabletoproduceotherconsequencesextremelycalamitous。
  2。Asmuchofthisdoctrineasrestsupontestimony,andnotuponinference,appearstomeincontrovertible。Igivecompletecredencetotheassertionofthecountrybankers,veryclearlyandcorrectlycondensedintoasmallcompassinthesentencejustquotedfromMrFullarton。Iamconvincedthattheycannotpossiblyincreasetheirissueofnotesinanyothercircumstancesthanthosewhicharetherestated。Ibelieve,also,thatthetheory,groundedbyMrFullartonuponthisfact,containsalargeportionoftruth,andisfarnearertobeingtheexpressionofthewholetruththananyformwhateverofthecurrencytheory。
  Therearetwostatesofthemarkets:onewhichmaybetermedthequiescentstate,theothertheexpectant,orspeculativestate。Thefirstisthatinwhichthereisnothingtendingtoengenderinanyconsiderableportionofthemercantilepublicadesiretoextendtheiroperations。Theproducersproduceandthedealerspurchaseonlytheirusualstocks,havingnoexpectationofamorethanusuallyrapidventforthem。Eachpersontransactshisordinaryamountofbusiness,andnomore;orincreasesitonlyincorrespondencewiththeincreaseofhiscapitalorconnexion,orwiththegradualgrowthofthedemandforhiscommodity,occasionedbythepublicprosperity。Notmeditatinganyunusualextensionoftheirownoperations,producersanddealersdonotneedmorethantheusualaccommodationfrombankersandothermoneylenders;andasitisonlybyextendingtheirloansthatbankersincreasetheirissues,nonebutamomentaryaugmentationofissuesisinthesecircumstancespossible。Ifatacertaintimeoftheyearaportionofthepublichavelargerpaymentstomakethanatothertimes,orifanindividual,undersomepeculiarexigency,requiresanextraadvance,theymayapplyformorebanknotes,andobtainthem;butthenoteswillnomoreremainincirculation,thantheextraquantityofBankofEnglandnoteswhichareissuedonceineverythreemonthsinpaymentofthedividends。Thepersontowhom,afterbeingborrowed,thenotesarepaidaway,hasnoextrapaymentstomake,andnopeculiarexigency,andhekeepsthembyhimunused,orsendsthemintodeposit,orrepayswiththemapreviousadvancemadetohimbysomebanker:inanycasehedoesnotbuycommoditieswiththem,sincebythesuppositionthereisnothingtoinducehimtolayinalargerstockofcommoditiesthanbefore。Evenifwesuppose,aswemaydo,thatbankerscreateanartificialincreaseofthedemandforloansbyofferingthembelowthemarketrateofinterest,thenotestheyissuewillnotremainincirculation;forwhentheborrower,havingcompletedthetransactionforwhichheavailedhimselfofthem,haspaidthemaway,thecreditorordealerwhoreceivesthem,havingnodemandfortheimmediateuseofanextraquantityofnotes,sendsthemintodeposit。Inthiscase,therefore,therecanbenoaddition,atthediscretionofbankers,tothegeneralcirculatingmedium:anyincreaseoftheirissueseithercomesbacktothem,orremainsidleinthehandsofthepublic,andnorisetakesplaceinprices。
  Butthereisanotherstateofthemarkets,strikinglycontrastedwiththepreceding,andtothisstateitisnotsoobviousthatthetheoryofMrTookeandMrFullartonisapplicable;namely,whenanimpressionprevails,whetherwellfoundedorgroundless,thatthesupplyofoneormoregreatarticlesofcommerceislikelytofallshortoftheordinaryconsumption。Insuchcircumstancesallpersonsconnectedwiththosecommoditiesdesiretoextendtheiroperations。Theproducersorimportersdesiretoproduceorimportalargerquantity,speculatorsdesiretolayinastockinordertoprofitbytheexpectedriseofprice,andholdersofthecommoditydesireadditionaladvancestoenablethemtocontinueholding。
  Alltheseclassesaredisposedtomakeamorethanordinaryuseoftheircredit,andtothisdesireitisnotdeniedthatbankersveryoftenundulyadminister。Effectsofthesamekindmaybeproducedbyanythingwhich,excitingmorethanusualhopesofprofit,givesincreasedbrisknesstobusiness。forexample,asuddenforeigndemandforcommoditiesonalargescale,ortheexpectationofit;suchasoccurredontheopeningofSpanishAmericatoEnglishtrade,andhasoccurredonvariousoccasionsinthetradewiththeUnitedStates。Suchoccurrencesproduceatendencytoariseofpriceinexportablearticles,andgeneratespeculations,sometimesofareasonable,and(aslongasalargeproportionofmeninbusinesspreferexcitementtosafety)
  frequentlyofanirrationalorimmoderatecharacter。Insuchcasesthereisadesireinthemercantileclasses,orinsomeportionofthem,toemploytheircredit,inamorethanusualdegree,asapowerofpurchasing。Thisisastateofbusinesswhich,whenpushedtoanextremelength,bringsontherevulsioncalledacommercialcrisis;anditisaknownfactthatsuchperiodsofspeculationhardlyeverpassoffwithouthavingbeenattended,duringsomepartoftheirprogress,byaconsiderableincreaseofbanknotes。
  Tothis,however,itisrepliedbyMrTookeandMrFullarton,thattheincreaseofthecirculationalwaysfollowsinsteadofprecedingtheriseofprices,andisnotitscause,butitseffect。Thatinthefirstplace,thespeculativepurchasesbywhichpricesareraised,arenoteffectedbybanknotesbutbycheques,orstillmorecommonlyonasimplebookcredit:andsecondly,eveniftheyweremadewithbanknotesborrowedforthatexpresspurposefrombankers,thenotes,afterbeingusedforthatpurpose,would,ifnotwantedforcurrenttransactions,bereturnedintodepositbythepersonsreceivingthem。InthisI
  fullyconcur,andIregarditasproved,bothscientificallyandhistorically,thatduringtheascendingperiodofspeculation,andaslongasitisconfinedtotransactionsbetweendealers,theissuesofbanknotesareseldommateriallyincreased,norcontributeanythingtothespeculativeriseofprices。Itseemstome,however,thatthiscannolongerbeaffirmedwhenspeculationhasproceededsofarastoreachtheproducers。
  Speculativeordersgivenbymerchantstomanufacturersinducethemtoextendtheiroperations,andtobecomeapplicantstobankersforincreasedadvances,whichifmadeinnotes,arenotpaidawaytopersonswhoreturnthemintodeposit,butarepartiallyexpendedinpayingwages,andpassintothevariouschannelsofretailtrade,wheretheybecomedirectlyeffectiveinproducingafurtherriseofprices。Icannotbutthinkthatthisemploymentofbanknotesmusthavebeenpowerfullyoperativeonpricesatthetimewhennotesofoneandtwopoundsvaluewerepermittedbylaw。Admitting,however,thattheprohibitionofnotesbelowfivepoundshasnowrenderedthispartoftheiroperationcomparativelyinsignificantbygreatlylimitingtheirapplicabilitytothepaymentofwages,thereisanotherformoftheirinstrumentalitywhichcomesintoplayinthelatterstagesofspeculation,andwhichformstheprincipalargumentofthemoremoderatesupportersofthecurrencytheory。Thoughadvancesbybankersareseldomdemandedforthepurposeofbuyingonspeculation,theyarelargelydemandedbyunsuccessfulspeculatorsforthepurposeofholdingon;andthecompetitionofthesespeculatorsforashareoftheloanablecapital,makeseventhosewhohavenotspeculated,moredependentthanbeforeonbankersfortheadvancestheyrequire。Betweentheascendingperiodofspeculationandtherevulsion,thereisanintervalextendingtoweeksandsometimesmonths,ofstrugglingagainstafall。Thetidehavingshownsignsofturning,thespeculativeholdersareunwillingtosellinafallingmarket,andinthemeantimetheyrequirefundstoenablethemtofulfileventheirordinaryengagements。Itisthisstagethatisordinarilymarkedbyaconsiderableincreaseintheamountofthebanknotecirculation。Thatsuchanincreasedoesusuallytakeplace,isdeniedbynoone。AndIthinkitmustbeadmittedthatthisincreasetendstoprolongthedurationofthespeculations;thatitenablesthespeculativepricestobekeptupforsometimeaftertheywouldotherwisehavecollapsed;andthereforeprolongsandincreasesthedrainofthepreciousmetalsforexportation,whichisaleadingfeatureofthisstageintheprogressofacommercialcrisis:thecontinuanceofwhichdrainatlastendangeringthepowerofthebankstofulfiltheirengagementofpayingtheirnotesondemand,theyarecompelledtocontracttheircreditmoresuddenlyandseverelythanwouldhavebeennecessaryiftheyhadbeenpreventedfromproppingupspeculationbyincreasedadvances,afterthetimewhentherecoilhadbecomeinevitable。
  3。Topreventthisretardationoftherecoil,andultimateaggravationofitsseverity,istheobjectoftheschemeforregulatingthecurrency,ofwhichLordOverstone,MrNorman,andColonelTorrens,werethefirstpromulgators,andwhichhas,inaslightlymodifiedform,beenenactedintolaw。(2*)
  Accordingtotheschemeinitsoriginalpurity,theissueofpromissorynotesforcirculationwastobeconfinedtoonebody。
  IntheformadoptedbyParliament,allexistingissuerswerepermittedtoretainthisprivilege,butnoneweretobehereafteradmittedtoit,evenintheplaceofthosewhomightdiscontinuetheirissues:and,forallexcepttheBankofEngland,amaximumofissueswasprescribed,onascaleintentionallylow。TotheBankofEnglandnomaximumwasfixedfortheaggregateamountofitsnotes,butonlyfortheportionissuedonsecurities,orinotherwords,onloan。Thesewerenevertoexceedacertainlimit,fixedinthefirstinstanceatfourteenmillions。(3*)Allissuesbeyondthatamountmustbeinexchangeforbullion;ofwhichtheBankisboundtopurchase,atatriflebelowtheMintvaluation,anyquantitywhichisofferedtoit,givingitsnotesinexchange。Inregard,therefore,toanyissueofnotesbeyondthelimitoffourteenmillions,theBankispurelypassive,havingnofunctionbutthecompulsoryoneofgivingitsnotesforgoldat3l。17s。9d。,andgoldforitsnotesat3l。17s。101/2d。,wheneverandbywhomsoeveritiscalledupontodoso。
  Theobjectforwhichthismechanismisintendedis,thatthebank—notecurrencymayvaryinitsamountattheexacttimes,andintheexactdegree,inwhichapurelymetalliccurrencywouldvary。Andthepreciousmetalsbeingthecommoditythathashithertoapproachednearesttothatinvariabilityinallthecircumstancesinfluencingvalue,whichfitsacommodityforbeingadoptedasamediumofexchange,itseemstobethoughtthattheexcellenceoftheActof1844isfullymadeout,ifunderitsoperationtheissuesconforminalltheirvariationsofquantity,andtherefore,asisinferred,ofvalue,tothevariationswhichwouldtakeplaceinacurrencywhollymetallic。
  Now,allreasonableopponentsoftheAct,incommonwithitssupporters,acknowledgeasanessentialrequisiteofanysubstituteforthepreciousmetals,thatitshouldconformexactlyinitspermanentvaluetoametallicstandard。Andtheysay,thatsolongasitisconvertibleintospecieondemand,itdoesandmustsoconform。Butwhenthevalueofametallicorofanyothercurrencyisspokenof,therearetwopointstobeconsidered;thepermanentoraveragevalue,andthefluctuations。
  Itistothepermanentvalueofametalliccurrency,thatthevalueofapapercurrencyoughttoconform。Butthereisnoobviousreasonwhyitshouldberequiredtoconformtothefluctuationstoo。Theonlyobjectofitsconformingatall,issteadinessofvalue;andwithrespecttofluctuationsthesolethingdesirableisthattheyshouldbethesmallestpossible。Nowthefluctuationsinthevalueofthecurrencyaredetermined,notbyitsquantity,whetheritconsistofgoldorofpaper,butbytheexpansionsandcontractionsofcredit。Todiscover,therefore,whatcurrencywillconformthemostnearlytothepermanentvalueofthepreciousmetals,wemustfindunderwhatcurrencythevariationsincreditareleastfrequentandleastextreme。Now,whetherthisobjectisbestattainedbyametalliccurrency(andthereforebyapapercurrencyexactlyconforminginquantitytoit)ispreciselythequestiontobedecided。Ifitshouldprovethatapapercurrencywhichfollowsallthefluctuationsinquantityofametallic,leadstomoreviolentrevulsionsofcreditthanonewhichisnotheldtothisrigidconformity,itwillfollowthatthecurrencywhichagreesmostexactlyinquantitywithametalliccurrencyisnotthatwhichadheresclosesttoitsvalue;thatistosay,itspermanentvalue,withwhichaloneagreementisdesirable。
  Whetherthisisreallythecaseornotwewillnowinquire。
  Andfirst,letusconsiderwhethertheActeffectsthepracticalobjectchieflyreliedoninitsdefencebythemoresoberofitsadvocates,thatofarrestingspeculativeextensionsofcreditatanearlierperiod,withalessdrainofgold,andconsequentlybyamilderandmoregradualprocess。Ithinkitmustbeadmittedthattoacertaindegreeitissuccessfulinthisobject。
  Iamawareofwhatmaybeurged,andreasonablyurged,inoppositiontothisopinion。Itmaybesaid,thatwhenthetimearrivesatwhichthebanksarepressedforincreasedadvancestoenablespeculatorstofulfiltheirengagements,alimitationoftheissueofnoteswillnotpreventthebanks,ifotherwisewilling,frommakingtheseadvances;thattheyhavestilltheirdepositsasasourcefromwhichloansmaybemadebeyondthepointwhichisconsistentwithprudenceasbankers;andthateveniftheyrefusedtodoso,theonlyeffectwouldbe,thatthedepositsthemselveswouldbedrawnouttosupplythewantsofthedepositors;whichwouldbejustasmuchanadditiontothebanknotesandcoininthehandsofthepublic,asifthenotesthemselveswereincreased。Thisistrue,andisasufficientanswertothosewhothinkthattheadvancesofbankstopropupfailingspeculationsareobjectionablechieflyasanincreaseofthecurrency。Butthemodeinwhichtheyarereallyobjectionable,isasanextensionofcredit。If,insteadofincreasingtheirdiscounts,thebanksallowtheirdepositstobedrawnout,thereisthesameincreaseofcurrency(forashorttimeatleast),butthereisnotanincreaseofloans,atthetimewhenthereoughttobeadiminution。Iftheydoincreasetheirdiscounts,notbymeansofnotes,butattheexpenseofthedepositsalone,theirdeposits(properlysocalled)aredefiniteandexhaustible,whilenotesmaybeincreasedtoanyamount,or,afterbeingreturned,maybere—issuedwithoutlimit。Itistruethatabank,ifwillingtoaddindefinitelytoitsliabilities,hasthepowerofmakingitsnominaldepositsasunlimitedafundasitsissuescouldbe;ithasonlytomakeitsadvancesinabookcredit,whichiscreatingdepositsoutofitsownliabilities,themoneyforwhichithasmadeitselfresponsiblebecomingadepositinitshands,tobedrawnagainstbycheques;
  andthechequeswhendrawnmaybeliquidated(eitheratthesamebankorattheclearinghouse)withouttheaidofnotes,byameretransferofcreditfromoneaccounttoanother。Iapprehenditischieflyinthiswaythatundueextensionsofcredit,inperiodsofspeculation,arecommonlymade。Butthebanksarenotlikelytopersistinthiscoursewhenthetidebeginstoturn。Itisnotwhentheirdepositshavealreadybeguntoflowout,thattheyarelikelytocreatedepositaccountswhichrepresent,insteadoffundsplacedintheirhands,freshliabilitiesoftheirown。Butexperienceprovesthatextensionofcredit,whenintheformofnotes,goesonlongaftertherecoilfromover—speculationhascommenced。Whenthismodeofresistingtherevulsionismadeimpossible,anddepositsandbookcreditsareleftastheonlysourcesfromwhichundueadvancescanbemade,therateofinterestisnotsooften,orsolong,preventedfromrising,afterthedifficultiesconsequentonexcessofspeculationbegintobefelt。Onthecontrary,thenecessitywhichthebanksfeelofdiminishingtheiradvancestomaintaintheirsolvency,whentheyfindtheirdepositsflowingout,andcannotsupplythevacantplacebytheirownnotes,acceleratestheriseoftherateofinterest。Speculativeholdersarethereforeobligedtosubmitearliertothatlossbyresale,whichcouldnothavebeenpreventedfromcomingonthematlast:therecoilofpricesandcollapseofgeneralcredittakeplacesooner。
  Toappreciatetheeffectswhichthisaccelerationofthecrisishasinmitigatingitsintensity,letusadvertmoreparticularlytothenatureandeffectsofthatleadingfeatureintheperiodjustprecedingthecollapse,thedrainofgold。Ariseofpricesproducedbyaspeculativeextensionofcredit,evenwhenbanknoteshavenotbeentheinstrument,isnotthelesseffectual(ifitlastslongenough)inturningtheexchanges:andwhentheexchangeshaveturnedfromthiscause,theycanonlybeturnedback,andthedrainofgoldstopped,eitherbyafallofpricesorbyariseoftherateofinterest。Afallofpriceswillstopitbyremovingthecausewhichproducedit,andbyrenderinggoodsamoreadvantageousremittancethangold,evenforpayingdebtsalreadydue。Ariseoftherateofinterest,andconsequentfallofthepricesofsecurities,willaccomplishthepurposestillmorerapidly,byinducingforeigners,insteadoftakingawaythegoldwhichisduetothem,toleaveitforinvestmentwithinthecountry,andevensendgoldintothecountrytotakeadvantageoftheincreasedrateofinterest。Ofthislastmodeofstoppingadrainofgold,theyear1847
  affordedsignalexamples。Butuntiloneofthesetwothingstakesplaceuntileitherpricesfall,ortherateofinterestrises—nothingcanpossiblyarrest,orevenmoderate,theeffluxofgold。Now,neitherwillpricesfallnorinterestrise,solongastheundulyexpandedcreditisupheldbythecontinuedadvancesofbankers。Itiswellknownthatwhenadrainofgoldhassetin,evenifbanknoteshavenotincreasedinquantity,itisuponthemthatthecontractionfirstfalls,thegoldwantedforexportationbeingalwaysobtainedfromtheBankofEnglandinexchangeforitsnotes。Butunderthesystemwhichpreceded1844,theBankofEngland,beingsubjected,incommonwithotherbanks,totheimportunitiesforfreshadvanceswhicharecharacteristicofsuchatime,could,andoftendid,immediatelyre—issuethenoteswhichhadbeenreturnedtoitinexchangeforbullion。Itisagreaterror,certainly,tosupposethatthemischiefofthisre—issuechieflyconsistedinpreventingacontractionofthecurrency。Itwas,however,quiteasmischievousasithaseverbeensupposedtobe。Aslongasitlasted,theeffluxofgoldcouldnotcease,sinceneitherwouldpricesfallnorinterestrisewhiletheseadvancescontinued。Prices,havingrisenwithoutanyincreaseofbanknotes,couldwellhavefallenwithoutadiminutionofthem;buthavingriseninconsequenceofanextensionofcredit,theycouldnotfallwithoutacontractionofit。Aslong,therefore,astheBankofEnglandandtheotherbanksperseveredinthiscourse,solonggoldcontinuedtoflowout,untilsolittlewasleftthattheBankofEngland,beingindangerofsuspensionofpayments,wascompelledatlasttocontractitsdiscountssogreatlyandsuddenlyastoproduceamuchmoreextremevariationintherateofinterest,inflictmuchgreaterlossanddistressonindividuals,anddestroyamuchgreateramountoftheordinarycreditofthecountry,thananyrealnecessityrequired。