’Nevertheless,thislatterkindoftaxesareinprincipleas
  ineligibleastheformer,thoughnotpreciselyonthesame
  ground。Aprotectingdutycanneverbeacauseofgain,but
  alwaysandnecessarilyofloss,tothecountryimposingit,just
  sofarasitisefficacioustoitsend。Anon—protectingduty,on
  thecontrary,wouldinmostcasesbeasourceofgaintothe
  countryimposingit,insofarasthrowingpartoftheweightof
  itstaxesuponotherpeopleisagain;butitwouldbeameans
  whichitcouldseldombeadvisabletoadopt,beingsoeasily
  counteractedbyapreciselysimilarproceedingontheotherside。
  ’IfEngland,inthecasealreadysupposed,soughttoobtain
  forherselfmorethanhernaturalshareoftheadvantageofthe
  tradewithGermany,byimposingadutyuponlinen,Germanywould
  onlyhavetoimposeadutyuponcloth,sufficienttodiminishthe
  demandforthatarticleaboutasmuchasthedemandforlinenhad
  beendiminishedinEnglandbythetax。Thingswouldthenbeas
  before,andeachcountrywouldpayitsowntax。Unless,indeed,
  thesumofthetwodutiesexceededtheentireadvantageofthe
  trade;forinthatcasethetrade,anditsadvantage,wouldcease
  entirely。’Therewouldbenoadvantage,therefore,in
  imposingdutiesofthiskind,withaviewtogainbytheminthe
  mannerwhichhasbeenpointedout。Butwhenanypartofthe
  revenueisderivedfromtaxesoncommodities,thesemayoftenbe
  aslittleobjectionableastherest。Itisevident,too,that
  considerationsofreciprocity,whicharequiteunessentialwhen
  thematterindebateisaprotectingduty,areofmaterial
  importancewhentherepealofdutiesofthisotherdescriptionis
  discussed。Acountrycannotbeexpectedtorenouncethepowerof
  taxingforeigners,unlessforeignerswillinreturnpractise
  towardsitselfthesameforbearance。Theonlymodeinwhicha
  countrycansaveitselffrombeingaloserbytherevenueduties
  imposedbyothercountriesonitscommodities,istoimpose
  correspondingrevenuedutiesontheirs。Onlyitmusttakecare
  thatthosedutiesbenotsohighastoexceedallthatremainsof
  theadvantageofthetrade,andputanendtoimportation
  altogether,causingthearticletobeeitherproducedathome,or
  importedfromanotherandadearermarket。’
  NOTES:
  1。Itistrue,thisdoesnotconstitute,asatfirstsightit
  appearstodo,acaseoftakingmoreoutofthepocketsofthe
  peoplethanthestatereceives;sinceifthestateneedsthe
  advance,andgetsitinthismanner,itcandispensewithan
  equivalentamountofborrowinginstockorexchequerbills。But
  itismoreeconomicalthatthenecessitiesofthestateshouldbe
  suppliedfromthedisposablecapitalinthehandsofthelending
  class,thanbyanartificialadditiontotheexpensesofoneor
  severalclassesofproducersordealers。
  2。Probablythestrongestknowninstanceofalargerevenue
  raisedfromforeignersbyataxonexports,istheopiumtrade
  withChina。ThehighpriceofthearticleundertheGovernment
  monopoly(whichisequivalenttoahighexportduty)hasso
  littleeffectindiscouragingitsconsumption,thatitissaidto
  havebeenoccasionallysoldinChinaforasmuchasitsweightin
  silver。
  ThePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy
  byJohnStuartMill
  Book5
  Chapter5
  OfSomeOtherTaxes
  1。Besidesdirecttaxesonincome,andtaxesonconsumption,
  thefinancialsystemsofmostcountriescompriseavarietyof
  miscellaneousimposts,notstrictlyincludedineitherclass。The
  modernEuropeansystemsretainmanysuchtaxes,thoughinmuch
  lessnumberandvarietythanthosesemi—barbarousgovernments
  whichEuropeaninfluencehasnotyetreached。Insomeofthese,
  scarcelyanyincidentoflifehasescapedbeingmadeanexcuse
  forsomefiscalexaction;hardlyanyact,notbelongingtodaily
  routine,canbeperformedbyanyone,withoutobtainingleave
  fromsomeagentofgovernment,whichisonlygrantedin
  considerationofapayment:especiallywhentheactrequiresthe
  aidorthepeculiarguaranteeofapublicauthority。Inthe
  presenttreatisewemayconfineourattentiontosuchtaxesas
  latelyexisted,orstillexist,incountriesusuallyclassedas
  civilized。
  Inalmostallnationsaconsiderablerevenueisdrawnfrom
  taxesoncontracts。Theseareimposedinvariousforms。One
  expedientisthatoftaxingthelegalinstrumentwhichservesas
  evidenceofthecontract,andwhichiscommonlytheonlyevidence
  legallyadmissible。InEngland,scarcelyanycontractisbinding
  unlessexecutedonstampedpaper,whichhaspaidataxto
  government;anduntilverylately,whenthecontractrelatedto
  propertythetaxwasproportionallymuchheavieronthesmaller
  thanonthelargertransactions;whichisstilltrueofsomeof
  thosetaxes。Therearealsostamp—dutiesonthelegalinstruments
  whichareevidenceofthefulfilmentofcontracts;suchas
  acknowledgmentsofreceipt,anddeedsofrelease。Taxeson
  contractsarenotalwaysleviedbymeansofstamps。Thedutyon
  salesbyauction,abrogatedbySirRobertPeel,wasaninstance
  inpoint。Thetaxesontransfersoflandedproperty,inFrance,
  areanother:inEnglandtherearestamp—duties。Insome
  countries,contractsofmanykindsarenotvalidunless
  registered,andtheirregistrationismadeanoccasionforatax。
  Oftaxesoncontracts,themostimportantarethoseonthe
  transferofproperty;chieflyonpurchasesandsales。Taxeson
  thesaleofconsumablecommoditiesaresimplytaxesonthose
  commodities。Iftheyaffectonlysomeparticularcommodities,
  theyraisethepricesofthosecommodities,andarepaidbythe
  consumer。Iftheattemptweremadetotaxallpurchasesand
  sales,which,howeverabsurd,wasforcenturiesthelawofSpain,
  thetax,ifitcouldbeenforced,wouldbeequivalenttoataxon
  allcommodities,andwouldnotaffectprices:ifleviedfromthe
  sellers,itwouldbeataxonprofits,iffromthebuyers,atax
  onconsumption;andneitherclasscouldthrowtheburthenupon
  theother。Ifconfinedtosomeonemodeofsale,asforexample
  byauction,itdiscouragesrecoursetothatmode,andifofany
  materialamount,preventsitfrombeingadoptedatall,unlessin
  acaseofemergency;inwhichcaseasthesellerisundera
  necessitytosell,butthebuyerundernonecessitytobuy,the
  taxfallsontheseller;andthiswasthestrongestofthe
  objectionstotheauctionduty:italmostalwaysfellona
  necessitousperson,andinthecrisisofhisnecessities。
  Taxesonthepurchaseandsaleoflandare,inmost
  countries,liabletothesameobjection。Landedpropertyinold
  countriesisseldompartedwith,exceptfromreduced
  circumstances,orsomeurgentneed:theseller,therefore,must
  takewhathecanget,whilethebuyer,whoseobjectisan
  investment,makeshiscalculationsontheinterestwhichhecan
  obtainforhismoneyinotherways,andwillnotbuyifheis
  chargedwithagovernmenttaxonthetransaction。(1*)Ithas
  indeedbeenobjected,thatthisargumentwouldnotapplyifall
  modesofpermanentinvestment,suchasthepurchaseofgovernment
  securities,sharesinjoint—stockcompanies,mortgages,andthe
  like,weresubjecttothesametax。Buteventhen,ifpaidbythe
  buyer,itwouldbeequivalenttoataxoninterest:if
  sufficientlyheavytobeofanyimportance,itwoulddisturbthe
  establishedrelationbetweeninterestandprofit;andthe
  disturbancewouldredressitselfbyariseintherateof
  interest,andafallofthepriceoflandandofallsecurities。
  Itappearstome,therefore,thattheselleristhepersonby
  whomsuchtaxes,unlessunderpeculiarcircumstances,will
  generallybeborne。
  Alltaxesmustbecondemnedwhichthrowobstaclesintheway
  ofthesaleofland,orotherinstrumentsofproduction。Such
  salestendnaturallytorenderthepropertymoreproductive。The
  seller,whethermovedbynecessityorchoice,isprobablysome
  onewhoiseitherwithoutthemeans,orwithoutthecapacity,to
  makethemostadvantageoususeofthepropertyforproductive
  purposes;whilethebuyer,ontheotherhand,isatanyratenot
  needy,andisfrequentlybothinclinedandabletoimprovethe
  property,since,asitisworthmoretosuchapersonthantoany
  other,heislikelytoofferthehighestpriceforit。Alltaxes,
  therefore,andalldifficultiesandexpenses,annexedtosuch
  contracts,aredecidedlydetrimental;especiallyinthecaseof
  land,thesourceofsubsistence,andtheoriginalfoundationof
  allwealth,ontheimprovementofwhich,therefore,somuch
  depends。Toogreatfacilitiescannotbegiventoenablelandto
  passintothehands,andassumethemodesofaggregationor
  division,mostconducivetoitsproductiveness。Iflanded
  propertiesaretoolarge,alienationshouldbefree,inorder
  thattheymaybesubdivided;iftoosmall,inorderthattheymay
  beunited。Alltaxesonthetransferoflandedpropertyshouldbe
  abolished;but,asthelandlordshavenoclaimtoberelieved
  fromanyreservationwhichthestatehashithertomadeinitsown
  favourfromtheamountoftheirrent,anannualimpostequivalent
  totheaverageproduceofthesetaxesshouldbedistributedover
  thelandgenerally,intheformofaland—tax。
  Someofthetaxesoncontractsareverypernicious,imposing
  avirtualpenaltyupontransactionswhichitoughttobethe
  policyofthelegislatortoencourage。Ofthissortisthe
  stamp—dutyonleases,whichinacountryoflargepropertiesare
  anessentialconditionofgoodagriculture;andthetaxeson
  insurances,adirectdiscouragementtoprudenceandforethought。
  2。Nearlyalliedtothetaxesoncontractsarethoseon
  communication。Theprincipaloftheseisthepostagetax;to
  whichmaybeaddedtaxesonadvertisements,andonnewspapers,
  whicharetaxesonthecommunicationofinformation。
  Thecommonmodeoflevyingataxontheconveyanceof
  letters,isbymakingthegovernmentthesoleauthorizedcarrier
  ofthem,anddemandingamonopolyprice。Whenthispriceisso
  moderateasitisinthiscountryundertheuniformpenny
  postage,scarcelyifatallexceedingwhatwouldbechargedunder
  thefreestcompetitionbyanyprivatecompany,itcanhardlybe
  consideredastaxation,butratherastheprofitsofabusiness;
  whateverexcessthereisabovetheordinaryprofitsofstock
  beingafairresultofthesavingofexpense,causedbyhaving
  onlyoneestablishmentandonesetofarrangementsforthewhole
  country,insteadofmanycompetingones。Thebusiness,too,being
  onewhichbothcanandoughttobeconductedonfixedrules,is
  oneofthefewbusinesseswhichitisnotunsuitabletoa
  governmenttoconduct。Thepostoffice,therefore,isatpresent
  oneofthebestofthesourcesfromwhichthiscountryderives
  itsrevenue。Butapostagemuchexceedingwhatwouldbepaidfor
  thesameserviceinasystemoffreedom,isnotadesirabletax。
  Itschiefweightfallsonlettersofbusiness,andincreasesthe
  expenseofmercantilerelationsbetweendistantplaces。Itis
  likeanattempttoraisealargerevenuebyheavytolls:it
  obstructsalloperationsbywhichgoodsareconveyedfromplace
  toplace,anddiscouragestheproductionofcommoditiesinone
  placeforconsumptioninanother;whichisnotonlyinitselfone
  ofthegreatestsourcesofeconomyoflabour,butisanecessary
  conditionofalmostallimprovementsinproduction,andoneof
  thestrongeststimulantstoindustry,andpromotersof
  civilization。
  Thetaxonadvertisementswasnotfreefromthesame
  objection,sinceinwhateverdegreeadvertisementsareusefulto
  business,byfacilitatingthecomingtogetherofthedealeror
  producerandtheconsumer,inthatsamedegree,ifthetaxbe
  highenoughtobeaseriousdiscouragementtoadvertising,it
  prolongstheperiodduringwhichgoodsremainunsold,andcapital
  lockedupinidleness。
  Ataxonnewspapersisobjectionable,notsomuchwhereit
  doesfallaswhereisdoesnot,thatis,whereitprevents
  newspapersfrombeingused。Tothegeneralityofthosewhobuy
  them,newspapersarealuxurywhichtheycanaswellaffordto
  payforasanyotherindulgence,andwhichisasunexceptionable
  asourceofrevenue。Buttothatlargepartofthecommunitywho
  havebeentaughttoread,buthavereceivedlittleother
  intellectualeducation,newspapersarethesourceofnearlyall
  thegeneralinformationwhichtheypossess,andofnearlyall
  theiracquaintancewiththeideasandtopicscurrentamong
  mankind;andaninterestismoreeasilyexcitedinnewspapers,
  thaninbooksorothermorereconditesourcesofinstruction。
  Newspaperscontributesolittle,inadirectway,tothe
  originationofusefulideas,thatmanypersonsundervaluethe
  importanceoftheirofficeindisseminatingthem。Theycorrect
  manyprejudicesandsuperstitions,andkeepupahabitof
  discussion,andinterestinpublicconcerns,theabsenceofwhich
  isagreatcauseofstagnationofmindusuallyfoundinthelower
  andmiddle,ifnotinall,ranks,ofthosecountrieswhere
  newspapersofanimportantorinterestingcharacterdonotexist。
  Thereoughttobenotaxes(asinthiscountrytherenowarenot)
  whichrenderthisgreatdiffuserofinformation,ofmental
  excitement,andmentalexercise,lessaccessibletothatportion
  ofthepublicwhichmostneedstobecarriedintoaregionof
  ideasandinterestsbeyonditsownlimitedhorizon。
  3。Intheenumerationofbadtaxes,aconspicuousplacemust
  beassignedtolawtaxes;whichextractarevenueforthestate
  fromthevariousoperationsinvolvedinanapplicationtothe
  tribunals。Likeallneedlessexpensesattachedtolaw
  proceedings,theyareataxonredress,andthereforeapremium
  oninjury。Althoughsuchtaxeshavebeenabolishedinthis
  countryasageneralsourceofrevenue,theystillexistinthe
  formoffeesofcourt,fordefrayingtheexpenseofthecourtsof
  justice;undertheidea,apparently,thatthosemayfairlybe
  requiredtobeartheexpensesoftheadministrationofjustice,
  whoreapthebenefitofit。Thefallacyofthisdoctrinewas
  powerfullyexposedbyBentham。Asheremarked,thosewhoare
  underthenecessityofgoingtolaw,arethosewhobenefitleast,
  notmost,bythelawanditsadministration。Tothemthe
  protectionwhichthelawaffordshasnotbeencomplete,since
  theyhavebeenobligedtoresorttoacourtofjusticeto
  ascertaintheirrights,ormaintainthoserightsagainst
  infringement:whiletheremainderofthepublichaveenjoyedthe
  immunityfrominjuryconferredbythelawandthetribunals,
  withouttheinconvenienceofanappealtothem。
  4。BesidesthegeneraltaxesoftheState,thereareinall
  ormostcountrieslocaltaxes,todefrayanyexpensesofapublic
  naturewhichitisthoughtbesttoplaceunderthecontrolor
  managementofalocalauthority。Someoftheseexpensesare
  incurredforpurposesinwhichtheparticularlocalityissolely
  orchieflyinterested;asthepaving,cleansing,andlightingof
  thestreets;orthemakingandrepairingofroadsandbridges,
  whichmaybeimportanttopeoplefromanypartofthecountry,
  butonlyinsofarasthey,orgoodsinwhichtheyhavean
  interest,passalongtheroadsoroverthebridges。Inother
  casesagain,theexpensesareofakindasnationallyimportant
  asanyothers,butaredefrayedlocallybecausesupposedmore
  likelytobewelladministeredbylocalbodies;as,inEngland,
  thereliefofthepoor,andthesupportofgaols,andinsome
  othercountries,ofschools。Todecideforwhatpublicobjects
  localsuperintendenceisbestsuited,andwhatarethosewhich
  shouldbekeptimmediatelyunderthecentralgovernment,orunder
  amixedsystemoflocalmanagementandcentralsuperintendence,
  isaquestionnotofpoliticaleconomy,butofadministration。It
  isanimportantprinciple,however,thattaxesimposedbyalocal
  authority,beinglessamenabletopublicityanddiscussionthan
  theactsofthegovernment,shouldalwaysbespecial—laidon
  forsomedefiniteservice,andnotexceedingtheexpenseactually
  incurredinrenderingtheservice。Thuslimited,itisdesirable,
  wheneverpracticable,thattheburthenshouldfallonthoseto
  whomtheserviceisrendered;thattheexpense,forinstance,of
  roadsandbridges,shouldbedefrayedbyatollonpassengersand
  goodsconveyedbythem,thusdividingthecostbetweenthosewho
  usethemforpleasureorconvenience,andtheconsumersofthe
  goodswhichtheyenabletobebroughttoandfromthemarketata
  diminishedexpense。When,however,thetollshaverepaidwith
  interestthewholeoftheexpenditure,theroadorbridgeshould
  bethrownopenfreeoftoll,thatitmaybeusedalsobythoseto
  whom,unlessopengratuitously,itwouldbevalueless;provision
  beingmadeforrepairseitherfromthefundsofthestate,orby
  arateleviedonthelocalitieswhichreaptheprincipalbenefit。
  InEngland,almostalllocaltaxesaredirect,(thecoalduty
  oftheCityofLondon,andafewsimilarimposts,beingthechief
  exceptions),thoughthegreatestpartofthetaxationforgeneral
  purposesisindirect。Onthecontrary,inFrance,Austria,and
  othercountrieswheredirecttaxationismuchmorelargely
  employedbythestate,thelocalexpensesoftownsare
  principallydefrayedbytaxesleviedoncommoditieswhenentering
  them。Theseindirecttaxesaremuchmoreobjectionableintowns
  thanonthefrontier,becausethethingswhichthecountry
  suppliestothetownsarechieflythenecessariesoflifeandthe
  materialsofmanufacture,while,ofwhatacountryimportsfrom
  foreigncountries,thegreaterpartusuallyconsistsofluxuries。
  Anoctroicannotproducealargerevenue,withoutpressing
  severelyuponthelabouringclassesofthetowns;unlesstheir
  wagesriseproportionally,inwhichcasethetaxfallsinagreat
  measureontheconsumersoftownproduce,whetherresidingin
  townorcountry,sincecapitalwillnotremaininthetownsif
  itsprofitsfallbelowtheirordinaryproportionascomparedwith
  theruraldistricts。
  NOTES:
  1。Thestatementinthetextrequiresmodificationinthecaseof
  countrieswherethelandisownedinsmallportions。These,being
  neitherabadgeofimportance,noringeneralanobjectoflocal
  attachment,arereadilypartedwithatasmalladvanceontheir
  originalcost,withtheintentionofbuyingelsewhere;andthe
  desireofacquiringlandevenondisadvantageoustermsisso
  great,astobelittlecheckedbyevenahighrateoftaxation。
  ThePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy
  byJohnStuartMill
  Book5
  Chapter6
  ComparisonbetweenDirectandIndirectTaxes
  1。Aredirectorindirecttaxesthemosteligible?This
  question,atalltimesinteresting,hasoflateexciteda
  considerableamountofdiscussion。InEnglandthereisapopular
  feeling,ofoldstanding,infavourofindirect,oritshould
  ratherbesaidinoppositiontodirect,taxation。Thefeelingis
  notgroundedonthemeritsofthecase,andisofapuerilekind。
  AnEnglishmandislikes,notsomuchthepayment,astheactof
  paying。Hedislikesseeingthefaceofthetax—collector,and
  beingsubjectedtohisperemptorydemand。Perhaps,too,themoney
  whichheisrequiredtopaydirectlyoutofhispocketisthe
  onlytaxationwhichheisquitesurethathepaysatall。Thata
  taxofoneshillingperpoundontea,oroftwoshillingsper
  bottleonwine,raisesthepriceofeachpoundofteaandbottle
  ofwinewhichheconsumes,bythatandmorethanthatamount,
  cannotindeedbedenied;itisthefact,andisintendedtobe
  so,andhehimself,attimes,isperfectlyawareofit;butit
  makeshardlyanyimpressiononhispracticalfeelingsand
  associations,servingtoillustratethedistinctionbetweenwhat
  ismerelyknowntobetrueandwhatisfelttobeso。The
  unpopularityofdirecttaxation,contrastedwiththeeasymanner
  inwhichthepublicconsenttoletthemselvesbefleecedinthe
  pricesofcommodities,hasgeneratedinmanyfriendsof
  improvementadirectlyoppositemodeofthinkingtothe
  foregoing。Theycontendthattheveryreasonwhichmakesdirect
  taxationdisagreeable,makesitpreferable。Underit,everyone
  knowshowmuchhereallypays;andifhevotesforawar,orany
  otherexpensivenationalluxury,hedoessowithhiseyesopento
  whatitcostshim。Ifalltaxesweredirect,taxationwouldbe
  muchmoreperceivedthanatpresent;andtherewouldbea
  securitywhichnowthereisnot,foreconomyinthepublic
  expenditure。
  Althoughthisargumentisnotwithoutforce,itsweightis
  likelytobeconstantlydiminishing。Therealincidenceof
  indirecttaxationiseverydaymoregenerallyunderstoodandmore
  familiarlyrecognized:andwhateverelsemaybesaidofthe
  changeswhicharetakingplaceinthetendenciesofthehuman
  mind,itcanscarcely,Ithink,bedenied,thatthingsaremore
  andmoreestimatedaccordingtotheircalculatedvalue,andless
  accordingtotheirnon—essentialaccompaniments。Themere
  distinctionbetweenpayingmoneydirectlytothetax—collector,
  andcontributingthesamesumthroughtheinterventionofthe
  tea。dealerorthewine—merchant,nolongermakesthewhole
  differencebetweendislikeoropposition,andpassive
  acquiescence。Butfurther,whileanysuchinfirmityofthe
  popularmindsubsists,theargumentgroundedonittellspartly
  ontheothersideofthequestion。Ifourpresentrevenueof
  aboutseventymillionswereallraisedbydirecttaxes,an
  extremedissatisfactionwouldcertainlyariseathavingtopayso
  much;butwhilemen’smindsaresolittleguidedbyreason,as
  suchachangeoffeelingfromsoirrelevantacausewouldimply,
  sogreatanaversiontotaxationmightnotbeanunqualified
  good。Oftheseventymillionsinquestion,nearlythirtyare
  pledged,underthemostbindingobligations,tothosewhose
  propertyhasbeenborrowedandspentbythestate:andwhilethis
  debtremainsunredeemed,agreatlyincreasedimpatienceof
  taxationwouldinvolvenolittledangerofabreachoffaith,
  similartothatwhich,inthedefaultingstatesofAmerica,has
  beenproduced,andinsomeofthemstillcontinues,fromthesame
  cause。Thatpart,indeed,ofthepublicexpenditure,whichis
  devotedtothemaintenanceofcivilandmilitaryestablishments,
  (thatis,allexcepttheinterestofthenationaldebt,)affords,
  inmanyofitsdetails,amplescopeforretrenchment。Butwhile
  muchoftherevenueiswastedunderthemerepretenceofpublic
  service,somuchofthemostimportantbusinessofgovernmentis
  leftundone,thatwhatevercanberescuedfromuseless
  expenditureisurgentlyrequiredforuseful。Whethertheobject
  beeducation;amoreefficientandaccessibleadministrationof
  justice;reformsofanykindwhich,liketheSlaveEmancipation,
  requirecompensationtoindividualinterests;orwhatisas
  importantasanyofthese,theentertainmentofasufficient
  staffofableandeducatedpublicservants,toconductina
  betterthanthepresentawkwardmannerthebusinessof
  legislationandadministration;everyoneofthesethingsimplies
  considerableexpense,andmanyofthemhaveagainandagainbeen
  preventedbythereluctancewhichexistedtoapplytoParliament
  foranincreasedgrantofpublicmoney,though(besidesthatthe
  existingmeanswouldprobablybesufficientifappliedtothe
  properpurposes)thecostwouldberepaid,oftenahundredfold,
  inmerepecuniaryadvantagetothecommunitygenerally。Ifso
  greatanadditionweremadetothepublicdislikeoftaxationas
  mightbetheconsequenceofconfiningittothedirectform,the
  classeswhoprofitbythemisapplicationofpublicmoneymight
  probablysucceedinsavingthatbywhichtheyprofit,atthe
  expenseofthatwhichwouldonlybeusefultothepublic。
  Thereis,however,afrequentpleainsupportofindirect
  taxation,whichmustbealtogetherrejected,asgroundedona
  fallacy。Weareoftentoldthattaxesoncommoditiesareless
  burthensomethanothertaxes,becausethecontributorcanescape
  fromthembyceasingtousethetaxedcommodity。Hecertainly
  can,ifthatbehisobject,deprivethegovernmentofthemoney:
  buthedoessobyasacrificeofhisownindulgences,which(if
  hechosetoundergoit)wouldequallymakeuptohimforthesame
  amounttakenfromhimbydirecttaxation。Supposeataxlaidon
  wine,sufficienttoaddfivepoundstothepriceofthequantity
  ofwinewhichheconsumesinayear。Hehasonly(wearetold)to
  diminishhisconsumptionofwineby5l。,andheescapesthe
  burthen。True:butifthe5l。,insteadofbeinglaidonwine,
  hadbeentakenfromhimbyanincometax,hecould,byexpending
  5l。lessinwine,equallysavetheamountofthetax,sothat
  thedifferencebetweenthetwocasesisreallyillusory。Ifthe
  governmenttakesfromthecontributorfivepoundsayear,whether
  inonewayoranother,exactlythatamountmustberetrenched
  fromhisconsumptiontoleavehimaswelloffasbefore;andin
  eitherwaythesameamountofsacrifice,neithermorenorless,
  isimposedonhim。
  Ontheotherhand,itissomeadvantageonthesideof
  indirecttaxes,thatwhattheyexactfromthecontributoris
  takenatatimeandinamannerlikelytobeconvenienttohim。
  Itispaidatatimewhenhehasatanyrateapaymenttomake;
  itcauses,therefore,noadditionaltrouble,nor(unlessthetax
  beonnecessaries)anyinconveniencebutwhatisinseparablefrom
  thepaymentoftheamount。Hecanalso,exceptinthecaseof
  veryperishablearticles,selecthisowntimeforlayingina
  stockofthecommodity,andconsequentlyforpaymentofthetax。
  Theproducerordealerwhoadvancesthesetaxes,is,indeed,
  sometimessubjectedtoinconvenience;but,inthecaseof
  importedgoods,thisinconvenienceisreducedtoaminimumby
  whatiscalledtheWarehousingSystem,underwhich,insteadof
  payingthedutyatthetimeofimportation,heisonlyrequired
  todosowhenhetakesoutthegoodsforconsumption,whichis
  seldomdoneuntilhehaseitheractuallyfound,orhasthe
  prospectofimmediatelyfinding,apurchaser。
  Thestrongestobjection,however,toraisingthewholeorthe
  greaterpartofalargerevenuebydirecttaxes,isthe
  impossibilityofassessingthemfairlywithoutaconscientious
  co—operationonthepartofthecontributors,nottobehopedfor
  inthepresentlowstateofpublicmorality。Inthecaseofan
  incometax,wehavealreadyseenthatunlessitbefound
  practicabletoexemptsavingsaltogetherfromthetax,the
  burthencannotbeapportionedwithanytolerableapproachto
  fairnessuponthosewhoseincomesarederivedfrombusinessor
  professions;andthisisinfactadmittedbymostofthe
  advocatesofdirecttaxation,who,Iamafraid,generallyget
  overthedifficultybyleavingthoseclassesuntaxed,and
  confiningtheirprojectedincometaxto’realizedproperty’,in
  whichformitcertainlyhasthemeritofbeingaveryeasyform
  ofplunder。Butenoughhasbeensaidincondemnationofthis
  expedient。Wehaveseen,however,thatahouse—taxisaformof
  directtaxationnotliabletothesameobjectionsasanincome
  tax,andindeedliabletoasfewobjectionsofanykindas
  perhapsanyofourindirecttaxes。Butitwouldbeimpossibleto
  raisebyahouse。taxalone,thegreatestpartoftherevenueof
  GreatBritain,withoutproducingaveryobjectionable
  overcrowdingofthepopulation,throughthestrongmotivewhich
  allpersonswouldhavetoavoidthetaxbyrestrictingtheir
  houseaccommodation。Besides,evenahouse—taxhasinequalities,
  andconsequentinjustices;notaxisexemptfromthem,anditis
  neitherjustnorpolitictomakealltheinequalitiesfallinthe
  sameplaces,bycallingupononetaxtodefraythewholeorthe
  chiefpartofthepublicexpenditure。Somuchofthelocal
  taxation,inthiscountry,beingalreadyintheformofa
  house。tax,itisprobablethattenmillionsayearwouldbefully
  asmuchascouldbeneficiallybelevied,throughthismedium,for
  generalpurposes。
  Acertainamountofrevenuemay,aswehaveseen,beobtained
  withoutinjusticebyapeculiartaxonrent。Besidesthepresent
  land。tax,andanequivalentfortherevenuenowderivedfrom
  stampdutiesontheconveyanceofland,somefurthertaxation
  might,Ihavecontended,atsomefutureperiodbeimposed,to
  enablethestatetoparticipateintheprogressiveincreaseof
  theincomesoflandlordsfromnaturalcauses。Legaciesand
  inheritances,wehavealsoseen,oughttobesubjectedto
  taxationsufficienttoyieldaconsiderablerevenue。Withthese
  taxes,andahouse。taxofsuitableamount;weshould,Ithink,
  havereachedtheprudentlimitsofdirecttaxation,saveina
  nationalemergencysourgentastojustifythegovernmentin
  disregardingtheamountofinequalityandunfairnesswhichmay
  ultimatelybefoundinseparablefromanincometax。Theremainder
  oftherevenuewouldhavetobeprovidedbytaxesonconsumption,
  andthequestionis,whichofthesearetheleastobjectionable。
  2。Therearesomeformsofindirecttaxationwhichmustbe
  peremptorilyexcluded。Taxesoncommodities,forrevenue
  purposes,mustnotoperateasprotectingduties,butmustbe
  leviedimpartiallyoneverymodeinwhichthearticlescanbe
  obtained,whetherproducedinthecountryitself,orimported。An
  exclusionmustalsobeputuponalltaxesonthenecessariesof
  life,oronthematerialsorinstrumentsemployedinproducing
  thosenecessaries。Suchtaxesarealwaysliabletoencroachon
  whatshouldbeleftuntaxed,theincomesbarelysufficientfor
  healthfulexistence;andonthemostfavourablesupposition,
  namely,thatwagesrisetocompensatethelabourersforthetax,
  itoperatesasapeculiartaxonprofits,whichisatonce
  unjust,anddetrimentaltonationalwealth。(1*)Whatremainare
  taxesonluxuries。Andthesehavesomepropertieswhichstrongly
  recommendthem。Inthefirstplace,theycannever,byany
  possibility,touchthosewhosewholeincomeisexpendedon
  necessaries;whiletheydoreachthosebywhomwhatisrequired
  fornecessaries,isexpendedonindulgences。Inthenextplace,
  theyoperateinsomecasesasanuseful,andtheonlyuseful,
  kindofsumptuarylaw。Idisclaimallasceticism,andbynomeans
  wishtoseediscouraged,eitherbylaworopinion,anyindulgence
  (consistentwiththemeansandobligationsofthepersonusing
  it)whichissoughtfromagenuineinclinationfor,andenjoyment
  of,thethingitself;butagreatportionoftheexpensesofthe
  higherandmiddleclassesinmostcountries,andthegreatestin
  this,isnotincurredforthesakeofthepleasureaffordedby
  thethingsonwhichthemoneyisspent,butfromregardto
  opinion,andanideathatcertainexpensesareexpectedfrom
  them,asanappendageofstation;andIcannotbutthinkthat
  expenditureofthissortisamostdesirablesubjectoftaxation。
  Iftaxationdiscouragesit,somegoodisdone,andifnot,no
  harm;forinsofarastaxesareleviedonthingswhichare
  desiredandpossessedfrommotivesofthisdescription,nobodyis
  theworseforthem。Whenathingisboughtnotforitsusebut
  foritscostliness,cheapnessisnorecommendation。AsSismondi
  remarks,theconsequenceofcheapeningarticlesofvanity,isnot
  thatlessisexpendedonsuchthings,butthatthebuyers
  substituteforthecheapenedarticlesomeotherwhichismore
  costly,oramoreelaboratequalityofthesamething;andasthe
  inferiorqualityansweredthepurposeofvanityequallywellwhen
  itwasequallyexpensive,ataxonthearticleisreallypaidby
  nobody:itisacreationofpublicrevenuebywhichnobody
  loses。(2*)
  3。Inordertoreduceasmuchaspossibletheinconveniences,
  andincreasetheadvantages,incidenttotaxesoncommodities,
  thefollowingarethepracticalruleswhichsuggestthemselves。
  1st。Toraiseaslargearevenueasconvenientlymaybe,from
  thoseclassesofluxurieswhichhavemostconnexionwithvanity,
  andleastwithpositiveenjoyment;suchasthemorecostly
  qualitiesofallkindsofpersonalequipmentandornament。2ndly。
  Wheneverpossible,todemandthetax,notfromtheproducer,but
  directlyfromtheconsumer,sincewhenleviedontheproducerit
  raisesthepricealwaysbymore,andoftenbymuchmore,thanthe
  mereamountofthetax。Mostoftheminorassessedtaxesinthis
  countryarerecommendedbyboththeseconsiderations。Butwith
  regardtohorsesandcarriages,astherearemanypersonsto
  whom,fromhealthorconstitution,thesearenotsomuchluxuries
  asnecessaries,thetaxpaidbythosewhohavebutoneriding
  horse,orbutonecarriage,especiallyofthecheaper
  descriptions,shouldbelow;whiletaxationshouldrisevery
  rapidlywiththenumberofhorsesandcarriages,andwiththeir
  costliness。3rdly。Butastheonlyindirecttaxeswhichyielda
  largerevenuearethosewhichfallonarticlesofuniversalor
  verygeneralconsumption,andasitisthereforenecessaryto
  havesometaxesonrealluxuries,thatis,onthingswhichafford
  pleasureinthemselves,andarevaluedonthataccountrather
  thanfortheircost;thesetaxesshould,ifpossible,beso
  adjustedastofallwiththesameproportionalweightonsmall,
  onmoderate,andonlargeincomes。Thisisnotaneasymatter;
  sincethethingswhicharethesubjectsofthemoreproductive
  taxes,areinproportionmorelargelyconsumedbythepoorer
  membersofthecommunitythanbytherich。Tea,coffee,sugar,
  tobacco,fermenteddrinks,canhardlybesotaxedthatthepoor
  shallnotbearmorethantheirdueshareoftheburthen。
  Somethingmightbedonebymakingthedutyonthesuperior
  qualities,whichareusedbythericherconsumers,muchhigherin
  proportiontothevalue(insteadofmuchlower,asisalmost
  universallythepractice,underthepresentEnglishsystem);but
  insomecasesthedifficultyofatalladjustingthedutytothe
  value,soastopreventevasion,issaid,withwhattruthIknow
  not,tobeinsuperable;sothatitisthoughtnecessarytolevy
  thesamefixeddutyonallthequalitiesalike:aflagrant
  injusticetothepoorerclassofcontributors,unlesscompensated
  bytheexistenceofothertaxesfromwhich,asfromthepresent
  incometax,theyarealtogetherexempt。4thly。Asfarasis
  consistentwiththeprecedingrules,taxationshouldratherbe
  concentratedonafewarticlesthandiffusedovermany,inorder
  thattheexpensesofcollectionmaybesmaller,andthatasfew
  employmentsaspossiblemaybeburthensomelyandvexatiously
  interferedwith。5thly。Amongluxuriesofgeneralconsumption,
  taxationshouldbypreferenceattachitselftostimulants,
  becausethese,thoughinthemselvesaslegitimateindulgencesas
  anyothers,aremoreliablethanmostotherstobeusedin
  excess,sothatthechecktoconsumption,naturallyarisingfrom
  taxation,isonthewholebetterappliedtothemthantoother
  things。6thly。Asfarasotherconsiderationspermit,taxation
  shouldbeconfinedtoimportedarticles,sincethesecanbetaxed
  withalessdegreeofvexatiousinterference,andwithfewer
  incidentalbadeffects,thanwhenataxisleviedonthefieldor
  ontheworkshop。Custom—dutiesare,caeterisparibus,muchless
  objectionablethanexcise:buttheymustbelaidonlyonthings
  whicheithercannot,oratleastwillnot,beproducedinthe
  countryitself;orelsetheirproductiontheremustbeprohibited
  (asinEnglandisthecasewithtobacco),orsubjectedtoan
  excisedutyofequivalentamount。7thly。Notaxoughttobekept
  sohighastofurnishamotivetoitsevasion,toostrongtobe
  counteractedbyordinarymeansofprevention:andespeciallyno
  commodityshouldbetaxedsohighlyastoraiseupaclassof
  lawlesscharacters,smugglers,illicitdistillers,andthelike。
  Oftheexciseandcustomdutieslatelyexistinginthis
  country,allwhichareintrinsicallyunfittoformpartofagood
  systemoftaxation,have,sincethelastreformsbyMrGladstone,
  beengotridof。Amongthesearealldutiesonordinaryarticles
  offood,whetherforhumanbeingsorforcattle;thoseontimber,
  asfall。ingonthematerialsoflodging,whichisoneofthe
  necessariesoflife;alldutiesonthemetals,andonimplements
  madeofthem;taxesonsoap,whichisanecessaryofcleanliness,
  andontallow,thematerialbothofthatandofsomeother
  necessaries;thetaxonpaper,anindispensableinstrumentof
  almostallbusinessandofmostkindsofinstruction。Theduties
  whichnowyieldnearlythewholeofthecustomsandexcise
  revenue,thoseonsugar,coffee,tea,wine,beer,spirits,and
  tobacco,areinthemselveswherealargeamountofrevenueis
  necessary,extremelypropertaxes;butatpresentgrosslyunjust,
  fromthedisproportionateweightwithwhichtheypressonthe
  poorerclasses;andsomeofthem(thoseonspiritsandtobacco)
  aresohighastocauseaconsiderableamountofsmuggling。Itis
  probablethatmostofthesetaxesmightbearagreatreduction
  withoutanymateriallossofrevenue。Inwhatmannerthefiner
  articlesofmanufacture,consumedbytherich,mightmost
  advantageouslybetaxed,Imustleavetobedecidedbythosewho
  havetherequisitepracticalknowledge。Thedifficultywouldbe,
  toeffectitwithoutaninadmissibledegreeofinterferencewith
  production。Incountrieswhich,liketheUnitedStates,import
  theprincipalpartofthefinermanufactureswhichtheyconsume,
  thereislittledifficultyinthematter:andevenwherenothing
  isimportedbuttherawmaterial,thatmaybetaxed,especially
  thequalitiesofitwhichareexclusivelyemployedforthe
  fabricsusedbythericherclassofconsumers。Thus,inEnglanda
  highcustom—dutyonrawsilkwouldbeconsistentwithprinciple;
  anditmightperhapsbepracticabletotaxthefinerqualitiesof
  cottonorlinenyarn,whetherspuninthecountryitselfor
  imported。
  NOTES:
  1。Somearguethatthematerialsandinstrumentsofall
  productionshouldbeexemptfromtaxation;butthese,whenthey
  donotenterintotheproductionofnecessaries,seemasproper
  subjectsoftaxationasthefinishedarticle。Itischieflywith
  referencetoforeigntrade,thatsuchtaxeshavebeenconsidered
  injurious。Internationallyspeaking,theymaybelookeduponas
  exportduties,and,unlessincasesinwhichanexportdutyis
  advisable,theyshouldbeaccompaniedwithanequivalentdrawback
  onexportation。Butthereisnosufficientreasonagainsttaxing
  thematerialsandinstrumentsusedintheproductionofanything
  whichisitselfafitobjectoftaxation。
  2。’Werewetosupposethatdiamondscouldonlybeprocuredfrom
  oneparticularanddistantcountry,andpearlsfromanother,and
  weretheproduceoftheminesintheformer,andofthefishery
  inthelatter,fromtheoperationofnaturalcauses,tobecome
  doublydifficulttoprocure,theeffectwouldmerelybethatin
  timehalfthequantityofdiamondsandpearlswouldbesufficient
  tomarkacertainopulenceandrank,thatithadbeforebeen
  necessarytoemployforthatpurpose。Thesamequantityofgold,
  orsomecommodityreducibleatlasttolabour,wouldberequired
  toproducethenowreducedamount,astheformerlargeramount。
  Werethedifficultyinterposedbytheregulationsof
  legislators……itcouldpurposesofmakenodifferencetothe
  fitnessofthesearticlestoservethevanity。’Supposethat
  meanswerediscoveredwherebythephysiologicalprocesswhich
  generatesthepearlmightbeinducedadlibitum,theresultbeing
  thattheamountoflabourexpendedinprocuringeachpearl,came
  tobeonlythefivehundredthpartofwhatitwasbefore。’The
  ultimateeffectofsuchachangewoulddependonwhetherthe
  fisherywerefreeornot。Wereitfreetoall,aspearlscouldbe
  gotsimplyforthelabouroffishingforthem,astringofthem
  mightbehadforafewpence。Theverypoorestclassofsociety
  couldthereforeaffordtodecoratetheirpersonswiththem。They
  wouldthussoonbecomeextremelyvulgarandunfashionable,andso
  atlastvalueless。Ifhoweverwesupposethatinsteadofthe
  fisherybeingfree,thelegislatorownsandhascompletecommand
  oftheplace,wherealonepearlsaretobeprocured;asthe
  progressofdiscoveryadvanced,hemightimposeadutyonthem
  equaltothediminutionoflabournecessarytoprocurethem。They
  wouldthenbeasmuchesteemedastheywerebefore。Whatsimple
  beautytheyhavewouldremainunchanged。Thedifficultytobe
  surmountedinordertoobtainthemwouldbedifferent,but
  equallygreat。andtheywouldthereforeequallyservetomarkthe
  opulenceofthosewhopossessedthem。’Thenetrevenueobtained
  bysuchatax’wouldnotcostthesocietyanything。Ifnotabused
  initsapplication,itwouldbeaclearadditionofsomuchto
  theresourcesofthecommunity。’——Rae,NewPrinciplesof
  PoliticalEconomy,pp。369—71。
  ThePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy
  byJohnStuartMill
  Book5
  Chapter7
  OfaNationalDebt
  1。Thequestionmustnowbeconsidered,howfaritisright
  orexpedienttoraisemoneyforthepurposeofgovernment,notby
  layingontaxestotheamountrequired,butbytakingaportion
  ofthecapitalofthecountryintheformofaloan,andcharging
  thepublicrevenuewithonlytheinterest。Nothingneedsbesaid
  aboutprovidingfortemporarywantsbytakingupmoney;for
  instance,byanissueofexchequerbills,destinedtobepaid
  off,atfurthestinayearortwo,fromtheproceedsofthe
  existingtaxes。Thisisaconvenientexpedient,andwhenthe
  governmentdoesnotpossessatreasureorhoard,isoftena
  necessaryone,ontheoccurrenceofextraordinaryexpenses,orof
  atemporaryfailureintheordinarysourcesofrevenue。Whatwe
  havetodiscussistheproprietyofcontractinganationaldebt
  ofapermanentcharacter;defrayingtheexpensesofawar,orof
  anyseasonofdifficulty,byloans,toberedeemedeithervery
  graduallyandatadistantperiod,ornotatall。
  ThisquestionhasalreadybeentoucheduponintheFirst
  Book。Weremarked,thatifthecapitaltakeninloansis
  abstractedfromfundseitherengagedinproduction,ordestined
  tobeemployedinit,theirdiversionfromthatpurposeis
  equivalenttotakingtheamountfromthewagesofthelabouring
  classes。Borrowing,inthiscase,isnotasubstituteforraising
  thesupplieswithintheyear。Agovernmentwhichborrowsdoes
  actuallytaketheamountwithintheyear,andthattoobyatax
  exclusivelyonthelabouringclasses:thanwhichitcouldhave
  donenothingworse,ifithadsupplieditswantsbyavowed
  taxation;andinthatcasethetransaction,anditsevils,would
  haveendedwiththeemergency;whilebythecircuitousmode
  adopted,thevalueextractedfromthelabourersisgained,notby
  thestate,butbytheemployersoflabour,thestateremaining
  chargedwiththedebtbesides,andwithitsinterestin
  perpetuity。Thesystemofpublicloans,insuchcircumstances,
  maybepronouncedtheveryworstwhich,inthepresentstateof
  civilization,isstillincludedinthecatalogueoffinancial
  expedients。
  Wehoweverremarkedthatthereareothercircumstancesin
  whichloansarenotchargeablewiththesepernicious
  consequences:namely,first,whenwhatisborrowedisforeign
  capital,theoverflowingsofthegeneralaccumulationofthe
  world;or,secondly,whenitiscapitalwhicheitherwouldnot
  havebeensavedatallunlessthismodeofinvestmenthadbeen
  opentoit,orafterbeingsaved,wouldhavebeenwastedin
  unproductiveenterprises,orsenttoseekemploymentinforeign
  countries。Whentheprogressofaccumulationhasreducedprofits
  eithertotheultimateortothepracticalminimum,——tothe
  rate,lessthanwhichwouldeitherputastoptotheincreaseof
  capital,orsendthewholeofthenewaccumulationsabroad;
  governmentmayannuallyinterceptthesenewaccumulations,
  withouttrenchingontheemploymentorwagesofthelabouring
  classesinthecountryitself,orperhapsinanyothercountry。
  Tothisextent,therefore,theloansystemmaybecarried,
  withoutbeingliabletotheutterandperemptorycondemnation
  whichisduetoitwhenitoverpassesthislimit。Whatiswanted
  isanindextodeterminewhether,inanygivenseriesofyears,
  asduringthelastgreatwarforexample,thelimithasbeen
  exceededornot。
  Suchanindexexists,atonceacertainandanobviousone。
  Didthegovernment,byitsloanoperations,augmenttherateof
  interest?Ifitonlyopenedachannelforcapitalwhichwouldnot
  otherwisehavebeenaccumulated,orwhich,ifaccumulated,would
  nothavebeenemployedwithinthecountry;thisimpliesthatthe
  capital,whichthegovernmenttookandexpended,couldnothave
  foundemploymentattheexistingrateofinterest。Solongasthe
  loansdonomorethanabsorbthissurplus,theypreventany
  tendencytoafalloftherateofinterest,buttheycannot
  occasionanyrise。Whentheydoraisetherateofinterest,as
  theydidinamostextraordinarydegreeduringtheFrenchwar,
  thisispositiveproofthatthegovernmentisacompetitorfor
  capitalwiththeordinarychannels,ofproductiveinvestment,and
  iscarryingoff,notmerelyfundswhichwouldnot,butfunds
  whichwould,havefoundproductiveemploymentwithinthecountry。
  Tothefullextent,therefore,towhichtheloansofgovernment,
  duringthewar,causedtherateofinteresttoexceedwhatitwas
  before,andwhatithasbeensince,thoseloansarechargeable
  withalltheevilswhichhavebeendescribed。Ifitbeobjected
  thatinterestonlyrosebecauseprofitsrose,Ireplythatthis
  doesnotweaken,butstrengthens,theargument。Ifthegovernment
  loansproducedtheriseofprofitsbythegreatamountofcapital
  whichtheyabsorbed,bywhatmeanscantheyhavehadthiseffect,
  unlessbyloweringthewagesoflabour?Itwillperhapsbesaid,
  thatwhatkeptprofitshighduringthewarwasnotthedrafts
  madeonthenationalcapitalbytheloans,buttherapidprogress
  ofindustrialimprovements。This,inagreatmeasure,wasthe
  fact;anditnodoubtalleviatedthehardshiptothelabouring
  classes,andmadethefinancialsystemwhichwaspursuedless。
  activelymischievous,butnotlesscontrarytoprinciple。These
  veryimprovementsinindustry,maderoomforalargeramountof
  capital;andthegovernment,bydrainingawayagreatpartofthe
  annualaccumulations,didnotindeedpreventthatcapitalfrom
  existingultimately,(foritstartedintoexistencewithgreat
  rapidityafterthepeace),butpreventeditfromexistingatthe
  time,andsubtractedjustsomuch,whilethewarlasted,from
  distributionamongproductivelabourers。Ifthegovernmenthad
  abstainedfromtakingthiscapitalbyloan,andhadalloweditto
  reachthelabourers,buthadraisedthesupplieswhichit
  requiredbyadirecttaxonthelabouringclasses,itwouldhave
  produced(ineveryrespectbuttheexpenseandinconvenienceof
  collectingthetax)theverysameeconomicaleffectswhichitdid
  produce,exceptthatweshouldnotnowhavehadthedebt。The
  courseitactuallytookwasthereforeworsethantheveryworst
  modewhichitcouldpossiblyhaveadoptedofraisingthesupplies
  withintheyear:andtheonlyexcuse,orjustification,whichit
  admitsof,(sofarasthatexcusecouldbetrulypleaded),was
  hardnecessity;theimpossibilityofraisingsoenormousan
  annualsumbytaxation,withoutresortingtotaxeswhichfrom
  theirodiousness,orfromthefacilityofevasion,itwouldhave
  beenfoundimpracticabletoenforce。