Iftheaboveresult——thesatisfactionofthedemandwithAexcluded——hadbeenaccomplished，perchance，bytheinvestmentofmorethandoublethecapitalinCorD，orinboth，thenthematterwouldassumeadifferentaspect。Forexample，ifthethirdinvestmentofcapitalweremadeinC:
TABLEIVaTypeofsoilAcresCapital£；Profit£；PriceofProd。£；OutputQrsSellingprice£；Proceeds£；RentRateofSurplusProfitInGrainQrsInMoney£；
B1516411/26000%
C171/211/29911/2131/2341/260%
D1516811/21246120%*
Total3171/231/22121311/27101/2Inthiscase，comparedwithTableIV，theoutputfromChasrisenfrom6to9qrs，thesurplus-productfrom2to3qrs，andthemoney-rentfrom£；3to£；41/2。ComparedwithTableII，wherethelatterwas£；12，andTableI，whereitwas£；6，themoney-renthas，ontheotherhand，decreased。Thetotalrentalingrain=7qrsandhasfallencomparedwithTableII12qrsandrisencomparedwithTableI6qrs；inmoney£；101/2ithasfallencomparedwithboth£；18and£；36。
Ifthethirdinvestmentofcapitalof£；21/2hadbeenemployedonsoilB，itwouldindeedhavealteredthequantityofproduction，butwouldnothaveaffectedtherent，since，accordingtoourassumption，thesuccessiveinvestmentsdonotproduceanydifferencesuponthesamesoilandsoilBdoesnotyieldanyrent。
Ifweassume，ontheotherhand，thatthethirdinvestmentofcapitaltakesplaceuponDinsteadofC，wehavethefollowing，TableIVb:
TypeofsoilAcresCapital£；Profit£；PriceofProd。£；OutputQrsSellingprice£；Proceeds£；RentRateofSurplusProfitInGrainQrInMoney£；
B1516411/26000%
C1516611/292360%
D171/211/291211/21869120%*
Total3171/231/2212233812Herethetotalproductis22qrs，morethandoublethatofTableI，althoughtheinvestedcapitalisonly£；171/2asagainst£；10，thatis，nottwicetheamount。Thetotalproductisalsolargerby2qrsthanthatofTableII，althoughtheinvestedcapitalinthelatterislarger——namely，£；20。
ComparedwithTableI，therentingrainfromsoilDhasincreasedfrom3[IntheGerman1894editionthisreads:2。朎d。]to6qrs，whereasthemoney-rent，£；9，hasremainedthesame。ComparedwithTableII，thegrain-rentfromDisthesame，namely，6qrs，butthemoney-renthasfallenfrom£；18to£；9。
Comparingthetotalrents，thegrain-rentfromTableIVb=8qrsislargerthanthatfromTableI=6qrsandthanthatfromTableIVa=7
qrs；butitissmallerthanthatfromTable11=12qrs。Themoney-rentfromTableIVb=£；12islargerthanthatfromTableIVa=£；101/2andsmallerthanthatfromTable1=£；18andthatfromTableII=
£；36。
Inorderthatthetotalrentalmay，undertheconditionsofTableIVbwiththeeliminationofrentfromB，beequaltothatofTableI，weneed£；6moreofsurplus-product，thatis，4qrsat£；11/2，whichisthenewpriceofproduction。Wethenhaveatotalrentalof£；18
againasinTableI。ThemagnitudeoftherequiredadditionalcapitalwillvaryaccordingtowhetherweinvestitinCorD，ordivideitbetweenthetwo。
OnC，£；5capitalyields2qrsofsurplus-product；consequently，£；10additionalcapitalyields4qrsofadditionalsurplus-product。
OnD，£；5additionalcapitalwouldsufficetoproduce4qrsofadditionalgrain-rentundertheconditionsassumedhere，namelythattheproductivityoftheadditionalinvestmentsofcapitalremainsthesame。Weshouldthenobtainthefollowingresults:
TABLEIVcTypeofsoilAcresCapital£；Proft£；PriceofProd。£；OutputQrsSellingprice£；Proceeds£；RentRateofSurplusProfitQrs£；
B1516411/26000%
C1153181811/2276960%
D171/211/291211/21869120%*
Total3271/251/23334511218TABLEIVdTypeofsoilAcresCapital£；Proft£；PriceofProd。£；OutputQrsSellingprice£；Proceeds£；RentRateofSurplusProfitQrs£；
B1516411/26000%
C1516611/292360%
D1121/221/2152011/2301015120%*
Total3221/241/22730451218Thetotalmoneyrentalwouldbeexactlyone-halfofwhatitwasinTableII，wheretheadditionalcapitalswereinvestedatconstantpricesofproduction。
ThemostimportantthingistocomparetheabovetableswithTableI。
Wefindthatwhilethepriceofproductionhasfallenbyone-half，i。e。，from60shillingsto30shillingsperquarter，thetotalmoneyrentalhasremainedthesame，namely=£；18，andthegrain-renthascorrespondinglydoubledfrom6to12qrs。UponBtherenthasdisappeared；uponCthemoney-renthasrisenbyone-halfinlVc，buthasfallenbyone-halfinIVd；uponD
inIVc，ithasremainedthesame，=£；9，andhasrisenfrom£；9
to£；15inIVd。Theproductionhasrisenfrom10to34qrsinIVe，andto30qrsinIVd；theprofitfrom£；2to£；51/2inIVcandto£；4inIVd。Thetotalinvestmentofcapitalhasrisenintheonecasefrom£；10to£；271/2，andintheotherfrom£；10to£；221/2；i。e。，inbothcasesithasmorethandoubled。Therateofrent，thatis，therentcalculatedontheinvestedcapital，isinalltablesfromIVtoIVdeverywherethesameforeachkindofsoil——whichwasalreadyimpliedintheassumptionthattherateofproductivityforthetwosuccessiveinvestmentsofcapitalremainsthesameforeachsoiltype。ButcomparedwithTableIthisratehasfallen，bothfortheaverageofallkindsofsoilandforeachoneofthemindividually。InTableIitwas=180%onanaverage，whereasinIVcit=18/271/2x100=
655/11%andinIVdit=18/221/2
x100=80%。Theaveragemoney-rentperacrehasrisen。Formerly，inTableI，itsaveragewas£；41/2peracrefromallfouracres，whereasinIVcandIVditis£；6peracreuponthethreeacres。
Itsaverageupontherent-bearinglandwasformerly£；6，whereasnowitis£；9peracre。Hencethemoney-valueoftherentperacrehasrisenandnowrepresentstwiceasmuchgrainasitdidformerly；butthe12qrsofgrain-rentarenowlessthanone-halfofthetotaloutputof34and30[IntheGerman1894editionthisreads:33and27。？Ed。]
qrsrespectively，whereasinTableIthe6qrsrepresent3/5ofthetotaloutputof10qrs。Consequently，althoughtherentasanaliquotpartofthetotaloutputhasfallen，andhasalsofallenwhencalculatedontheinvestedcapital，itsmoney-valuecalculatedperacrehasrisen，andstillmoreitsvalueasaproduct。IfwetakesoilDinTablelVd，wefindthatthepriceofproductioncorrespondingtothecapitaloutlayhere=£；15，ofwhich£；121/2isinvestedcapital。Themoney-rent=£；15。InTableI，forthesamesoilD，thepriceofproductionwas=£；3，theinvestedcapital=
£；21/2，andthemoney-rent=£；9；thatis，thelatterwasthreetimesthepriceofproductionandalmostfourtimesthecapital。InTablelVd，themoney-rentforD，£；15，isexactlyequaltothepriceofproductionandlargerthanthecapitalbyonly1/5。Nevertheless，themoney-rentperacreis2/3larger，namely，£；15insteadof£；9。InTableI，thegrain-rentof3qrs=3/4ofthetotalproductof4qrs；inTableIVditis10qrs，orone-halfthetotalproduct20qrsperacreofD。
Thisshowsthatthemoney-valueandgrainvalueoftherentperacremayrise，althoughitconstitutesasmalleraliquotpartofthetotalyieldandhasfalleninproportiontotheinvestedcapital。
ThevalueofthetotalproductinTable1=£；30；therent=£；18，ormorethanone-halfofit。ThevalueofthetotalproductinIVd=£；45，ofwhichtherent=£；18，orlessthanone-half。
Now，thereasonwhyinspiteofthefallinpriceby£；11/2perquarter，i。e。，afallof50%，andinspiteofthereductionincompetingsoilfrom4to3acres，thetotalmoney-rentremainsthesameandthetotalgrain-rentisdoubled，while，calculatedperacre，boththegrain-rentandmoney-rentrise，isthatmorequartersofsurplus-productareproduced。Thepriceofgrainfallsby50%，andthesurplus-productincreasesby100%。Butinordertoobtainthisresult，thetotalproductionundertheconditionsassumedbyusmustbetrebled，andtheinvestmentofcapitalinthesuperiorsoilsmustbemorethandoubled。Atwhatratethelattermustincreasedependsinthefirstplaceuponthedistributionofadditionalcapitalinvestmentsamongthebetterandbestsoils，alwaysassumingthattheproductivityofthecapitalinvestedineachsoiltypeincreasesproportionatelytoitsmagnitude。
Ifthefallinpriceofproductionweresmaller，lessadditionalcapitalwouldberequiredtoproducethesamemoney-rent。IfthesupplyrequiredtothrowsoilAoutofcultivation-andthisdependsnotmerelyupontheoutputperacreofA，butalsoupontheshareheldbyAintheentirecultivatedarea——thus，ifthesupplyrequiredforthispurposewerelarger，andtherebyalsotheamountofadditionalinvestedcapitalrequiredinsoilsbetterthanA，then，othercircumstancesremainingthesame，themoneyandgrainrentswouldhaveincreasedstillmore，althoughsoilBwouldhaveceasedyieldingmoneyandgrainrents。IfthecapitaleliminatedfromAhadbeen=£；5，thetablestobecomparedforthiscasewouldbetablesIIandIVd。Thetotalproductwouldhaveincreasedfrom20to30
qrs。Themoney-rentwouldbeonlyhalfaslarge，or£；48insteadof£；36；thegrain-rentwouldbethesame，namely=12qrs。
Ifatotalproductof44qrs=£；66couldbeproduceduponDwithacapital=£；271/2——correspondingtotheoldrateforD，4qrsper£；21/2capital——thenthetotalrentalwouldoncemorereachthelevelattainedinTableII，andthetablewouldappearasfollows:
TypeofSoilCapital£；OutputQrsGrain-RentQrsMoney-Rent£；
B5400
C5623
D271/2442233
Total371/2542436Thetotalproductionwouldbe54qrsasagainst20qrsinTableII，andthemoney-rentwouldbethesame，=£；36。Butthetotalcapitalwouldbe£；371/2，whereasinTableIIitwas=20。
Thetotalinvestedcapitalwouldbedoublealmost，whileproductionwouldbenearlytreble；thegrain-rentwouldbedoubleandthemoney-rentwouldremainthesame。Hence，ifthepricefalls-whileproductivityremainsthesame——asaresultoftheinvestmentofadditionalmoney-capitalinthebettersoilswhichyieldrent，thatis，allsoilsbetterthanA，thenthetotalcapitalhasatendencynottoincreaseatthesamerateasproductionandgrain-rent；thustheincreaseingrain-rentmaycompensateforthelossinmoney-rentduetothefallingprice。ThesamelawalsomanifestsitselfinthattheinvestedcapitalmustbeproportionatelylargerasmoreisinvestedinCthanD，i。e。，insoilsyieldinglessrentratherthaninsoilsyieldingmorerent。Thepointissimplythis:inorderthatthemoney-rentmayremainthesameorrise，adefiniteadditionalquantityofsurplus-productmustbeproduced，andthegreaterthefertilityofthesoilsyieldingsurplus-product，thelesscapitalthisrequires。IfthedifferencebetweenBandC，andCandD，werestillgreater，stilllessadditionalcapitalwouldberequired。Thespecificproportionisdeterminedby1theratiooffallinprice，inotherwords，bythedifferencebetweensoilB，whichdoesnotyieldrentnow，andsoilA，whichformerlywasthesoilnotyieldingrent；2theratioofthedifferencesbetweenthesoilsbetterthanBupwards；3theamountofnewlyinvestedadditionalcapital，and4itsdistributionamongthesoilsofvaryingquality。
Infact，weseethatthislawmerelyexpresseswhatwasalreadyascertainedinthefirstcase:Whenthepriceofproductionisgiven，nomatterwhatitsmagnitude，therentmayincreaseasaresultofadditionalcapitalinvestment。ForowingtotheeliminationofA，wenowhaveanewdifferentialrentIwithBastheworstSoiland£；11/2perquarterasthenewpriceofproduction。ThisappliestoTableIVaswellastoTableII。Itisthesamelaw，exceptthatourpointofdepartureissoilBinsteadofA，andourpriceofproductionistakenas£；11/2insteadof£；3。
Theimportantthinghereisthis:TotheextentthatsomuchandsomuchadditionalcapitalwasnecessaryinordertowithdrawthecapitalfromsoilAandcreatethesupplywithoutit，wefindthatthismaybeaccompaniedbyanunaltered，rising，orfallingrentperacre，ifnotfromallplotsoflandthenatleastfromsome，andsofarastheaverageofthecultivatedplotsisconcerned。Wehaveseenthatgrain-rentandmoney-rentdonotmaintainauniformrelationtooneanother。Itismerelyduetotraditionthatgrain-rentisstillofanyimportanceineconomics。Onemightdemonstrateequallywellthat，e。g。，amanufacturercanbuymuchmoreofhisyarnwithhisprofitof£；5thanhecouldformerlywithaprofitof£；10。Itshowsatanyrate，thatmessieurslandlords，whentheyaresimultaneouslyownersorshareholdersinmanufacturingestablishments，sugar-refineries，distilleries，etc。，mayintheircapacityasproducersoftheirownrawmaterialsstillmakeaconsiderableprofitwhenthemoney-rentisfalling。[1]
II。Decreasingrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapital。
Thisintroducesnothingnewintotheproblem，insofarasthepriceofproductionmayalsofallinthiscase，asinthecasejustconsidered，onlywhenadditionalinvestmentsofcapitalinbettersoilsthanArendertheoutputfromAsuperfluousandthecapitalisthereforewithdrawnfromA，orAisemployedfortheproductionofotherproducts。Thiscasehasbeenexhaustivelydiscussedabove。Itwasshownthattherentingrainandmoneyperacremayincrease，decrease，orremainunchanged。
Forconvenienceinmakingcomparisonswereproducethefollowingtable:
TABLEIV
TypeofSoilAcresCapital£；Profit£；PriceofProduction。perQrOutputQrsGrain-RentQrsMoney-RentQrsRateofSurplusProfitA121/21/231000
B121/21/211/2213120%
C121/21/21326240%
D121/21/23/4439360%
Total41010618180%averageNowletusassumethataquantityof16qrssuppliedbyB，C，andDatadecreasingrateofproductivitysufficestoexcludeAfromcultivation。
Insuchcase，TableIIIistransformedintothefollowing:
TABLEV
TypeofSoilAcresInvestmentofCapital£；Profit£；OutputQrsSellingprice£；Proceeds£；Grain-RentQrsMoney-Rent£；RateofSurplusProfitB121/221/21211/2=31/215/76000
C121/221/2132=515/784/711/224/7513/7%
D121/221/21431/2=71/215/7126/7466/71371/7%**
Total3***1516273/751/293/7942/7%average****[*IntheGerman1894editionthisreads512/5——Ed。]
[**Ibid。1371/5——Ed。]
[***Ibid。:4——Ed。]
[****Here，aswellasintablesVI，VII，VIII，IXandXthelandwhichyieldsnorentisleftoutofconsideration——Ed。]
Here，atadecreasingrateof；productivityoftheadditionalcapital，andavaryingdecreaseforthevarioussoiltypes，theregulatingpriceofproductionhasfallenfrom£；3to£；15/7。
Theinvestmentofcapitalhasrisenbyone-half-from£；10to£；15。
Themoney-renthasfallenbyalmostone-half-from£；18to£；93/7，butthegrain-renthasfallenbyonly1/12——from6qrsto51/2qrs。Thetotaloutputhasrisenfrom10to16，orby60%。Thegrain-rentconstitutesalittlemorethanone-thirdofthetotalproduct。Theadvancedcapitalistothemoney-rentas15:93/7，whereasformerlythisratiowas10
:18。
III。Risingrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapital。
ThisdiffersfromVariantIatthebeginningofthischapter，wherethepriceofproductionfallswhiletherateofproductivityremainsthesame，merelyinthatwhenagivenamountofadditionalproduceisrequiredtoexcludesoilAthisoccursheremorequickly。
Theeffectmayvaryinaccordancewiththedistributionofinvestmentsamongthevarioussoilsforafalling，aswellasanincreasing，productivityoftheadditionalcapitalinvestments。Insofarasthisvaryingeffectbalancesoutthedifferences，oraccentuatesthem，thedifferentialrentofthebettersoils，andtherebythetotalrentaltoo，willfallorrise，aswasalreadythecaseindifferentialrentI。Inotherrespects，everythingdependsuponthemagnitudeofthelandareaandcapitalexcludedtogetherwithA，andupontherelativemagnitudeofadvancedcapitalrequiredwitharisingproductivityinordertoproducetheadditionaloutputtomeetthedemand。
Theonlypointworthwhileanalysinghere，andwhichreallytakesusbacktotheinvestigationofthewayinwhichthisdifferentialprofitistransformedintodifferentialrent，isthefollowing:
Inthefirstcase，wherethepriceofproductionremainsthesametheadditionalcapitalwhichmaybeinvestedinsoilAdoesnotaffectthedifferentialrentassuch，sincesoilA，asbefore，doesnotyieldanyrent，thepriceofitsproduceremainsthesame，anditcontinuestoregulatethemarket。
Inthesecondcase，VariantI，wherethepriceofproductionfallswhiletherateofproductivityremainsthesame，soilAwillnecessarilybeexcluded，andstillmoresoinVariantIIfallingpriceofproductionwithfallingrateofproductivity，sinceotherwisetheadditionalcapitalinvestedinsoilAwouldhavehadtoraisethepriceofproduction。Buthere，inVariantIIIofthesecondcase，wherethepriceofproductionfallsbecausetheproductivityoftheadditionalcapitalrises，thisadditionalcapitalmayundercertaincircumstancesbeinvestedinsoilAaswellasinthebettersoils。
LetusassumethatwheninvestedinsoilAanadditionalcapitalof£；21/2produces11/5qrsinsteadof1qr。
TABLEVI
TypeofSoilAcresCapital£；Profit£；PriceofProduction£；OutputQrsSellingprice£；Proceeds£；RentRateofSurplusProfitQrs£；
A121/221/216111/5=21/528/116000%
B121/221/216222/5=42/528/111221/56120%
C121/221/216333/5=63/528/111842/512240%
D121/221/216444/5=84/528/112463/518360%
4204242260131/536240%AsidefrombeingcomparedwiththebasicTableI，thistableshouldbecomparedwithTableII，whereatwo-foldinvestmentofcapitalisassociatedwithaconstantproductivity，proportionaltotheinvestmentofcapital。
Inaccordancewithourassumption，theregulatingpriceofproductionfalls。Ifitweretoremainconstant，=£；3，thentheworstsoilA，whichusedtoyieldnorentwithaninvestmentofonly£；21/2，wouldnowyieldrentwithoutworsesoilbeingbroughtundercultivation。
Thiswouldhaveoccurredduetoanincreaseintheproductivityofthissoil，butonlyforapartofthecapital，notfortheoriginalcapitalinvested。Thefirst£；3ofproductionpriceyield1qr；thesecondyield11/5qrs；buttheentireoutputof21/5qrsisnowsoldatitsaverageprice。Sincetherateofproductivityincreaseswiththeadditionalinvestmentofcapital，thispresupposesanimprovement。
Thelattermayconsistofageneralincreaseincapitalinvestedperacremorefertiliser，moremechanisedlabour，etc。，oritmaybethatonlythroughthisadditionalcapitalitisatallpossibletobringaboutaqualitativelydifferentmoreproductiveinvestmentofthecapital。Inbothcases，theinvestmentof£；5ofcapitalperacreyieldsanoutputof21/5qrs，whereastheinvestmentofone-halfofthiscapital，i。e。，£；21/5，yieldsonly1qrofproduce。TheproducefromsoilAcould，regardlessoftransientmarketconditions，onlycontinuetobesoldatahigherpriceofproductioninsteadofatthenewaverageprice，aslongasaconsiderableareaoftypeAsoilcontinuedtobecultivatedwithacapitalofonly£；21/2peracre。Butassoonasthenewrelationof£；5ofcapitalperacre，andtherebytheimprovedmanagement，becomesuniversal，theregulatingpriceofproductionwouldhavetofallto£；28/11。Thedifferencebetweenthetwoportionsofcapitalwoulddisappear，andthen，infact，thecultivationofanacreofsoilAwithacapitalofonly£；21/2wouldbeabnormal，i。e。，wouldnotcorrespondtothenewconditionsofproduction。Itwouldthennolongerbeadifferencebetweentheyieldsfromdifferentportionsofcapitalinvestedinthesameacre，butbetweenasufficientandaninsufficienttotalinvestmentofcapitalperacre。Thisshows，firstofall，thatinsufficientcapitalinthehandsofalargenumberoftenantfarmersitmustbealargenumber，forasmallnumberwouldsimplybecompelledtosellbelowtheirpriceofproductionproducesthesameeffectasadifferentiationofthesoilsthemselvesinadescendingline。Theinferiorcultivationofinferiorsoilincreasestherentfromsuperiorsoils；itmayevenleadtorentbeingyieldedfrombettercultivatedsoilofequallypoorquality，whichwouldotherwisenotbeyielded。Itshows，secondly，thatdifferentialrent，insofarasitarisesfromsuccessiveinvestmentsofcapitalinthesametotalarea，resolvesitselfinrealityintoanaverage，inwhichtheeffectsofthevariousinvestmentsofcapitalarenolongerrecognisableanddistinguishable，andthereforedonotresultinrentbeingyieldedfromtheworstsoil，butrather:1maketheaveragepriceofthetotalyieldfor，say，anacreofA，thenewregulatingpriceand2appearasalterationinthetotalquantityofcapitalperacrerequiredunderthenewconditionsfortheadequatecultivationofthesoil；andinwhichtheindividualsuccessiveinvestmentsofcapital，aswellastheirrespectiveeffects，willappearindistinguishablyblendedtogether。Itisexactlythesamewiththeindividualdifferentialrentsfromthesuperiorsoils。
Ineachcase，theyaredeterminedbythedifferencebetweentheaverageoutputfromthesoilinquestionandtheoutputfromtheworstsoilattheincreasedcapitalinvestment——whichhasnowbecomenormal。
Nosoilyieldsanyproducewithoutaninvestmentofcapital。Thisisthecaseevenforsimpledifferentialrent，differentialrentI；whenitissaidthatoneacreofsoilA，whichregulatesthepriceofproduction，yieldssomuchandsomuchproduceatsuchandsuchaprice，andthatsuperiorsoilsB，CandDyieldsomuchdifferentialproduce，andthereforesomuchandsomuchmoney-rentattheregulatingpriceofproduction，itisalwaysassumedthatadefiniteamountofcapitalisinvestedwhich，undertheprevailingconditionsofproduction，isconsiderednormal。Inthesameway，acertainminimumcapitalisrequiredforeveryindividualbranchofindustryinorderthatthecommoditiesmaybeproducedattheirpriceofproduction。
Ifthisminimumisalteredasaresultofsuccessiveinvestmentsofcapitalassociatedwithimprovementsonthesamesoil，itoccursgradually。
Solongasacertainnumberofacres，say，ofA，donotreceivethisadditionalworkingcapital，arentisproduceduponthebettercultivatedacresofAduetotheunalteredpriceofproduction，andtherentfromallsuperiorsoils，B，CandD，isincreased。Butassoonasthenewmethodofcultivationhasbecomegeneralenoughtobethenormalone，thepriceofproductionfalls；therentfromthesuperiorplotsdeclinesagain，andthatportionofsoilAthatdoesnotpossesstheworkingcapital，whichhasnowbecometheaverage，mustsellitsproducebelowitsindividualpriceofproduction，i。e。，belowtheaverageprofit。
Inthecaseofafallingpriceofproduction，thisalsooccursevenwithdecreasingproductivityoftheadditionalcapital——assoonastherequiredtotalproductissupplied，inconsequenceofincreasedinvestmentofcapital，bythesuperiorsoils，andthus，e。g。，theworkingcapitaliswithdrawnfromA，i。e。，Anolongercompetesintheproductionofthisparticularproduct，e。g。，wheat。Thequantityofcapitalwhichisnowrequired，onanaverage，tobeinvestedinthebettersoilB，thenewregulator，nowbecomesnormal:andwhenonespeaksofthevaryingfertilityofplotsofland，itisassumedthatthisnewnormalquantityofcapitalperacreisemployed。
Ontheotherhand，itisevidentthatthisaverageinvestmentofcapital，say，inEngland，of£；8peracrepriorto1848，and£；12subsequenttothatyear，willconstitutethestandardinconcludingleases。Forthefarmerexpendingmorethanthis，thesurplus-profitisnottransformedintorentforthedurationofthecontract。Whetherthistakesplaceafterexpirationofthecontractornotwilldependuponthecompetitionamongthefarmerswhoareinapositiontomakethesameextracapitaladvance。
Wearenotreferringheretosuchpermanentsoilimprovementsthatcontinuetoprovidetheincreasedoutputwiththesameorevenwithadecreasingoutlayofcapital。Suchimprovements，althoughproductsofcapital，havethesameeffectasnaturaldifferencesinthequalityoftheland。
Wesee，then，thatafactorcomesintoconsiderationinthecaseofdifferentialrentIIwhichdoesnotappearinthecaseofdifferentialrentIassuch，sincethelattercancontinuetoexistindependentlyofanychangeinthenormalinvestmentofcapitalperacre。Itis，ontheonehand，theblurringofresultsfromvariousinvestments，ofcapitalinregulatingsoilA，whoseoutputflowsimplyappearsasanormalaverageoutputperacre。Itis，ontheotherhand，thechangeinthenormalminimum，orintheaveragemagnitudeofinvestedcapitalperacre，sothatthischangeappearsasapropertyofthesoil。Itis，finally，thedifferenceinthemanneroftransformingsurplus-profitintotheformofrent。
TableVIshows，furthermore，comparedwithtablesIandII，thatthegrain-renthasmorethandoubledinrelationtoI，andhasincreasedby11/5qrsinrelationtoII；whilethemoney-renthasdoubledinrelationtoI，buthasnotchangedinrelationtoII。Itwouldhaveincreasedconsiderablyifotherconditionsremainingthesame
moreoftheadditionalcapitalhadbeenallocatedtothesuperiorsoils，orifontheotherbandtheeffectoftheadditionalcapitalonAhadbeenlessappreciable，andthustheregulatingaveragepriceperquarterfromAhadbeenhigher。
Iftheincreaseinproductivenessbymeansofadditionalcapitalshouldproducevaryingresultsforthevarioussoils，thiswouldproduceachangeintheirdifferentialrents。
Inanycase，ithasbeenshownthattherentperacre，forinstancewithadoubledinvestmentofcapital，maynotonlydouble，butmaymorethandouble——whilethepriceofproductionfallsinconsequenceofanincreasedrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapitalinvested，i。e。，whenthisproductivitygrowsatahigherratethantheadvancedcapital。
ButitmayalsofallifthepriceofproductionshouldfallmuchlowerasaresultofamorerapidincreaseinproductivenessofsoilA。
Letusassumethattheadditionalinvestmentsofcapital，forinstanceinBandC，donotincreasetheproductivityatthesamerateastheydoforA，sothattheproportionaldifferencesdecreaseforBandCandtheincreaseinoutputdoesnotmakeupforthefallinprice。Then，comparedwithTableII，the[money]rentfromDwouldremainunchanged，andthatfromBandCwouldfall。
TABLEVIaTypeofSoilAcresCapital£；Profit£；OutputPerAcreQrsSellingpriceProceeds£；Grain-RentQrsMoney-RentQrsA121/221/2113=411/2600
B121/221/21221/2=41/211/263/41/23/4
C121/221/2135=811/21246
D121/221/21412=1611/2241218
Total420321/2161/2243/4Finally，themoney-rentwouldriseifmoreadditionalcapitalwereinvestedinthesuperiorsoilswiththesameproportionalincreaseinproductivenessthaninA，oriftheadditionalinvestmentsofcapitalinthesuperiorsoilswereeffectiveatanincreasingrateofproductivity。Inbothcasesthedifferenceswouldincrease。
Themoney-rentfallswhentheimprovementduetoadditionalinvestmentofcapitalreducesthedifferencescompletely，orinpart，andaffectsAmorethanBandC。Thesmallertheincreaseinproductivityofthesuperiorsoils，themoreitfalls。Itdependsupontheextentofinequalityproduced，whetherthegrain-rentshallrise，fallorremainstationary。
Themoney-rentrises，andsimilarlythegrain-rent，eitherwhen——theproportionaldifferenceinadditionalfertilityofthevarioussoilsremainingunaltered——morecapitalisinvestedintherent-bearingsoilsthaninrentlesssoilA，andmoreinsoilsyieldinghigherrentthaninthoseyieldinglowerrents；orwhenthefertility——theadditionalcapitalremainingequal——increasesmoreonthebetterandbestsoilsthanonA，i。e。，themoneyandgrainrentsriseinproportiontothisincreaseinfertilityofthebettersoilsabovethatofthepoorerones。
Butunderallcircumstances，thereisarelativeriseinrentwhenincreasedproductivepoweristheresultofanadditionofcapital，andnotmerelytheresultofincreasedfertilitywithunalteredinvestmentofcapital。
Thisistheabsolutepointofview，whichshowsthathere，asinallformercases，therentandincreasedrentperacreasinthecaseofdifferentialrentIontheentirecultivatedarea——themagnitudeoftheaveragerental
aretheresultofanincreasedinvestmentofCapitalinland，nomatterwhetherthiscapitalfunctionswithaconstantrateofproductivityatconstantordecreasingpricesorwithadecreasingrateofproductivityatconstantorfallingprices，orwithanincreasingrateofproductivityatfallingprices。Forourassumption:constantpriceswithaconstant，falling，orrisingrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapital，andfallingpriceswithaconstant，falling，orrisingrateofproductivity，resolvesitselfinto:aconstantrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapitalatconstantorfallingprices，afallingrateofproductivityatconstantorfallingprices，andarisingrateofproductivityatconstantandfallingprices。Althoughtherentmayremainstationary，ormayfall，inallthesecases，itwouldfallmoreiftheadditionalinvestmentofcapital，othercircumstancesremainingthesame，werenotaprerequisitefortheincreasedproductiveness。Theadditionalcapital，then，isalwaysthecausefortherelativelyhighrent，althoughabsolutelyitmayhavedecreased。
Footnotes[1]TheabovetablesIVatoIVdhadtoberecalculatedduetoanerrorincomputationwhichranthroughallofthem。Whilethisdidnotaffectthetheoreticalconclusionsdrawnfromthesetables，itintroduced，inpart，quitemonstrousnumericalvaluesforproductionperacre。Eventhesearenotobjectionableinprinciple。Forallreliefandtopographicalmapsitiscustomarytochooseamuchlargerscalefortheverticalthanforthehorizontal。Nevertheless，shouldanyonefeelthathisagrarianfeelingshavebeeninjuredthereby，heisatlibertytomultiplythenumberofacresbyanynumericalvaluethatwillsatisfyhim。Onemightalsochoose10，12，14，16bushels8
bushels=1quarterperacreinTable1insteadof1，2，3，4quarters，andthederivednumericalvaluesintheothertableswouldremainwithinthelimitsofprobability；itwillbefoundthattheresult，i。e。，theratioofrentincreasetocapitalincrease，isexactlythesame。Thishasbeendoneinthetablesincludedbytheeditorinthenextchapter。？F。
E。
Capital，Vol。3，Chapter47KarlMarxCAPITALVol。III
THEPROCESSOF
CAPITALISTPRODUCTIONASAWHOLEPartVI
TRANSFORMATIONOFSURPLUS-PROFIT
INTOGROUNDRENTCHAPTER47
GenesisofCapitalistGround-RentI。INTRODUCTORYREMARKS
Wemustclarifyinourmindswhereinliestherealdifficultyinanalysingground-rentfromtheviewpointofmoderneconomics，asthetheoreticalexpressionofthecapitalistmodeofproduction。Evenmanyofthemoremodernwritershavenotasyetgraspedthis，asevidencedbyeachrenewedattemptto”newly”explainground-rent。Thenoveltyalmostinvariablyconsistsinarelapseintolongout-of-dateviews。Thedifficultyisnottoexplainthesurplus-productproducedbyagriculturalcapitalanditscorrespondingsurplus-valueingeneral。Thisquestionissolvedintheanalysisofthesurplus-valueproducedbyallproductivecapital，inwhateversphereitmaybeinvested。Thedifficultyconsistsratherinshowingthesourceoftheexcessofsurplus-valuepaidthelandlordbycapitalinvestedinlandintheformofrent，afterequalisationofthesurplus-valuetotheaverageprofitamongthevariouscapitals，afterthevariouscapitalshavesharedinthetotalsurplus-valueproducedbythesocialcapitalinallspheresofproductioninproportiontotheirrelativesize；inotherwords，thesourcesubsequenttothisequalisationandtheapparentlyalreadycompleteddistributionofallsurplus-valuewhich，ingeneral，istobedistributed。
Quiteapartfromthepracticalmotives，whichproddedmoderneconomistsasspokesmenofindustrialcapitalagainstlandedpropertytoinvestigatethisquestion——motiveswhichweshallpointoutmoreclearlyinthechapteronhistoryofground-rent——thequestionwasofparamountinteresttothemastheorists。Toadmitthattheappearanceofrentforcapitalinvestedinagricultureisduetosomeparticulareffectproducedbythesphereofinvestmentitself，duetosingularqualitiesoftheearth抯crustitself，istantamounttogivinguptheconceptionofvalueassuch，thustantamounttoabandoningallattemptsatascientificunderstandingofthisfield。
Eventhesimpleobservationthatrentispaidoutofthepriceofagriculturalproduce——whichtakesplaceevenwhererentispaidinkindifthefarmeristorecoverhispriceofproduction——showedtheabsurdityofattemptingtoexplaintheexcessofthispriceovertheordinarypriceofproduction；
inotherwords，toexplaintherelativedearnessofagriculturalproductsonthebasisoftheexcessofnaturalproductivityofagriculturalproductionovertheproductivityofotherlinesofproduction。Forthereverseistrue:themoreproductivelabouris，thecheaperiseveryaliquotpartofitsproduct，becausesomuchgreateristhemassofuse-valuesincorporatingthesamequantityoflabour，i。e。，thesamevalue。
Thewholedifficultyinanalysingrent，therefore，consistsinexplainingtheexcessofagriculturalprofitovertheaverageprofit，notthesurplus-value，buttheexcessofsurplus-valuecharacteristicofthissphereofproduction；
inotherwords，notthe”netproduct”，buttheexcessofthisnetproductoverthenetproductofotherbranchesofindustry。Theaverageprofititselfisaproductformedunderverydefinitehistoricalproductionrelationsbythemovementofsocialprocesses，aproductwhich，aswehaveseen，requiresverycomplexadjustment。Tobeabletospeakatallofasurplusovertheaverageprofit，thisaverageprofititselfmustalreadybeestablishedasastandardandasaregulatorofproductioningeneralasisthecaseundercapitalistproduction。Forthisreasontherecanbenotalkofrentinthemodernsense，arentconsistingofasurplusovertheaverageprofit，i。e。，overandabovetheproportionalshareofeachindividualcapitalinthesurplus-valueproducedbythetotalsocialcapital，insocialformationswhereitisnotcapitalwhichperformsthefunctionofenforcingallsurplus-labourandappropriatingdirectlyallsurplus-value。Andwherethereforecapitalhasnotyetcompletely，oronlysporadically，broughtsociallabourunderitscontrol。Itreflectsnaï；veté；，e。g。，ofapersonlikePassyseebelow，whenhespeaksofrentinprimitivesocietyasasurplusoverprofit[Passy，Rentedusol。In:Dictionnairedel？eacute；conomiepolitique，TomeII。Paris，1854，p。511——Ed。]——
ahistoricallydefinedsocialformofsurplus-value，butwhich，accordingtoPassy，mightalmostaswellexistwithoutanysociety。
Fortheoldereconomists，whoingeneralmerelybeginanalysingthecapitalistmodeofproduction，stillundevelopedintheirday，theanalysisofrentofferseithernodifficultyatall，oronlyadifficultyofacompletelydifferentkind。Petty，Cantillon，andingeneralthosewriterswhoareclosertofeudaltimes，assumeground-renttobethenormalformofsurplus-valueingeneral，[[Petty]ATreatiseonTaxesandContributions，London，1667，pp。23-24；[RichardCantillon]Essaisurlanatureducommerceengé；neral，Amsterdam，1756——Ed。]whereasprofittothemisstillamorphouslycombinedwithwages，oratbestappearstobeaportionofsurplus-valueextortedbythecapitalistfromthelandlord。
Thesewritersthustakeastheirpointofdepartureasituationwhere，inthefirstplace，theagriculturalpopulationstillconstitutestheoverwhelmingmajorityofthenation，and，secondly，thelandlordstillappearsasthepersonappropriatingatfirsthandthesurplus-labourofthedirectproducersbyvirtueofhismonopolyoflandedproperty，wherelandedproperty，therefore；
stillappearsasthemainconditionofproduction。Forthesewritersthequestioncouldnotyetbeposed，which，inversely，seekstoinvestigatefromtheviewpointofcapitalistproductionhowlandedpropertymanagestowrestbackagainfromcapitalaportionofthesurplus-valueproducedbyitthatis，filchedbyitfromthedirectproducersandalreadyappropriateddirectly。
Thephysiocratsaretroubledbydifficultiesofanothernature。
Astheactuallyfirstsystematicspokesmenofcapital，theyattempttoanalysethenatureofsurplus-valueingeneral。Forthem，thisanalysiscoincideswiththeanalysisofrent，theonlyformofsurplus-valuewhichtheyrecognise。Therefore，theyconsiderrent-yielding，oragricultural，capitaltobetheonlycapitalproducingsurplus-value，andtheagriculturallaboursetinmotionbyit，theonlylabourproducingsurplus-value，whichfromacapitalistviewpointisquiteproperlyconsideredtheonlyproductivelabour。Theyarequiterightinconsideringthecreationofsurplus-valueasdecisive。ApartfromothermeritstobesetforthinBookIV，theydeservecreditprimarilyforgoingbackfrommerchant抯capital，whichfunctionssolelyinthesphereofcirculation，toproductivecapital，inoppositiontothemercantilesystem，which，withitscruderealism，constitutestheactualvulgareconomyofthatperiod，pushingintothebackgroundinfavourofitsownpracticalintereststhebeginningsofscientificanalysismadebyPettyandhissuccessors。Inthiscritiqueofthemercantilesystem，incidentally，onlyitsconceptionsofcapitalandsurplus-valuearedealtwith。Ithasalreadybeenindicatedpreviouslythatthemonetarysystemcorrectlyproclaimsproductionfortheworld-marketandthetransformationoftheoutputintocommodities，andthusintomoney，astheprerequisiteandconditionofcapitalistproduction。Inthissystem抯furtherdevelopmentintothemercantilesystem，itisnolongerthetransformationofcommodity-valueintomoney，butthecreationofsurplus-valuewhichisdecisive——butfromthemeaninglessviewpointofthecirculationsphereand，atthesametime，insuchmannerthatthissurplusvalueisrepresentedassurplusmoney，asthebalanceoftradesurplus。Atthesametime，however，thecharacteristicfeatureoftheinterestedmerchantsandmanufacturersofthatperiod，whichisinkeepingwiththestageofcapitalistdevelopmentrepresentedbythem，isthatthetransformationoffeudalagriculturalsocietiesintoindustrialonesandthecorrespondingindustrialstruggleofnationsontheworld-marketdependsonanaccelerateddevelopmentofcapital，whichisnottobearrivedatalongtheso-callednaturalpath，butratherbymeansofcoercivemeasures。Itmakesatremendousdifferencewhethernationalcapitalisgraduallyandslowlytransformedintoindustrialcapital，orwhetherthisdevelopmentisacceleratedbymeansofataxwhichtheyimposethroughprotectivedutiesmainlyuponlandowners，middleandsmallpeasants，andhandicraftsmen，bywayofacceleratedexpropriationoftheindependentdirectproducers，andthroughtheviolentlyacceleratedaccumulationandconcentrationofcapital，inshortbymeansoftheacceleratedestablishmentofconditionsofcapitalistproduction。Itsimultaneouslymakesanenormousdifferenceinthecapitalistandindustrialexploitationofthenaturalnationalproductivepower。Hencethenationalcharacterofthemercantilesystemisnotmerelyaphraseonthelipsofitsspokesmen。
Underthepretextofconcernsolelyforthewealthofthenationandtheresourcesofthestate，they，infact，pronouncetheinterestsofthecapitalistclassandtheamassingofrichesingeneraltobetheultimateaimofthestate，andthusproclaimbourgeoissocietyinplaceoftheolddivinestate。
Butatthesametimetheyareconsciouslyawarethatthedevelopmentoftheinterestsofcapitalandofthecapitalistclass，ofcapitalistproduction，formsthefoundationofnationalpowerandnationalascendancyinmodernsociety。
Thephysiocrats，furthermore，arecorrectinstatingthatinfactallproductionofsurplus-value，andthusalldevelopmentofcapital，hasforitsnaturalbasistheproductivenessofagriculturallabour。Ifmanwerenotcapableofproducinginoneworking-daymoremeansofsubsistence，whichsignifiesinthestrictestsensemoreagriculturalproductsthaneverylabourerneedsforhisownreproduction，ifthedailyexpenditureofhisentirelabourpowersufficedmerelytoproducethemeansofsubsistenceindispensableforhisownindividualrequirements，thenonecouldnotspeakatalleitherofsurplus-productorsurplus-value。Anagriculturallabourproductivityexceedingtheindividualrequirementsofthelaboureristhebasisofallsocieties，andisaboveallthebasisofcapitalistproduction，whichdisengagesaconstantlyincreasingportionofsocietyfromtheproductionofbasicfoodstuffsandtransformstheminto”freeheads，”asSteuart[Steuart，AnInquiryIntothePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy，Vol。I，Dublin，1770，p。396——Ed。]hasit，makingthemavailableforexploitationinotherspheres。
Butwhatcanbesaidofmorerecentwritersoneconomics，suchasDaire，Passy，etc。，whoparrotthemostprimitiveconceptionsconcerningthenaturalconditionsofsurplus-labourandtherebysurplus-valueingeneral，inthetwilightofclassicaleconomy，indeedonitsverydeath-bed，andwhoimaginethattheyarethuspropoundingsomethingnewandstrikingonground-rent[Daire，Introduction。In:Physiocrats，1。Teil，Paris，1846；Passy，Rentedusol。In:Dictionnairedel？eacute；conomiepolitique，TomeII，Paris，1854，p。511——Ed。]longafterthisground-renthasbeeninvestigatedasaspecialformandbecomeaspecificportionofsurplus-value？
Itisparticularlycharacteristicofvulgareconomythatitechoeswhatwasnew，original，profoundandjustifiedduringaspecificoutgrownstageofdevelopment，inaperiodwhenithasturnedplatitudinous，stale，andfalse。Itthusconfessesitscompleteignoranceoftheproblemswhichconcernedclassicaleconomy。Itconfoundsthemwithquestionsthatcouldonlyhavebeenposedonalowerlevelofdevelopmentofbourgeoissociety。Thesameholdstrueofitsincessantandself-complacentruminationofthephysiocraticphrasesconcerningfreetrade。Thesephraseshavelongsincelostalltheoreticalinterest，nomatterhowmuchtheymayengagethepracticalattentionofthisorthatstate。
Innaturaleconomyproper，whennopartoftheagriculturalproduct，orbutaveryinsignificantportion，entersintotheprocessofcirculation，andthenonlyarelativelysmallportionofthatpartoftheproductwhichrepresentsthelandlord抯revenue，as，e。g。，inmanyRomanlatifundia，oruponthevillasofCharlemagne，ormoreorlessduringtheentireMiddleAgesseeVinç；ard，Histoiredutravail，theproductandsurplus-productofthelargeestatesconsistsbynomeanspurelyofproductsofagriculturallabour。Itencompassesequallywelltheproductsofindustriallabour。Domestichandicraftsandmanufacturinglabourassecondaryoccupationsofagriculture，whichformsthebasis，aretheprerequisiteofthatmodeofproductionuponwhichnaturaleconomyrests——inEuropeanantiquityandtheMiddleAgesaswellasinthepresent-dayIndiancommunity，inwhichthetraditionalorganisationhasnotyetbeendestroyed。Thecapitalistmodeofproductioncompletelyabolishesthisrelationship；aprocesswhichmaybestudiedonalargescaleparticularlyinEnglandduringthelastthirdofthe18thcentury。ThinkerslikeHerrenschwand，whohadgrownupinmoreorlesssemi-feudalsocieties，stillconsider，e。g。，aslateasthecloseofthe18thcentury，thisseparationofmanufacturefromagricultureasafoolhardysocialadventure，asanunthinkablyriskymodeofexistence。Andevenintheagriculturaleconomiesofantiquityshowingthegreatestanalogytocapitalistagriculture，namelyCarthageandRome，thesimilaritytoaplantationeconomyisgreaterthantoaformcorrespondingtothereallycapitalistmodeofexploitation。[42a]Aformalanalogy，which，simultaneously，however，turnsouttobecompletelyillusoryinallessentialpointstoapersonfamiliarwiththecapitalistmodeofproduction，whodoesnot，likeHerrMommsen，[43]discoveracapitalistmodeofproductionineverymonetaryeconomy，isnottobefoundatallincontinentalItalyduringantiquity，butatbestonlyinSicily，sincethisislandservedRomeasanagriculturaltributarysothatitsagriculturewasaimedchieflyatexport。Farmersinthemodernsenseexistedthere。
Anerroneousconceptionofthenatureofrentisbaseduponthefactthatrentinkind，partlyastithestothechurchandpartlyasacuriosityperpetuatedbylong-establishedcontracts，hasbeendraggedoverintomoderntimesfromthenaturaleconomyoftheMiddleAges，completelyincontradictiontotheconditionsofthecapitalistmodeofproduction。Ittherebycreatestheimpressionthatrentdoesnotarisefromthepriceoftheagriculturalproduct，butfromitsmass，thusnotfromsocialconditions，butfromtheearth。Wehavepreviouslyshownthatalthoughsurplus-valueismanifestedinasurplus-producttheconversedoesnotholdthatasurplus-product，representingamereincreaseinthemassofproduct，constitutessurplus-value。
Itmayrepresentaminusquantityinvalue。Otherwisethecottonindustryof1860，comparedwiththatof1840，wouldshowanenormoussurplus-value，whereasonthecontrarythepriceoftheyarnhasfallen。Rentmayincreaseenormouslyasaresultofasuccessionofcropfailures，becausethepriceofgrainrises，althoughthissurplus-valueappearsasanabsolutelydecreasingmassofdearerwheat。Conversely，therentmayfallinconsequenceofasuccessionofbountifulyears，becausethepricefalls，althoughthereducedrentappearsasagreatermassofcheaperwheat。Asregardsrentinkind，itshouldbenotednowthat，inthefirstplace，itisameretraditioncarriedoverfromanobsoletemodeofproductionandmanagingtoprolongitsexistenceasasurvival。Itscontradictiontothecapitalistmodeofproductionisshownbyitsdisappearanceofitselffromprivatecontracts，anditsbeingforciblyshakenoffasananachronism，whereverlegislationwasabletointerveneasinthecaseofchurchtithesinEngland。Secondly，however，whererentinkindpersistedonthebasisofcapitalistproduction，itwasnomore，andcouldbenomore，thananexpressionofmoney-rentinmedievalgarb。Wheat，forinstance，isquotedat40shillingsperquarter。
Oneportionofthiswheatmustreplacethewagescontainedtherein，andmustbesoldtobecomeavailableforrenewedexpenditure。Anotherportionmustbesoldtopayitsproportionateshareoftaxes。Seedandevenaportionoffertiliserenterascommoditiesintotheprocessofreproduction，whereverthecapitalistmodeofproductionandwithitdivisionofsociallabouraredeveloped，i。e。，theymustbepurchasedforreplacementpurposes；
andthereforeanotherportionofthisquartermustbesoldtoobtainmoneyforthis。Insofarastheyneednotbeboughtasactualcommodities，butaretakenoutoftheproductitselfinkind，inordertoenterintoitsreproductionanewasconditionsofproduction——asoccursnotonlyinagriculture，butinmanyotherlinesofproductionproducingconstantcapital——theyfigureinthebooksasmoneyofaccountandaredeductedaselementsofthecost-price。Thewearandtearofmachinery，andoffixedcapitalingeneral，mustbemadegoodinmoney。Andfinallycomesprofit，whichiscalculatedonthissum，expressedascostseitherinactualmoneyorinmoneyofaccount。Thisprofitisrepresentedbyadefiniteportionofthegrossproduct，whichisdeterminedbyitsprice。Andtheexcessportionwhichthenremainsformsrent。Iftherentinkindstipulatedbycontractisgreaterthanthisremainderdeterminedbytheprice，thenitdoesnotconstituterent，butadeductionfromprofit。Owingtothispossibilityalone，rentinkindisanobsoleteform，insofarasitdoesnotreflectthepriceoftheproduct，butmaybegreaterorsmallerthantherealrent，andthusmaycomprisenotonlyadeductionfromprofit，butalsofromthoseelementsrequiredforcapitalreplacement。Infact，thisrentinkind，sofarasitisrentnotmerelyinnamebutalsoinessence，isexclusivelydeterminedbytheexcessofthepriceoftheproductoveritspriceofproduction。Onlyitpresupposesthatthisvariableisaconstantmagnitude。
Butitissuchacomfortingreflectionthattheproductinkindshouldsuffice，first，tomaintainthelabourersecondly，toleavethecapitalisttenantfarmermorefoodthanheneeds，andfinally，thattheremaindershouldconstitutethenaturalrent。Quitelikeamanufacturerproducing200，000yardsofcottongoods。Theseyardsofgoodsnotonlysufficetoclothehislabourers；toclothehiswife，allhisoffspringandhimselfabundantly；butalsoleaveoverenoughcottonforsale，inadditiontopayinganenormousrentintermsofcottongoods。Itisallsosimple！
Deductthepriceofproductionfrom200，000yardsofcottongoods，andasurplusofcottongoodsmustremainforrent。Butitisindeedanaiveconceptiontodeductthepriceofproductionof，say，£；10，000from200，000yardsofcottongoods，withoutknowingthesellingprice，todeductmoneyfromcottongoods，todeductanexchange-valuefromause-valueassuch，andthustodeterminethesurplusofyardsofcottongoodsoverpoundssterling。Itisworsethansquaringthecircle，whichisatleastbasedupontheconceptionthatthereisalimitatwhichstraightlinesandcurvesimperceptiblyflowtogether。ButsuchistheprescriptionofM。Passy。
Deductmoneyfromcottongoods，beforethecottongoodshavebeenconvertedintomoney，eitherinone抯mindorinreality！Whatremainsistherent，which，however，istobegraspednaturalitersee，forinstance，KarlArnd[K。Arnd，Dienaturgemä；sseVolkswirtschaft，gegenü；berdemMonopoliengeisteunddemCommunismus，Hanau，1845，S。461-62——Ed。]andnotbydeviltriesofsophistry。Theentirerestorationofrentinkindisfinallyreducedtothisfoolishness，thedeductionofthepriceofproductionfromsomanyandsomanybushelsofwheat，andthesubtractionofasumofmoneyfromacubicmeasure。
II。LABOURRENT
Ifweconsiderground-rentinitssimplestform，thatoflabourrent，wherethedirectproducer，usinginstrumentsoflabourplough，cattle，etc。whichactuallyorlegallybelongtohim，cultivatessoilactuallyownedbyhimduringpartoftheweek，andworksduringtheremainingdaysupontheestateofthefeudallordwithoutanycompensationfromthefeudallord，thesituationhereisstillquiteclear，forinthiscaserentandsurplus-valueareidentical。Rent，notprofit，istheformherethroughwhichunpaidsurplus-labourexpressesitself。Towhatextentthelaboureraself-sustainingserfcansecureinthiscaseasurplusabovehisindispensablenecessitiesoflife，i。e。，asurplusabovethatwhichwewouldcallwagesunderthecapitalistmodeofproduction，depends，othercircumstancesremainingunchanged，upontheproportioninwhichhislabour-timeisdividedintolabour-timeforhimselfandenforcedlabour-timeforhisfeudallord。
Thissurplusabovetheindispensablerequirementsoflife，thegermofwhatappearsasprofitunderthecapitalistmodeofproduction，isthereforewhollydeterminedbytheamountofground-rent，whichinthiscaseisnotonlydirectlyunpaidsurplus-labour，butalsoappearsassuch。Itisunpaidsurplus-labourforthe”owner”ofthemeansofproduction，whichherecoincidewiththeland，andsofarastheydifferfromit，aremereaccessoriestoit。Thattheproductoftheserfmustheresufficetoreproducehisconditionsoflabour，inadditiontohissubsistence，isacircumstancewhichremainsthesameunderallmodesofproduction。Foritisnottheresultoftheirspecificform，butanaturalrequisiteofallcontinuousandreproductivelabouringeneral，ofanycontinuingproduction，whichisalwayssimultaneouslyreproduction，i。e。，includingreproductionofitsownoperatingconditions。Itisfurthermoreevidentthatinallformsinwhichthedirectlabourerremainsthe”possessor”ofthemeansofproductionandlabourconditionsnecessaryfortheproductionofhisownmeansofsubsistence，thepropertyrelationshipmustsimultaneouslyappearasadirectrelationoflordshipandservitude，sothatthedirectproducerisnotfree；alackoffreedomwhichmaybereducedfromserfdomwithenforcedlabourtoameretributaryrelationship。Thedirectproducer，accordingtoourassumption，istobefoundhereinpossessionofhisownmeansofproduction，thenecessarymateriallabourconditionsrequiredfortherealisationofhislabourandtheproductionofhismeansofsubsistence。
Heconductshisagriculturalactivityandtheruralhomeindustriesconnectedwithitindependently。Thisindependenceisnotunderminedbythecircumstancethatthesmallpeasantsmayformamongthemselvesamoreorlessnaturalproductioncommunity，astheydoinIndia，sinceitisheremerelyaquestionofindependencefromthenominallordofthemanor。Undersuchconditionsthesurplus-labourforthenominalownerofthelandcanonlybeextortedfromthembyotherthaneconomicpressure，whatevertheformassumedmaybe。[44]Thisdiffersfromslaveorplantationeconomyinthattheslaveworksunderalienconditionsofproductionandnotindependently。Thus，conditionsofpersonaldependencearerequisite，alackofpersonalfreedom，nomattertowhatextent，andbeingtiedtothesoilasitsaccessory，bondageinthetruesenseoftheword。Shouldthedirectproducersnotbeconfrontedbyaprivatelandowner，butrather，asinAsia，underdirectsubordinationtoastatewhichstandsoverthemastheirlandlordandsimultaneouslyassovereign，thenrentandtaxescoincide，orrather，thereexistsnotaxwhichdiffersfromthisformofground-rent。Undersuchcircumstances，thereneedexistnostrongerpoliticaloreconomicpressurethanthatcommontoallsubjectiontothatstate。Thestateisthenthesupremelord。Sovereigntyhereconsistsintheownershipoflandconcentratedonanationalscale。But，ontheotherhand，noprivateownershipoflandexists，althoughthereisbothprivateandcommonpossessionanduseofland。
Thespecificeconomicform，inwhichunpaidsurplus-labourispumpedoutofdirectproducers，determinestherelationshipofrulersandruled，asitgrowsdirectlyoutofproductionitselfand，inturn，reactsuponitasadeterminingelement。Uponthis，however，isfoundedtheentireformationoftheeconomiccommunitywhichgrowsupoutoftheproductionrelationsthemselves，therebysimultaneouslyitsspecificpoliticalform。
Itisalwaysthedirectrelationshipoftheownersoftheconditionsofproductiontothedirectproducers——arelationalwaysnaturallycorrespondingtoadefinitestageinthedevelopmentofthemethodsoflabourandtherebyitssocialproductivity——whichrevealstheinnermostsecret，thehiddenbasisoftheentiresocialstructureandwithitthepoliticalformoftherelationofsovereigntyanddependence，inshort，thecorrespondingspecificformofthestate。Thisdoesnotpreventthesameeconomicbasis——thesamefromthestandpointofitsmainconditions——duetoinnumerabledifferentempiricalcircumstances，naturalenvironment，racialrelations，externalhistoricalinfluences，etc。fromshowinginfinitevariationsandgradationsinappearance，whichcanbeascertainedonlybyanalysisoftheempiricallygivencircumstances。
Somuchisevidentwithrespecttolabourrent，thesimplestandmostprimitiveformofrent:Rentisheretheprimevalformofsurplus-labourandcoincideswithit。Butthisidentityofsurplus-valuewithunpaidlabourofothersneednotbeanalysedherebecauseitstillexistsinitsvisible，palpableform，sincethelabourofthedirectproducerforhimselfisstillseparatedinspaceandtimefromhislabourforthelandlordandthelatterappearsdirectlyinthebrutalformofenforcedlabourforathirdperson。
Inthesamewaythe”attribute”possessedbythesoiltoproducerentisherereducedtoatangiblyopensecret，forthedispositiontofurnishrentherealsoincludeshumanlabour-powerboundtothesoil，andthepropertyrelationwhichcompelstheowneroflabour-powertodriveitonandactivateitbeyondsuchmeasureasisrequiredtosatisfyhisownindispensableneeds。Rentconsistsdirectlyintheappropriationofthissurplusexpenditureoflabour-powerbythelandlord；forthedirectproducerpayshimnoadditionalrent。Here，wheresurplus-valueandrentarenotonlyidenticalbutwheresurplus-valuehasthetangibleformofsurplus-labour，thenaturalconditionsorlimitsofrent，beingthoseofsurplus-valueingeneral，areplainlyclear。Thedirectproducermust1possessenoughlabour-power，and2
thenaturalconditionsofhislabour，aboveallthesoilcultivatedbyhim，mustheproductiveenough，inaword，thenaturalproductivityofhislabourmustbebigenoughtogivehimthepossibilityofretainingsomesurplus-labouroverandabovethatrequiredforthesatisfactionofhisownindispensableneeds。Itisnotthispossibilitywhichcreatestherent，butrathercompulsionwhichturnsthispossibilityintoreality。