ThisdecisionIcausedtobeannulledbythecourtthathadrenderedit；andthepresentpoweroftheNationalGovernmenttodealeffectivelywiththetrustsisduesolelytothesuccessoftheAdministrationinsecuringthisreversalofitsformerdecisionbytheSupremeCourt。
　　TheConstitutionwasformedverylargelybecauseithadbecomeimperativetogivetosomecentralauthoritythepowertoregulateandcontrolinterstatecommerce。Atthattimewhencorporationswereintheirinfancyandbigcombinationsunknown，therewasnodifficultyinexercisingthepowergranted。Intheory，therightoftheNationtoexercisethispowercontinuedunquestioned。Butchangingconditionsobscuredthematterinthesightofthepeopleasawhole；andtheconsciousandtheunconsciousadvocatesofanunlimitedanduncontrollablecapitalismgraduallysecuredthewhittlingawayoftheNationalpowertoexercisethistheoreticalrightofcontroluntilitpracticallyvanished。AftertheCivilWar，withtheportentousgrowthofindustrialcombinationsinthiscountry，cameaperiodofreactionarydecisionsbythecourtswhich，asregardscorporations，culminatedinwhatisknownastheKnightcase。
　　TheShermanAnti-TrustLawwasenactedin1890becausetheformationoftheTobaccoTrustandtheSugarTrust，theonlytwogreattruststheninthecountryasidefromtheStandardOilTrust，whichwasagradualgrowth，hadawakenedapopulardemandforlegislationtodestroymonopolyandcurbindustrialcombinations。ThisdemandtheAnti-TrustLawwasintendedtosatisfy。TheAdministrationsofMr。
　　HarrisonandMr。Clevelandevidentlyconstruedthislawasprohibitingsuchcombinationsinthefuture，notascondemningthosewhichhadbeenformedpriortoitsenactment。In1895，however，theSugarTrust，whoseoutputoriginallywasaboutfifty-fivepercentofallsugarproducedintheUnitedStates，obtainedcontrolofthreeothercompaniesinPhiladelphiabyexchangingitsstockfortheirs，andthusincreaseditsbusinessuntilitcontrolledninety-eightpercentoftheentireproduct。UnderCleveland，theGovernmentbroughtproceedingsagainsttheSugarTrust，invokingtheAnti-TrustLaw，tosetasidetheacquisitionofthesecorporations。ThetestcasewasontheabsorptionoftheKnightCompany。TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates，withbutonedissentingvote，heldadverselytotheGovernment。TheytookthegroundthatthepowerconferredbytheConstitutiontoregulateandcontrolinterstatecommercedidnotextendtotheproductionormanufactureofcommoditieswithinaState，andthatnothingintheShermanAnti-TrustLawprohibitedacorporationfromacquiringallthestockofothercorporationsthroughexchangeofitsstockfortheirs，suchexchangenotbeing“commerce“
　　intheopinionoftheCourt，eventhoughbysuchacquisitionthecorporationwasenabledtocontroltheentireproductionofacommoditythatwasanecessaryoflife。TheeffectofthisdecisionwasnotmerelytheabsolutenullificationoftheAnti-TrustLaw，sofarasindustrialcorporationswereconcerned，butwasalsoineffectadeclarationthat，undertheConstitution，theNationalGovernmentcouldpassnolawreallyeffectiveforthedestructionorcontrolofsuchcombinations。
　　ThisdecisionlefttheNationalGovernment，thatis，thepeopleoftheNation，practicallyhelplesstodealwiththelargecombinationsofmodernbusiness。ThecourtsinothercasesassertedthepoweroftheFederalGovernmenttoenforcetheAnti-TrustLawsofarastransportationratesbyrailwaysengagedininterstatecommercewereconcerned。ButsolongasthetrustswerefreetocontroltheproductionofcommoditieswithoutinterferencefromtheGeneralGovernment，theywerewellcontenttoletthetransportationofcommoditiestakecareofitself——especiallyasthelawagainstrebateswasatthattimeadeadletter；andtheCourtbyitsdecisionintheKnightcasehadinterdictedanyinterferencebythePresidentorbyCongresswiththeproductionofcommodities。ItwasontheauthorityofthiscasethatpracticallyallthebigtrustsintheUnitedStates，exceptingthosealreadymentioned，wereformed。Usuallytheywereorganizedas“holding“companies，eachoneacquiringcontrolofitsconstituentcorporationsbyexchangingitsstockfortheirs，anoperationwhichtheSupremeCourthadthusdecidedcouldnotbeprohibited，controlled，regulated，orevenquestionedbytheFederalGovernment。
　　SuchwastheconditionofourlawswhenIaccededtothePresidency。
　　Justbeforemyaccession，asmallgroupoffinanciers，desiringtoprofitbythegovernmentalimpotencetowhichwehadbeenreducedbytheKnightdecision，hadarrangedtotakecontrolofpracticallytheentirerailwaysystemintheNorthwest——possiblyasthefirststeptowardcontrollingtheentirerailwaysystemofthecountry。ThiscontroloftheNorthwesternrailwaysystemswastobeeffectedbyorganizinganew“holding“company，andexchangingitsstockagainstthestockofthevariouscorporationsengagedinrailwaytransportationthroughoutthatvastterritory，exactlyastheSugarTrusthadacquiredcontroloftheKnightcompanyandotherconcerns。
　　ThiscompanywascalledtheNorthernSecuritiesCompany。NotlongafterIbecamePresident，ontheadviceoftheAttorney-General，Mr。
　　Knox，andthroughhim，Iorderedproceedingstobeinstitutedforthedissolutionofthecompany。Asfarascouldbetoldbytheirutterancesatthetime，amongallthegreatlawyersintheUnitedStatesMr。Knoxwastheonlyonewhobelievedthatthisactioncouldbesustained。ThedefensewasbasedexpresslyonthegroundthattheSupremeCourtintheKnightcasehadexplicitlysanctionedtheformationofsuchacompanyastheNorthernSecuritiesCompany。Therepresentativesofprivilegeintimated，andsometimesassertedoutright，thatindirectingtheactiontobebroughtIhadshownalackofrespectfortheSupremeCourt，whichhadalreadydecidedthequestionatissuebyavoteofeighttoone。Mr。JusticeWhite，thenontheCourtandnowChiefJustice，setforththepositionthatthetwocaseswereinprincipleidenticalwithincontrovertiblelogic。IngivingtheviewsofthedissentingminorityontheactionIhadbrought，hesaid：
　　“Theparallelbetweenthetwocases[theKnightcaseandtheNorthernSecuritiescase]iscomplete。Theonecorporationacquiredthestockofotherandcompetingcorporationsinexchangeforitsown。Itwasconcededforthepurposesofthecase，thatindoingsomonopolyhadbeenbroughtaboutintherefiningofsugar，thatthesugartobeproducedwaslikelytobecomethesubjectofinterstatecommerce，andindeedthatpartofitwouldcertainlybecomeso。ButthepowerofCongresswasdecidednottoextendtothesubject，becausetheownershipofthestockinthecorporationswasnotitselfcommerce。”
　　Mr。JusticeWhitewasentirelycorrectinthisstatement。Thecaseswereparallel。ItwasnecessarytoreversetheKnightcaseintheinterestsofthepeopleagainstmonopolyandprivilegejustasithadbeennecessarytoreversetheDredScottcaseintheinterestofthepeopleagainstslaveryandprivilege；justaslateritbecamenecessarytoreversetheNewYorkBakeshopcaseintheinterestofthepeopleagainstthatformofmonopolisticprivilegewhichputhumanrightsbelowpropertyrightswherewageworkerswereconcerned。
　　ByavoteoffivetofourtheSupremeCourtreverseditsdecisionintheKnightcase，andintheNorthernSecuritiescasesustainedtheGovernment。Thepowertodealwithindustrialmonopolyandsuppressitandtocontrolandregulatecombinations，ofwhichtheKnightcasehaddeprivedtheFederalGovernment，wasthusrestoredtoitbytheNorthernSecuritiescase。Afterthislaterdecisionwasrendered，suitswerebroughtbymydirectionagainsttheAmericanTobaccoCompanyandtheStandardOilCompany。Bothwereadjudgedcriminalconspiracies，andtheirdissolutionordered。TheKnightcasewasfinallyoverthrown。Theviciousdoctrineitembodiednolongerremainsasanobstacletoobstructthepathwayofjusticewhenitassailsmonopoly。Messrs。Knox，Moody，andBonaparte，whosuccessivelyoccupiedthepositionofAttorney-Generalunderme，wereprofoundlawyersandfearlessandablemen；andtheycompletelyestablishedthenewerandmorewholesomedoctrineunderwhichtheFederalGovernmentmaynowdealwithmonopolisticcombinationsandconspiracies。
　　Thedecisionsrenderedinthesevariouscasesbroughtundermydirectionconstitutetheentireauthorityuponwhichanyactionmustrestthatseeksthroughtheexerciseofnationalpowertocurbmonopolisticcontrol。ThemenwhoorganizedanddirectedtheNorthernSecuritiesCompanywerealsothecontrollingforcesintheSteelCorporation，whichhassincebeenprosecutedundertheact。TheproceedingsagainsttheSugarTrustforcorruptioninconnectionwiththeNewYorkCustomHousearesufficientlyinterestingtobeconsideredseparately。
　　FromthestandpointofgivingcompletecontroltotheNationalGovernmentoverbigcorporationsengagedininter-Statebusiness，itwouldbeimpossibletoover-estimatetheimportanceoftheNorthernSecuritiesdecisionandofthedecisionsafterwardsrenderedinlinewithitinconnectionwiththeothertrustswhosedissolutionwasordered。ThesuccessoftheNorthernSecuritiescasedefinitelyestablishedthepoweroftheGovernmenttodealwithallgreatcorporations。WithoutthissuccesstheNationalGovernmentmusthaveremainedintheimpotencetowhichithadbeenreducedbytheKnightdecisionasregardsthemostimportantofitsinternalfunctions。ButoursuccessinestablishingthepoweroftheNationalGovernmenttocurbmonopoliesdidnotestablishtherightmethodofexercisingthatpower。Wehadgainedthepower。Wehadnotdevisedthepropermethodofexercisingit。
　　Monopoliescan，althoughinrathercumbrousfashion，bebrokenupbylawsuits。Greatbusinesscombinations，however，cannotpossiblybemadeusefulinsteadofnoxiousindustrialagenciesmerelybylawsuits，andespeciallybylawsuitssupposedtobecarriedonfortheirdestructionandnotfortheircontrolandregulation。IatoncebegantourgeuponCongresstheneedoflawssupplementingtheAnti-TrustLaw——forthislawstruckatallbigbusiness，goodandbad，alike，andastheeventprovedwasveryinefficientincheckingbadbigbusiness，andyetwasaconstantthreatagainstdecentbusinessmen。IstronglyurgedtheinaugurationofasystemofthoroughgoinganddrasticGovernmentalregulationandcontroloverallbigbusinesscombinationsengagedininter-Stateindustry。
　　HereIwasabletoaccomplishonlyasmallpartofwhatIdesiredtoaccomplish。Iwasopposedbothbythefoolishradicalswhodesiredtobreakupallbigbusiness，withtheimpossibleidealofreturningtomid-nineteenthcenturyindustrialconditions；andalsobythegreatprivilegedintereststhemselves，whousedtheseordinarily——butsometimesnotentirely——well-meaning“stoolpigeonprogressives“tofurthertheirowncause。Theworstrepresentativesofbigbusinessencouragedtheoutcryforthetotalabolitionofbigbusiness，becausetheyknewthattheycouldnotbehurtinthisway，andthatsuchanoutcrydistractedtheattentionofthepublicfromthereallyefficientmethodofcontrollingandsupervisingthem，injustbutmasterlyfashion，whichwasadvocatedbythesanerepresentativesofreform。However，wesucceededinmakingagoodbeginningbysecuringthepassageofalawcreatingtheDepartmentofCommerceandLabor，andwithittheerectionoftheBureauofCorporations。ThefirstheadoftheDepartmentofCommerceandLaborwasMr。Cortelyou，laterSecretaryoftheTreasury。HewassucceededbyMr。OscarStraus。ThefirstheadoftheBureauofCorporationswasMr。Garfield，whowassucceededbyMr。HerbertKnoxSmith。Nofourbetterpublicservantsfromthestandpointofthepeopleasawholecouldhavebeenfound。
　　TheStandardOilCompanytooktheleadinopposingallthislegislation。Thiswasnatural，forithadbeentheworstoffenderintheamassingofenormousfortunesbyimpropermethodsofallkinds，attheexpenseofbusinessrivalsandofthepublic，includingthecorruptionofpublicservants。Ifanymanthinksthiscondemnationextreme，IreferhimtothelanguageofficiallyusedbytheSupremeCourtofthenationinitsdecisionagainsttheStandardOilCompany。
　　Throughtheircounsel，andbydirecttelegramsandletterstoSenatorsandCongressmenfromvariousheadsoftheStandardOilorganization，theydidtheirbesttokillthebillprovidingfortheBureauofCorporations。Igotholdofoneortwoofthesetelegramsandletters，however，andpromptlypublishedthem；and，asgenerallyhappensinsuchacase，themenwhowereall-powerfulaslongastheycouldworkinsecretandbehindcloseddoorsbecamepowerlessassoonastheywereforcedintotheopen。Thebillwentthroughwithoutfurtherdifficulty。
　　Thetruewayofdealingwithmonopolyistopreventitbyadministrativeactionbeforeitgrowssopowerfulthatevenwhencourtscondemnittheyshrinkfromdestroyingit。TheSupremeCourtintheTobaccoandStandardOilcases，forinstance，usedveryvigorouslanguageincondemningthesetrusts；butthenetresultofthedecisionwasofpositiveadvantagetothewrongdoers，andthishastendedtobringthewholebodyofourlawintodisreputeinquarterswhereitisoftheveryhighestimportancethatthelawbeheldinrespectandeveninreverence。MyeffortwastosecurethecreationofaFederalCommissionwhichshouldneitherexcusenortoleratemonopoly，butpreventitwhenpossibleanduprootitwhendiscovered；
　　andwhichshouldinadditioneffectivelycontrolandregulateallbigcombinations，andshouldgivehonestbusinesscertaintyastowhatthelawwasandsecurityaslongasthelawwasobeyed。SuchaCommissionwouldfurnishasteadyexpertcontrol，acontroladaptedtotheproblem；anddissolutionisneithercontrolnorregulation，butispurelynegative；andnegativeremediesareoflittlepermanentavail。