Nothingappearsmoresurprisingtothose，whoconsiderhumanaffairswithaphilosophicaleve，thantheeasinesswithwhichthemanyaregovernedbythefew；andtheimplicitsubmission，withwhichmenresigntheirownsentimentsandpassionstothoseoftheirrulers。Whenweenquirebywhatmeansthiswonderiseffected，weshallfind，that，asFORCEisalwaysonthesideofthegoverned，thegovernorshavenothingtosupportthembutopinion。Itistherefore，onopiniononlythatgovernmentisfounded；andthismaximextendstothemostdespoticandmostmilitarygovernments，aswellastothemostfreeandmostpopular。ThesoldanofEGYPT，ortheemperorofROME，mightdrivehisharmlesssubjects，likebrutebeasts，againsttheirsentimentsandinclination：Buthemust，atleast，haveledhismamalukes，orpraetorianbands，likemen，bytheiropinion。
　　Opinionisoftwokinds，towit，opinionofINTEREST，andopinionofRIGHT。Byopinionofinterest，Ichieflyunderstandthesenseofthegeneraladvantagewhichisreapedfromgovernment；togetherwiththepersuasion，thattheparticulargovernment，whichisestablished，isequallyadvantageouswithanyotherthatcouldeasilybesettled。Whenthisopinionprevailsamongthegeneralityofastate，oramongthosewhohavetheforceintheirhands，itgivesgreatsecuritytoanygovernment。
　　Rightisoftwokinds，righttoPOWERandrighttoPROPERTY。
　　Whatprevalenceopinionofthefirstkindhasovermankind，mayeasilybeunderstood，byobservingtheattachmentwhichallnationshavetotheirancientgovernment，andeventothosenames，whichhavehadthesanctionofantiquity。Antiquityalwaysbegetstheopinionofright；andwhateverdisadvantageoussentimentswemayentertainofmankind，theyarealwaysfoundtobeprodigalbothofbloodandtreasureinthemaintenanceofpublicjustice。Thereis，indeed，noparticular，inwhich，atfirstsight，theremayappearagreatercontradictionintheframeofthehumanmindthanthepresent。Whenmenactinafaction，theyareapt，withoutshameorremorse，toneglectallthetiesofhonourandmorality，inordertoservetheirparty；
　　andyet，whenafactionisformeduponapointofrightorprinciple，thereisnooccasion，wheremendiscoveragreaterobstinacy，andamoredeterminedsenseofjusticeandequity。Thesamesocialdispositionofmankindisthecauseofthesecontradictoryappearances。
　　Itissufficientlyunderstood，thattheopinionofrighttopropertyisofmomentinallmattersofgovernment。Anotedauthorhasmadepropertythefoundationofallgovernment；andmostofourpoliticalwritersseeminclinedtofollowhiminthatparticular。Thisiscarryingthemattertoofar；butstillitmustbeowned，thattheopinionofrighttopropertyhasagreatinfluenceinthissubject。
　　Uponthesethreeopinions，therefore，ofpublicinterest，ofrighttopower，andofrighttoproperty，areallgovernmentsfounded，andallauthorityofthefewoverthemany。Thereareindeedotherprinciples，whichaddforcetothese，anddetermine，limit，oraltertheiroperation；suchasself—interest，fear，andaffection：Butstillwemayassert，thattheseotherprinciplescanhavenoinfluencealone，butsupposetheantecedentinfluenceofthoseopinionsabove—mentioned。Theyare，therefore，tobeesteemedthesecondary，nottheoriginalprinciplesofgovernment。
　　For，first，astoself—interest，bywhichImeantheexpectationofparticularrewards，distinctfromthegeneralprotectionwhichwereceivefromgovernment，itisevidentthatthemagistrate’sauthoritymustbeantecedentlyestablished，atleastbehopedfor，inordertoproducethisexpectation。Theprospectofrewardmayaugmenthisauthoritywithregardtosomeparticularpersons；butcannevergivebirthtoit，withregardtothepublic。Mennaturallylookforthegreatestfavoursfromtheirfriendsandacquaintance；andtherefore，thehopesofanyconsiderablenumberofthestatewouldnevercenterinanyparticularsetofmen，ifthesemenhadnoothertitletomagistracy，andhadnoseparateinfluenceovertheopinionsofmankind。Thesameobservationmaybeextendedtotheothertwoprinciplesoffearandaffection。Nomanwouldhaveanyreasontofearthefuryofatyrant，ifhehadnoauthorityoveranybutfromfear；since，asasingleman，hisbodilyforcecanreachbutasmallway，andallthefartherpowerhepossessesmustbefoundedeitheronourownopinion，oronthepresumedopinionofothers。Andthoughaffectiontowisdomandvirtueinasovereignextendsveryfar，andhasgreatinfluence；yethemustantecedentlybesupposedinvestedwithapubliccharacter，otherwisethepublicesteemwillservehiminnostead，norwillhisvirtuehaveanyinfluencebeyondanarrowsphere。
　　AGovernmentmayendureforseveralages，thoughthebalanceofpower，andthebalanceofpropertydonotcoincide。Thischieflyhappens，whereanyrankororderofthestatehasacquiredalargeshareintheproperty；butfromtheoriginalconstitutionofthegovernment，hasnoshareinthepower。Underwhatpretencewouldanyindividualofthatorderassumeauthorityinpublicaffairs？Asmenarecommonlymuchattachedtotheirancientgovernment，itisnottobeexpected，thatthepublicwouldeverfavoursuchusurpations。Butwheretheoriginalconstitutionallowsanyshareofpower，thoughsmall，toanorderofmen，whopossessalargeshareoftheproperty，itiseasyforthemgraduallytostretchtheirauthority，andbringthebalanceofpowertocoincidewiththatofproperty。ThishasbeenthecasewiththehouseofcommonsinENGLAND。
　　Mostwriters，thathavetreatedoftheBRITISHgovernment，havesupposed，that，asthelowerhouserepresentsallthecommonsofGREATBRITAIN，itsweightinthescaleisproportionedtothepropertyandpowerofallwhomitrepresents。Butthisprinciplemustnotbereceivedasabsolutelytrue。Forthoughthepeopleareapttoattachthemselvesmoretothehouseofcommons，thantoanyothermemberoftheconstitution；thathousebeingchosenbythemastheirrepresentatives，andasthepublicguardiansoftheirliberty；yetarethereinstanceswherethehouse，evenwheninoppositiontothecrown，hasnotbeenfollowedbythepeople；aswemayparticularlyobserveofthetoryhouseofcommonsinthereignofkingWILLIAM。Werethemembersobligedtoreceiveinstructionsfromtheirconstituents，liketheDUTCHdeputies，thiswouldentirelyalterthecase；andifsuchimmensepowerandriches，asthoseofallthecommonsofGREATBRITAIN，werebroughtintothescale，itisnoteasytoconceive，thatthecrowncouldeitherinfluencethatmultitudeofpeople，orwithstandthatoverbalanceofproperty。Itistrue，thecrownhasgreatinfluenceoverthecollectivebodyintheelectionsofmembers；butwerethisinfluence，whichatpresentisonlyexertedonceinsevenyears，tobeemployedinbringingoverthepeopletoeveryvote，itwouldsoonbewasted；andnoskill，popularity，orrevenue，couldsupportit。Imust，therefore，beofopinion，thatanalterationinthisparticularwouldintroduceatotalalterationinourgovernment，andwouldsoonreduceittoapurerepublic；and，perhaps，toarepublicofnoinconvenientform。Forthoughthepeople，collectedinabodyliketheROMANtribes，bequiteunfitforgovernment，yetwhendispersedinsmallbodies，theyaremoresusceptiblebothofreasonandorder；theforceofpopularcurrentsandtidesis，inagreatmeasure，broken；andthepublicinterestmaybepursuedwithsomemethodandconstancy。Butitisneedlesstoreasonanyfartherconcerningaformofgovernment，whichisneverlikelytohaveplaceinGREATBRITAIN，andwhichseemsnottobetheaimofanypartyamongstus。Letuscherishandimproveourancientgovernmentasmuchaspossible，withoutencouragingapassionforsuchdangerousnovelties。