Thingsaresaidto’be’1inanaccidentalsense,2bytheir
ownnature。
1Inanaccidentalsense,e。g。wesay’therighteousdoeris
musical’,and’themanismusical’,and’themusicianisaman’,
justaswesay’themusicianbuilds’,becausethebuilderhappensto
bemusicalorthemusiciantobeabuilder;forhere’onethingis
another’means’oneisanaccidentofanother’。Sointhecaseswe
havementioned;forwhenwesay’themanismusical’and’themusician
isaman’,or’hewhoispaleismusical’or’themusicianispale’,
thelasttwomeanthatbothattributesareaccidentsofthesame
thing;thefirstthattheattributeisanaccidentofthatwhichis,
while’themusicalisaman’meansthat’musical’isanaccidentof
aman。Inthissense,too,thenot-paleissaidtobe,becausethat
ofwhichitisanaccidentis。Thuswhenonethingissaidinan
accidentalsensetobeanother,thisiseitherbecausebothbelong
tothesamething,andthisis,orbecausethattowhichtheattribute
belongsis,orbecausethesubjectwhichhasasanattributethatof
whichitisitselfpredicated,itselfis。
2Thekindsofessentialbeingarepreciselythosethatare
indicatedbythefiguresofpredication;forthesensesof’being’are
justasmanyasthesefigures。Since,then,somepredicatesindicate
whatthesubjectis,othersitsquality,othersquantity,others
relation,othersactivityorpassivity,othersits’where’,othersits
’when’,’being’hasameaningansweringtoeachofthese。Forthereis
nodifferencebetween’themanisrecovering’and’theman
recovers’,norbetween’themaniswalkingorcutting’and’theman
walks’or’cuts’;andsimilarlyinallothercases。
Again,’being’and’is’meanthatastatementistrue,’not
being’thatitisnottruebutfalses-andthisalikeinthecaseof
affirmationandofnegation;e。g。’Socratesismusical’meansthat
thisistrue,or’Socratesisnot-pale’meansthatthisistrue;but
’thediagonalofthesquareisnotcommensuratewiththeside’means
thatitisfalsetosayitis。
Again,’being’and’thatwhichis’meanthatsomeofthe
thingswehavementioned’are’potentially,othersincomplete
reality。Forwesaybothofthatwhichseespotentiallyandofthat
whichseesactually,thatitis’seeing’,andbothofthatwhichcan
actualizeitsknowledgeandofthatwhichisactualizingit,thatit
knows,andbothofthattowhichrestisalreadypresentandofthat
whichcanrest,thatitrests。Andsimilarlyinthecaseof
substances;wesaytheHermesisinthestone,andthehalfofthe
lineisintheline,andwesayofthatwhichisnotyetripethat
itiscorn。Whenathingispotentialandwhenitisnotyetpotential
mustbeexplainedelsewhere。
Wecall’substance’1thesimplebodies,i。e。earthandfireand
waterandeverythingofthesort,andingeneralbodiesandthethings
composedofthem,bothanimalsanddivinebeings,andthepartsof
these。Allthesearecalledsubstancebecausetheyarenot
predicatedofasubjectbuteverythingelseispredicatedofthem-2
Thatwhich,beingpresentinsuchthingsasarenotpredicatedofa
subject,isthecauseoftheirbeing,asthesoulisofthebeingof
ananimal-3Thepartswhicharepresentinsuchthings,limiting
themandmarkingthemasindividuals,andbywhosedestructionthe
wholeisdestroyed,asthebodyisbythedestructionoftheplane,as
somesay,andtheplanebythedestructionoftheline;andingeneral
numberisthoughtbysometobeofthisnature;forifitis
destroyed,theysay,nothingexists,anditlimitsallthings-4The
essence,theformulaofwhichisadefinition,isalsocalledthe
substanceofeachthing。
Itfollows,then,that’substance’hastwosenses,Aultimate
substratum,whichisnolongerpredicatedofanythingelse,andB
thatwhich,beinga’this’,isalsoseparableandofthisnatureis
theshapeorformofeachthing。
’Thesame’means1thatwhichisthesameinanaccidental
sense,e。g。’thepale’and’themusical’arethesamebecausetheyare
accidentsofthesamething,and’aman’and’musical’becausetheone
isanaccidentoftheother;and’themusical’is’aman’becauseit
isanaccidentoftheman。Thecomplexentityisthesameaseither
ofthesimpleonesandeachoftheseisthesameasit;forboth
’theman’and’themusical’aresaidtobethesameas’themusical
man’,andthisthesameasthey。Thisiswhyallofthese
statementsaremadenotuniversally;foritisnottruetosaythat
everymanisthesameas’themusical’foruniversalattributes
belongtothingsinvirtueoftheirownnature,butaccidentsdonot
belongtotheminvirtueoftheirownnature;butofthe
individualsthestatementsaremadewithoutqualification。For
’Socrates’and’musicalSocrates’arethoughttobethesame;but
’Socrates’isnotpredicableofmorethanonesubject,andtherefore
wedonotsay’everySocrates’aswesay’everyman’。
Somethingsaresaidtobethesameinthissense,others2
arethesamebytheirownnature,inasmanysensesasthatwhichis
onebyitsownnatureisso;forboththethingswhosematterisone
eitherinkindorinnumber,andthosewhoseessenceisone,are
saidtobethesame。Clearly,therefore,samenessisaunityofthe
beingeitherofmorethanonethingorofonethingwhenitistreated
asmorethanone,ie。whenwesayathingisthesameasitself;for
wetreatitastwo。
Thingsarecalled’other’ifeithertheirkindsortheirmatters
orthedefinitionsoftheiressencearemorethanone;andin
general’other’hasmeaningsoppositetothoseof’thesame’。
’Different’isapplied1tothosethingswhichthoughother
arethesameinsomerespect,onlynotinnumberbuteitherinspecies
oringenusorbyanalogy;2tothosewhosegenusisother,andto
contraries,andtoanthingsthathavetheirothernessintheir
essence。
Thosethingsarecalled’like’whichhavethesameattributesin
everyrespect,andthosewhichhavemoreattributesthesamethan
different,andthosewhosequalityisone;andthatwhichshares
withanotherthingthegreaternumberorthemoreimportantofthe
attributeseachofthemoneoftwocontrariesinrespectofwhich
thingsarecapableofaltering,islikethatotherthing。Thesenses
of’unlike’areoppositetothoseof’like’。
Theterm’opposite’isappliedtocontradictories,andto
contraries,andtorelativeterms,andtoprivationandpossession,
andtotheextremesfromwhichandintowhichgenerationand
dissolutiontakeplace;andtheattributesthatcannotbepresentat
thesametimeinthatwhichisreceptiveofboth,aresaidtobe
opposed,-eitherthemselvesoftheirconstituents。Greyandwhite
colourdonotbelongatthesametimetothesamething;hencetheir
constituentsareopposed。
Theterm’contrary’isapplied1tothoseattributesdiffering
ingenuswhichcannotbelongatthesametimetothesamesubject,2
tothemostdifferentofthethingsinthesamegenus,3tothemost
differentoftheattributesinthesamerecipientsubject,4to
themostdifferentofthethingsthatfallunderthesamefaculty,5
tothethingswhosedifferenceisgreatesteitherabsolutelyorin
genusorinspecies。Theotherthingsthatarecalledcontraryare
socalled,somebecausetheypossesscontrariesoftheabovekind,
somebecausetheyarereceptiveofsuch,somebecausetheyare
productiveoforsusceptibletosuch,orareproducingorsuffering
them,orarelossesoracquisitions,orpossessionsorprivations,
ofsuch。Since’one’and’being’havemanysenses,theotherterms
whicharederivedfromthese,andtherefore’same’,’other’,and
’contrary’,mustcorrespond,sothattheymustbedifferentforeach
category。
Theterm’otherinspecies’isappliedtothingswhichbeingof
thesamegenusarenotsubordinatetheonetotheother,orwhich
beinginthesamegenushaveadifference,orwhichhaveacontrariety
intheirsubstance;andcontrariesareotherthanoneanotherin
specieseitherallcontrariesorthosewhicharesocalledinthe
primarysense,andsoarethosethingswhosedefinitionsdifferin
theinfimaspeciesofthegenuse。g。manandhorseareindivisiblein
genus,buttheirdefinitionsaredifferent,andthosewhichbeing
inthesamesubstancehaveadifference。’Thesameinspecies’hasthe
variousmeaningsoppositetothese。
Thewords’prior’and’posterior’areapplied1tosomethings
ontheassumptionthatthereisafirst,i。e。abeginning,ineach
classbecausetheyarenearersomebeginningdeterminedeither
absolutelyandbynature,orbyreferencetosomethingorinsome
placeorbycertainpeople;e。g。thingsarepriorinplacebecause
theyarenearereithertosomeplacedeterminedbynaturee。g。the
middleorthelastplace,ortosomechanceobject;andthatwhichis
fartherisposterior-Otherthingsarepriorintime;somebybeing
fartherfromthepresent,i。e。inthecaseofpasteventsforthe
TrojanwarispriortothePersian,becauseitisfartherfromthe
present,othersbybeingnearerthepresent,i。e。inthecaseof
futureeventsfortheNemeangamesarepriortothePythian,ifwe
treatthepresentasbeginningandfirstpoint,becausetheyare
nearerthepresent-Otherthingsarepriorinmovement;forthat
whichisnearerthefirstmoverispriore。g。theboyispriortothe
man;andtheprimemoveralsoisabeginningabsolutely-Othersare
priorinpower;forthatwhichexceedsinpower,i。e。themore
powerful,isprior;andsuchisthataccordingtowhosewillthe
other-i。e。theposterior-mustfollow,sothatifthepriordoesnot
setitinmotiontheotherdoesnotmove,andifitsetsitin
motionitdoesmove;andherewillisabeginning-Othersarepriorin
arrangement;thesearethethingsthatareplacedatintervalsin
referencetosomeonedefinitethingaccordingtosomerule,e。g。in
thechorusthesecondmanispriortothethird,andinthelyrethe
secondloweststringispriortothelowest;forintheonecasethe
leaderandintheotherthemiddlestringisthebeginning。
These,then,arecalledpriorinthissense,but2inanother
sensethatwhichispriorforknowledgeistreatedasalso
absolutelyprior;ofthese,thethingsthatarepriorindefinitiondo
notcoincidewiththosethatarepriorinrelationtoperception。
Forindefinitionuniversalsareprior,inrelationtoperception
individuals。Andindefinitionalsotheaccidentispriortothe
whole,e。g。’musical’to’musicalman’,forthedefinitioncannot
existasawholewithoutthepart;yetmusicalnesscannotexistunless
thereissomeonewhoismusical。
3Theattributesofpriorthingsarecalledprior,e。g。
straightnessispriortosmoothness;foroneisanattributeofaline
assuch,andtheotherofasurface。
Somethingsthenarecalledpriorandposteriorinthissense,
others4inrespectofnatureandsubstance,i。e。thosewhichcanbe
withoutotherthings,whiletheotherscannotbewithoutthem,-a
distinctionwhichPlatoused。Ifweconsiderthevarioussensesof
’being’,firstlythesubjectisprior,sothatsubstanceisprior;
secondly,accordingaspotencyorcompleterealityistakeninto
account,differentthingsareprior,forsomethingsarepriorin
respectofpotency,othersinrespectofcompletereality,e。g。in
potencythehalflineispriortothewholeline,andthepartto
thewhole,andthemattertotheconcretesubstance,butincomplete
realitytheseareposterior;foritisonlywhenthewholehasbeen
dissolvedthattheywillexistincompletereality。Inasense,
therefore,allthingsthatarecalledpriorandposteriorareso
calledwithreferencetothisfourthsense;forsomethingscan
existwithoutothersinrespectofgeneration,e。g。thewhole
withouttheparts,andothersinrespectofdissolution,e。g。thepart
withoutthewhole。Andthesameistrueinallothercases。