Itisclearalsofromtheseveryfactswhatconsequence
　　confrontsthosewhosaytheIdeasaresubstancescapableofseparate
　　existence，andatthesametimemaketheFormconsistofthegenusand
　　thedifferentiae。ForiftheFormsexistand’animal’ispresentin
　　’man’and’horse’，itiseitheroneandthesameinnumber，or
　　different。Informulaitisclearlyone；forhewhostatesthe
　　formulawillgothroughtheformulaineithercase。Ifthenthere
　　isa’man-in-himself’whoisa’this’andexistsapart，thepartsalso
　　ofwhichheconsists，e。g。’animal’and’two-footed’，mustindicate
　　’thises’，andbecapableofseparateexistence，andsubstances；
　　therefore’animal’，aswellas’man’，mustbeofthissort。
　　Now1ifthe’animal’in’thehorse’andin’man’isoneandthe
　　same，asyouarewithyourself，ahowwilltheoneinthingsthat
　　existapartbeone，andhowwillthis’animal’escapebeingdivided
　　evenfromitself？
　　Further，bifitistosharein’two-footed’and
　　’many-footed’，animpossibleconclusionfollows；forcontrary
　　attributeswillbelongatthesametimetoitalthoughitisoneanda
　　’this’。Ifitisnottoshareinthem，whatistherelationimplied
　　whenonesaystheanimalistwo-footedorpossessedoffeet？But
　　perhapsthetwothingsare’puttogether’andare’incontact’，orare
　　’mixed’。Yetalltheseexpressionsareabsurd。
　　But2supposetheFormtobedifferentineachspecies。Then
　　therewillbepracticallyaninfinitenumberofthingswhosesubstance
　　isanimal’；foritisnotbyaccidentthat’man’has’animal’for
　　oneofitselements。Further，manythingswillbe’animal-itself’。For
　　ithe’animal’ineachspecieswillbethesubstanceofthespecies；
　　foritisafternothingelsethatthespeciesiscalled；ifitwere，
　　thatotherwouldbeanelementin’man’，i。e。wouldbethegenusof
　　man。Andfurther，iialltheelementsofwhich’man’iscomposed
　　willbeIdeas。Noneofthem，then，willbetheIdeaofonethingand
　　thesubstanceofanother；thisisimpossible。The’animal’，then，
　　presentineachspeciesofanimalswillbeanimal-itself。Further，
　　fromwhatisthis’animal’ineachspeciesderived，andhowwillitbe
　　derivedfromanimal-itself？Orhowcanthis’animal’，whoseessenceis
　　simplyanimality，existapartfromanimal-itself？
　　Further，3inthecaseofsensiblethingsboththese
　　consequencesandothersstillmoreabsurdfollow。If，then，these
　　consequencesareimpossible，clearlytherearenotFormsofsensible
　　thingsinthesenseinwhichsomemaintaintheirexistence。
　　Sincesubstanceisoftwokinds，theconcretethingandthe
　　formulaImeanthatonekindofsubstanceistheformulatakenwith
　　thematter，whileanotherkindistheformulainitsgenerality，
　　substancesintheformersensearecapableofdestructionforthey
　　arecapablealsoofgeneration，butthereisnodestructionofthe
　　formulainthesensethatitiseverincourseofbeingdestroyedfor
　　thereisnogenerationofiteither；thebeingofhouseisnot
　　generated，butonlythebeingofthishouse，butwithoutgeneration
　　anddestructionformulaeareandarenot；forithasbeenshownthat
　　noonebegetsnormakesthese。Forthisreason，also，thereisneither
　　definitionofnordemonstrationaboutsensibleindividual
　　substances，becausetheyhavematterwhosenatureissuchthatthey
　　arecapablebothofbeingandofnotbeing；forwhichreasonallthe
　　individualinstancesofthemaredestructible。Ifthendemonstration
　　isofnecessarytruthsanddefinitionisascientificprocess，andif，
　　justasknowledgecannotbesometimesknowledgeandsometimes
　　ignorance，butthestatewhichvariesthusisopinion，sotoo
　　demonstrationanddefinitioncannotvarythus，butitisopinion
　　thatdealswiththatwhichcanbeotherwisethanasitis，clearly
　　therecanneitherbedefinitionofnordemonstrationaboutsensible
　　individuals。Forperishingthingsareobscuretothosewhohavethe
　　relevantknowledge，whentheyhavepassedfromourperception；and
　　thoughtheformulaeremaininthesoulunchanged，therewillnolonger
　　beeitherdefinitionordemonstration。Andsowhenoneofthe
　　definition-mongersdefinesanyindividual，hemustrecognizethat
　　hisdefinitionmayalwaysbeoverthrown；foritisnotpossibleto
　　definesuchthings。
　　NorisitpossibletodefineanyIdea。FortheIdeais，asits
　　supporterssay，anindividual，andcanexistapart；andtheformula
　　mustconsistofwords；andhewhodefinesmustnotinventaword
　　foritwouldbeunknown，buttheestablishedwordsarecommontoall
　　themembersofaclass；thesethenmustapplytosomethingbesidesthe
　　thingdefined；e。g。ifoneweredefiningyou，hewouldsay’an
　　animalwhichislean’or’pale’，orsomethingelsewhichwillapply
　　alsotosomeoneotherthanyou。Ifanyoneweretosaythatperhaps
　　alltheattributestakenapartmaybelongtomanysubjects，but
　　togethertheybelongonlytothisone，wemustreplyfirstthatthey
　　belongalsotoboththeelements；e。g。’two-footedanimal’belongs
　　toanimalandtothetwo-footed。Andinthecaseofeternal
　　entitiesthisisevennecessary，sincetheelementsarepriortoand
　　partsofthecompound；naymore，theycanalsoexistapart，if’man’
　　canexistapart。Foreitherneitherorbothcan。If，then，neither
　　can，thegenuswillnotexistapartfromthevariousspecies；butif
　　itdoes，thedifferentiawillalso。Secondly，wemustreplythat
　　’animal’and’two-footed’arepriorinbeingto’two-footedanimal’；
　　andthingswhicharepriortoothersarenotdestroyedwhentheothers
　　are。
　　Again，iftheIdeasconsistofIdeasastheymust，sinceelements
　　aresimplerthanthecompound，itwillbefurthernecessarythat
　　theelementsalsoofwhichtheIdeaconsists，e。g。’animal’and
　　’two-footed’，shouldbepredicatedofmanysubjects。Ifnot，how
　　willtheycometobeknown？FortherewillthenbeanIdeawhich
　　cannotbepredicatedofmoresubjectsthanone。Butthisisnot
　　thoughtpossible-everyIdeaisthoughttobecapableofbeingshared。
　　Ashasbeensaid，then，theimpossibilityofdefining
　　individualsescapesnoticeinthecaseofeternalthings，especially
　　thosewhichareunique，likethesunorthemoon。Forpeopleerrnot
　　onlybyaddingattributeswhoseremovalthesunwouldsurvive，e。g。
　　’goingroundtheearth’or’night-hidden’forfromtheirviewit
　　followsthatifitstandsstillorisvisible，itwillnolongerbe
　　thesun；butitisstrangeifthisisso；for’thesun’meansa
　　certainsubstance；butalsobythementionofattributeswhichcan
　　belongtoanothersubject；e。g。ifanotherthingwiththestated
　　attributescomesintoexistence，clearlyitwillbeasun；theformula
　　thereforeisgeneral。Butthesunwassupposedtobeanindividual，
　　likeCleonorSocrates。Afterall，whydoesnotoneofthe
　　supportersoftheIdeasproduceadefinitionofanIdea？Itwould
　　becomeclear，iftheytried，thatwhathasnowbeensaidistrue。
　　Evidentlyevenofthethingsthatarethoughttobesubstances，
　　mostareonlypotencies，-boththepartsofanimalsfornoneofthem
　　existsseparately；andwhentheyareseparated，thentootheyexist，
　　allofthem，merelyasmatterandearthandfireandair；fornoneof
　　themisaunity，butasitwereamereheap，tilltheyareworkedup
　　andsomeunityismadeoutofthem。Onemightmostreadilysupposethe
　　partsoflivingthingsandthepartsofthesoulnearlyrelatedto
　　themtoturnouttobeboth，i。e。existentincompleterealityaswell
　　asinpotency，becausetheyhavesourcesofmovementinsomethingin
　　theirjoints；forwhichreasonsomeanimalslivewhendivided。Yetall
　　thepartsmustexistonlypotentially，whentheyareoneand
　　continuousbynature，-notbyforceorbygrowingintoone，forsuch
　　aphenomenonisanabnormality。
　　Sincetheterm’unity’isusedliketheterm’being’，andthe
　　substanceofthatwhichisoneisone，andthingswhosesubstanceis
　　numericallyonearenumericallyone，evidentlyneitherunitynorbeing
　　canbethesubstanceofthings，justasbeinganelementora
　　principlecannotbethesubstance，butweaskwhat，then，the
　　principleis，thatwemayreducethethingtosomethingmoreknowable。
　　Nowoftheseconcepts’being’and’unity’aremoresubstantialthan
　　’principle’or’element’or’cause’，butnoteventheformerare
　　substance，sinceingeneralnothingthatiscommonissubstance；for
　　substancedoesnotbelongtoanythingbuttoitselfandtothat
　　whichhasit，ofwhichitisthesubstance。Further，thatwhichisone
　　cannotbeinmanyplacesatthesametime，butthatwhichiscommonis
　　presentinmanyplacesatthesametime；sothatclearlyno
　　universalexistsapartfromitsindividuals。
　　ButthosewhosaytheFormsexist，inonerespectareright，in
　　givingtheFormsseparateexistence，iftheyaresubstances；butin
　　anotherrespecttheyarenotright，becausetheysaytheoneovermany
　　isaForm。Thereasonfortheirdoingthisisthattheycannotdeclare
　　whatarethesubstancesofthissort，theimperishablesubstances
　　whichexistapartfromtheindividualandsensiblesubstances。They
　　makethem，then，thesameinkindastheperishablethingsforthis
　　kindofsubstanceweknow——’man-himself’and’horse-itself’，adding
　　tothesensiblethingstheword’itself’。Yetevenifwehadnot
　　seenthestars，nonetheless，Isuppose，wouldtheyhavebeeneternal
　　substancesapartfromthosewhichweknew；sothatnowalsoifwedo
　　notknowwhatnon-sensiblesubstancesthereare，yetitisdoubtless
　　necessarythatthereshouldhesome-Clearly，then，nouniversal
　　termisthenameofasubstance，andnosubstanceiscomposedof
　　substances。
　　Letusstatewhat，i。e。whatkindofthing，substanceshouldbe
　　saidtobe，takingoncemoreanotherstarting-point；forperhaps
　　fromthisweshallgetaclearviewalsoofthatsubstancewhich
　　existsapartfromsensiblesubstances。Since，then，substanceisa
　　principleandacause，letuspursueitfromthisstarting-point。
　　The’why’isalwayssoughtinthisform——’whydoesonethingattachto
　　someother？’Fortoinquirewhythemusicalmanisamusicalman，is
　　eithertoinquire——aswehavesaidwhythemanismusical，oritis
　　somethingelse。Now’whyathingisitself’isameaninglessinquiry
　　fortogivemeaningtothequestion’why’thefactortheexistence
　　ofthethingmustalreadybeevident-e。g。thatthemoonis
　　eclipsed-butthefactthatathingisitselfisthesinglereason
　　andthesinglecausetobegiveninanswertoallsuchquestionsas
　　whythemanisman，orthemusicianmusical’，unlessonewereto
　　answer’becauseeachthingisinseparablefromitself，anditsbeing
　　onejustmeantthis’；this，however，iscommontoallthingsandis
　　ashortandeasywaywiththequestion。Butwecaninquirewhymanis
　　ananimalofsuchandsuchanature。This，then，isplain，thatweare
　　notinquiringwhyhewhoisamanisaman。Weareinquiring，then，
　　whysomethingispredicableofsomethingthatitispredicablemust
　　beclear；forifnot，theinquiryisaninquiryintonothing。E。g。
　　whydoesitthunder？Thisisthesameas’whyissoundproducedinthe
　　clouds？’Thustheinquiryisaboutthepredicationofonethingof
　　another。Andwhyarethesethings，i。e。bricksandstones，ahouse？
　　Plainlyweareseekingthecause。Andthisistheessencetospeak
　　abstractly，whichinsomecasesistheend，e。g。perhapsinthe
　　caseofahouseorabed，andinsomecasesisthefirstmover；for
　　thisalsoisacause。Butwhiletheefficientcauseissoughtinthe
　　caseofgenesisanddestruction，thefinalcauseissoughtinthecase
　　ofbeingalso。
　　Theobjectoftheinquiryismosteasilyoverlookedwhereoneterm
　　isnotexpresslypredicatedofanothere。g。whenweinquire’whatman
　　is’，becausewedonotdistinguishanddonotsaydefinitelythat
　　certainelementsmakeupacertainwhole。Butwemustarticulateour
　　meaningbeforewebegintoinquire；ifnot，theinquiryisonthe
　　border-linebetweenbeingasearchforsomethingandasearchfor
　　nothing。Sincewemusthavetheexistenceofthethingassomething
　　given，clearlythequestioniswhythematterissomedefinite
　　thing；e。g。whyarethesematerialsahouse？Becausethatwhichwas
　　theessenceofahouseispresent。Andwhyisthisindividualthing，
　　orthisbodyhavingthisform，aman？Thereforewhatweseekisthe
　　cause，i。e。theform，byreasonofwhichthematterissomedefinite
　　thing；andthisisthesubstanceofthething。Evidently，then，inthe
　　caseofsimpletermsnoinquirynorteachingispossible；ourattitude
　　towardssuchthingsisotherthanthatofinquiry。