Onemightraisethequestion，whywomandoesnotdifferfromman
　　inspecies，whenfemaleandmalearecontraryandtheirdifference
　　isacontrariety；andwhyafemaleandamaleanimalarenotdifferent
　　inspecies，thoughthisdifferencebelongstoanimalinvirtueof
　　itsownnature，andnotaspalenessordarknessdoes；both’female’
　　and’male’belongtoitquaanimal。Thisquestionisalmostthesame
　　astheother，whyonecontrarietymakesthingsdifferentinspecies
　　andanotherdoesnot，e。g。’withfeet’and’withwings’do，but
　　palenessanddarknessdonot。Perhapsitisbecausetheformerare
　　modificationspeculiartothegenus，andthelatterarelessso。And
　　sinceoneelementisdefinitionandoneismatter，contrarietieswhich
　　areinthedefinitionmakeadifferenceinspecies，butthosewhich
　　areinthethingtakenasincludingitsmatterdonotmakeone。Andso
　　palenessinaman，ordarkness，doesnotmakeone，noristherea
　　differenceinspeciesbetweenthepalemanandthedarkman，not
　　evenifeachofthembedenotedbyoneword。Formanisherebeing
　　consideredonhismaterialside，andmatterdoesnotcreatea
　　difference；foritdoesnotmakeindividualmenspeciesofman，though
　　thefleshandthebonesofwhichthismanandthatmanconsistare
　　other。Theconcretethingisother，butnototherinspecies，
　　becauseinthedefinitionthereisnocontrariety。Thisisthe
　　ultimateindivisiblekind。Calliasisdefinitionmatter，thepale
　　man，then，issoalso，becauseitistheindividualCalliasthatis
　　pale；man，then，ispaleonlyincidentally。Neitherdoabrazenand
　　awoodencircle，then，differinspecies；andifabrazentriangleand
　　awoodencircledifferinspecies，itisnotbecauseofthematter，
　　butbecausethereisacontrarietyinthedefinition。Butdoesthe
　　matternotmakethingsotherinspecies，whenitisotherinacertain
　　way，oristhereasenseinwhichitdoes？Forwhyisthishorseother
　　thanthismaninspecies，althoughtheirmatterisincludedwiththeir
　　definitions？Doubtlessbecausethereisacontrarietyinthe
　　definition。Forwhilethereisacontrarietyalsobetweenpalemanand
　　darkhorse，anditisacontrarietyinspecies，itdoesnotdepend
　　onthepalenessoftheoneandthedarknessoftheother，sinceeven
　　ifbothhadbeenpale，yettheywouldhavebeenotherinspecies。
　　Butmaleandfemale，whiletheyaremodificationspeculiarto
　　’animal’，aresonotinvirtueofitsessencebutinthematter，ie。
　　thebody。Thisiswhythesameseedbecomesfemaleormalebybeing
　　actedoninacertainway。Wehavestated，then，whatitistobe
　　otherinspecies，andwhysomethingsdifferinspeciesandothers
　　donot。
　　Sincecontrariesareotherinform，andtheperishableandthe
　　imperishablearecontrariesforprivationisadeterminate
　　incapacity，theperishableandtheimperishablemustbedifferent
　　inkind。
　　Nowsofarwehavespokenofthegeneraltermsthemselves，sothat
　　itmightbethoughtnottobenecessarythateveryimperishable
　　thingshouldbedifferentfromeveryperishablethinginform，justas
　　noteverypalethingisdifferentinformfromeverydarkthing。For
　　thesamethingcanbeboth，andevenatthesametimeifitisa
　　universale。g。mancanbebothpaleanddark，andifitisan
　　individualitcanstillbeboth；forthesamemancanbe，thoughnot
　　atthesametime，paleanddark。Yetpaleiscontrarytodark。
　　Butwhilesomecontrariesbelongtocertainthingsbyaccident
　　e。g。boththosenowmentionedandmanyothers，otherscannot，and
　　amongtheseare’perishable’and’imperishable’。Fornothingisby
　　accidentperishable。Forwhatisaccidentaliscapableofnotbeing
　　present，butperishablenessisoneoftheattributesthatbelongof
　　necessitytothethingstowhichtheybelong；orelseoneandthesame
　　thingmaybeperishableandimperishable，ifperishablenessiscapable
　　ofnotbelongingtoit。Perishablenessthenmusteitherbetheessence
　　orbepresentintheessenceofeachperishablething。Thesame
　　accountholdsgoodforimperishablenessalso；forbothare
　　attributeswhicharepresentofnecessity。Thecharacteristics，
　　then，inrespectofwhichandindirectconsequenceofwhichonething
　　isperishableandanotherimperishable，areopposite，sothatthe
　　thingsmustbedifferentinkind。
　　Evidently，then，therecannotbeFormssuchassomemaintain，
　　forthenonemanwouldbeperishableandanotherimperishable。Yetthe
　　Formsaresaidtobethesameinformwiththeindividualsandnot
　　merelytohavethesamename；butthingswhichdifferinkindare
　　fartherapartthanthosewhichdifferinform。
　　THATWisdomisascienceoffirstprinciplesisevidentfromthe
　　introductorychapters，inwhichwehaveraisedobjectionstothe
　　statementsofothersaboutthefirstprinciples；butonemightaskthe
　　questionwhetherWisdomistobeconceivedasonescienceoras
　　several。Ifasone，itmaybeobjectedthatonesciencealwaysdeals
　　withcontraries，butthefirstprinciplesarenotcontrary。Ifitis
　　notone，whatsortofsciencesarethosewithwhichitistobe
　　identified？
　　Further，isitthebusinessofonescience，orofmorethanone，
　　toexaminethefirstprinciplesofdemonstration？Ifofone，whyof
　　thisratherthanofanyother？Ifofmore，whatsortofsciences
　　mustthesebesaidtobe？
　　Further，doesWisdominvestigateallsubstancesornot？Ifnot
　　all，itishardtosaywhich；butif，beingone，itinvestigates
　　themall，itisdoubtfulhowthesamesciencecanembraceseveral
　　subject-matters。
　　Further，doesitdealwithsubstancesonlyoralsowiththeir
　　attributes？Ifinthecaseofattributesdemonstrationispossible，in
　　thatofsubstancesitisnot。Butifthetwosciencesaredifferent，
　　whatiseachofthemandwhichisWisdom？Ifwethinkofitas
　　demonstrative，thescienceoftheattributesisWisdom，butifas
　　dealingwithwhatisprimary，thescienceofsubstancesclaimsthe
　　tide。
　　Butagainthesciencewearelookingformustnotbesupposedto
　　dealwiththecauseswhichhavebeenmentionedinthePhysics。ForA
　　itdoesnotdealwiththefinalcauseforthatisthenatureofthe
　　good，andthisisfoundinthefieldofactionandmovement；anditis
　　thefirstmover-forthatisthenatureoftheend-butinthecaseof
　　thingsunmovablethereisnothingthatmovedthemfirst，andBin
　　generalitishardtosaywhetherperchancethesciencewearenow
　　lookingfordealswithperceptiblesubstancesornotwiththem，but
　　withcertainothers。Ifwithothers，itmustdealeitherwiththe
　　Formsorwiththeobjectsofmathematics。Nowaevidentlythe
　　Formsdonotexist。Butitishardtosay，evenifonesupposethem
　　toexist，whyintheworldthesameisnottrueoftheotherthingsof
　　whichthereareForms，asoftheobjectsofmathematics。Imeanthat
　　thesethinkersplacetheobjectsofmathematicsbetweentheForms
　　andperceptiblethings，asakindofthirdsetofthingsapartboth
　　fromtheFormsandfromthethingsinthisworld；butthereisnota
　　thirdmanorhorsebesidestheidealandtheindividuals。Ifonthe
　　otherhanditisnotastheysay，withwhatsortofthingsmustthe
　　mathematicianbesupposedtodeal？Certainlynotwiththethingsin
　　thisworld；fornoneoftheseisthesortofthingwhichthe
　　mathematicalsciencesdemand。Norbdoesthesciencewhichweare
　　nowseekingtreatoftheobjectsofmathematics；fornoneofthem
　　canexistseparately。Butagainitdoesnotdealwithperceptible
　　substances；fortheyareperishable。
　　Ingeneralonemightraisethequestion，towhatkindofscience
　　itbelongstodiscussthedifficultiesaboutthematteroftheobjects
　　ofmathematics。Neithertophysicsbecausethewholeinquiryofthe
　　physicistisaboutthethingsthathaveinthemselvesaprinciple。
　　ofmovementandrest，noryettothesciencewhichinquiresinto
　　demonstrationandscience；forthisisjustthesubjectwhichit
　　investigates。Itremainsthenthatitisthephilosophywhichwe
　　havesetbeforeourselvesthattreatsofthosesubjects。
　　Onemightdiscussthequestionwhetherthescienceweare
　　seekingshouldbesaidtodealwiththeprincipleswhicharebysome
　　calledelements；allmensupposethesetobepresentincomposite
　　things。Butitmightbethoughtthatthescienceweseekshould
　　treatratherofuniversals；foreverydefinitionandeveryscience
　　isofuniversalsandnotofinfimaespecies，sothatasfarasthis
　　goesitwoulddealwiththehighestgenera。Thesewouldturnouttobe
　　beingandunity；forthesemightmostofallbesupposedtocontain
　　allthingsthatare，andtobemostlikeprinciplesbecausetheyare
　　bynature；foriftheyperishallotherthingsaredestroyedwith
　　them；foreverythingisandisone。Butinasmuchas，ifoneisto
　　supposethemtobegenera，theymustbepredicableoftheir
　　differentiae，andnogenusispredicableofanyofitsdifferentiae，
　　inthiswayitwouldseemthatweshouldnotmakethemgeneranor
　　principles。Further，ifthesimplerismoreofaprinciplethanthe
　　lesssimple，andtheultimatemembersofthegenusaresimplerthan
　　thegenerafortheyareindivisible，butthegeneraaredivided
　　intomanyanddifferingspecies，thespeciesmightseemtobethe
　　principles，ratherthanthegenera。Butinasmuchasthespeciesare
　　involvedinthedestructionofthegenera，thegeneraaremorelike
　　principles；forthatwhichinvolvesanotherinitsdestructionisa
　　principleofit。Theseandothersofthekindarethesubjectsthat
　　involvedifficulties。
　　Further，mustwesupposesomethingapartfromindividualthings，
　　orisitthesethatthescienceweareseekingtreatsof？Butthese
　　areinfiniteinnumber。Yetthethingsthatareapartfromthe
　　individualsaregeneraorspecies；butthesciencewenowseek
　　treatsofneitherofthese。Thereasonwhythisisimpossiblehasbeen
　　stated。Indeed，itisingeneralhardtosaywhetheronemustassume
　　thatthereisaseparablesubstancebesidesthesensiblesubstances
　　i。e。thesubstancesinthisworld，orthatthesearetherealthings
　　andWisdomisconcernedwiththem。Forweseemtoseekanotherkindof
　　substance，andthisisourproblem，i。e。toseeifthereis
　　somethingwhichcanexistapartbyitselfandbelongstonosensible
　　thing-Further，ifthereisanothersubstanceapartfromand
　　correspondingtosensiblesubstances，whichkindsofsensible
　　substancemustbesupposedtohavethiscorrespondingtothem？Why
　　shouldonesupposemenorhorsestohaveit，morethaneitherthe
　　otheranimalsorevenalllifelessthings？Ontheotherhandtosetup
　　otherandeternalsubstancesequalinnumbertothesensibleand
　　perishablesubstanceswouldseemtofallbeyondtheboundsof
　　probability-Butiftheprinciplewenowseekisnotseparablefrom
　　corporealthings，whathasabetterclaimtothenamematter？This，
　　however，doesnotexistinactuality，butexistsinpotency。Andit
　　wouldseemratherthattheformorshapeisamoreimportantprinciple
　　thanthis；buttheformisperishable，sothatthereisnoeternal
　　substanceatallwhichcanexistapartandindependent。Butthisis
　　paradoxical；forsuchaprincipleandsubstanceseemstoexistand
　　issoughtbynearlyallthemostrefinedthinkersassomethingthat
　　exists；forhowistheretobeorderunlessthereissomethingeternal
　　andindependentandpermanent？
　　Further，ifthereisasubstanceorprincipleofsuchanature
　　asthatwhichwearenowseeking，andifthisisoneforallthings，
　　andthesameforeternalandforperishablethings，itishardto
　　saywhyintheworld，ifthereisthesameprinciple，someofthe
　　thingsthatfallundertheprincipleareeternal，andothersarenot
　　eternal；thisisparadoxical。Butifthereisoneprincipleof
　　perishableandanotherofeternalthings，weshallbeinalike
　　difficultyiftheprincipleofperishablethings，aswellasthatof
　　eternal，iseternal；forwhy，iftheprincipleiseternal，arenotthe
　　thingsthatfallundertheprinciplealsoeternal？Butifitis
　　perishableanotherprincipleisinvolvedtoaccountforit，and
　　anothertoaccountforthat，andthiswillgoontoinfinity。
　　Ifontheotherhandwearetosetupwhatarethoughttobethe
　　mostunchangeableprinciples，beingandunity，firstly，ifeachof
　　thesedoesnotindicatea’this’orsubstance，howwilltheybe
　　separableandindependent？Yetweexpecttheeternalandprimary
　　principlestobeso。Butifeachofthemdoessignifya’this’or
　　substance，allthingsthatarearesubstances；forbeingispredicated
　　ofallthingsandunityalsoofsome；butthatallthingsthatare
　　aresubstanceisfalse。Further，howcantheyberightwhosaythat
　　thefirstprincipleisunityandthisissubstance，andgenerate
　　numberasthefirstproductfromunityandfrommatter，assertthat
　　numberissubstance？Howarewetothinkof’two’，andeachofthe
　　othernumberscomposedofunits，asone？Onthispointneitherdothey
　　sayanythingnorisiteasytosayanything。Butifweareto
　　supposelinesorwhatcomesaftertheseImeantheprimary
　　surfacestobeprinciples，theseatleastarenotseparable
　　substances，butsectionsanddivisions-theformerofsurfaces，the
　　latterofbodieswhilepointsaresectionsanddivisionsoflines；
　　andfurthertheyarelimitsofthesesamethings；andallthesearein
　　otherthingsandnoneisseparable。Further，howarewetosuppose
　　thatthereisasubstanceofunityandthepoint？Everysubstance
　　comesintobeingbyagradualprocess，butapointdoesnot；forthe
　　pointisadivision。