Somethingsareonlyactually,somepotentially,some
potentiallyandactually,whattheyare,viz。inonecaseaparticular
reality,inanother,characterizedbyaparticularquantity,orthe
like。Thereisnomovementapartfromthings;forchangeisalways
accordingtothecategoriesofbeing,andthereisnothingcommonto
theseandinnoonecategory。Buteachofthecategoriesbelongsto
allitssubjectsineitheroftwowayse。g。’this-ness’-forone
kindofitis’positiveform’,andtheotheris’privation’;andas
regardsqualityonekindis’white’andtheother’black’,andas
regardsquantityonekindis’complete’andtheother’incomplete’,
andasregardsspatialmovementoneis’upwards’andtheother
’downwards’,oronethingis’light’andanother’heavy’;sothat
thereareasmanykindsofmovementandchangeasofbeing。There
beingadistinctionineachclassofthingsbetweenthepotential
andthecompletelyreal,Icalltheactualityofthepotentialas
such,movement。Thatwhatwesayistrue,isplainfromthe
followingfacts。Whenthe’buildable’,insofarasitiswhatwemean
by’buildable’,existsactually,itisbeingbuilt,andthisisthe
processofbuilding。Similarlywithlearning,healing,walking,
leaping,ageing,ripening。Movementtakeswhenthecompletereality
itselfexists,andneitherearliernorlater。Thecompletereality,
then,ofthatwhichexistspotentially,whenitiscompletelyrealand
actual,notquaitself,butquamovable,ismovement。ByquaImean
this:bronzeispotentiallyastatue;butyetitisnotthecomplete
realityofbronzequabronzethatismovement。Foritisnotthe
samethingtobebronzeandtobeacertainpotency。Ifitwere
absolutelythesameinitsdefinition,thecompleterealityof
bronzewouldhavebeenamovement。Butitisnotthesame。Thisis
evidentinthecaseofcontraries;fortobecapableofbeingwelland
tobecapableofbeingillarenotthesame-foriftheywere,being
wellandbeingillwouldhavebeenthesame-itisthatwhichunderlies
andishealthyordiseased,whetheritismoistureorblood,thatis
oneandthesame。Andsinceitisnot。thesame,ascolourandthe
visiblearenotthesame,itisthecompleterealityofthepotential,
andaspotential,thatismovement。Thatitisthis,andthatmovement
takesplacewhenthecompleterealityitselfexists,andneither
earliernorlater,isevident。Foreachthingiscapableofbeing
sometimesactual,sometimesnot,e。g。thebuildablequabuildable;and
theactualityofthebuildablequabuildableisbuilding。Forthe
actualityiseitherthis-theactofbuilding-orthehouse。Butwhen
thehouseexists,itisnolongerbuildable;thebuildableiswhat
isbeingbuilt。Theactuality,then,mustbetheactofbuilding,
andthisisamovement。Andthesameaccountappliestoallother
movements。
Thatwhatwehavesaidisrightisevidentfromwhatallothers
sayaboutmovement,andfromthefactthatitisnoteasytodefineit
otherwise。Forfirstlyonecannotputitinanyclass。Thisisevident
fromwhatpeoplesay。Somecallitothernessandinequalityandthe
unreal;noneofthese,however,isnecessarilymoved,andfurther,
changeisnoteithertotheseorfromtheseanymorethanfromtheir
opposites。Thereasonwhypeopleputmovementintheseclassesisthat
itisthoughttobesomethingindefinite,andtheprinciplesinoneof
thetwo’columnsofcontraries’areindefinitebecausetheyare
privative,fornoneofthemiseithera’this’ora’such’orinany
oftheothercategories。Andthereasonwhymovementisthoughtto
beindefiniteisthatitcannotbeclassedeitherwiththepotency
ofthingsorwiththeiractuality;forneitherthatwhichiscapable
ofbeingofacertainquantity,northatwhichisactuallyofa
certainquantity,isofnecessitymoved,andmovementisthoughttobe
anactuality,butincomplete;thereasonisthatthepotential,
whoseactualityitis,isincomplete。Andthereforeitishardto
graspwhatmovementis;foritmustbeclassedeitherunder
privationorunderpotencyorunderabsoluteactuality,but
evidentlynoneoftheseispossible。Thereforewhatremainsisthatit
mustbewhatwesaid-bothactualityandtheactualitywehave
described-whichishardtodetectbutcapableofexisting。
Andevidentlymovementisinthemovable;foritisthecomplete
realizationofthisbythatwhichiscapableofcausingmovement。
Andtheactualityofthatwhichiscapableofcausingmovementisno
otherthanthatofthemovable。Foritmustbethecompleterealityof
both。Forwhileathingiscapableofcausingmovementbecauseit
candothis,itisamoverbecauseitisactive;butitisonthe
movablethatitiscapableofacting,sothattheactualityofbothis
one,justasthereisthesameintervalfromonetotwoasfromtwoto
one,andasthesteepascentandthesteepdescentareone,butthe
beingofthemisnotone;thecaseofthemoverandthemovedis
similar。
Theinfiniteiseitherthatwhichisincapableofbeing
traversedbecauseitisnotitsnaturetobetraversedthis
correspondstothesenseinwhichthevoiceis’invisible’,orthat
whichadmitsonlyofincompletetraverseorscarcelyadmitsof
traverse,orthatwhich,thoughitnaturallyadmitsoftraverse,is
nottraversedorlimited;further,athingmaybeinfinitein
respectofadditionorofsubtraction,orboth。Theinfinitecannotbe
aseparate,independentthing。Forifitisneitheraspatial
magnitudenoraplurality,butinfinityitselfisitssubstanceand
notanaccidentofit,itwillbeindivisible;forthedivisibleis
eithermagnitudeorplurality。Butifindivisible,itisnotinfinite,
exceptasthevoiceisinvisible;butpeopledonotmeanthis,norare
weexaminingthissortofinfinite,buttheinfiniteasuntraversable。
Further,howcananinfiniteexistbyitself,unlessnumberand
magnitudealsoexistbythemselvess-sinceinfinityisanattribute
ofthese?Further,iftheinfiniteisanaccidentofsomethingelse,
itcannotbequainfiniteanelementinthings,astheinvisibleis
notanelementinspeech,thoughthevoiceisinvisible。Andevidently
theinfinitecannotexistactually。Forthenanypartofitthatmight
betakenwouldbeinfinitefor’tobeinfinite’and’theinfinite’
arethesame,iftheinfiniteissubstanceandnotpredicatedofa
subject。Thereforeitiseitherindivisible,orifitispartible,it
isdivisibleintoinfinites;butthesamethingcannotbemany
infinitesasapartofairisair,soapartoftheinfinitewouldbe
infinite,iftheinfiniteissubstanceandaprinciple。Therefore
itmustbeimpartibleandindivisible。Buttheactuallyinfinite
cannotbeindivisible;foritmustbeofacertainquantity。Therefore
infinitybelongstoitssubjectincidentally。Butifso,thenaswe
havesaiditcannotbeitthatisaprinciple,butthatofwhichit
isanaccident-theairortheevennumber。
Thisinquiryisuniversal;butthattheinfiniteisnotamong
sensiblethings,isevidentfromthefollowingargument。Ifthe
definitionofabodyis’thatwhichisboundedbyplanes’,there
cannotbeaninfinitebodyeithersensibleorintelligible;nora
separateandinfinitenumber,fornumberorthatwhichhasanumberis
numerable。Concretely,thetruthisevidentfromthefollowing
argument。Theinfinitecanneitherbecompositenorsimple。Forait
cannotbeacompositebody,sincetheelementsarelimitedin
multitude。Forthecontrariesmustbeequalandnooneofthemmustbe
infinite;forifoneofthetwobodiesfallsatallshortoftheother
inpotency,thefinitewillbedestroyedbytheinfinite。Andthat
eachshouldbeinfiniteisimpossible。Forbodyisthatwhichhas
extensioninalldirections,andtheinfiniteistheboundlessly
extended,sothatiftheinfiniteisabodyitwillbeinfinitein
everydirection。Norbcantheinfinitebodybeoneand
simple-neither,assomesay,somethingapartfromtheelements,from
whichtheygeneratetheseforthereisnosuchbodyapartfromthe
elements;foreverythingcanberesolvedintothatofwhichit
consists,butnosuchproductofanalysisisobservedexceptthe
simplebodies,norfirenoranyotheroftheelements。Forapartfrom
thequestionhowanyofthemcouldbeinfinite,theAll,evenifitis
finite,cannoteitherbeorbecomeanyoneofthem,asHeraclitussays
allthingssometimebecomefire。Thesameargumentappliestothis
astotheOnewhichthenaturalphilosopherspositbesidesthe
elements。Foreverythingchangesfromcontrarytocontrary,e。g。
fromhottocold。
Further,asensiblebodyissomewhere,andwholeandparthavethe
sameproperplace,e。g。thewholeearthandpartoftheearth。
Thereforeifatheinfinitebodyishomogeneous,itwillbe
unmovableoritwillbealwaysmoving。Butthisisimpossible;forwhy
shoulditratherrest,ormove,down,up,oranywhere,ratherthan
anywhereelse?E。g。iftherewereaclodwhichwerepartofan
infinitebody,wherewillthismoveorrest?Theproperplaceofthe
bodywhichishomogeneouswithitisinfinite。Willtheclodoccupy
thewholeplace,then?Andhow?Thisisimpossible。Whatthenisits
restoritsmovement?Itwilleitherresteverywhere,andthenit
cannotmove;oritwillmoveeverywhere,andthenitcannotbe
still。ButbiftheAllhasunlikeparts,theproperplacesofthe
partsareunlikealso,and,firstly,thebodyoftheAllisnotone
exceptbycontact,and,secondly,thepartswillbeeitherfiniteor
infiniteinvarietyofkind。Finitetheycannotbe;forthenthose
ofonekindwillbeinfiniteinquantityandthoseofanotherwillnot
iftheAllisinfinite,e。g。fireorwaterwouldbeinfinite,but
suchaninfiniteelementwouldbedestructiontothecontrary
elements。Butifthepartsareinfiniteandsimple,theirplaces
alsoareinfiniteandtherewillbeaninfinitenumberofelements;
andifthisisimpossible,andtheplacesarefinite,theAllalso
mustbelimited。
Ingeneral,therecannotbeaninfinitebodyandalsoaproper
placeforbodies,ifeverysensiblebodyhaseitherweightor
lightness。Foritmustmoveeithertowardsthemiddleorupwards,
andtheinfiniteeitherthewholeorthehalfofit-cannotdo
either;forhowwillyoudivideit?Orhowwillpartoftheinfinite
bedownandpartup,orpartextremeandpartmiddle?Further,every
sensiblebodyisinaplace,andtherearesixkindsofplace,but
thesecannotexistinaninfinitebody。Ingeneral,iftherecannotbe
aninfiniteplace,therecannotbeaninfinitebody;andtherecannot
beaninfiniteplace,forthatwhichisinaplaceissomewhere,
andthismeanseitherupordownorinoneoftheotherdirections,
andeachoftheseisalimit。
Theinfiniteisnotthesameinthesensethatitisasingle
thingwhetherexhibitedindistanceorinmovementorintime,butthe
posterioramongtheseiscalledinfiniteinvirtueofitsrelation
totheprior;i。e。amovementiscalledinfiniteinvirtueofthe
distancecoveredbythespatialmovementoralterationorgrowth,
andatimeiscalledinfinitebecauseofthemovementwhichoccupies
it。