Thepsychologicalobservationsonwhichmyargumentisbasedwillnotperhapsbedirectlycontroverted，atleasttosuchanextentastoinvolvemymainconclusion:buttherearetwolinesofreasoningbywhichithasbeenattemptedtoweakentheforceofthisconclusionwithoutdirectlydenyingit。Inthefirstplace，itisurgedthatPleasure，thoughnottheonlyconsciousaimofhumanaction，isyetalwaystheresulttowhichitisunconsciouslydirected。Thepropositionwouldbedifficulttodisprove；sincenoonedeniesthatpleasureinsomedegreenormallyaccompaniestheattainmentofadesiredend:andwhenoncewegobeyondthetestimonyofconsciousnessthereseemstobenoclearmethodofdeterminingwhichamongtheconsequencesofanyactionistheendatwhichitisaimed。Forthesamereason，however，thepropositionisatanyrateequallydifficulttoprove。ButIshouldgofurther，andmaintainthatifweseriouslysetourselvestoconsiderhumanactiononitsunconsciousside，wecanonlyconceiveitasacombinationofmovementsofthepartsofamaterialorganism:andthatifwetrytoascertainwhatthe`end’inanycaseofsuchmovementsis，itisreasonabletoconcludethatitissomematerialresult，someorganicconditionconducivetothepreservationeitheroftheindividualorganismoroftheracetowhichitbelongs。Infact，thedoctrinethatpleasureortheabsenceofpain
　　istheendofallhumanactioncanneitherbesupportedbytheresultsofintrospection，norbytheresultsofexternalobservationandinference:
　　itratherseemstobereachedbyanarbitraryandillegitimatecombinationofthetwo。
　　Butagain，itissometimessaidthatwhateverbethecasewithourpresentadultconsciousness，ouroriginalimpulseswerealldirectedtowardspleasureorfrompain，andthatanyimpulsesotherwisedirectedarederivedfromtheseby``associationofideas’’。Icanfindnoevidencethateventendstoprovethis:sofaraswecanobservetheconsciousnessofchildren，thetwoelements，extra-regardingimpulseanddesireforpleasure，seemtocoexistinthesamemannerastheydoinmaturelife。Insofarasthereisanydifference，itseemstobeintheoppositedirection；astheactionsofchildren，beingmoreinstinctiveandlessreflective，aremorepromptedbyextra-regardingimpulse，andlessbyconsciousaimatpleasure。Nodoubtthetwokindsofimpulse，aswetracebackthedevelopmentofconsciousness，graduallybecomeindistinguishable:
　　butthisobviouslydoesnotjustifyusinidentifyingwitheitherofthetwothemoreindefiniteimpulseoutofwhichbothhavebeendeveloped。
　　Butevensupposingitwerefoundthatourearliestappetiteswereallmerelyappetitesforpleasure，itwouldhavelittlebearingonthepresentquestion。
　　WhatIamconcernedtomaintainisthatmendonotnownormallydesirepleasurealone，buttoanimportantextentotherthingsalso:someinparticularhavingimpulsestowardsvirtue，whichmayanddoconflictwiththeirconsciousdesirefortheirownpleasure。Tosayinanswertothisthatallmenoncedesiredpleasureis，fromanethicalpointofview，irrelevant:exceptontheassumptionthatthereisanoriginaltypeofman’sappetitivenature，towhich，assuch，itisrightorbestforhimtoconform。ButprobablynoHedonistwouldexpresslymaintainthis；
　　thoughsuchanassumption，nodoubt，isfrequentlymadebywritersoftheIntuitionalschool。{Note}
　　SomepsychologistsregardDesireasessentiallypainful。Thisviewseemstomeerroneous，accordingtotheordinaryuseoftheterm:andthoughitdoesnotnecessarilyinvolvetheconfusion-againstwhichIamchieflyconcernedtoguardinthepresentchapter-betweenthevolitionalstimulusofdesireitselfandthevolitionalstimulusofaversiontodesireaspainful，ithassometendencytocausethisconfusion。Itmaythereforebeworthwhiletopointoutthatthedifferenceofopinionbetweenmyselfandthepsychologistsinquestion——ofwhomI
　　selectDr。Bainasaleadingexample——dependslargely，thoughnotentirely，onadifferenceofdefinition。Inchap。viii。oftheseconddivisionofhisbookonTheEmotionsandtheWill，Dr。BaindefinesDesireas``thatphaseofvolitionwherethereisamotiveandnotabilitytoactonit’’，andgivesthefollowingillustration:——
　　``Theinmateofasmallgloomychamberconceivestohimselfthepleasureoflightandofanexpandedprospect:theunsatisfyingidealurgestheappropriateactionforgainingthereality；hegetsupandwalksout。Supposenowthatthesameidealdelightcomesintothemindofaprisoner。Unabletofulfiltheprompting，heremainsunderthesolicitationofthemotive:
　　andhisstateisdenominatedcraving，longing，appetite，desire。Ifallmotiveimpulsescouldbeatoncefollowedup，desirewouldhavenoplace？thereisabarinthewayofactingwhichleadstothestateofconflictandrendersdesireamoreorlesspainfulstateofmind。’’
　　NowIagreethatDesireismostfrequentlypainfulinsomedegreewhenthepersondesiringisinhibitedfromactingfortheattainmentofthedesiredobject。Idonotindeedthinkthatevenunderthesecircumstancesitisalwayspainful，especiallywhenitisaccompaniedwithhope。Takethesimplecaseofhunger。Ordinarily，whenIamlookingforwardtodinnerwithagoodappetite，IdonotfindhungerpainfulunlessIhavefastedunusuallylong——althoughcustomandaregardformydigestionpreventmefromsatisfyingtheappetitetillthesoupisserved。StillIadmitthatwhenactiontendingtofruitionisexcluded，desireisveryliabletobepainful。
　　Butitissurelycontrarytousagetorestricttheterm。Desiretothiscase。SupposeDr。Bain’sprisonerbecomespossessedofafile，andseeshiswaytogettingoutofprisonbyalongprocess，whichwillinvolve，amongotheroperations，thefilingofcertainbars。Itwouldsurelyseemabsurdtosaythathisdesirefinallyceaseswhentheoperationoffilingbegins，Nodoubttheconcentrationofattentiononthecomplexactivitiesnecessaryfortheattainmentoffreedomislikelytocausetheprisonertobesoabsorbedbyotherideasandfeelingsthatthedesireoffreedommaytemporarilyceasetobepresentinhisconsciousness。Butasthestimulusonwhichhiswholeactivityultimatelydependsiscertainlyderivedfromtheunrealisedideaoffreedom，thisidea，withtheconcomitantfeelingofdesire，willnormallyrecuratbriefintervalsduringtheprocess。Similarlyinothercases，whileitisquitetruethatmenoftenworkforadesiredendwithoutconsciouslyfeelingdesirefortheend，itwouldbeabsurdtosaythattheyneverfeeldesirewhilesoworking:atanyratethisrestricteduseofthetermhasnever，Ithink，beenadaptedbyethicalwritersintreatingofDesire。AndinsomepassagesDr。Bainhimselfseemstoadoptawidermeaning。Hesays，forinstance，inthechapterfromwhichIhavequoted，that``wehaveaformofdesire？whenweareworkingfordistantends’’。If，then，itbeallowedthatthefeelingofDesireisatanyratesometimesanelementofconsciousnesscoexistingwithaprocessofactivitydirectedtotheattainmentofthedesiredobject，orinterveninginthebriefpausesofsuchaprocess，Iventuretothinkthatwhenthefeelingisobservedundertheseconditions，itwillnotbefoundinaccordancewiththecommonexperienceofmankindtodescribeitasessentiallypainful。
　　Take，asasimpleinstance，thecaseofagameinvolvingbodilyexerciseandacontestofskill。Probablymanypersonswhotakepartinsuchexercisesforsanitaryorsocialpurposesbeginwithoutanyperceptibledesiretowinthegame:andprobablyaslongastheyremainthusindifferenttheexerciseisrathertedious。Usually，however，aconsciousdesiretowinthegameisexcited，asaconsequenceofactionsdirectedtowardsthisend:and——inmyexperienceatleast——inproportionasthefeelinggrowsstrong，thewholeprocessbecomesmorepleasurable。Ifthisbeadmittedtobeanormalexperience，itmustsurelybealsoadmittedthatDesireinthiscaseisafeelinginwhichintrospectiondoesnotenableustodetecttheslightestqualityofpain。
　　Itwouldbeeasytogiveanindefinitenumberofsimilarinstancesofenergeticactivitycarriedonforanend——whetherinsportorintheseriousbusinessoflife——whereakeendesirefortheattainmentoftheendinviewisindispensabletoarealenjoymentofthelabourrequiredtoattain，andwhereatthesametimewecannotdetectanypainfulnessinthedesire，howevermuchwetrytoseparateitinintrospectiveanalysisfromitsconcomitantfeeling。
　　TheerrorthatIamtryingtoremoveseemstomepartlyduetooverlookingthesecases，andcontemplatingexclusivelycasesinwhichDesireisforsomereasonorotherpreventedfromhavingitsnormaleffectinstimulatingactivitydirectedtotheattainmentofthedesiredobject。Partly，however，itseemstobeduetotheresemblancebetweenDesireandPain，towhichIhavedrawnattentioninthetextofthischapter，i。e。theunrestfulnesswhichisundoubtedlyacharacteristicofthestateofdesire，and——ordinarily——ofpain。Forthecharacteristicof``unrestfulness’’requiressomecaretodistinguishitfrom``uneasiness’’，inthesenseinwhichthislattertermsignifiessomedegreeofpainfulness。Themistakeisconnectedwiththeequallyerroneousview——whichHobbescontrovertsinhisusualforciblestyle——that``theFelicityofthislifeconsistethinthereposeofamindsatisfied’’；andithasalsosomeaffinitywiththewidespreadview——whichhasleftitsmarkonmorethanoneEuropeanlanguage——thatlabour，strenuousactivity，isessentiallypainful。Onboththesepoints，itoughttobesaid，thereisdoubtlessconsiderabledivergencebetweentheexperiencesofdifferentindividuals:butatanyrateamongEnglishmenIconceivethatapersonwhofindsdesirealwayspainful——inthesenseinwhich，asI
　　havetriedtoshow，thewordiscommonlyusedbothbymoralistsandinordinarydiscourse——isasexceptionalabeingasonewhofindslabouralwayspainful。
　　IntheprecedingchaptersIhavetreatedfirstofrational，andsecondlyofdisinterestedaction，withoutintroducingthevexedquestionoftheFreedomoftheWill。Thedifficultiesconnectedwiththisquestionhavebeenprovedbylongdialecticalexperiencetobesogreat，thatIanianxioustoconfinethemwithinasstrictlimitsasIcan。，andkeepasmuchofmysubjectaspossiblefreefromtheirperturbinginfluence。AnditappearstomethatwehavenopsychologicalwarrantforidentifyingDisinterestedwitheither``Free’’or``Rational’’action；whiletoidentifyRationalandFreeactionisatleastmisleading，andtendstoobscuretherealissueraisedintheFreeWillcontroversy。InthelastchapterIhavetriedtoshowthatactionstrictlydisinterested，thatis，disregardfulofforeseenbalanceofpleasuretoourselves，isfoundinthemostinstinctiveaswellasinthemostdeliberateandself-consciousregionofourvolitionalexperience。
　　Andrationalaction，asIconceive。it，remainsrational，howevercompletelytherationalityofanyindividual’sconductmaybedeterminedbycausesantecedentorexternaltohisownvolition:sothattheconceptionofactingrationally，asexplainedinthelastchapterbutone，isnotboundupwiththenotionofacting`freely’，asmaintainedbyLibertariansgenerallyagainstDeterminists。Isay``Libertariansgenerally’’，becauseinthestatementsmadebydisciplesofKantastotheconnexionofFreedomandRationality，thereappearstometobeaconfusionbetweentwomeaningsofthetermFreedom，whichrequiretobecarefullydistinguishedinanydiscussionofFreeWill。WhenadiscipleofKantsaysthataman``isafreeagentinsofarasheactsundertheguidanceofreason’’，thestatementeasilywinsassentfromordinaryreaders；since，asWhewellsays，weordinarily``considerourReasonasbeingourselvesratherthanourdesiresandaffections。
　　WespeakofDesire，Love，Anger，asmasteringus，orofourselvesascontrollingthem。Ifwedecidetoprefersomeremoteandabstractgoodtoimmediatepleasures，ortoconformtoarulewhichbringsuspresentpainwhichdecisionimpliesexerciseofReason，wemoreparticularlyconsidersuchactsasourownacts。’’[2]Idonot，therefore，objectonthescoreofusagetothisapplicationoftheterm``free’’todenotevoluntaryactionsinwhichtheseductivesolicitationofappetiteorpassionaresuccessfullyresisted:andIamsensibleofthegainineffectivenessofmoralpersuasionwhichisobtainedbythusenlistingthepowerfulsentimentofLibertyonthesideofReasonandMorality。Butitisclearthatifwesaythatamanisa``free’’agentinsofarasheactsrationally，wecannotalsosay——inthesamesense——thatitisbyhisown``free’’
　　choicethatheactsirrationally，whenhedoessoact；anditisthislatterpropositionwhichLibertariansgenerallyhavebeenconcernedtomaintain。
　　Theyhavethoughtitoffundamentalimportancetoshowthe`Freedom’ofthemoralagent，onaccountoftheconnexionthattheyhaveheldtoexistbetweenFreedomandMoralResponsibility:anditisobviousthattheFreedomthusconnectedwithResponsibilityisnottheFreedomthatisonlymanifestedorrealisedinrationalaction，buttheFreedomtochoosebetweenrightandwrongwhichismanifestedorrealisedequallyineitherchoice。NowitisimpliedintheChristianconsciousnessof``wilfulsin’’thatmendodeliberatelyandknowinglychoosetoactirrationally。Theydonotmerelypreferself-interesttodutyforhereisratheraconflictofclaimstorationalitythanclearirrationality；bute。g。sensualindulgencetohealth，revengetoreputation，etc。，thoughtheyknowthatsuchpreferenceisopposedtotheirtrueinterestsnolessthantotheirduty。Henceitdoesnotreallycorrespondtoourexperienceasawholetorepresenttheconflictbetweenreasonandpassionasaconflictbetween`ourselves’ontheonehandandaforceofnatureontheother。Wemaysay，ifwelike，thatwhenweyieldtopassion，webecome`theslavesofourdesiresandappetites’:butwemustatthesametimeadmitthatourslaveryisself-chosen。
　　Canwesay，then，ofthewilfulwrongdoerthathiswrongchoicewas`free’，inthesensethathemighthavechosenrightly，notmerelyiftheantecedentsofhisvolition，externalandinternal，hadbeendifferent，butsupposingtheseantecedentsunchanged？This，Iconceive，isthesubstantialissueraisedintheFreeWillcontroversy；whichInowproposebrieflytoconsider:
　　sinceitiswidelybelievedtobeofgreatEthicalimportance。