WisdomwasalwaysplacedbytheGreekphilosophersfirstinthelistofvirtues，andregardedasinamannercomprehendingalltheothers:infactinthepost-AristotelianschoolsthenotionoftheSageorideallyWisemansophoswasregularlyemployedtoexhibitinaconcreteformtherulesoflifelaiddownbyeachsystem。IncommonGreekusage，however，thetermjustmentionedwouldsignifyexcellenceinpurelyspeculativescience，nolessthanpracticalwisdom:andtheEnglishtermWisdomhas，tosomeextent，thesameambiguity。
　　Itis，however，chieflyusedinreferencetopractice:andevenwhenappliedtotheregionofpurespeculationsuggestsespeciallysuchintellectualgiftsandhabitsasleadtosoundpracticalconclusions:namely，comprehensivenessofview，thehabitofattendingimpartiallytoanumberofdiverseconsiderationsdifficulttoestimateexactly，andgoodjudgmentastotherelativeimportanceofeach。Atanyrate，itisonlyPracticalWisdomwhichwecommonlyclassamongVirtues，asdistinguishedfrompurelyintellectualexcellences。HowthenshallwedefinePracticalWisdom？Themostobviouspartofitsmeaningisatendencytodiscern，intheconductoflifegenerally，thebestmeanstotheattainmentofanyendsthatthenaturalplayofhumanmotivesmayleadustoseek。ascontrastedwithtechnicalskill，orthefacultyofselectingthebestmeanstogivenendsinacertainlimitedandspecialdepartmentofhumanaction。Suchskillinthespecialartsispartlycommunicablebymeansofdefiniterules，andpartlyamatteroftactorinstinct，dependingsomewhatonnaturalgiftsandpredispositions，buttoagreatextentacquiredbyexerciseandimitation；andsimilarlypracticalWisdom，ifunderstoodtobeSkillintheArtofLife，wouldinvolveacertainamountofscientificknowledge，theportionsofdifferentsciencesbearingdirectlyonhumanaction，togetherwithempiricalrulesrelatingtothesamesubject-matter；
　　andalsothetactortrainedinstinctjustmentioned，whichwouldevenbemoreprominenthere，onaccountoftheextremecomplexityofthesubject-matter。
　　Butitdoesnotappearfromthisanalysiswhythisskillshouldberegardedasavirtue:andreflectionwillshowthatwedonotordinarilymeanbywisdommerelythefacultyoffindingthebestmeanstoanyends:forweshouldnotcallthemostaccomplishedswindlerwise；whereasweshouldnothesitatetoattributetohimcleverness，ingenuity，andotherpurelyintellectualexcellences。Soagainweapplytheterm``worldly-wise’’toamanwhoskilfullychoosesthebestmeanstotheendofambition；butweshouldnotcallsuchaman`wise’withoutqualification。Wisdom，inshort，appearstometoimplyrightjudgmentinrespectofendsaswellasmeans。
　　Here，however，asubtlequestionarises。Fortheassumptiononwhichthistreatiseproceedsisthatthereareseveralultimateendsofaction，whichallclaimtoberationalends，suchaseverymanoughttoadopt。Hence，ifWisdomimpliesrightjudgmentastoends，itisclearthatapersonwhoregardssomeoneendasthesolerightorrationalultimateendwillnotconsideramanwisewhoadoptsanyotherultimateend。CanwesaythenthatinthecommonuseofthewordWisdomanyoneultimateendisdistinctlyimpliedtotheexclusionofothers？Itmaybesuggested，perhaps，thatinthemoralviewofCommonSensewhichwearenowtryingtomakeclear，sinceWisdomitselfisprescribedorcommendedasaqualityofconductintuitivelydiscernedtoberightorgood，theultimateendwhichthewisemanprefersmustbejustthisattainmentofrightnessorgoodnessinconductgenerally；ratherthanpleasureforhimselforothers，oranyotherulteriorend。Ithink，however，thatinthecaseofthisnotionitisimpossibletocarryoutthatanalysisofordinarypracticalreasoningintoseveraldistinctmethods，eachadmittingandneedingseparatedevelopment，uponwhichtheplanofthistreatiseisfounded。
　　For，aswesaw，itischaracteristicofCommonSensetoassumecoincidenceorharmonyamongthesedifferentcompetingmethods。Andhence，whileasregardsmostparticularvirtuesandduties，theexerciseofmoraljudgmentinordinarymenisprimafacieindependentofhedonisticcalculations，andoccasionallyinapparentconflictwiththeirresults，——sothatthereconciliationofthedifferentprocedurespresentsitselfasaproblemtobesolved——inthecomprehensivenotionofWisdomtheantagonismislatent。CommonSenseseemstomeanbyaWiseman，amanwhoattainsatonceallthedifferentrationalends；whobyconductinperfectconformitywiththetruemoralcodeattainsthegreatesthappinesspossiblebothforhimselfandformankindorthatportionofmankindtowhichhiseffortsarenecessarilyrestricted。Butifwefindthisharmonyunattainable，——if，forexample，RationalEgoismseemstoleadtoconductopposedtothetrueinterestsofmankindingeneral，andweaskwhetherwearetocallWisethemanwhoseeks，orhimwhosacrifices，hisprivateinterests，——CommonSensegivesnoclearreply。
　　LetusnowreturntothequestionwhetherWisdom，asexhibitedinrightjudgmentastoends，isinanydegreeattainableatwill，andso，accordingtoourdefinition，aVirtue。Atfirstsight，theperceptionoftherightendmayseemnottobevoluntaryanymorethanthecognitionofanyotherkindoftruth；andthoughinmostcasestheattainmentoftruthrequiresvoluntaryeffort，stillwedonotgenerallythinkitpossibleforanyman，bythisalone，toattainevenapproximatelytherightsolutionofadifficultintellectualproblem。Itisoftensaid，however，thatthecognitionofMoraltruthdependslargelyuponthe’heart’，thatis，uponacertainconditionofourdesiresandotheremotions:anditwouldseemtobeonthisviewthatWisdomisregardedasaVirtue；andwemayadmititassuch，accordingtothedefinitionbeforegiven，sofarasthisconditionoffeelingisattainableatwill。Still，oncloserscrutiny，therehardlyseemstobeagreementastotherightemotionalconditionsofthecognitionofends:assomewouldsaythatprayerorardentaspirationproducedthemostfavour。ablestate，whileotherswouldurgethatemotionalexcitementislikelytoperturbthejudgment，andwouldsaythatweneedforrightapprehensionrathertranquillityoffeeling:andsomewouldcontendthatacompletesuppressionofselfishimpulseswastheessentialcondition，whileotherswouldregardthisaschimericalandimpossible，or，ifpossible，aplainmisdirectionofeffort。OnthesepointswecannotdecideinthenameofCommonSense:butitwouldbegenerallyagreedthattherearecertainviolentpassionsandsensualappetiteswhichareknowntobeliabletopervertmoralapprehensions，andthatthesearetosomeextentunderthecontroloftheWill；sothatamanwhoexercisesmoraleffort“toresisttheirinfluence，whenhewishestodecideonendsofaction，maybesaidtobesofarvoluntarilywise。
　　AndthisappliestosomeextenteventothatotherfunctionofWisdom，firstdiscussed，whichconsistsintheselectionofthebestmeanstotheattainmentofgivenends。Forexperienceseemstoshowthatourinsightinpracticalmattersisliabletobepervertedbydesireandfear，andthatthisperversionmaybepreventedbyaneffortofself-control:sothatunwisdom，evenhere，isatleastnotaltogetherinvoluntary。Thusinadisputewhichmayleadtoaquarrel，Imaybeentirelyunabletoshowforesightandskillinmaintainingmyrightinsuchamannerastoavoidneedlessexasperation，andsofarmaybeunabletoconductthedisputewisely:butitisalwaysinmypower，beforetakingeachimportantstep，toreducetheinfluenceofangerorwoundedamourpropreonmydecisions，andImayavoidmuchunwisdominthisway。Anditistobeobservedthatvolitionhasamoreimportantparttoplayindevelopingorprotectingourinsightintotherightconductoflife，thanithasinrespectofthetechnicalskilltowhichwecomparedPracticalWisdom；inproportionasthereasoningsinwhichPracticalWisdomisexhibitedarelessclearandexact，andtheconclusionsinevitablymoreuncertain。Fordesireandfearcouldhardlymakeonegowronginanarithmeticalcalculation；
　　butinestimatingabalanceofcomplicatedpracticalprobabilitiesitismoredifficulttoresisttheinfluenceofstronginclination:anditwouldseemtobeamoreorlessdefiniteconsciousnessofthecontinualneedofsuchresistance，whichleadsustoregardWisdomasaVirtue。
　　WemaysaythenthatPracticalWisdom，sofarasitisavirtue，involvesahabitofresistancetodesiresandfearswhichiscommonlydistinguishedasSelf-control。Butsupposeamanhasdeterminedwithfullinsightthecourseofconductthatitisreasonableforhimtoadoptunderanygivencircumstances，thequestionstillremainswhetherhewillcertainlyadoptit。NowIhardlythinkthatCommonSenseconsidersthechoice，asdistinctfromthecognition，ofrightendstobelongtoWisdom；andyetweshouldscarcelycallamanwisewhodeliberatelychosetodowhatheknewtobecontrarytoreason。
　　Thetruthseemstobethatthenotionofsuchachoice，thoughthemodernmindadmitsitaspossible，issomewhatunfamiliarincomparisonwitheither1impulsiveirrationality，or2mistakenchoiceofbadforgood。Inthelastcase，ifthemistakeisentirelyinvoluntary，thechoicehas，ofcourse，nosubjectivewrongness:often，however，themistakenconclusioniscausedbyapervertinginfluenceofdesireorfearofwhichtheagentisobscurelyconscious，andwhichmightberesistedanddispelledbyaneffortofwill。Assocaused，themistakefallsundertheheadofculpableunwisdom，duetowantofself-controlsimilarinkind——thoughnotindegree——tothatwhichisexhibitedintherarerphenomenonofamandeliberatelychoosingtodowhatheknowstobebadforhim。
　　Thecaseofimpulsivewrongdoingissomewhatdifferent。
　　Itisclearthataresolutionmadeafterdeliberation，inaccordancewithourviewofwhatisright，shouldnotbeabandonedormodifiedexceptdeliberately——atleastiftimeforfreshdeliberationbeallowed——:andtheself-controlrequiredtoresistimpulsespromptingtosuchabandonmentormodificationwhichwemayperhapscallFirmness，——isanindispensableauxiliarytoWisdom。Butthegustsofimpulsethatthevaryingoccasionsoflifearousesometimestakeeffectsorapidlythattheresolutiontowhichtheyruncounterisnotactuallyrecalledatthetime:andinthiscasetheself-controlorfirmnessrequiredtopreventunreasonableactionseemstobenotattainableatwill，whenitismostwanted。Wecan，however，cultivatethisimportanthabitbygravingourresolvesdeeperinthemomentsofdeliberationthatcontinuallyinterveneamongthemomentsofimpulsiveaction。
　　InexaminingthefunctionsofWisdom，othersubordinateexcellencescomeintoview，whicharepartlyincludedinouridealconceptionofWisdomandpartlyauxiliaryorsupplementary。
　　Someofthese，however，noonewouldexactlycallvirtues:suchasSagacityinselectingthereallyimportantpointsamidacrowdofothers，Acutenessinseeingaidsorobstaclesthatliesomewhathidden，Ingenuityindevisingsubtleorcomplicatedmeanstoourends，andothercognatequalitiesmoreorlessvaguelydefinedandnamed。Wecannotbeacute，oringenious，orsagaciouswhenweplease，thoughwemaybecomemoresobypractice。ThesamemaybesaidofCaution，sofarasCautionimpliestakingintodueaccountmaterialcircumstancesunfavourabletoourwishesandaims:
　　forbynoeffortofwillcanwecertainlyseewhatcircumstancesarematerial；
　　wecanonlylooksteadilyandcomprehensively。Theterm`Caution’，however，mayalsobelegitimatelyappliedtoaspeciesofSelf-controlwhichweshallproperlyregardasaVirtue:viz。thetendencytodeliberatewheneverandsolongasdeliberationisjudgedtoberequired，eventhoughpowerfulimpulsesurgeustoimmediateaction。
　　And，inantithesistoCaution，wemaynoticeasanotherminorvirtuethequalitycalledDecision，sofaraswemeanbyDecisionthehabitofresistinganirrationalimpulsetowhichmenareliable，ofcontinuingtosomeextentinthedeliberativeattitudewhentheyknowthatdeliberationisnolongerexpedient，andthattheyoughttobeacting。`Decision’，however，isoftenappliedlike`Caution’todenotesolelyorchieflyamerelyintellectualexcellence；viz。thetendencytojudgerightlyastothetimeforclosingdeliberation。
　　IconcludethenthatsofarassuchqualitiesasthosewhichIhavedistinguishedasCaution，andDecision，arerecognisedasVirtuesandnotmerelyasintellectualexcellences，itisbecausetheyare，infact，speciesofSelf-control；
　　i。e。becausetheyinvolvevoluntaryadoptionofandadhesiontorationaljudgmentsastoconduct，inspiteofcertainirrationalmotivespromptinginanoppositedirection。Nowitmayseematfirstsightthatifwesupposeperfectcorrectnessofjudgmentcombinedwithperfectself-control，theresultwillbeaperfectperformanceofdutyinalldepartments；andtherealisationofperfectVirtue，exceptsofarasthisinvolvesthepresenceofcertainspecialemotionsnottobecommandedatwill。[2]Andnodoubtaperfectlywiseandself-controlledmancannotbeconceivedasbreakingorneglectinganymoralrule。Butitisimportanttoobservethatevensincereandsingle-mindedeffortstorealisewhatweseetoberightmayvaryinintensity；andthatthereforethetendencytomanifestahighdegreeofintensityinsucheffortsisproperlypraisedasEnergy，ifthequalitybepurelyvolitional；orundersomesuchnameasZealorMoralArdour，ifthevolitionalenergybereferredtointensityofemotion，andyetnotconnectedwithanyemotionmorespecialthanthegeneralloveofwhatisRightorGood。{Note}
　　MEBook3Chapter3Section3Note3
　　Note——ItistobeobservedthatinthediscussionsofthischapterthequestionatissuebetweenIntuitionalandUtilitarianEthicsisnotyetreached。For，grantingthatwecanelicitbyreflectionclearrulesofdutyundertheheadsofWisdom，CautionandDecision，therulesareobviouslynotindependent；theypresupposeanintellectualjudgmentotherwiseobtained，orcapableofbeingobtained，astowhatisrightorexpedienttodo。