Yetsurelyifwesawanymanshoutingwithadmirationandapplauseatabarbarousandunmeritedexecution,whichsomeinsolenttyranthadordered,weshouldnotthinkwewereguiltyofanygreatabsurdityindenominatingthisbehaviourviciousandmorallyevilinthehighestdegree,thoughitexpressednothingbutdepravedmoralfaculties,oranabsurdapprobationofthishorridaction,asofwhatwasnoble,magnanimous,andgreat。Ourheart,Iimagine,atthesightofsuchaspectator,wouldforgetforawhileitssympathywiththesufferer,andfeelnothingbuthorroranddetestation,atthethoughtofsoexecrableawretch。
Weshouldabominatehimevenmorethanthetyrantwhomightbegoadedonbythestrongpassionsofjealousy,fear,andresentment,anduponthataccountbemoreexcusable。Butthesentimentsofthespectatorwouldappearaltogetherwithoutcauseormotive,andthereforemostperfectlyandcompletelydetestable。Thereisnoperversionofsentimentoraffectionwhichourheartwouldbemoreaversetoenterinto,orwhichitwouldrejectwithgreaterhatredandindignationthanoneofthiskind;andsofarfromregardingsuchaconstitutionofmindasbeingmerelysomethingstrangeorinconvenient,andnotinanyrespectviciousormorallyevil,weshouldratherconsideritastheverylastandmostdreadfulstageofmoraldepravity。
Correctmoralsentiments,onthecontrary,naturallyappearinsomedegreelaudableandmorallygood。Theman,whosecensureandapplauseareuponalloccasionssuitedwiththegreatestaccuracytothevalueorunworthinessoftheobject,seemstodeserveadegreeevenofmoralapprobation。Weadmirethedelicateprecisionofhismoralsentiments:theyleadourownjudgments,and,uponaccountoftheiruncommonandsurprisingjustness,theyevenexciteourwonderandapplause。Wecannotindeedbealwayssurethattheconductofsuchapersonwouldbeinanyrespectcorrespondenttotheprecisionandaccuracyofhisjudgmentsconcerningtheconductofothers。Virtuerequireshabitandresolutionofmind,aswellasdelicacyofsentiment;andunfortunatelytheformerqualitiesaresometimeswanting,wherethelatterisinthegreatestperfection。Thisdispositionofmind,however,thoughitmaysometimesbeattendedwithimperfections,isincompatiblewithanythingthatisgrosslycriminal,andisthehappiestfoundationuponwhichthesuperstructureofperfectvirtuecanbebuilt。Therearemanymenwhomeanverywell,andseriouslypurposetodowhattheythinktheirduty,whonotwithstandingaredisagreeableonaccountofthecoarsenessoftheirmoralsentiments。
Itmaybesaid,perhaps,thatthoughtheprincipleofapprobationisnotfoundeduponanypowerofperceptionthatisinanyrespectanalogoustotheexternalsenses,itmaystillbefoundeduponapeculiarsentimentwhichanswersthisoneparticularpurposeandnoother。Approbationanddisapprobation,itmaybepretended,arecertainfeelingsoremotionswhichariseinthemindupontheviewofdifferentcharactersandactions;
andasresentmentmightbecalledasenseofinjuries,orgratitudeasenseofbenefits,sothesemayveryproperlyreceivethenameofasenseofrightandwrong,orofamoralsense。
Butthisaccountofthings,thoughitmaynotbeliabletothesameobjectionswiththeforegoing,isexposedtootherswhichareequallyunanswerable。
Firstofall,whatevervariationsanyparticularemotionmayundergo,itstillpreservesthegeneralfeatureswhichdistinguishittobeanemotionofsuchakind,andthesegeneralfeaturesarealwaysmorestrikingandremarkablethananyvariationwhichitmayundergoinparticularcases。Thusangerisanemotionofaparticularkind:andaccordinglyitsgeneralfeaturesarealwaysmoredistinguishablethanallthevariationsitundergoesinparticularcases。Angeragainstamanis,nodoubt,somewhatdifferentfromangeragainstawoman,andthatagainfromangeragainstachild。Ineachofthosethreecases,thegeneralpassionofangerreceivesadifferentmodificationfromtheparticularcharacterofitsobject,asmayeasilybeobservedbytheattentive。Butstillthegeneralfeaturesofthepassionpredominateinallthesecases。Todistinguishthese,requiresnoniceobservation:averydelicateattention,onthecontrary,isnecessarytodiscovertheirvariations:everybodytakesnoticeoftheformer;scarceanybodyobservesthelatter。
Ifapprobationanddisapprobation,therefore,were,likegratitudeandresentment,emotionsofaparticularkind,distinctfromeveryother,weshouldexpectthatinallthevariationswhicheitherofthemmightundergo,itwouldstillretainthegeneralfeatureswhichmarkittobeanemotionofsuchaparticularkind,clear,plain,andeasilydistinguishable。Butinfactithappensquiteotherwise。Ifweattendtowhatwereallyfeelwhenupondifferentoccasionsweeitherapproveordisapprove,weshallfindthatouremotioninonecaseisoftentotallydifferentfromthatinanother,andthatnocommonfeaturescanpossiblybediscoveredbetweenthem。Thustheapprobationwithwhichweviewatender,delicate,andhumanesentiment,isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat,daring,andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay,upondifferentoccasions,beperfectandentire;butwearesoftenedbytheone,andweareelevatedbytheother,andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。ButaccordingtothatsystemwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish,thismustnecessarilybethecase。Astheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveof,are,inthosetwocases,quiteoppositetooneanother,andasourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththoseoppositeemotions,whatwefeelupontheoneoccasion,canhavenosortofresemblancetowhatwefeelupontheother。Butthiscouldnothappenifapprobationconsistedinapeculiaremotionwhichhadnothingincommonwiththesentimentsweapprovedof,butwhicharoseattheviewofthosesentiments,likeanyotherpassionattheviewofitsproperobject。Thesamethingholdstruewithregardtodisapprobation。Ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnosortofresemblancetoourcontemptformean-spiritedness。Itisquiteadifferentspeciesofdiscordwhichwefeelattheviewofthosetwodifferentvices,betweenourownmindsandthoseofthepersonwhosesentimentsandbehaviourweconsider。
Secondly,Ihavealreadyobserved,thatnotonlythedifferentpassionsoraffectionsofthehumanmindwhichareapprovedordisapprovedof,appearmorallygoodorevil,butthatproperandimproperapprobationappear,toournaturalsentiments,tobestampedwiththesamecharacters。Iwouldask,therefore,howitis,that,accordingtothissystem,weapproveordisapproveofproperorimproperapprobation?Tothisquestionthereis,Iimagine,butonereasonableanswer,whichcanpossiblybegiven。Itmustbesaid,thatwhentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofathirdpersoncoincideswithourown,weapproveofhisapprobation,andconsideritas,insomemeasure,morallygood;andthat,onthecontrary,whenitdoesnotcoincidewithourownsentiments,wedisapproveofit,andconsideritas,insomemeasure,morallyevil。Itmustbeallowed,therefore,that,atleastinthisonecase,thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentiments,betweentheobserverandthepersonobserved,constitutesmoralapprobationordisapprobation。Andifitdoessointhisonecase,Iwouldask,whynotineveryother?Ortowhatpurposeimagineanewpowerofperceptioninordertoaccountforthosesentiments?
Againsteveryaccountoftheprincipleofapprobation,whichmakesitdependuponapeculiarsentiment,distinctfromeveryother,Iwouldobject;thatitisstrangethatthissentiment,whichProvidenceundoubtedlyintendedtobethegoverningprincipleofhumannature,shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeof,asnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Thewordmoralsenseisofverylateformation,andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue。Thewordapprobationhasbutwithinthesefewyearsbeenappropriatedtodenotepeculiarlyanythingofthiskind。Inproprietyoflanguageweapproveofwhateverisentirelytooursatisfaction,oftheformofabuilding,ofthecontrivanceofamachine,oftheflavourofadishofmeat。Thewordconsciencedoesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes,indeed,theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty,andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablyorcontrarytoitsdirections。Whenlove,hatred,joy,sorrow,gratitude,resentment,withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple,havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogettitlestoknowthemby,isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheeded,that,afewphilosophersexcepted,nobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit?
Whenweapproveofanycharacteroraction,thesentimentswhichwefeel,are,accordingtotheforegoingsystem,derivedfromfoursources,whichareinsomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。First,wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent;
secondly,weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions;thirdly,weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact;and,lastofall,whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety,theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutility,notunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。Afterdeducting,inanyoneparticularcase,allthatmustbeacknowledgedtoproceedfromsomeoneorotherofthesefourprinciples,Ishouldbegladtoknowwhatremains,andIshallfreelyallowthisoverplustobeascribedtoamoralsense,ortoanyotherpeculiarfaculty,providedanybodywillascertainpreciselywhatthisoverplusis。
Itmightbeexpected,perhaps,thatiftherewasanysuchpeculiarprinciple,suchasthismoralsenseissupposedtobe,weshouldfeelit,insomeparticularcases,separatedanddetachedfromeveryother,asweoftenfeeljoy,sorrow,hope,andfear,pureandunmixedwithanyotheremotion。Thishowever,Iimagine,cannotevenbepretended。Ihaveneverheardanyinstanceallegedinwhichthisprinciplecouldbesaidtoexertitselfaloneandunmixedwithsympathyorantipathy,withgratitudeorresentment,withtheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofanyactiontoanestablishedrule,orlastofallwiththatgeneraltasteforbeautyandorderwhichisexcitedbyinanimatedaswellasbyanimatedobjects。
II。Thereisanothersystemwhichattemptstoaccountfortheoriginofourmoralsentimentsfromsympathy,distinctfromthatwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish。Itisthatwhichplacesvirtueinutility,andaccountsforthepleasurewithwhichthespectatorsurveystheutilityofanyqualityfromsympathywiththehappinessofthosewhoareaffectedbyit。Thissympathyisdifferentbothfromthatbywhichweenterintothemotivesoftheagent,andfromthatbywhichwegoalongwiththegratitudeofthepersonswhoarebenefitedbyhisactions。Itisthesameprinciplewiththatbywhichweapproveofawell-contrivedmachine。Butnomachinecanbetheobjectofeitherofthosetwolastmentionedsympathies。Ihavealready,inthefourthpartofthisdiscourse,givensomeaccountofthissystem。
OftheMannerinwhichdifferentAuthorshavetreatedofthepracticalRulesofMoralityItwasobservedinthethirdpartofthisdiscourse,thattherulesofjusticearetheonlyrulesofmoralitywhicharepreciseandaccurate;thatthoseofalltheothervirtuesareloose,vague,andindeterminate;thatthefirstmaybecomparedtotherulesofgrammar;theotherstothosewhichcriticslaydownfortheattainmentofwhatissublimeandelegantincomposition,andwhichpresentusratherwithageneralideaoftheperfectionweoughttoaimat,thanaffordusanycertainandinfallibledirectionsforacquiringit。