dos，ordotalestate，somethingverydifferentfromour’dower。’
　　IthasbecomethedotofFrenchlaw，andisthefavouriteformof
　　settlingthepropertyofmarriedwomenallovertheContinentof
　　Europe。Itisacontributionbythewife’sfamily，orbythewife
　　herself，intendedtoassistthehusbandinbearingtheexpenses
　　oftheconjugalhousehold。Onlytherevenuebelongedtothe
　　husband，andmanyminuterules，whichneednotbespecifiedhere，
　　preventedhimfromspendingitonobjectsforeigntothepurpose
　　ofthesettlement。Thecorpusorcapitalofthesettledproperty
　　was，amongtheRomansasnowinFrance，incapableof
　　alienation，unlesswiththepermissionofacourtofjustice。If
　　anypartofthewife’spropertywasnotsettledonherasdos，it
　　becameherparapherna。Paraphernameanssomethingverydifferent
　　fromour’paraphernalia，’andisthebienssepar閟ofFrenchlaw。
　　Itwasthatportionofawife’spropertywhichwasheldbyher
　　underthestrictlawapplicabletoawomanmarryingwithout
　　’comingunderthehand。’Theauthorityofherguardianshaving
　　diedout，andthispartofherpropertynothaving，bythe
　　assumption，beenconveyedtothehusbandasdos，itremained
　　underherexclusivecontrol，andatherexclusivedisposal。Itis
　　onlyquiterecently，undertheMarriedWomen’sPropertyAct，that
　　wehavearrivedatasimilarinstitution，sincemoneysettledto
　　awife’sseparateuse，thoughpracticallythesamething，
　　requiredasettlementtocreateit。
　　Ihavenowabridgedaverylong，and，insomeportions，a
　　veryintricatehistory。TheRomanlawbeganbygivingallthe
　　wife’spropertytothehusband，becauseshewasassumedtobe，in
　　law，hisdaughter。Itendedinhavingforitsgeneralrulethat
　　allthewife’spropertywasunderherowncontrol，savewhena
　　partofithadbeenconvertedbysettlementintoafundfor
　　contributingtotheexpensesoftheconjugalhousehold。But，no
　　doubt，theexceptiontothegeneralrulewastheordinary
　　practice。Inallrespectablehouseholds，asnowontheContinent，
　　therewasasettlementbywayofdos。Notthatwearetosuppose
　　therewasamongtheRomansanysuchformofcontractasweare
　　accustomedtounderthenameofMarriageSettlement。The
　　mechanismwasinfinitelysimpler。Afewwordsonpaperwould
　　sufficetobringanypartofthewife’spropertyunderthe
　　well-ascertainedrulessuppliedbythewrittenlawfordotal
　　settlements，andnothingmorethanthesewordswouldbeneeded，
　　unlessthepersonsmarryingwishedtovarytheprovisionsofthe
　　lawbyexpressagreement。Thissimple，butmostadmirable，
　　contrivanceofhaving，sotospeak，modelsettlementssetforth
　　readymadeinthelaw，whichmaybeadoptedornotatpleasure，
　　characterisestheFrenchCodeNapol閛n，anditwasinheritedby
　　theFrenchfromtheRomans。
　　WarningyouthattheaccountwhichIhavegivenyouofthe
　　transitionsthroughwhichtheRomanlawofsettledproperty
　　passed，is，fromthenecessityofthecase，fragmentary，Ipass
　　totheevidenceofearlyideasonoursubjectwhichiscontained
　　intheHindoolaw。Thesettledpropertyofamarriedwoman，
　　incapableofalienationbyherhusband，iswell-knowntothe
　　HindoosunderthenameofStridhan。Itiscertainlyaremarkable
　　factthattheinstitutionseemstohavebeendevelopedamongthe
　　Hindoosataperiodrelativelymuchearlierthanamongthe
　　Romans。Butinsteadofbeingmaturedandimproved，asitwasin
　　theWesternsociety，thereisreasontothinkthatintheEast，
　　undervariousinfluenceswhichmaypartlybetraced，ithas
　　graduallybeenreducedtodimensionsandimportancefarinferior
　　tothosewhichatonetimebelongedtoit。
　　ThedefinitionofStridhan，or’woman’sproperty，’givenin
　　oneoftheoldestandmostauthoritativeoftheHindoojuridical
　　treatises，theMitakshara，isasfollows：’Thatwhichisgiven
　　tothewifebythefather，themother，thehusband，ora
　　brother，atthetimeofthewedding，beforethenuptialfire。’Up
　　tothispoint，thedoctrinehastheconcurrenceofallthe
　　schoolsofHindoolaw，butthecompileroftheMitaksharaaddsa
　　propositionnotfoundelsewhere：’alsopropertywhichshemay
　　haveacquiredbyinheritance，purchase，partition，seizure，or
　　finding，isdenominatedbyManuandtheothers“woman’s
　　property。“’Mitakshara，xi。2。。Thesewords，attributed，you
　　see，tothemythicallegislator，Manu，haveexcitedthemost
　　vehementcontroversiesamonglaterBrahminicalcommentators，and
　　havecausedconsiderableperplexitytoAnglo-IndianJudges，bound
　　astheyaretoelicitconsistentdoctrinefromtheHindoolegal
　　texts。’Allthepropertywhichawomanmayhaveacquiredby
　　inheritance，purchase，partition，seizure，orfinding，’isa
　　comprehensivedescriptionofalltheformsofpropertyasdefined
　　bythemodesofacquisition，and，ifallthisbeStridhan，it
　　followsthattheancientHindoolawsecuredtomarriedwomen，in
　　theoryatallevents，anevengreaterdegreeofproprietary
　　independencethanthatgiventothembythemodernEnglish
　　MarriedWomen’sPropertyAct。Nodoubtthereismuchdifficulty
　　inunderstandingthis。TheexistingHindoowrittenlaw，whichis
　　amixedbodyofreligious，moral，andlegalordinances，is
　　pre-eminentlydistinguishedbythestrictnesswithwhichit
　　maintainsanumberofobligationsplainlytraceabletothe
　　ancientdespotismoftheFamily，andbyitsexcessiveharshness
　　tothepersonalandproprietarylibertyofwomen。AmongtheAryan
　　sub-races，theHindoosmaybeasconfidentlyassertedasthe
　　Romanstohavehadtheirsocietyorganisedasacollectionof
　　patriarchallygovernedfamilies。If，then，atanyearlyperiod，
　　themarriedwomanhadamongtheHindoosherpropertyaltogether
　　enfranchisedfromherhusband’scontrol，itisnoteasytogivea
　　reasonwhytheobligationsofthefamilydespotismwererelaxed
　　inthisoneparticular。Inpointoffact，thereisnocluetothe
　　mysterysolongasweconfineourattentiontotheHindoolaw，
　　andnocourseisopentoaJudgeexcepttotakehisstandonthe
　　oneancientauthorityIhavequotedortofollowthegreatbulk
　　ofmodernauthoritieswhorepudiatethedoctrineofthe
　　Mitaksharaonthispoint。TheAnglo-IndianCourtshavenow
　　substantiallydecidedthatHindoolawwiththepossible
　　exceptionofthatcurrentinWesternIndialimitstheStridhan
　　topropertygiventothewomanathermarriageeitherbyher
　　familyorbyherhusband’MadrasHighCourtReports，’iii。312。
　　Ithink，however，thatifweextendourexaminationtoother
　　bodiesofAryancustom，wemaypartlyunderstandtheamplitude
　　whichtheMitakshara，oneofthemostarchaicofHindoo
　　compendia，assignstotheStridhan。Afullenquirywouldtakeme
　　muchbeyondthelimitswhichIhaveproposedtomyselfinthis
　　Lecture，butitsresultswouldshortlybethese。AmongtheAryan
　　communitiesasawhole，wefindtheearliesttracesofthe
　　separatepropertyofwomeninthewidelydisusedancient
　　institutionknownastheBride-Price。Partofthisprice，which
　　waspaidbythebridegroomeitherattheweddingorthedayafter
　　it，wenttothebride’sfatherascompensationforthe
　　PatriarchalorFamilyauthoritywhichwastransferredtothe
　　husband，butanotherpartwenttothebrideherselfandwasvery
　　generallyenjoyedbyherseparatelyandkeptapartfromher
　　husband’sproperty。Itfurtherappearsthatunderacertain
　　numberofAryancustomstheproprietaryrightsofotherkinds
　　whichwomenslowlyacquiredwereassimilatedtotheirrightsin
　　theirportionoftheBride-Price，probablyasbeingtheonly
　　existingtypeofwoman’sproperty。Theexactextentofthe
　　separateownershipwhichtheancientIrishlawallowedtomarried
　　womenisstilluncertain，butundoubtedlytheyhadsomepowerof
　　dealingwiththeirownpropertywithouttheconsentoftheir
　　husbands，andthiswasoneoftheinstitutionsexpresslydeclared
　　bytheJudgestobeillegalatthebeginningoftheseventeenth
　　century。
　　IfthentheStridhanhadapre-historicorigininthe
　　Bride-Price，itsgrowthanddecaybecomemoreintelligible。First
　　ofallitwaspropertyconferredonthewifebythehusband’at
　　thenuptialfire，’asthesacerdotalHindoolawyersexpressit。
　　NextitcametoincludewhattheRomanscalledthedos，property
　　assignedtothewifeathermarriagebyherownfamily。Thenext
　　stagemayverywellhavebeenreachedonlyincertainpartsof
　　India，andtherulesrelatingtoitmayonlyhavefoundtheirway
　　intothedoctrineofcertainschools；butstillthereisnothing
　　contrarytotheanalogiesoflegalhistoryintheextensionof
　　theStridhanuntilitincludedallthepropertyofamarried
　　woman。Thereallyinterestingquestionishowcamethelawto
　　retreatafterapparentlyadvancingfartherthantheMiddleRoman
　　Lawintheproprietaryenfranchisementofwomen，andwhatarethe
　　causesofthestronghostilityofthegreatmajorityofHindoo
　　lawyerstothetextoftheMitakshara，ofwhichtheauthority
　　couldnotbewhollydenied？Thereareinfactclearindications
　　ofasustainedgeneraleffortonthepartoftheBrahminical
　　writersonmixedlawandreligion，tolimittheprivilegesof
　　womenwhichtheyseemtohavefoundrecognisedbyolder
　　authorities。TheattentionofEnglishandEuropeanstudentsof
　　theHindoolawbookswasfirstattractedtothissubjectbya
　　naturaldesiretoscrutinisethesacredtextsuponwhichthe
　　Brahminlearnedwereinthehabitofinsistingindefenceofthe
　　abominablepracticeofSutteeorwidow-burning。Thediscoverywas
　　soonmadethattheoldestmonumentsoflawandreligiongaveno
　　countenancetotherite，andtheconclusionwasatoncedrawn
　　that，evenonHindooprinciples，itwasanunlawfulinnovation。
　　Thismodeofreasoningundoubtedlygavecomforttomanydevout
　　Hindoos，whomnosecularargumentcouldhavereconciledtothe
　　abandonmentofacustomofprovedantiquity；butstill，initself
　　itwasunsound。Thedisuseofallpracticeswhichascholarcould
　　showtoberelativelymodernwoulddissolvethewholeHindoo
　　system。Theseinquiries，pushedmuchfarther，haveshownthatthe
　　Hindoolaws，religiousandcivil，haveforcenturiesbeen
　　undergoingtransmutation，development，and，insomepoints，
　　depravationatthehandsofsuccessiveBrahminicalexpositors，
　　andthatnoruleshavebeensouniformlychanged——asweshould
　　say，fortheworse——asthosewhichaffectthelegalpositionof
　　women。
　　Itwillprobablybeconcededbyallwhohavepaidany
　　attentiontooursubject，thatthecivilisedsocietiesofthe
　　West，insteadilyenlargingthepersonalandproprietary
　　independenceofwomen，andeveningrantingtothempolitical
　　privilege，areonlyfollowingoutstillfartheralawof
　　developmentwhichtheyhavebeenobeyingformanycenturies。The
　　society，whichonceconsistedofcompactfamilies，hasgot
　　extremelyneartotheconditioninwhichitwillconsist
　　exclusivelyofindividuals，whenithasfinallyandcompletely
　　assimilatedthelegalpositionofwomentothelegalpositionof
　　men。Inadditiontomanyotherobjectionswhichmaybeurged
　　againstthecommonallegationthatthelegaldisabilitiesof
　　womenaremerelypartofthetyrannyofsexoversex，itis
　　historicallyandphilosophicallyvalueless，asindeedaremost
　　propositionsconcerningclassessolargeassexes。Whatreally
　　didexististhedespotismofgroupsoverthememberscomposing
　　them。Whatreallyisbeingrelaxedisthestringencyofthis
　　despotism。Whetherthisrelaxationisdestinedtoendinutter
　　dissolution——whether，ontheotherhand，undertheinfluence
　　eitherofvoluntaryagreementorofimperativelaw，societyis