HeteronomyoftheWillastheSourceofallspuriousPrinciplesofMoralityIfthewillseeksthelawwhichistodetermineitanywhereelsethaninthefitnessofitsmaximstobeuniversallawsofitsowndictation，consequentlyifitgoesoutofitselfandseeksthislawinthecharacterofanyofitsobjects，therealwaysresultsheteronomy。Thewillinthatcasedoesnotgiveitselfthelaw，butitisgivenbytheobjectthroughitsrelationtothewill。Thisrelation，whetheritrestsoninclinationoronconceptionsofreason，onlyadmitsofhypotheticalimperatives："IoughttodosomethingbecauseIwishforsomethingelse。"Onthecontrary，themoral，andthereforecategorical，imperativesays："Ioughttodosoandso，eventhoughIshouldnotwishforanythingelse。"E。g。，theformersays："I
　　oughtnottolie，ifIwouldretainmyreputation"；thelattersays：
　　"Ioughtnottolie，althoughitshouldnotbringmetheleastdiscredit。"Thelatterthereforemustsofarabstractfromallobjectsthattheyshallhavenoinfluenceonthewill，inorderthatpracticalreason（will）maynotberestrictedtoadministeringaninterestnotbelongingtoit，butmaysimplyshowitsowncommandingauthorityasthesupremelegislation。Thus，e。g。，Ioughttoendeavourtopromotethehappinessofothers，notasifitsrealizationinvolvedanyconcernofmine（whetherbyimmediateinclinationorbyanysatisfactionindirectlygainedthroughreason），butsimplybecauseamaximwhichexcludesitcannotbecomprehendedasauniversallawinoneandthesamevolition。
　　ClassificationofallPrinciplesofMoralitywhichcanbefoundedontheConceptionofHeteronomyHereaselsewherehumanreasoninitspureuse，solongasitwasnotcriticallyexamined，hasfirsttriedallpossiblewrongwaysbeforeitsucceededinfindingtheonetrueway。
　　Allprincipleswhichcanbetakenfromthispointofviewareeitherempiricalorrational。Theformer，drawnfromtheprincipleofhappiness，arebuiltonphysicalormoralfeelings；thelatter，drawnfromtheprincipleofperfection，arebuilteitherontherationalconceptionofperfectionasapossibleeffect，oronthatofanindependentperfection（thewillofGod）asthedeterminingcauseofourwill。
　　Empiricalprinciplesarewhollyincapableofservingasafoundationformorallaws。Fortheuniversalitywithwhichtheseshouldholdforallrationalbeingswithoutdistinction，theunconditionalpracticalnecessitywhichistherebyimposedonthem，islostwhentheirfoundationistakenfromtheparticularconstitutionofhumannature，ortheaccidentalcircumstancesinwhichitisplaced。Theprincipleofprivatehappiness，however，isthemostobjectionable，notmerelybecauseitisfalse，andexperiencecontradictsthesuppositionthatprosperityisalwaysproportionedtogoodconduct，noryetmerelybecauseitcontributesnothingtotheestablishmentofmorality—sinceitisquiteadifferentthingtomakeaprosperousmanandagoodman，ortomakeoneprudentandsharp—sightedforhisowninterestsandtomakehimvirtuous—butbecausethespringsitprovidesformoralityaresuchasratherundermineitanddestroyitssublimity，sincetheyputthemotivestovirtueandtoviceinthesameclassandonlyteachustomakeabettercalculation，thespecificdifferencebetweenvirtueandvicebeingentirelyextinguished。Ontheotherhand，astomoralfeeling，thissupposedspecialsense，*theappealtoitisindeedsuperficialwhenthosewhocannotthinkbelievethatfeelingwillhelpthemout，eveninwhatconcernsgenerallaws：andbesides，feelings，whichnaturallydifferinfinitelyindegree，cannotfurnishauniformstandardofgoodandevil，norhasanyonearighttoformjudgementsforothersbyhisownfeelings：neverthelessthismoralfeelingisnearertomoralityanditsdignityinthisrespect，thatitpaysvirtuethehonourofascribingtoherimmediatelythesatisfactionandesteemwehaveforheranddoesnot，asitwere，tellhertoherfacethatwearenotattachedtoherbyherbeautybutbyprofit。
　　*Iclasstheprincipleofmoralfeelingunderthatofhappiness，becauseeveryempiricalinterestpromisestocontributetoourwell—beingbytheagreeablenessthatathingaffords，whetheritbeimmediatelyandwithoutaviewtoprofit，orwhetherprofitberegarded。Wemustlikewise，withHutcheson，classtheprincipleofsympathywiththehappinessofothersunderhisassumedmoralsense。
　　Amongsttherationalprinciplesofmorality，theontologicalconceptionofperfection，notwithstandingitsdefects，isbetterthanthetheologicalconceptionwhichderivesmoralityfromaDivineabsolutelyperfectwill。Theformeris，nodoubt，emptyandindefiniteandconsequentlyuselessforfindingintheboundlessfieldofpossiblerealitythegreatestamountsuitableforus；moreover，inattemptingtodistinguishspecificallytherealityofwhichwearenowspeakingfromeveryother，itinevitablytendstoturninacircleandcannotavoidtacitlypresupposingthemoralitywhichitistoexplain；
　　itisneverthelesspreferabletothetheologicalview，first，becausewehavenointuitionofthedivineperfectionandcanonlydeduceitfromourownconceptions，themostimportantofwhichisthatofmorality，andourexplanationwouldthusbeinvolvedinagrosscircle；and，inthenextplace，ifweavoidthis，theonlynotionoftheDivinewillremainingtousisaconceptionmadeupoftheattributesofdesireofgloryanddominion，combinedwiththeawfulconceptionsofmightandvengeance，andanysystemofmoralserectedonthisfoundationwouldbedirectlyopposedtomorality。
　　However，ifIhadtochoosebetweenthenotionofthemoralsenseandthatofperfectioningeneral（twosystemswhichatleastdonotweakenmorality，althoughtheyaretotallyincapableofservingasitsfoundation），thenIshoulddecideforthelatter，becauseitatleastwithdrawsthedecisionofthequestionfromthesensibilityandbringsittothecourtofpurereason；andalthoughevenhereitdecidesnothing，itatalleventspreservestheindefiniteidea（ofawillgoodinitselffreefromcorruption，untilitshallbemorepreciselydefined。
　　FortherestIthinkImaybeexcusedherefromadetailedrefutationofallthesedoctrines；thatwouldonlybesuperfluouslabour，sinceitissoeasy，andisprobablysowellseenevenbythosewhoseofficerequiresthemtodecideforoneofthesetheories（becausetheirhearerswouldnottoleratesuspensionofjudgement）。
　　Butwhatinterestsusmorehereistoknowthattheprimefoundationofmoralitylaiddownbyalltheseprinciplesisnothingbutheteronomyofthewill，andforthisreasontheymustnecessarilymisstheiraim。
　　Ineverycasewhereanobjectofthewillhastobesupposed，inorderthattherulemaybeprescribedwhichistodeterminethewill，theretheruleissimplyheteronomy；theimperativeisconditional，namely，iforbecauseonewishesforthisobject，oneshouldactsoandso：henceitcannevercommandmorally，thatis，categorically。Whethertheobjectdeterminesthewillbymeansofinclination，asintheprincipleofprivatehappiness，orbymeansofreasondirectedtoobjectsofourpossiblevolitiongenerally，asintheprincipleofperfection，ineithercasethewillneverdeterminesitselfimmediatelybytheconceptionoftheaction，butonlybytheinfluencewhichtheforeseeneffectoftheactionhasonthewill；Ioughttodosomething，onthisaccount，becauseIwishforsomethingelse；andheretheremustbeyetanotherlawassumedinmeasitssubject，bywhichInecessarilywillthisotherthing，andthislawagainrequiresanimperativetorestrictthismaxim。Fortheinfluencewhichtheconceptionofanobjectwithinthereachofourfacultiescanexerciseonthewillofthesubject，inconsequenceofitsnaturalproperties，dependsonthenatureofthesubject，eitherthesensibility（inclinationandtaste），ortheunderstandingandreason，theemploymentofwhichisbythepeculiarconstitutionoftheirnatureattendedwithsatisfaction。Itfollowsthatthelawwouldbe，properlyspeaking，givenbynature，and，assuch，itmustbeknownandprovedbyexperienceandwouldconsequentlybecontingentandthereforeincapableofbeinganapodeicticpracticalrule，suchasthemoralrulemustbe。Notonlyso，butitisinevitablyonlyheteronomy；
　　thewilldoesnotgiveitselfthelaw，butisgivenbyaforeignimpulsebymeansofaparticularnaturalconstitutionofthesubjectadaptedtoreceiveit。Anabsolutelygoodwill，then，theprincipleofwhichmustbeacategoricalimperative，willbeindeterminateasregardsallobjectsandwillcontainmerelytheformofvolitiongenerally，andthatasautonomy，thatistosay，thecapabilityofthemaximsofeverygoodwilltomakethemselvesauniversallaw，isitselftheonlylawwhichthewillofeveryrationalbeingimposesonitself，withoutneedingtoassumeanyspringorinterestasafoundation。
　　Howsuchasyntheticalpracticalaprioripropositionispossible，andwhyitisnecessary，isaproblemwhosesolutiondoesnotliewithintheboundsofthemetaphysicofmorals；andwehavenothereaffirmeditstruth，muchlessprofessedtohaveaproofofitinourpower。Wesimplyshowedbythedevelopmentoftheuniversallyreceivednotionofmoralitythatanautonomyofthewillisinevitablyconnectedwithit，orratherisitsfoundation。Whoeverthenholdsmoralitytobeanythingreal，andnotachimericalideawithoutanytruth，mustlikewiseadmittheprincipleofitthatishereassigned。Thissectionthen，likethefirst，wasmerelyanalytical。
　　Nowtoprovethatmoralityisnocreationofthebrain，whichitcannotbeifthecategoricalimperativeandwithittheautonomyofthewillistrue，andasanaprioriprincipleabsolutelynecessary，thissupposesthepossibilityofasyntheticuseofpurepracticalreason，whichhoweverwecannotventureonwithoutfirstgivingacriticalexaminationofthisfacultyofreason。Intheconcludingsectionweshallgivetheprincipaloutlinesofthiscriticalexaminationasfarasissufficientforourpurpose。
　　THIRDSECTION
　　TRANSITIONFROMTHEMETAPHYSICOFMORALSTOTHE
　　CRITIQUEOFPUREPRACTICALREASON
　　TheConceptofFreedomistheKeythatexplainstheAutonomyoftheWillThewillisakindofcausalitybelongingtolivingbeingsinsofarastheyarerational，andfreedomwouldbethispropertyofsuchcausalitythatitcanbeefficient，independentlyofforeigncausesdeterminingit；justasphysicalnecessityisthepropertythatthecausalityofallirrationalbeingshasofbeingdeterminedtoactivitybytheinfluenceofforeigncauses。
　　Theprecedingdefinitionoffreedomisnegativeandthereforeunfruitfulforthediscoveryofitsessence，butitleadstoapositiveconceptionwhichissomuchthemorefullandfruitful。
　　Sincetheconceptionofcausalityinvolvesthatoflaws，accordingtowhich，bysomethingthatwecallcause，somethingelse，namelytheeffect，mustbeproduced；hence，althoughfreedomisnotapropertyofthewilldependingonphysicallaws，yetitisnotforthatreasonlawless；onthecontraryitmustbeacausalityactingaccordingtoimmutablelaws，butofapeculiarkind；otherwiseafreewillwouldbeanabsurdity。Physicalnecessityisaheteronomyoftheefficientcauses，foreveryeffectispossibleonlyaccordingtothislaw，thatsomethingelsedeterminestheefficientcausetoexertitscausality。Whatelsethencanfreedomofthewillbebutautonomy，thatis，thepropertyofthewilltobealawtoitself？Buttheproposition："Thewillisineveryactionalawtoitself，"onlyexpressestheprinciple："Toactonnoothermaximthanthatwhichcanalsohaveasanobjectitselfasauniversallaw。"Nowthisispreciselytheformulaofthecategoricalimperativeandistheprincipleofmorality，sothatafreewillandawillsubjecttomorallawsareoneandthesame。
　　Onthehypothesis，then，offreedomofthewill，moralitytogetherwithitsprinciplefollowsfromitbymereanalysisoftheconception。
　　However，thelatterisasyntheticproposition；viz。，anabsolutelygoodwillisthatwhosemaximcanalwaysincludeitselfregardedasauniversallaw；forthispropertyofitsmaximcanneverbediscoveredbyanalysingtheconceptionofanabsolutelygoodwill。Nowsuchsyntheticpropositionsareonlypossibleinthisway：thatthetwocognitionsareconnectedtogetherbytheirunionwithathirdinwhichtheyarebothtobefound。Thepositiveconceptoffreedomfurnishesthisthirdcognition，whichcannot，aswithphysicalcauses，bethenatureofthesensibleworld（intheconceptofwhichwefindconjoinedtheconceptofsomethinginrelationascausetosomethingelseaseffect）。Wecannotnowatonceshowwhatthisthirdistowhichfreedompointsusandofwhichwehaveanideaapriori，norcanwemakeintelligiblehowtheconceptoffreedomisshowntobelegitimatefromprinciplesofpurepracticalreasonandwithitthepossibilityofacategoricalimperative；butsomefurtherpreparationisrequired。
　　FreedommustbepresupposedasaPropertyoftheWillofallRationalBeingsItisnotenoughtopredicatefreedomofourownwill，fromWhateverreason，ifwehavenotsufficientgroundsforpredicatingthesameofallrationalbeings。Forasmoralityservesasalawforusonlybecausewearerationalbeings，itmustalsoholdforallrationalbeings；andasitmustbededucedsimplyfromthepropertyoffreedom，itmustbeshownthatfreedomalsoisapropertyofallrationalbeings。Itisnotenough，then，toproveitfromcertainsupposedexperiencesofhumannature（whichindeedisquiteimpossible，anditcanonlybeshownapriori），butwemustshowthatitbelongstotheactivityofallrationalbeingsendowedwithawill。NowIsayeverybeingthatcannotactexceptundertheideaoffreedomisjustforthatreasoninapracticalpointofviewreallyfree，thatistosay，alllawswhichareinseparablyconnectedwithfreedomhavethesameforceforhimasifhiswillhadbeenshowntobefreeinitselfbyaprooftheoreticallyconclusive。*NowIaffirmthatwemustattributetoeveryrationalbeingwhichhasawillthatithasalsotheideaoffreedomandactsentirelyunderthisidea。Forinsuchabeingweconceiveareasonthatispractical，thatis，hascausalityinreferencetoitsobjects。Nowwecannotpossiblyconceiveareasonconsciouslyreceivingabiasfromanyotherquarterwithrespecttoitsjudgements，forthenthesubjectwouldascribethedeterminationofitsjudgementnottoitsownreason，buttoanimpulse。Itmustregarditselfastheauthorofitsprinciplesindependentofforeigninfluences。Consequentlyaspracticalreasonorasthewillofarationalbeingitmustregarditselfasfree，thatistosay，thewillofsuchabeingcannotbeawillofitsownexceptundertheideaoffreedom。Thisideamustthereforeinapracticalpointofviewbeascribedtoeveryrationalbeing。
　　*Iadoptthismethodofassumingfreedommerelyasanideawhichrationalbeingssupposeintheiractions，inordertoavoidthenecessityofprovingitinitstheoreticalaspectalso。Theformerissufficientformypurpose；foreventhoughthespeculativeproofshouldnotbemadeout，yetabeingthatcannotactexceptwiththeideaoffreedomisboundbythesamelawsthatwouldobligeabeingwhowasactuallyfree。Thuswecanescapeherefromtheonuswhichpressesonthetheory。
　　OftheInterestattachingtotheIdeasofMoralityWehavefinallyreducedthedefiniteconceptionofmoralitytotheideaoffreedom。Thislatter，however，wecouldnotprovetobeactuallyapropertyofourselvesorofhumannature；onlywesawthatitmustbepresupposedifwewouldconceiveabeingasrationalandconsciousofitscausalityinrespectofitsactions，i。e。，asendowedwithawill；andsowefindthatonjustthesamegroundswemustascribetoeverybeingendowedwithreasonandwillthisattributeofdeterminingitselftoactionundertheideaofitsfreedom。
　　Nowitresultedalsofromthepresuppositionoftheseideasthatwebecameawareofalawthatthesubjectiveprinciplesofaction，i。e。，maxims，mustalwaysbesoassumedthattheycanalsoholdasobjective，thatis，universalprinciples，andsoserveasuniversallawsofourowndictation。ButwhythenshouldIsubjectmyselftothisprincipleandthatsimplyasarationalbeing，thusalsosubjectingtoitallotherbeingendowedwithreason？Iwillallowthatnointeresturgesmetothis，forthatwouldnotgiveacategoricalimperative，butImusttakeaninterestinitanddiscernhowthiscomestopass；forthisproperlyan"Iought"isproperlyan"Iwould，"validforeveryrationalbeing，providedonlythatreasondeterminedhisactionswithoutanyhindrance。Butforbeingsthatareinadditionaffectedaswearebyspringsofadifferentkind，namely，sensibility，andinwhosecasethatisnotalwaysdonewhichreasonalonewoulddo，forthesethatnecessityisexpressedonlyasan"ought，"andthesubjectivenecessityisdifferentfromtheobjective。
　　Itseemsthenasifthemorallaw，thatis，theprincipleofautonomyofthewill，wereproperlyspeakingonlypresupposedintheideaoffreedom，andasifwecouldnotproveitsrealityandobjectivenecessityindependently。Inthatcaseweshouldstillhavegainedsomethingconsiderablebyatleastdeterminingthetrueprinciplemoreexactlythanhadpreviouslybeendone；butasregardsitsvalidityandthepracticalnecessityofsubjectingoneselftoit，weshouldnothaveadvancedastep。Forifwewereaskedwhytheuniversalvalidityofourmaximasalawmustbetheconditionrestrictingouractions，andonwhatwegroundtheworthwhichweassigntothismannerofacting—aworthsogreatthattherecannotbeanyhigherinterest；andifwewereaskedfurtherhowithappensthatitisbythisaloneamanbelieveshefeelshisownpersonalworth，incomparisonwithwhichthatofanagreeableordisagreeableconditionistoberegardedasnothing，tothesequestionswecouldgivenosatisfactoryanswer。
　　Wefindindeedsometimesthatwecantakeaninterestinapersonalqualitywhichdoesnotinvolveanyinterestofexternalcondition，providedthisqualitymakesuscapableofparticipatingintheconditionincasereasonweretoeffecttheallotment；thatistosay，themerebeingworthyofhappinesscaninterestofitselfevenwithoutthemotiveofparticipatinginthishappiness。Thisjudgement，however，isinfactonlytheeffectoftheimportanceofthemorallawwhichwebeforepresupposed（whenbytheideaoffreedomwedetachourselvesfromeveryempiricalinterest）；butthatweoughttodetachourselvesfromtheseinterests，i。e。，toconsiderourselvesasfreeinactionandyetassubjecttocertainlaws，soastofindaworthsimplyinourownpersonwhichcancompensateusforthelossofeverythingthatgivesworthtoourcondition；thiswearenotyetabletodiscerninthisway，nordoweseehowitispossiblesotoact—inotherwords，whencethemorallawderivesitsobligation。
　　Itmustbefreelyadmittedthatthereisasortofcircleherefromwhichitseemsimpossibletoescape。Intheorderofefficientcausesweassumeourselvesfree，inorderthatintheorderofendswemayconceiveourselvesassubjecttomorallaws：andweafterwardsconceiveourselvesassubjecttotheselaws，becausewehaveattributedtoourselvesfreedomofwill：forfreedomandself—legislationofwillarebothautonomyand，therefore，arereciprocalconceptions，andforthisveryreasononemustnotbeusedtoexplaintheotherorgivethereasonofit，butatmostonlylogicalpurposestoreduceapparentlydifferentnotionsofthesameobjecttoonesingleconcept（aswereducedifferentfractionsofthesamevaluetothelowestterms）。
　　Oneresourceremainstous，namely，toinquirewhetherwedonotoccupydifferentpointsofviewwhenbymeansoffreedomwethinkourselvesascausesefficientapriori，andwhenweformourconceptionofourselvesfromouractionsaseffectswhichweseebeforeoureyes。
　　Itisaremarkwhichneedsnosubtlereflectiontomake，butwhichwemayassumethateventhecommonestunderstandingcanmake，althoughitbeafteritsfashionbyanobscurediscernmentofjudgementwhichitcallsfeeling，thatallthe"ideas"thatcometousinvoluntarily（asthoseofthesenses）donotenableustoknowobjectsotherwisethanastheyaffectus；sothatwhattheymaybeinthemselvesremainsunknowntous，andconsequentlythatasregards"ideas"ofthiskindevenwiththeclosestattentionandclearnessthattheunderstandingcanapplytothem，wecanbythemonlyattaintotheknowledgeofappearances，nevertothatofthingsinthemselves。Assoonasthisdistinctionhasoncebeenmade（perhapsmerelyinconsequenceofthedifferenceobservedbetweentheideasgivenusfromwithout，andinwhichwearepassive，andthosethatweproducesimplyfromourselves，andinwhichweshowourownactivity），thenitfollowsofitselfthatwemustadmitandassumebehindtheappearancesomethingelsethatisnotanappearance，namely，thethingsinthemselves；althoughwemustadmitthatastheycanneverbeknowntousexceptastheyaffectus，wecancomenonearertothem，norcanweeverknowwhattheyareinthemselves。Thismustfurnishadistinction，howevercrude，betweenaworldofsenseandtheworldofunderstanding，ofwhichtheformermaybedifferentaccordingtothedifferenceofthesensuousimpressionsinvariousobservers，whilethesecondwhichisitsbasisalwaysremainsthesame，Evenastohimself，amancannotpretendtoknowwhatheisinhimselffromtheknowledgehehasbyinternalsensation。Forashedoesnotasitwerecreatehimself，anddoesnotcomebytheconceptionofhimselfaprioributempirically，itnaturallyfollowsthathecanobtainhisknowledgeevenofhimselfonlybytheinnersenseand，consequently，onlythroughtheappearancesofhisnatureandthewayinwhichhisconsciousnessisaffected。Atthesametimebeyondthesecharacteristicsofhisownsubject，madeupofmereappearances，hemustnecessarilysupposesomethingelseastheirbasis，namely，hisego，whateveritscharacteristicsinitselfmaybe。Thusinrespecttomereperceptionandreceptivityofsensationshemustreckonhimselfasbelongingtotheworldofsense；butinrespectofwhatevertheremaybeofpureactivityinhim（thatwhichreachesconsciousnessimmediatelyandnotthroughaffectingthesenses），hemustreckonhimselfasbelongingtotheintellectualworld，ofwhich，however，hehasnofurtherknowledge。Tosuchaconclusionthereflectingmanmustcomewithrespecttoallthethingswhichcanbepresentedtohim：itisprobablytobemetwitheveninpersonsofthecommonestunderstanding，who，asiswellknown，areverymuchinclinedtosupposebehindtheobjectsofthesensessomethingelseinvisibleandactingofitself。Theyspoilit，however，bypresentlysensualizingthisinvisibleagain；thatistosay，wantingtomakeitanobjectofintuition，sothattheydonotbecomeawhitthewiser。
　　Nowmanreallyfindsinhimselfafacultybywhichhedistinguisheshimselffromeverythingelse，evenfromhimselfasaffectedbyobjects，andthatisreason。Thisbeingpurespontaneityisevenelevatedabovetheunderstanding。Foralthoughthelatterisaspontaneityanddoesnot，likesense，merelycontainintuitionsthatarisewhenweareaffectedbythings（andarethereforepassive），yetitcannotproducefromitsactivityanyotherconceptionsthanthosewhichmerelyservetobringtheintuitionsofsenseunderrulesand，thereby，tounitetheminoneconsciousness，andwithoutthisuseofthesensibilityitcouldnotthinkatall；whereas，onthecontrary，reasonshowssopureaspontaneityinthecaseofwhatI
　　callideas[idealconceptions]thatittherebyfartranscendseverythingthatthesensibilitycangiveit，andexhibitsitsmostimportantfunctionindistinguishingtheworldofsensefromthatofunderstanding，andtherebyprescribingthelimitsoftheunderstandingitself。
　　Forthisreasonarationalbeingmustregardhimselfquaintelligence（notfromthesideofhislowerfaculties）asbelongingnottotheworldofsense，buttothatofunderstanding；hencehehastwopointsofviewfromwhichhecanregardhimself，andrecogniselawsoftheexerciseofhisfaculties，andconsequentlyofallhisactions：first，sofarashebelongstotheworldofsense，hefindshimselfsubjecttolawsofnature（heteronomy）；secondly，asbelongingtotheintelligibleworld，underlawswhichbeingindependentofnaturehavetheirfoundationnotinexperiencebutinreasonalone。
　　Asarationalbeing，andconsequentlybelongingtotheintelligibleworld，mancanneverconceivethecausalityofhisownwillotherwisethanonconditionoftheideaoffreedom，forindependenceofthedeterminatecausesofthesensibleworld（anindependencewhichreasonmustalwaysascribetoitself）isfreedom。
　　Nowtheideaoffreedomisinseparablyconnectedwiththeconceptionofautonomy，andthisagainwiththeuniversalprincipleofmoralitywhichisideallythefoundationofallactionsofrationalbeings，justasthelawofnatureisofallphenomena。
　　Nowthesuspicionisremovedwhichweraisedabove，thattherewasalatentcircleinvolvedinourreasoningfromfreedomtoautonomy，andfromthistothemorallaw，viz。：thatwelaiddowntheideaoffreedombecauseofthemorallawonlythatwemightafterwardsinturninferthelatterfromfreedom，andthatconsequentlywecouldassignnoreasonatallforthislaw，butcouldonly[present]itasapetitioprincipiiwhichwelldisposedmindswouldgladlyconcedetous，butwhichwecouldneverputforwardasaprovableproposition。
　　Fornowweseethat，whenweconceiveourselvesasfree，wetransferourselvesintotheworldofunderstandingasmembersofitandrecognisetheautonomyofthewillwithitsconsequence，morality；
　　whereas，ifweconceiveourselvesasunderobligation，weconsiderourselvesasbelongingtotheworldofsenseandatthesametimetotheworldofunderstanding。
　　HowisaCategoricalImperativePossible？
　　Everyrationalbeingreckonshimselfquaintelligenceasbelongingtotheworldofunderstanding，anditissimplyasanefficientcausebelongingtothatworldthathecallshiscausalityawill。Ontheothersideheisalsoconsciousofhimselfasapartoftheworldofsenseinwhichhisactions，whicharemereappearances[phenomena]ofthatcausality，aredisplayed；wecannot，however，discernhowtheyarepossiblefromthiscausalitywhichwedonotknow；butinsteadofthat，theseactionsasbelongingtothesensibleworldmustbeviewedasdeterminedbyotherphenomena，namely，desiresandinclinations。IfthereforeIwereonlyamemberoftheworldofunderstanding，thenallmyactionswouldperfectlyconformtotheprincipleofautonomyofthepurewill；ifIwereonlyapartoftheworldofsense，theywouldnecessarilybeassumedtoconformwhollytothenaturallawofdesiresandinclinations，inotherwords，totheheteronomyofnature。（Theformerwouldrestonmoralityasthesupremeprinciple，thelatteronhappiness。）Since，however，theworldofunderstandingcontainsthefoundationoftheworldofsense，andconsequentlyofitslawsalso，andaccordinglygivesthelawtomywill（whichbelongswhollytotheworldofunderstanding）directly，andmustbeconceivedasdoingso，itfollowsthat，althoughontheonesideImustregardmyselfasabeingbelongingtotheworldofsense，yetontheothersideImustrecognizemyselfassubjectasanintelligencetothelawoftheworldofunderstanding，i。e。，toreason，whichcontainsthislawintheideaoffreedom，andthereforeassubjecttotheautonomyofthewill：
　　consequentlyImustregardthelawsoftheworldofunderstandingasimperativesformeandtheactionswhichconformtothemasduties。
　　Andthuswhatmakescategoricalimperativespossibleisthis，thattheideaoffreedommakesmeamemberofanintelligibleworld，inconsequenceofwhich，ifIwerenothingelse，allmyactionswouldalwaysconformtotheautonomyofthewill；butasIatthesametimeintuitemyselfasamemberoftheworldofsense，theyoughtsotoconform，andthiscategorical"ought"impliesasyntheticaprioriproposition，inasmuchasbesidesmywillasaffectedbysensibledesiresthereisaddedfurthertheideaofthesamewillbutasbelongingtotheworldoftheunderstanding，pureandpracticalofitself，whichcontainsthesupremeconditionaccordingtoreasonoftheformerwill；preciselyastotheintuitionsofsensethereareaddedconceptsoftheunderstandingwhichofthemselvessignifynothingbutregularformingeneralandinthiswaysyntheticaprioripropositionsbecomepossible，onwhichallknowledgeofphysicalnaturerests。
　　Thepracticaluseofcommonhumanreasonconfirmsthisreasoning。
　　Thereisnoone，noteventhemostconsummatevillain，providedonlythatbeisotherwiseaccustomedtotheuseofreason，who，whenwesetbeforehimexamplesofhonestyofpurpose，ofsteadfastnessinfollowinggoodmaxims，ofsympathyandgeneralbenevolence（evencombinedwithgreatsacrificesofadvantagesandcomfort），doesnotwishthathemightalsopossessthesequalities。Onlyonaccountofhisinclinationsandimpulseshecannotattainthisinhimself，butatthesametimehewishestobefreefromsuchinclinationswhichareburdensometohimself。Heprovesbythisthathetransfershimselfinthoughtwithawillfreefromtheimpulsesofthesensibilityintoanorderofthingswhollydifferentfromthatofhisdesiresinthefieldofthesensibility；sincehecannotexpecttoobtainbythatwishanygratificationofhisdesires，noranypositionwhichwouldsatisfyanyofhisactualorsupposableinclinations（forthiswoulddestroythepre—eminenceoftheveryideawhichwreststhatwishfromhim）：hecanonlyexpectagreaterintrinsicworthofhisownperson。Thisbetterperson，however，heimagineshimselftobewhenbetransfershimselftothepointofviewofamemberoftheworldoftheunderstanding，towhichheisinvoluntarilyforcedbytheideaoffreedom，i。e。，ofindependenceondeterminingcausesoftheworldofsense；andfromthispointofviewheisconsciousofagoodwill，whichbyhisownconfessionconstitutesthelawforthebadwillthathepossessesasamemberoftheworldofsense—alawwhoseauthorityherecognizeswhiletransgressingit。Whathemorally"ought"isthenwhathenecessarily"would，"asamemberoftheworldoftheunderstanding，andisconceivedbyhimasan"ought"onlyinasmuchashelikewiseconsidershimselfasamemberoftheworldofsense。
　　OftheExtremeLimitsofallPracticalPhilosophy。
　　Allmenattributetothemselvesfreedomofwill。Hencecomealljudgementsuponactionsasbeingsuchasoughttohavebeendone，althoughtheyhavenotbeendone。However，thisfreedomisnotaconceptionofexperience，norcanitbeso，sinceitstillremains，eventhoughexperienceshowsthecontraryofwhatonsuppositionoffreedomareconceivedasitsnecessaryconsequences。Ontheothersideitisequallynecessarythateverythingthattakesplaceshouldbefixedlydeterminedaccordingtolawsofnature。Thisnecessityofnatureislikewisenotanempiricalconception，justforthisreason，thatitinvolvesthemotionofnecessityandconsequentlyofaprioricognition。Butthisconceptionofasystemofnatureisconfirmedbyexperience；anditmustevenbeinevitablypresupposedifexperienceitselfistobepossible，thatis，aconnectedknowledgeoftheobjectsofsenserestingongenerallaws。Thereforefreedomisonlyanideaofreason，anditsobjectiverealityinitselfisdoubtful；whilenatureisaconceptoftheunderstandingwhichproves，andmustnecessarilyprove，itsrealityinexamplesofexperience。
　　Therearisesfromthisadialecticofreason，sincethefreedomattributedtothewillappearstocontradictthenecessityofnature，andplacedbetweenthesetwowaysreasonforspeculativepurposesfindstheroadofphysicalnecessitymuchmorebeatenandmoreappropriatethanthatoffreedom；yetforpracticalpurposesthenarrowfootpathoffreedomistheonlyoneonwhichitispossibletomakeuseofreasoninourconduct；henceitisjustasimpossibleforthesubtlestphilosophyasforthecommonestreasonofmentoargueawayfreedom。Philosophymustthenassumethatnorealcontradictionwillbefoundbetweenfreedomandphysicalnecessityofthesamehumanactions，foritcannotgiveuptheconceptionofnatureanymorethanthatoffreedom。
　　Nevertheless，eventhoughweshouldneverbeabletocomprehendhowfreedomispossible，wemustatleastremovethisapparentcontradictioninaconvincingmanner。Forifthethoughtoffreedomcontradictseitheritselfornature，whichisequallynecessary，itmustincompetitionwithphysicalnecessitybeentirelygivenup。
　　Itwould，however，beimpossibletoescapethiscontradictionifthethinkingsubject，whichseemstoitselffree，conceiveditselfinthesamesenseorintheverysamerelationwhenitcallsitselffreeaswheninrespectofthesameactionitassumesitselftobesubjecttothelawofnature。Henceitisanindispensableproblemofspeculativephilosophytoshowthatitsillusionrespectingthecontradictionrestsonthis，thatwethinkofmaninadifferentsenseandrelationwhenwecallhimfreeandwhenweregardhimassubjecttothelawsofnatureasbeingpartandparcelofnature。Itmustthereforeshowthatnotonlycanboththeseverywellco—exist，butthatbothmustbethoughtasnecessarilyunitedinthesamesubject，sinceotherwisenoreasoncouldbegivenwhyweshouldburdenreasonwithanideawhich，thoughitmaypossiblywithoutcontradictionbereconciledwithanotherthatissufficientlyestablished，yetentanglesusinaperplexitywhichsorelyembarrassesreasoninitstheoreticemployment。Thisduty，however，belongsonlytospeculativephilosophy。Thephilosopherthenhasnooptionwhetherhewillremovetheapparentcontradictionorleaveituntouched；forinthelattercasethetheoryrespectingthiswouldbebonumvacans，intothepossessionofwhichthefatalistwouldhavearighttoenterandchaseallmoralityoutofitssupposeddomainasoccupyingitwithouttitle。
　　Wecannothoweverasyetsaythatwearetouchingtheboundsofpracticalphilosophy。Forthesettlementofthatcontroversydoesnotbelongtoit；itonlydemandsfromspeculativereasonthatitshouldputanendtothediscordinwhichitentanglesitselfintheoreticalquestions，sothatpracticalreasonmayhaverestandsecurityfromexternalattackswhichmightmakethegrounddebatableonwhichitdesirestobuild。
　　Theclaimstofreedomofwillmadeevenbycommonreasonarefoundedontheconsciousnessandtheadmittedsuppositionthatreasonisindependentofmerelysubjectivelydeterminedcauseswhichtogetherconstitutewhatbelongstosensationonlyandwhichconsequentlycomeunderthegeneraldesignationofsensibility。Manconsideringhimselfinthiswayasanintelligenceplaceshimselftherebyinadifferentorderofthingsandinarelationtodetermininggroundsofawhollydifferentkindwhenontheonehandhethinksofhimselfasanintelligenceendowedwithawill，andconsequentlywithcausality，andwhenontheotherheperceiveshimselfasaphenomenonintheworldofsense（ashereallyisalso），andaffirmsthathiscausalityissubjecttoexternaldeterminationaccordingtolawsofnature。Nowhesoonbecomesawarethatbothcanholdgood，nay，mustholdgoodatthesametime。Forthereisnotthesmallestcontradictioninsayingthatathinginappearance（belongingtotheworldofsense）issubjecttocertainlaws，ofwhichtheverysameasathingorbeinginitselfisindependent，andthathemustconceiveandthinkofhimselfinthistwofoldway，restsastothefirstontheconsciousnessofhimselfasanobjectaffectedthroughthesenses，andastothesecondontheconsciousnessofhimselfasanintelligence，i。e。，asindependentonsensibleimpressionsintheemploymentofhisreason（inotherwordsasbelongingtotheworldofunderstanding）。
　　Henceitcomestopassthatmanclaimsthepossessionofawillwhichtakesnoaccountofanythingthatcomesundertheheadofdesiresandinclinationsand，onthecontrary，conceivesactionsaspossibletohim，nay，evenasnecessarywhichcanonlybedonebydisregardingalldesiresandsensibleinclinations。Thecausalityofsuchactionsliesinhimasanintelligenceandinthelawsofeffectsandactions[whichdepend]ontheprinciplesofanintelligibleworld，ofwhichindeedheknowsnothingmorethanthatinitpurereasonaloneindependentofsensibilitygivesthelaw；moreoversinceitisonlyinthatworld，asanintelligence，thatheishisproperself（beingasmanonlytheappearanceofhimself），thoselawsapplytohimdirectlyandcategorically，sothattheincitementsofinclinationsandappetites（inotherwordsthewholenatureoftheworldofsense）cannotimpairthelawsofhisvolitionasanintelligence。Nay，hedoesnotevenholdhimselfresponsiblefortheformerorascribethemtohisproperself，i。e。，hiswill：heonlyascribestohiswillanyindulgencewhichhemightyieldthemifheallowedthemtoinfluencehismaximstotheprejudiceoftherationallawsofthewill。
　　Whenpracticalreasonthinksitselfintoaworldofunderstanding，itdoesnottherebytranscenditsownlimits，asitwouldifittriedtoenteritbyintuitionorsensation。Theformerisonlyanegativethoughtinrespectoftheworldofsense，whichdoesnotgiveanylawstoreasonindeterminingthewillandispositiveonlyinthissinglepointthatthisfreedomasanegativecharacteristicisatthesametimeconjoinedwitha（positive）facultyandevenwithacausalityofreason，whichwedesignateawill，namelyafacultyofsoactingthattheprincipleoftheactionsshallconformtotheessentialcharacterofarationalmotive，i。e。，theconditionthatthemaximhaveuniversalvalidityasalaw。Butwereittoborrowanobjectofwill，thatis，amotive，fromtheworldofunderstanding，thenitwouldoverstepitsboundsandpretendtobeacquaintedwithsomethingofwhichitknowsnothing。Theconceptionofaworldoftheunderstandingisthenonlyapointofviewwhichreasonfindsitselfcompelledtotakeoutsidetheappearancesinordertoconceiveitselfaspractical，whichwouldnotbepossibleiftheinfluencesofthesensibilityhadadeterminingpoweronman，butwhichisnecessaryunlessheistobedeniedtheconsciousnessofhimselfasanintelligenceand，consequently，asarationalcause，energizingbyreason，thatis，operatingfreely。Thisthoughtcertainlyinvolvestheideaofanorderandasystemoflawsdifferentfromthatofthemechanismofnaturewhichbelongstothesensibleworld；anditmakestheconceptionofanintelligibleworldnecessary（thatistosay，thewholesystemofrationalbeingsasthingsinthemselves）。Butitdoesnotintheleastauthorizeustothinkofitfurtherthanastoitsformalconditiononly，thatis，theuniversalityofthemaximsofthewillaslaws，andconsequentlytheautonomyofthelatter，whichaloneisconsistentwithitsfreedom；
　　whereas，onthecontrary，alllawsthatrefertoadefiniteobjectgiveheteronomy，whichonlybelongstolawsofnatureandcanonlyapplytothesensibleworld。
　　Butreasonwouldoverstepallitsboundsifitundertooktoexplainhowpurereasoncanbepractical，whichwouldbeexactlythesameproblemastoexplainhowfreedomispossible。
　　Forwecanexplainnothingbutthatwhichwecanreducetolaws，theobjectofwhichcanbegiveninsomepossibleexperience。Butfreedomisamereidea，theobjectiverealityofwhichcaninnowisebeshownaccordingtolawsofnature，andconsequentlynotinanypossibleexperience；andforthisreasonitcanneverbecomprehendedorunderstood，becausewecannotsupportitbyanysortofexampleoranalogy。Itholdsgoodonlyasanecessaryhypothesisofreasoninabeingthatbelievesitselfconsciousofawill，thatis，ofafacultydistinctfrommeredesire（namely，afacultyofdeterminingitselftoactionasanintelligence，inotherwords，bylawsofreasonindependentlyonnaturalinstincts）。Nowwheredeterminationaccordingtolawsofnatureceases，thereallexplanationceasesalso，andnothingremainsbutdefence，i。e。，theremovaloftheobjectionsofthosewhopretendtohaveseendeeperintothenatureofthings，andthereuponboldlydeclarefreedomimpossible。Wecanonlypointouttothemthatthesupposedcontradictionthattheyhavediscoveredinitarisesonlyfromthis，thatinordertobeabletoapplythelawofnaturetohumanactions，theymustnecessarilyconsidermanasanappearance：thenwhenwedemandofthemthattheyshouldalsothinkofhimquaintelligenceasathinginitself，theystillpersistinconsideringhiminthisrespectalsoasanappearance。Inthisviewitwouldnodoubtbeacontradictiontosupposethecausalityofthesamesubject（thatis，hiswill）tobewithdrawnfromallthenaturallawsofthesensibleworld。Butthiscontradictiondisappears，iftheywouldonlybethinkthemselvesandadmit，asisreasonable，thatbehindtheappearancestheremustalsolieattheirroot（althoughhidden）
　　thethingsinthemselves，andthatwecannotexpectthelawsofthesetobethesameasthosethatgoverntheirappearances。
　　Thesubjectiveimpossibilityofexplainingthefreedomofthewillisidenticalwiththeimpossibilityofdiscoveringandexplaininganinterest*whichmancantakeinthemorallaw。Neverthelesshedoesactuallytakeaninterestinit，thebasisofwhichinuswecallthemoralfeeling，whichsomehavefalselyassignedasthestandardofourmoraljudgement，whereasitmustratherbeviewedasthesubjectiveeffectthatthelawexercisesonthewill，theobjectiveprincipleofwhichisfurnishedbyreasonalone。
　　*Interestisthatbywhichreasonbecomespractical，i。e。，acausedeterminingthewill。Hencewesayofrationalbeingsonlythattheytakeaninterestinathing；irrationalbeingsonlyfeelsensualappetites。Reasontakesadirectinterestinactionthenonlywhentheuniversalvalidityofitsmaximsisalonesufficienttodeterminethewill。Suchaninterestaloneispure。Butifitcandeterminethewillonlybymeansofanotherobjectofdesireoronthesuggestionofaparticularfeelingofthesubject，thenreasontakesonlyanindirectinterestintheaction，and，asreasonbyitselfwithoutexperiencecannotdiscovereitherobjectsofthewilloraspecialfeelingactuatingit，thislatterinterestwouldonlybeempiricalandnotapurerationalinterest。Thelogicalinterestofreason（namely，toextenditsinsight）isneverdirect，butpresupposespurposesforwhichreasonisemployed。
　　Inorderindeedthatarationalbeingwhoisalsoaffectedthroughthesensesshouldwillwhatreasonalonedirectssuchbeingsthattheyoughttowill，itisnodoubtrequisitethatreasonshouldhaveapowertoinfuseafeelingofpleasureorsatisfactioninthefulfilmentofduty，thatistosay，thatitshouldhaveacausalitybywhichitdeterminesthesensibilityaccordingtoitsownprinciples。
　　Butitisquiteimpossibletodiscern，i。e。，tomakeitintelligibleapriori，howamerethought，whichitselfcontainsnothingsensible，canitselfproduceasensationofpleasureorpain；forthisisaparticularkindofcausalityofwhichasofeveryothercausalitywecandeterminenothingwhateverapriori；wemustonlyconsultexperienceaboutit。Butasthiscannotsupplyuswithanyrelationofcauseandeffectexceptbetweentwoobjectsofexperience，whereasinthiscase，althoughindeedtheeffectproducedlieswithinexperience，yetthecauseissupposedtobepurereasonactingthroughmereideaswhichoffernoobjecttoexperience，itfollowsthatforusmenitisquiteimpossibletoexplainhowandwhytheuniversalityofthemaximasalaw，thatis，morality，interests。Thisonlyiscertain，thatitisnotbecauseitinterestsusthatithasvalidityforus（forthatwouldbeheteronomyanddependenceofpracticalreasononsensibility，namely，onafeelingasitsprinciple，inwhichcaseitcouldnevergivemorallaws），butthatitinterestsusbecauseitisvalidforusasmen，inasmuchasithaditssourceinourwillasintelligences，inotherwords，inourproperself，andwhatbelongstomereappearanceisnecessarilysubordinatedbyreasontothenatureofthethinginitself。
　　Thequestionthen，"Howacategoricalimperativeispossible，"canbeansweredtothisextent，thatwecanassigntheonlyhypothesisonwhichitispossible，namely，theideaoffreedom；andwecanalsodiscernthenecessityofthishypothesis，andthisissufficientforthepracticalexerciseofreason，thatis，fortheconvictionofthevalidityofthisimperative，andhenceofthemorallaw；buthowthishypothesisitselfispossiblecanneverbediscernedbyanyhumanreason。Onthehypothesis，however，thatthewillofanintelligenceisfree，itsautonomy，astheessentialformalconditionofitsdetermination，isanecessaryconsequence。
　　Moreover，thisfreedomofwillisnotmerelyquitepossibleasahypothesis（notinvolvinganycontradictiontotheprincipleofphysicalnecessityintheconnexionofthephenomenaofthesensibleworld）asspeculativephilosophycanshow：butfurther，arationalbeingwhoisconsciousofcausalitythroughreason，thatistosay，ofawill（distinctfromdesires），mustofnecessitymakeitpractically，thatis，inidea，theconditionofallhisvoluntaryactions。Buttoexplainhowpurereasoncanbeofitselfpracticalwithouttheaidofanyspringofactionthatcouldbederivedfromanyothersource，i。e。，howthemereprincipleoftheuniversalvalidityofallitsmaximsaslaws（whichwouldcertainlybetheformofapurepracticalreason）canofitselfsupplyaspring，withoutanymatter（object）ofthewillinwhichonecouldantecedentlytakeanyinterest；andhowitcanproduceaninterestwhichwouldbecalledpurelymoral；orinotherwords，howpurereasoncanbepractical—
　　toexplainthisisbeyondthepowerofhumanreason，andallthelabourandpainsofseekinganexplanationofitarelostanItisjustthesameasifIsoughttofindouthowfreedomitselfispossibleasthecausalityofawill。ForthenIquitthegroundofphilosophicalexplanation，andIhavenoothertogoupon。Imightindeedrevelintheworldofintelligenceswhichstillremainstome，butalthoughIhaveanideaofitwhichiswellfounded，yetI
　　havenottheleastknowledgeofit，noranIeverattaintosuchknowledgewithalltheeffortsofmynaturalfacultyofreason。ItsignifiesonlyasomethingthatremainsoverwhenIhaveeliminatedeverythingbelongingtotheworldofsensefromtheactuatingprinciplesofmywill，servingmerelytokeepinboundstheprincipleofmotivestakenfromthefieldofsensibility；fixingitslimitsandshowingthatitdoesnotcontainallinallwithinitself，butthatthereismorebeyondit；butthissomethingmoreI
　　knownofurther。Ofpurereasonwhichframesthisideal，thereremainsaftertheabstractionofallmatter，i。e。，knowledgeofobjects，nothingbuttheform，namely，thepracticallawoftheuniversalityofthemaxims，andinconformitywiththisconceptionofreasoninreferencetoapureworldofunderstandingasapossibleefficientcause，thatisacausedeterminingthewill。Theremustherebeatotalabsenceofsprings；unlessthisideaofanintelligibleworldisitselfthespring，orthatinwhichreasonprimarilytakesaninterest；buttomakethisintelligibleispreciselytheproblemthatwecannotsolve。
　　Herenowistheextremelimitofallmoralinquiry，anditisofgreatimportancetodetermineitevenonthisaccount，inorderthatreasonmaynotontheoneband，totheprejudiceofmorals，seekaboutintheworldofsenseforthesuprememotiveandaninterestcomprehensiblebutempirical；andontheotherhand，thatitmaynotimpotentlyflapitswingswithoutbeingabletomoveinthe（forit）
　　emptyspaceoftranscendentconceptswhichwecalltheintelligibleworld，andsoloseitselfamidstchimeras。Fortherest，theideaofapureworldofunderstandingasasystemofallintelligences，andtowhichweourselvesasrationalbeingsbelong（althoughwearelikewiseontheothersidemembersofthesensibleworld），thisremainsalwaysausefulandlegitimateideaforthepurposesofrationalbelief，althoughallknowledgestopsatitsthreshold，useful，namely，toproduceinusalivelyinterestinthemorallawbymeansofthenobleidealofauniversalkingdomofendsinthemselves（rationalbeings），towhichwecanbelongasmembersthenonlywhenwecarefullyconductourselvesaccordingtothemaximsoffreedomasiftheywerelawsofnature。
　　ConcludingRemarkThespeculativeemploymentofreasonwithrespecttonatureleadstotheabsolutenecessityofsomesupremecauseoftheworld：thepracticalemploymentofreasonwithaviewtofreedomleadsalsotoabsolutenecessity，butonlyofthelawsoftheactionsofarationalbeingassuch。Nowitisanessentialprincipleofreason，howeveremployed，topushitsknowledgetoaconsciousnessofitsnecessity（withoutwhichitwouldnotberationalknowledge）。Itis，however，anequallyessentialrestrictionofthesamereasonthatitcanneitherdiscernthenecessityofwhatisorwhathappens，norofwhatoughttohappen，unlessaconditionissupposedonwhichitisorhappensoroughttohappen。Inthisway，however，bytheconstantinquiryforthecondition，thesatisfactionofreasonisonlyfurtherandfurtherpostponed。Henceitunceasinglyseekstheunconditionallynecessaryandfindsitselfforcedtoassumeit，althoughwithoutanymeansofmakingitcomprehensibletoitself，happyenoughifonlyitcandiscoveraconceptionwhichagreeswiththisassumption。Itisthereforenofaultinourdeductionofthesupremeprincipleofmorality，butanobjectionthatshouldbemadetohumanreasoningeneral，thatitcannotenableustoconceivetheabsolutenecessityofanunconditionalpracticallaw（suchasthecategoricalimperativemustbe）。Itcannotbeblamedforrefusingtoexplainthisnecessitybyacondition，thatistosay，bymeansofsomeinterestassumedasabasis，sincethelawwouldthenceasetobeasupremelawofreason。Andthuswhilewedonotcomprehendthepracticalunconditionalnecessityofthemoralimperative，weyetcomprehenditsincomprehensibility，andthisisallthatcanbefairlydemandedofaphilosophywhichstrivestocarryitsprinciplesuptotheverylimitofhumanreason。