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Itisageneralruleindealingwithargumentsthatdependonlanguagethatthesolutionalwaysfollowstheoppositeofthepointonwhichtheargumentturns:e。g。iftheargumentdependsuponcombination,thenthesolutionconsistsindivision;ifupondivision,thenincombination。Again,ifitdependsonanacuteaccent,thesolutionisagraveaccent;ifonagraveaccent,itisanacute。Ifitdependsonambiguity,onecansolveitbyusingtheoppositeterm;e。g。ifyoufindyourselfcallingsomethinginanimate,despiteyourpreviousdenialthatitwasso,showinwhatsenseitisalive:
if,ontheotherhand,onehasdeclaredittobeinanimateandthesophisthasprovedittobeanimate,sayhowitisinanimate。Likewisealsoinacaseofamphiboly。Iftheargumentdependsonlikenessofexpression,theoppositewillbethesolution。’Couldamangivewhathehasnotgot?’No,notwhathehasnotgot;buthecouldgiveitinawayinwhichhehasnotgotit,e。g。onediebyitself。’
Doesamanknoweitherbylearningorbydiscoveryeachthingthatheknows,singly?butnotthethingsthatheknows,collectively。’
Alsoamantreads,perhaps,onanythinghewalksthrough,butnotonthetimehewalksthrough。Likewisealsointhecaseoftheotherexamples。
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IndealingwithargumentsthatdependonAccident,oneandthesamesolutionmeetsallcases。Forsinceitisindeterminatewhenanattributeshouldbeascribedtoathing,incaseswhereitbelongstotheaccidentofthething,andsinceinsomecasesitisgenerallyagreedandpeopleadmitthatitbelongs,whileinotherstheydenythatitneedbelong,weshouldtherefore,assoonastheconclusionhasbeendrawn,sayinanswertothemallalike,thatthereisnoneedforsuchanattributetobelong。Onemust,however,bepreparedtoadduceanexampleofthekindofattributemeant。AllargumentssuchasthefollowingdependuponAccident。’DoyouknowwhatIamgoingtoaskyou?youknowthemanwhoisapproaching’,or’themaninthemask’?’Isthestatueyourworkofart?’or’Isthedogyourfather?’’Istheproductofasmallnumberwithasmallnumberasmallnumber?’Foritisevidentinallthesecasesthatthereisnonecessityfortheattributewhichistrueofthething’saccidenttobetrueofthethingaswell。Foronlytothingsthatareindistinguishableandoneinessenceisitgenerallyagreedthatallthesameattributesbelong;whereasinthecaseofagoodthing,tobegoodisnotthesameastobegoingtobethesubjectofaquestion;norinthecaseofamanapproaching,orwearingamask,is’tobeapproaching’thesamethingas’tobeCoriscus’,sothatsupposeIknowCoriscus,butdonotknowthemanwhoisapproaching,itstillisn’tthecasethatIbothknowanddonotknowthesameman;
nor,again,ifthisismineandisalsoaworkofart,isitthereforemyworkofart,butmypropertyorthingorsomethingelse。(Thesolutionisafterthesamemannerintheothercasesaswell。)
Somesolvetheserefutationsbydemolishingtheoriginalpropositionasked:fortheysaythatitispossibletoknowandnottoknowthesamething,onlynotinthesamerespect:accordingly,whentheydon’tknowthemanwhoiscomingtowardsthem,butdoknowCorsicus,theyassertthattheydoknowanddon’tknowthesameobject,butnotinthesamerespect。Yet,aswehavealreadyremarked,thecorrectionofargumentsthatdependuponthesamepointoughttobethesame,whereasthisonewillnotstandifoneadoptsthesameprincipleinregardnottoknowingsomething,buttobeing,ortobeingisainacertainstate,e。g。supposethatXisfather,andisalsoyours:forifinsomecasesthisistrueanditispossibletoknowandnottoknowthesamething,yetwiththatcasethesolutionstatedhasnothingtodo。Certainlythereisnothingtopreventthesameargumentfromhavinganumberofflaws;butitisnottheexpositionofanyandeveryfaultthatconstitutesasolution:foritispossibleforamantoshowthatafalseconclusionhasbeenproved,butnottoshowonwhatitdepends,e。g。inthecaseofZeno’sargumenttoprovethatmotionisimpossible。Sothatevenifanyoneweretotrytoestablishthatthisdoctrineisanimpossibleone,hestillismistaken,andevenifheprovedhiscasetenthousandtimesover,stillthisisnosolutionofZeno’sargument:forthesolutionwasallalonganexpositionoffalsereasoning,showingonwhatitsfalsitydepends。Ifthenhehasnotprovedhiscase,oristryingtoestablishevenatrueproposition,orafalseone,inafalsemanner,topointthisoutisatruesolution。Possibly,indeed,thepresentsuggestionmayverywellapplyinsomecases:butinthesecases,atanyrate,noteventhiswouldbegenerallyagreed:forheknowsboththatCoriscusisCoriscusandthattheapproachingfigureisapproaching。Toknowandnottoknowthesamethingisgenerallythoughttobepossible,whene。g。oneknowsthatXiswhite,butdoesnotrealizethatheismusical:forinthatwayhedoesknowandnotknowthesamething,thoughnotinthesamerespect。ButastotheapproachingfigureandCoriscusheknowsboththatitisapproachingandthatheisCoriscus。
Alikemistaketothatofthosewhomwehavementionedisthatofthosewhosolvetheproofthateverynumberisasmallnumber:forif,whentheconclusionisnotproved,theypassthisoverandsaythataconclusionhasbeenprovedandistrue,onthegroundthateverynumberisbothgreatandsmall,theymakeamistake。
Somepeoplealsousetheprincipleofambiguitytosolvetheaforesaidreasonings,e。g。theproofthat’Xisyourfather’,or’son’,or’slave’。Yetitisevidentthatiftheappearanceaproofdependsuponapluralityofmeanings,theterm,ortheexpressioninquestion,oughttobearanumberofliteralsenses,whereasnoonespeaksofAasbeing’B’schild’intheliteralsense,ifBisthechild’smaster,butthecombinationdependsuponAccident。’IsA
yours?’’Yes。’’AndisAachild?’’Yes。’’ThenthechildAisyours,’
becausehehappenstobebothyoursandachild;butheisnot’yourchild’。
Thereisalsotheproofthat’something"ofevils"isgood’;forwisdomisa’knowledge"ofevils"’。Buttheexpressionthatthisis’ofsoand—so’(=’so—and—so’s’)hasnotanumberofmeanings:itmeansthatitis’so—and—so’sproperty’。Wemaysupposeofcourse,ontheotherhand,thatithasanumberofmeanings—forwealsosaythatmanis’oftheanimals’,thoughnottheirproperty;andalsothatanytermrelatedto’evils’inawayexpressedbyagenitivecaseisonthataccountaso—and—so’ofevils’,thoughitisnotoneoftheevils—butinthatcasetheapparentlydifferentmeaningsseemtodependonwhetherthetermisusedrelativelyorabsolutely。’Yetitisconceivablypossibletofindarealambiguityinthephrase"Somethingofevilsisgood"。’Perhaps,butnotwithregardtothephraseinquestion。Itwouldoccurmorenearly,supposethat’A
servantisgoodofthewicked’;thoughperhapsitisnotquitefoundeventhere:forathingmaybe’good’andbe’X’s’withoutbeingatthesametime’X’sgood’。Noristhesayingthat’Manisoftheanimals’aphrasewithanumberofmeanings:foraphrasedoesnotbecomepossessedofanumberofmeaningsmerelysupposeweexpressitelliptically:forweexpress’GivemetheIliad’byquotinghalfalineofit,e。g。’Giveme"Sing,goddess,ofthewrath……"’
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Thoseargumentswhichdependuponanexpressionthatisvalidofaparticularthing,orinaparticularrespect,orplace,ormanner,orrelation,andnotvalidabsolutely,shouldbesolvedbyconsideringtheconclusioninrelationtoitscontradictory,toseeifanyofthesethingscanpossiblyhavehappenedtoit。Foritisimpossibleforcontrariesandoppositesandanaffirmativeandanegativetobelongtothesamethingabsolutely;thereis,however,nothingtopreventeachfrombelonginginaparticularrespectorrelationormanner,ortopreventoneofthemfrombelonginginaparticularrespectandtheotherabsolutely。Sothatifthisonebelongsabsolutelyandthatoneinaparticularrespect,thereisasyetnorefutation。Thisisafeatureonehastofindintheconclusionbyexaminingitincomparisonwithitscontradictory。
Allargumentsofthefollowingkindhavethisfeature:’Isitpossibleforwhatis—nottobe?"No。"But,yousee,itissomething,despiteitsnotbeing。’Likewisealso,Beingwillnotbe;foritwillnothesomeparticularformofbeing。Isitpossibleforthesamemanatthesametimetobeakeeperandabreakerofhisoath?’’Canthesamemanatthesametimebothobeyanddisobeythesameman?’
Orisn’titthecasethatbeingsomethinginparticularandBeingarenotthesame?Ontheotherhand,Not—being,evenifitbesomething,neednotalsohaveabsolute’being’aswell。Norifamankeepshisoathinthisparticularinstanceorinthisparticularrespect,isheboundalsotobeakeeperofoathsabsolutely,buthewhoswearsthathewillbreakhisoath,andthenbreaksit,keepsthisparticularoathonly;heisnotakeeperofhisoath:noristhedisobedientman’obedient’,thoughheobeysoneparticularcommand。
Theargumentissimilar,also,asregardstheproblemwhetherthesamemancanatthesametimesaywhatisbothfalseandtrue:butitappearstobeatroublesomequestionbecauseitisnoteasytoseeinwhichofthetwoconnexionstheword’absolutely’istoberendered—with’true’orwith’false’。Thereis,however,nothingtopreventitfrombeingfalseabsolutely,thoughtrueinsomeparticularrespectorrelation,i。e。beingtrueinsomethings,thoughnot’true’
absolutely。Likewisealsoincasesofsomeparticularrelationandplaceandtime。Forallargumentsofthefollowingkinddependuponthis。’Ishealth,orwealth,agoodthing?’’Yes。’’Buttothefoolwhodoesnotuseitarightitisnotagoodthing:thereforeitisbothgoodandnotgood。’’Ishealth,orpoliticalpower,agoodthing?’’Yes。"Butsometimesitisnotparticularlygood:thereforethesamethingisbothgoodandnotgoodtothesameman。’Orratherthereisnothingtopreventathing,thoughgoodabsolutely,beingnotgoodtoaparticularman,orbeinggoodtoaparticularman,andyetnotgoodorhere。’Isthatwhichtheprudentmanwouldnotwish,anevil?’’Yes。’’Buttogetridof,hewouldnotwishthegood:
thereforethegoodisanevil。’Butthatisamistake;foritisnotthesamethingtosay’Thegoodisanevil’and’togetridofthegoodisanevil’。Likewisealsotheargumentofthethiefismistaken。
Foritisnotthecasethatifthethiefisanevilthing,acquiringthingsisalsoevil:whathewishes,therefore,isnotwhatisevilbutwhatisgood;fortoacquiresomethinggoodisgood。Also,diseaseisanevilthing,butnottogetridofdisease。’Isthejustpreferabletotheunjust,andwhattakesplacejustlytowhattakesplaceunjustly?’Yes。’’Buttotobeputtodeathunjustlyispreferable。’’Isitjustthateachshouldhavehisown?’’Yes。’’Butwhateverdecisionsamancomestoonthestrengthofhispersonalopinion,evenifitbeafalseopinion,arevalidinlaw:thereforethesameresultisbothjustandunjust。’Also,shouldonedecideinfavourofhimwhosayswhatisunjust?’’Theformer。’’Butyousee,itisjustfortheinjuredpartytosayfullythethingshehassuffered;
andthesearefallacies。Forbecausetosufferathingunjustlyispreferable,unjustwaysarenotthereforepreferable,thoughinthisparticularcasetheunjustmayverywellbebetterthanthejust。
Also,tohaveone’sownisjust,whiletohavewhatisanother’sisnotjust:allthesame,thedecisioninquestionmayverywellbeajustdecision,whateveritbethattheopinionofthemanwhogavethedecisionsupports:forbecauseitisjustinthisparticularcaseorinthisparticularmanner,itisnotalsojustabsolutely。Likewisealso,thoughthingsareunjust,thereisnothingtopreventthespeakingofthembeingjust:forbecausetospeakofthingsisjust,thereisnonecessitythatthethingsshouldbejust,anymorethanbecausetospeakofthingsbeofuse,thethingsneedbeofuse。
Likewisealsointhecaseofwhatisjust。Sothatitisnotthecasethatbecausethethingsspokenofareunjust,thevictorygoestohimwhospeaksunjustthings:forhespeaksofthingsthatarejusttospeakof,thoughabsolutely,i。e。tosuffer,theyareunjust。
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Refutationsthatdependonthedefinitionofarefutationmust,accordingtotheplansketchedabove,bemetbycomparingtogethertheconclusionwithitscontradictory,andseeingthatitshallinvolvethesameattributeinthesamerespectandrelationandmannerandtime。Ifthisadditionalquestionbeputatthestart,youshouldnotadmitthatitisimpossibleforthesamethingtobebothdoubleandnotdouble,butgrantthatitispossible,onlynotinsuchawayaswasagreedtoconstitutearefutationofyourcase。Allthefollowingargumentsdependuponapointofthatkind。’DoesamanwhoknowsAtobeA,knowthethingcalledA?’andinthesameway,’isonewhoisignorantthatAisAignorantofthethingcalledA?’
’Yes。’’ButonewhoknowsthatCoriscusisCoriscusmightbeignorantofthefactthatheismusical,sothathebothknowsandisignorantofthesamething。’Isathingfourcubitslonggreaterthanathingthreecubitslong?’’Yes。’’Butathingmightgrowfromthreetofourcubitsinlength;’nowwhatis’greater’isgreaterthana’less’:accordinglythethinginquestionwillbebothgreaterandlessthanitselfinthesamerespect。
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Astorefutationsthatdependonbeggingandassumingtheoriginalpointtobeproved,supposethenatureofthequestiontobeobvious,oneshouldnotgrantit,eventhoughitbeaviewgenerallyheld,butshouldtellhimthetruth。Suppose,however,thatitescapesone,then,thankstothebadnessofargumentsofthatkind,oneshouldmakeone’serrorrecoiluponthequestioner,andsaythathehasbroughtnoargument:forarefutationmustbeprovedindependentlyoftheoriginalpoint。Secondly,oneshouldsaythatthepointwasgrantedundertheimpressionthatheintendednottouseitasapremiss,buttoreasonagainstit,intheoppositewayfromthatadoptedinrefutationsonsideissues。
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Also,thoserefutationsthatbringonetotheirconclusionthroughtheconsequentyoushouldshowupinthecourseoftheargumentitself。Themodeinwhichconsequencesfollowistwofold。Fortheargumenteitheristhatastheuniversalfollowsonitsparticular—as(e。g。)’animal’followsfrom’man’—sodoestheparticularonitsuniversal:fortheclaimismadethatifAisalwaysfoundwithB,thenBalsoisalwaysfoundwithA。Orelseitproceedsbywayoftheoppositesofthetermsinvolved:forifA
followsB,itisclaimedthatA’soppositewillfollowB’sopposite。
OnthislatterclaimtheargumentofMelissusalsodepends:forheclaimsthatbecausethatwhichhascometobehasabeginning,thatwhichhasnotcometobehasnone,sothatiftheheavenhasnotcometobe,itisalsoeternal。Butthatisnotso;forthesequenceisviceversa。
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Inthecaseofanyrefutationswhosereasoningdependsonsomeaddition,lookandseeifuponitssubtractiontheabsurdityfollowsnonetheless:andthenifso,theanswerershouldpointthisout,andsaythathegrantedtheadditionnotbecausehereallythoughtit,butforthesakeoftheargument,whereasthequestionerhasnotuseditforthepurposeofhisargumentatall。
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Tomeetthoserefutationswhichmakeseveralquestionsintoone,oneshoulddrawadistinctionbetweenthemstraightawayatthestart。Foraquestionmustbesingletowhichthereisasingleanswer,sothatonemustnotaffirmordenyseveralthingsofonething,noronethingofmany,butoneofone。Butjustasinthecaseofambiguousterms,anattributebelongstoatermsometimesinbothitssenses,andsometimesinneither,sothatasimpleanswerdoesone,asithappens,noharmdespitethefactthatthequestionisnotsimple,soitisinthesecasesofdoublequestionstoo。Whenever,then,theseveralattributesbelongtotheonesubject,ortheonetothemany,themanwhogivesasimpleanswerencountersnoobstacleeventhoughhehascommittedthismistake:butwheneveranattributebelongstoonesubjectbutnottotheother,orthereisaquestionofanumberofattributesbelongingtoanumberofsubjectsandinonesensebothbelongtoboth,whileinanothersense,again,theydonot,thenthereistrouble,sothatonemustbewareofthis。Thus(e。g。)inthefollowingarguments:SupposingtobegoodandBevil,youwill,ifyougiveasingleansweraboutboth,becompelledtosaythatitistruetocallthesegood,andthatitistruetocallthemevilandlikewisetocallthemneithergoodnorevil(foreachofthemhasnoteachcharacter),sothatthesamethingwillbebothgoodandevilandneithergoodnorevil。Also,sinceeverythingisthesameasitselfanddifferentfromanythingelse,inasmuchasthemanwhoanswersdoublequestionssimplycanbemadetosaythatseveralthingsare’thesame’notasotherthingsbut’asthemselves’,andalsothattheyaredifferentfromthemselves,itfollowsthatthesamethingsmustbeboththesameasanddifferentfromthemselves。Moreover,ifwhatisgoodbecomesevilwhilewhatisevilisgood,thentheymustbothbecometwo。Sooftwounequalthingseachbeingequaltoitself,itwillfollowthattheyarebothequalandunequaltothemselves。
Nowtheserefutationsfallintotheprovinceofothersolutionsaswell:for’both’and’all’havemorethanonemeaning,sothattheresultingaffirmationanddenialofthesamethingdoesnotoccur,exceptverbally:andthisisnotwhatwemeantbyarefutation。Butitisclearthatiftherebenotputasinglequestiononanumberofpoints,buttheanswererhasaffirmedordeniedoneattributeonlyofonesubjectonly,theabsurditywillnotcometopass。
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Withregardtothosewhodrawoneintorepeatingthesamethinganumberoftimes,itisclearthatonemustnotgrantthatpredicationsofrelativetermshaveanymeaninginabstractionbythemselves,e。g。that’double’isasignificanttermapartfromthewholephrase’doubleofhalf’merelyonthegroundthatitfiguresinit。Fortenfiguresin’tenminusone’andin’notdo’,andgenerallytheaffirmationinthenegation;butforallthat,supposeanyoneweretosay,’Thisisnotwhite’,hedoesnotsaythatitiswhite。Thebareword’double’,onemayperhapssay,hasnotevenanymeaningatall,anymorethanhas’the’in’thehalf’:andevenifithasameaning,yetithasnotthesamemeaningasinthecombination。Noris’knowledge’thesamethinginaspecificbranchofit(supposeit,e。g。tobe’medicalknowledge’)asitisingeneral:foringeneralitwasthe’knowledgeoftheknowable’。Inthecaseoftermsthatarepredicatedofthetermsthroughwhichtheyaredefined,youshouldsaythesamething,thatthetermdefinedisnotthesameinabstractionasitisinthewholephrase。For’concave’hasageneralmeaningwhichisthesameinthecaseofasnubnose,andofabandyleg,butwhenaddedtoeithersubstantivenothingpreventsitfromdifferentiatingitsmeaning;infactitbearsonesenseasappliedtothenose,andanotherasappliedtotheleg:forintheformerconnexionitmeans’snub’andinthelatter’bandyshaped’;i。e。itmakesnodifferencewhetheryousay’asnubnose’or’aconcavenose’。
Moreover,theexpressionmustnotbegrantedinthenominativecase:
foritisafalsehood。Forsnubnessisnotaconcavenosebutsomething(e。g。anaffection)belongingtoanose:hence,thereisnoabsurdityinsupposingthatthesnubnoseisanosepossessingtheconcavitythatbelongstoanose。
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Withregardtosolecisms,wehavepreviouslysaidwhatitisthatappearstobringthemabout;themethodoftheirsolutionwillbeclearinthecourseoftheargumentsthemselves。Solecismistheresultaimedatinallargumentsofthefollowingkind:’Isathingtrulythatwhichyoutrulycallit?’’Yes’。’But,speakingofastone,youcallhimreal:thereforeofastoneitfollowsthat"himisreal"。’No:rather,talkingofastonemeansnotsayingwhich’but’whom’,andnot’that’but’him’。If,then,anyoneweretoask,’Isastonehimwhomyoutrulycallhim?’hewouldbegenerallythoughtnottobespeakinggoodGreek,anymorethanifheweretoask,’Ishewhatyoucallher?’Speakinthiswayofa’stick’oranyneuterword,andthedifferencedoesnotbreakout。Forthisreason,also,nosolecismisincurred,supposeanyoneasks,’Isathingwhatyousayittobe?’’Yes’。’But,speakingofastick,youcallitreal:
therefore,ofastickitfollowsthatitisreal。’’Stone’,however,and’he’havemasculinedesignations。Nowsupposesomeoneweretoask,’Can"he"beashe"(afemale)?’,andthenagain,’Well,butisnotheCoriscus?’andthenweretosay,’Thenheisa"she",’hehasnotprovedthesolecism,evenifthename’Coriscus’doessignifya’she’,if,ontheotherhand,theanswererdoesnotgrantthis:thispointmustbeputasanadditionalquestion:whileifneitherisitthefactnordoeshegrantit,thenthesophisthasnotprovedhiscaseeitherinfactorasagainstthepersonhehasbeenquestioning。Inlikemanner,then,intheaboveinstanceaswellitmustbedefinitelyputthat’he’meansthestone。If,however,thisneitherissonorisgranted,theconclusionmustnotbestated:
thoughitfollowsapparently,becausethecase(theaccusative),thatisreallyunlike,appearstobelikethenominative。’Isittruetosaythatthisobjectiswhatyoucallitbyname?’’Yes’。’Butyoucallitbythenameofashield:thisobjectthereforeis"ofashield"。’No:notnecessarily,becausethemeaningof’thisobject’isnot’ofashield’but’ashield’:’ofashield’wouldbethemeaningof’thisobject’s’。Noragainif’Heiswhatyoucallhimbyname’,while’thenameyoucallhimbyisCleon’s’,ishetherefore’Cleon’s’:forheisnot’Cleon’s’,forwhatwassaidwasthat’He,nothis,iswhatIcallhimbyname’。Forthequestion,ifputinthelatterway,wouldnotevenbeGreek。’Doyouknowthis?’’Yes。’
’Butthisishe:thereforeyouknowhe’。No:rather’this’hasnotthesamemeaningin’Doyouknowthis?’asin’Thisisastone’;inthefirstitstandsforanaccusative,inthesecondforanominativecase。’Whenyouhaveunderstandingofanything,doyouunderstandit?’
’Yes。’’Butyouhaveunderstandingofastone:thereforeyouunderstandofastone。’No:theonephraseisinthegenitive,’ofastone’,whiletheotherisintheaccusative,’astone’:andwhatwasgrantedwasthat’youunderstandthat,notofthat,ofwhichyouhaveunderstanding’,sothatyouunderstandnot’ofastone’,but’thestone’。
Thusthatargumentsofthiskinddonotprovesolecismbutmerelyappeartodoso,andbothwhytheysoappearandhowyoushouldmeetthem,isclearfromwhathasbeensaid。
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Wemustalsoobservethatofalltheargumentsaforesaiditiseasierwithsometoseewhyandwherethereasoningleadsthehearerastray,whilewithothersitismoredifficult,thoughoftentheyarethesameargumentsastheformer。Forwemustcallanargumentthesameifitdependsuponthesamepoint;butthesameargumentisapttobethoughtbysometodependondiction,byothersonaccident,andbyothersonsomethingelse,becauseeachofthem,whenworkedwithdifferentterms,isnotsoclearasitwas。Accordingly,justasinfallaciesthatdependonambiguity,whicharegenerallythoughttobethesilliestformoffallacy,somearecleareventothemaninthestreet(forhumorousphrasesnearlyalldependondiction;e。g。’Themangotthecartdownfromthestand’;and’Whereareyoubound?’
’Totheyardarm’;and’Whichcowwillcalveafore?’’Neither,butbothbehind;’and’IstheNorthwindclear?’’No,indeed;forithasmurderedthebeggarandthemerchant。"IsheaGoodenough—King?’’No,indeed;aRob—son’:andsowiththegreatmajorityoftherestaswell),whileothersappeartoeludethemostexpert(anditisasymptomofthisthattheyoftenfightabouttheirterms,e。g。
whetherthemeaningof’Being’and’One’isthesameinalltheirapplicationsordifferent;forsomethinkthat’Being’and’One’
meanthesame;whileotherssolvetheargumentofZenoandParmenidesbyassertingthat’One’and’Being’areusedinanumberofsenses),likewisealsoasregardsfallaciesofAccidentandeachoftheothertypes,someoftheargumentswillbeeasiertoseewhileothersaremoredifficult;alsotograsptowhichclassafallacybelongs,andwhetheritisarefutationornotarefutation,isnotequallyeasyinallcases。
Anincisiveargumentisonewhichproducesthegreatestperplexity:forthisistheonewiththesharpestfang。Nowperplexityistwofold,onewhichoccursinreasonedarguments,respectingwhichofthepropositionsaskedoneistodemolish,andtheotherincontentiousarguments,respectingthemannerinwhichoneistoassenttowhatispropounded。Thereforeitisinsyllogisticargumentsthatthemoreincisiveonesproducethekeenestheart—searching。Nowasyllogisticargumentismostincisiveiffrompremissesthatareasgenerallyacceptedaspossibleitdemolishesaconclusionthatisacceptedasgenerallyaspossible。Fortheoneargument,ifthecontradictoryischangedabout,makesalltheresultingsyllogismsalikeincharacter:foralwaysfrompremissesthataregenerallyaccepteditwillproveaconclusion,negativeorpositiveasthecasemaybe,thatisjustasgenerallyaccepted;andthereforeoneisboundtofeelperplexed。Anargument,then,ofthiskindisthemostincisive,viz。theonethatputsitsconclusiononallfourswiththepropositionsasked;andsecondcomestheonethatarguesfrompremisses,allofwhichareequallyconvincing:forthiswillproduceanequalperplexityastowhatkindofpremiss,ofthoseasked,oneshoulddemolish。Hereinisadifficulty:foronemustdemolishsomething,butwhatonemustdemolishisuncertain。Ofcontentiousarguments,ontheotherhand,themostincisiveistheonewhich,inthefirstplace,ischaracterizedbyaninitialuncertaintywhetherithasbeenproperlyreasonedornot;andalsowhetherthesolutiondependsonafalsepremissoronthedrawingofadistinction;while,oftherest,thesecondplaceisheldbythatwhosesolutionclearlydependsuponadistinctionorademolition,andyetitdoesnotrevealclearlywhichitisofthepremissesasked,whosedemolition,orthedrawingofadistinctionwithinit,willbringthesolutionabout,butevenleavesitvaguewhetheritisontheconclusionorononeofthepremissesthatthedeceptiondepends。
Nowsometimesanargumentwhichhasnotbeenproperlyreasonedissilly,supposingtheassumptionsrequiredtobeextremelycontrarytothegeneralvieworfalse;butsometimesitoughtnottobeheldincontempt。Forwheneversomequestionisleftout,ofthekindthatconcernsboththesubjectandthenerveoftheargument,thereasoningthathasbothfailedtosecurethisaswell,andalsofailedtoreasonproperly,issilly;butwhenwhatisomittedissomeextraneousquestion,thenitisbynomeanstobelightlydespised,buttheargumentisquiterespectable,thoughthequestionerhasnotputhisquestionswell。
Justasitispossibletobringasolutionsometimesagainsttheargument,atothersagainstthequestionerandhismodeofquestioning,andatothersagainstneitherofthese,likewisealsoitispossibletomarshalone’squestionsandreasoningbothagainstthethesis,andagainsttheanswererandagainstthetime,wheneverthesolutionrequiresalongertimetoexaminethantheperiodavailable。
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Astothenumber,then,andkindofsourceswhencefallaciesariseindiscussion,andhowwearetoshowthatouropponentiscommittingafallacyandmakehimutterparadoxes;moreover,bytheuseofwhatmaterialssolescismisbroughtabout,andhowtoquestionandwhatisthewaytoarrangethequestions;moreover,astothequestionwhatuseisservedbyallargumentsofthiskind,andconcerningtheanswerer’spart,bothasawholeingeneral,andinparticularhowtosolveargumentsandsolecisms—onallthesethingslettheforegoingdiscussionsuffice。Itremainstorecallouroriginalproposalandtobringourdiscussiontoaclosewithafewwordsuponit。
Ourprogrammewas,then,todiscoversomefacultyofreasoningaboutanythemeputbeforeusfromthemostgenerallyacceptedpremissesthatthereare。Forthatistheessentialtaskoftheartofdiscussion(dialectic)andofexamination(peirastic)。Inasmuch,however,asitisannexedtoit,onaccountofthenearpresenceoftheartofsophistry(sophistic),notonlytobeabletoconductanexaminationdialecticallybutalsowithashowofknowledge,wethereforeproposedforourtreatisenotonlytheaforesaidaimofbeingabletoexactanaccountofanyview,butalsotheaimofensuringthatinstandinguptoanargumentweshalldefendourthesisinthesamemannerbymeansofviewsasgenerallyheldaspossible。
Thereasonofthiswehaveexplained;forthis,too,waswhySocratesusedtoaskquestionsandnottoanswerthem;forheusedtoconfessthathedidnotknow。Wehavemadeclear,inthecourseofwhatprecedes,thenumberbothofthepointswithreferencetowhich,andofthematerialsfromwhich,thiswillbeaccomplished,andalsofromwhatsourceswecanbecomewellsuppliedwiththese:wehaveshown,moreover,howtoquestionorarrangethequestioningasawhole,andtheproblemsconcerningtheanswersandsolutionstobeusedagainstthereasoningsofthequestioner。Wehavealsocleareduptheproblemsconcerningallothermattersthatbelongtothesameinquiryintoarguments。InadditiontothiswehavebeenthroughthesubjectofFallacies,aswehavealreadystatedabove。
Thatourprogramme,then,hasbeenadequatelycompletedisclear。
Butwemustnotomittonoticewhathashappenedinregardtothisinquiry。Forinthecaseofalldiscoveriestheresultsofpreviouslaboursthathavebeenhandeddownfromothershavebeenadvancedbitbybitbythosewhohavetakenthemon,whereastheoriginaldiscoveriesgenerallymakeadvancethatissmallatfirstthoughmuchmoreusefulthanthedevelopmentwhichlaterspringsoutofthem。
Foritmaybethatineverything,asthesayingis,’thefirststartisthemainpart’:andforthisreasonalsoitisthemostdifficult;forinproportionasitismostpotentinitsinfluence,soitissmallestinitscompassandthereforemostdifficulttosee:
whereaswhenthisisoncediscovered,itiseasiertoaddanddeveloptheremainderinconnexionwithit。Thisisinfactwhathashappenedinregardtorhetoricalspeechesandtopracticallyalltheotherarts:forthosewhodiscoveredthebeginningsofthemadvancedtheminallonlyalittleway,whereasthecelebritiesofto—dayaretheheirs(sotospeak)ofalongsuccessionofmenwhohaveadvancedthembitbybit,andsohavedevelopedthemtotheirpresentform,Tisiascomingnextafterthefirstfounders,thenThrasymachusafterTisias,andTheodorusnexttohim,whileseveralpeoplehavemadetheirseveralcontributionstoit:andthereforeitisnottobewonderedatthatthearthasattainedconsiderabledimensions。Ofthisinquiry,ontheotherhand,itwasnotthecasethatpartoftheworkhadbeenthoroughlydonebefore,whileparthadnot。Nothingexistedatall。ForthetraininggivenbythepaidprofessorsofcontentiousargumentswaslikethetreatmentofthematterbyGorgias。Fortheyusedtohandoutspeechestobelearnedbyheart,somerhetorical,othersintheformofquestionandanswer,eachsidesupposingthattheirargumentsoneithersidegenerallyfallamongthem。Andthereforetheteachingtheygavetheirpupilswasreadybutrough。Fortheyusedtosupposethattheytrainedpeoplebyimpartingtothemnottheartbutitsproducts,asthoughanyoneprofessingthathewouldimpartaformofknowledgetoobviateanypaininthefeet,werethennottoteachamantheartofshoe—makingorthesourceswhencehecanacquireanythingofthekind,butweretopresenthimwithseveralkindsofshoesofallsorts:
forhehashelpedhimtomeethisneed,buthasnotimpartedanarttohim。Moreover,onthesubjectofRhetoricthereexistsmuchthathasbeensaidlongago,whereasonthesubjectofreasoningwehadnothingelseofanearlierdatetospeakofatall,butwerekeptatworkforalongtimeinexperimentalresearches。If,then,itseemstoyouafterinspectionthat,suchbeingthesituationasitexistedatthestart,ourinvestigationisinasatisfactoryconditioncomparedwiththeotherinquiriesthathavebeendevelopedbytradition,theremustremainforallofyou,orforourstudents,thetaskofextendingusyourpardonfortheshortcomingsoftheinquiry,andforthediscoveriesthereofyourwarmthanks。