DEDICATION
　　Thegrand，leadingprinciple，towardswhicheveryargumentunfoldedinthesepagesdirectlyconverges，istheabsoluteandessentialimportanceofhumandevelopmentinitsrichestdiversity。
　　WILHELMVONHUMBOLDT：SphereandDutiesofGovernment。
　　TOthebelovedanddeploredmemoryofherwhowastheinspirer，andinparttheauthor，ofallthatisbestinmywritings—thefriendandwifewhoseexaltedsenseoftruthandrightwasmystrongestincitement，andwhoseapprobationwasmychiefreward—I
　　dedicatethisvolume。LikeallthatIhavewrittenformanyyears，itbelongsasmuchtoherastome;buttheworkasitstandshashad，inaveryinsufficientdegree，theinestimableadvantageofherrevision;someofthemostimportantportionshavingbeenreservedforamorecarefulre—examination，whichtheyarenowneverdestinedtoreceive。WereIbutcapableofinterpretingtotheworldonehalfthegreatthoughtsandnoblefeelingswhichareburiedinhergrave，I
　　shouldbethemediumofagreaterbenefittoit，thaniseverlikelytoarisefromanythingthatIcanwrite，unpromptedandunassistedbyherallbutunrivalledwisdom。
　　Chapter1
　　IntroductoryTHESUBJECTofthisEssayisnottheso—calledLibertyoftheWill，sounfortunatelyopposedtothemisnameddoctrineofPhilosophicalNecessity;butCivil，orSocialLiberty：thenatureandlimitsofthepowerwhichcanbelegitimatelyexercisedbysocietyovertheindividual。Aquestionseldomstated，andhardlyeverdiscussed，ingeneralterms，butwhichprofoundlyinfluencesthepracticalcontroversiesoftheagebyitslatentpresence，andislikelysoontomakeitselfrecognisedasthevitalquestionofthefuture。Itissofarfrombeingnew，that，inacertainsense，ithasdividedmankind，almostfromtheremotestages;butinthestageofprogressintowhichthemorecivilisedportionsofthespecieshavenowentered，itpresentsitselfundernewconditions，andrequiresadifferentandmorefundamentaltreatment。
　　ThestrugglebetweenLibertyandAuthorityisthemostconspicuousfeatureintheportionsofhistorywithwhichweareearliestfamiliar，particularlyinthatofGreece，Rome，andEngland。Butinoldtimesthiscontestwasbetweensubjects，orsomeclassesofsubjects，andtheGovernment。Byliberty，wasmeantprotectionagainstthetyrannyofthepoliticalrulers。Therulerswereconceived（exceptinsomeofthepopulargovernmentsofGreece）asinanecessarilyantagonisticpositiontothepeoplewhomtheyruled。TheyconsistedofagoverningOne，oragoverningtribeorcaste，whoderivedtheirauthorityfrominheritanceorconquest，who，atallevents，didnotholditatthepleasureofthegoverned，andwhosesupremacymendidnotventure，perhapsdidnotdesire，tocontest，whateverprecautionsmightbetakenagainstitsoppressiveexercise。Theirpowerwasregardedasnecessary，butalsoashighlydangerous;asaweaponwhichtheywouldattempttouseagainsttheirsubjects，nolessthanagainstexternalenemies。Topreventtheweakermembersofthecommunityfrombeingpreyeduponbyinnumerablevultures，itwasneedfulthatthereshouldbeananimalofpreystrongerthantherest，commissionedtokeepthemdown。Butasthekingofthevultureswouldbenolessbentuponpreyingontheflockthananyoftheminorharpies，itwasindispensabletobeinaperpetualattitudeofdefenceagainsthisbeakandclaws。Theaim，therefore，ofpatriotswastosetlimitstothepowerwhichtherulershouldbesufferedtoexerciseoverthecommunity;andthislimitationwaswhattheymeantbyliberty。Itwasattemptedintwoways。First，byobtainingarecognitionofcertainimmunities，calledpoliticallibertiesorrights，whichitwastoberegardedasabreachofdutyintherulertoinfringe，andwhichifhedidinfringe，specificresistance，orgeneralrebellion，washeldtobejustifiable。Asecond，andgenerallyalaterexpedient，wastheestablishmentofconstitutionalchecks，bywhichtheconsentofthecommunity，orofabodyofsomesort，supposedtorepresentitsinterests，wasmadeanecessaryconditiontosomeofthemoreimportantactsofthegoverningpower。Tothefirstofthesemodesoflimitation，therulingpower，inmostEuropeancountries，wascompelled，moreorless，tosubmit。Itwasnotsowiththesecond;and，toattainthis，orwhenalreadyinsomedegreepossessed，toattainitmorecompletely，becameeverywheretheprincipalobjectoftheloversofliberty。Andsolongasmankindwerecontenttocombatoneenemybyanother，andtoberuledbyamaster，onconditionofbeingguaranteedmoreorlessefficaciouslyagainsthistyranny，theydidnotcarrytheiraspirationsbeyondthispoint。
　　Atime，however，came，intheprogressofhumanaffairs，whenmenceasedtothinkitanecessityofnaturethattheirgovernorsshouldbeanindependentpower，opposedininteresttothemselves。ItappearedtothemmuchbetterthatthevariousmagistratesoftheStateshouldbetheirtenantsordelegates，revocableattheirpleasure。
　　Inthatwayalone，itseemed，couldtheyhavecompletesecuritythatthepowersofgovernmentwouldneverbeabusedtotheirdisadvantage。Bydegreesthisnewdemandforelectiveandtemporaryrulersbecametheprominentobjectoftheexertionsofthepopularparty，whereveranysuchpartyexisted;andsuperseded，toaconsiderableextent，thepreviouseffortstolimitthepowerofrulers。Asthestruggleproceededformakingtherulingpoweremanatefromtheperiodicalchoiceoftheruled，somepersonsbegantothinkthattoomuchimportancehadbeenattachedtothelimitationofthepoweritself。That（itmightseem）wasaresourceagainstrulerswhoseinterestswerehabituallyopposedtothoseofthepeople。
　　Whatwasnowwantedwas，thattherulersshouldbeidentifiedwiththepeople;thattheirinterestandwillshouldbetheinterestandwillofthenation。Thenationdidnotneedtobeprotectedagainstitsownwill。Therewasnofearofitstyrannisingoveritself。Lettherulersbeeffectuallyresponsibletoit，promptlyremovablebyit，anditcouldaffordtotrustthemwithpowerofwhichitcoulditselfdictatetheusetobemade。Theirpowerwasbutthenation’sownpower，concentrated，andinaformconvenientforexercise。Thismodeofthought，orratherperhapsoffeeling，wascommonamongthelastgenerationofEuropeanliberalism，intheContinentalsectionofwhichitstillapparentlypredominates。Thosewhoadmitanylimittowhatagovernmentmaydo，exceptinthecaseofsuchgovernmentsastheythinkoughtnottoexist，standoutasbrilliantexceptionsamongthepoliticalthinkersoftheContinent。Asimilartoneofsentimentmightbythistimehavebeenprevalentinourowncountry，ifthecircumstanceswhichforatimeencouragedit，hadcontinuedunaltered。
　　But，inpoliticalandphilosophicaltheories，aswellasinpersons，successdisclosesfaultsandinfirmitieswhichfailuremighthaveconcealedfromobservation。Thenotion，thatthepeoplehavenoneedtolimittheirpoweroverthemselves，mightseemaxiomatic，whenpopulargovernmentwasathingonlydreamedabout，orreadofashavingexistedatsomedistantperiodofthepast。NeitherwasthatnotionnecessarilydisturbedbysuchtemporaryaberrationsasthoseoftheFrenchRevolution，theworstofwhichweretheworkofausurpingfew，andwhich，inanycase，belonged，nottothepermanentworkingofpopularinstitutions，buttoasuddenandconvulsiveoutbreakagainstmonarchicalandaristocraticdespotism。Intime，however，ademocraticrepubliccametooccupyalargeportionoftheearth’ssurface，andmadeitselffeltasoneofthemostpowerfulmembersofthecommunityofnations;andelectiveandresponsiblegovernmentbecamesubjecttotheobservationsandcriticismswhichwaituponagreatexistingfact。Itwasnowperceivedthatsuchphrasesas"self—government，"and"thepowerofthepeopleoverthemselves，"donotexpressthetruestateofthecase。The"people"
　　whoexercisethepowerarenotalwaysthesamepeoplewiththoseoverwhomitisexercised;andthe"self—government"spokenofisnotthegovernmentofeachbyhimself，butofeachbyalltherest。
　　Thewillofthepeople，moreover，practicallymeansthewillofthemostnumerousorthemostactivepartofthepeople;themajority，orthosewhosucceedinmakingthemselvesacceptedasthemajority;
　　thepeople，consequentlymaydesiretooppressapartoftheirnumber;
　　andprecautionsareasmuchneededagainstthisasagainstanyotherabuseofpower。Thelimitation，therefore，ofthepowerofgovernmentoverindividualslosesnoneofitsimportancewhentheholdersofpowerareregularlyaccountabletothecommunity，thatis，tothestrongestpartytherein。Thisviewofthings，recommendingitselfequallytotheintelligenceofthinkersandtotheinclinationofthoseimportantclassesinEuropeansocietytowhoserealorsupposedinterestsdemocracyisadverse，hashadnodifficultyinestablishingitself;andinpoliticalspeculations"thetyrannyofthemajority"isnowgenerallyincludedamongtheevilsagainstwhichsocietyrequirestobeonitsguard。
　　Likeothertyrannies，thetyrannyofthemajoritywasatfirst，andisstillvulgarly，heldindread，chieflyasoperatingthroughtheactsofthepublicauthorities。Butreflectingpersonsperceivedthatwhensocietyisitselfthetyrant—societycollectivelyovertheseparateindividualswhocomposeit—itsmeansoftyrannisingarenotrestrictedtotheactswhichitmaydobythehandsofitspoliticalfunctionaries。Societycananddoesexecuteitsownmandates：andifitissueswrongmandatesinsteadofright，oranymandatesatallinthingswithwhichitoughtnottomeddle，itpractisesasocialtyrannymoreformidablethanmanykindsofpoliticaloppression，since，thoughnotusuallyupheldbysuchextremepenalties，itleavesfewermeansofescape，penetratingmuchmoredeeplyintothedetailsoflife，andenslavingthesoulitself。Protection，therefore，againstthetyrannyofthemagistrateisnotenough：thereneedsprotectionalsoagainstthetyrannyoftheprevailingopinionandfeeling;againstthetendencyofsocietytoimpose，byothermeansthancivilpenalties，itsownideasandpracticesasrulesofconductonthosewhodissentfromthem;tofetterthedevelopment，and，ifpossible，preventtheformation，ofanyindividualitynotinharmonywithitsways，andcompelsallcharacterstofashionthemselvesuponthemodelofitsown。Thereisalimittothelegitimateinterferenceofcollectiveopinionwithindividualindependence：andtofindthatlimit，andmaintainitagainstencroachment，isasindispensabletoagoodconditionofhumanaffairs，asprotectionagainstpoliticaldespotism。
　　Butthoughthispropositionisnotlikelytobecontestedingeneralterms，thepracticalquestion，wheretoplacethelimit—howtomakethefittingadjustmentbetweenindividualindependenceandsocialcontrol—isasubjectonwhichnearlyeverythingremainstobedone。
　　Allthatmakesexistencevaluabletoanyone，dependsontheenforcementofrestraintsupontheactionsofotherpeople。Somerulesofconduct，therefore，mustbeimposed，bylawinthefirstplace，andbyopiniononmanythingswhicharenotfitsubjectsfortheoperationoflaw。Whattheserulesshouldbeistheprincipalquestioninhumanaffairs;butifweexceptafewofthemostobviouscases，itisoneofthosewhichleastprogresshasbeenmadeinresolving。Notwoages，andscarcelyanytwocountries，havedecideditalike;andthedecisionofoneageorcountryisawondertoanother。Yetthepeopleofanygivenageandcountrynomoresuspectanydifficultyinit，thanifitwereasubjectonwhichmankindhadalwaysbeenagreed。Theruleswhichobtainamongthemselvesappeartothemself—evidentandself—justifying。
　　Thisallbutuniversalillusionisoneoftheexamplesofthemagicalinfluenceofcustom，whichisnotonly，astheproverbsays，asecondnature，butiscontinuallymistakenforthefirst。Theeffectofcustom，inpreventinganymisgivingrespectingtherulesofconductwhichmankindimposeononeanother，isallthemorecompletebecausethesubjectisoneonwhichitisnotgenerallyconsiderednecessarythatreasonsshouldbegiven，eitherbyonepersontoothersorbyeachtohimself。Peopleareaccustomedtobelieve，andhavebeenencouragedinthebeliefbysomewhoaspiretothecharacterofphilosophers，thattheirfeelings，onsubjectsofthisnature，arebetterthanreasons，andrenderreasonsunnecessary。Thepracticalprinciplewhichguidesthemtotheiropinionsontheregulationofhumanconduct，isthefeelingineachperson’smindthateverybodyshouldberequiredtoactashe，andthosewithwhomhesympathises，wouldlikethemtoact。Noone，indeed，acknowledgestohimselfthathisstandardofjudgmentishisownliking;butanopiniononapointofconduct，notsupportedbyreasons，canonlycountasoneperson’spreference;andifthereasons，whengiven，areamereappealtoasimilarpreferencefeltbyotherpeople，itisstillonlymanypeople’slikinginsteadofone。Toanordinaryman，however，hisownpreference，thussupported，isnotonlyaperfectlysatisfactoryreason，buttheonlyonehegenerallyhasforanyofhisnotionsofmorality，taste，orpropriety，whicharenotexpresslywritteninhisreligiouscreed;andhischiefguideintheinterpretationevenofthat。Men’sopinions，accordingly，onwhatislaudableorblamable，areaffectedbyallthemultifariouscauseswhichinfluencetheirwishesinregardtotheconductofothers，andwhichareasnumerousasthosewhichdeterminetheirwishesonanyothersubject。
　　Sometimestheirreason—atothertimestheirprejudicesorsuperstitions：oftentheirsocialaffections，notseldomtheirantisocialones，theirenvyorjealousy，theirarroganceorcontemptuousness：butmostcommonlytheirdesiresorfearsforthemselves—theirlegitimateorillegitimateself—interest。
　　Whereverthereisanascendantclass，alargeportionofthemoralityofthecountryemanatesfromitsclassinterests，anditsfeelingsofclasssuperiority。ThemoralitybetweenSpartansandHelots，betweenplantersandnegroes，betweenprincesandsubjects，betweennoblesandroturiers，betweenmenandwomen，hasbeenforthemostpartthecreationoftheseclassinterestsandfeelings：
　　andthesentimentsthusgeneratedreactinturnuponthemoralfeelingsofthemembersoftheascendantclass，intheirrelationsamongthemselves。Where，ontheotherhand，aclass，formerlyascendant，haslostitsascendancy，orwhereitsascendancyisunpopular，theprevailingmoralsentimentsfrequentlybeartheimpressofanimpatientdislikeofsuperiority。Anothergranddeterminingprincipleoftherulesofconduct，bothinactandforbearance，whichhavebeenenforcedbylaworopinion，hasbeentheservilityofmankindtowardsthesupposedpreferencesoraversionsoftheirtemporalmastersoroftheirgods。Thisservility，thoughessentiallyselfish，isnothypocrisy;itgivesrisetoperfectlygenuinesentimentsofabhorrence;itmademenburnmagiciansandheretics。Amongsomanybaserinfluences，thegeneralandobviousinterestsofsocietyhaveofcoursehadashare，andalargeone，inthedirectionofthemoralsentiments：less，however，asamatterofreason，andontheirownaccount，thanasaconsequenceofthesympathiesandantipathieswhichgrewoutofthem：andsympathiesandantipathieswhichhadlittleornothingtodowiththeinterestsofsociety，havemadethemselvesfeltintheestablishmentofmoralitieswithquiteasgreatforce。
　　Thelikingsanddislikingsofsociety，orofsomepowerfulportionofit，arethusthemainthingwhichhaspracticallydeterminedtheruleslaiddownforgeneralobservance，underthepenaltiesoflaworopinion。Andingeneral，thosewhohavebeeninadvanceofsocietyinthoughtandfeeling，haveleftthisconditionofthingsunassailedinprinciple，howevertheymayhavecomeintoconflictwithitinsomeofitsdetails。Theyhaveoccupiedthemselvesratherininquiringwhatthingssocietyoughttolikeordislike，thaninquestioningwhetheritslikingsordislikingsshouldbealawtoindividuals。Theypreferredendeavouringtoalterthefeelingsofmankindontheparticularpointsonwhichtheywerethemselvesheretical，ratherthanmakecommoncauseindefenceoffreedom，withhereticsgenerally。Theonlycaseinwhichthehighergroundhasbeentakenonprincipleandmaintainedwithconsistency，byanybutanindividualhereandthere，isthatofreligiousbelief：acaseinstructiveinmanyways，andnotleastsoasformingamoststrikinginstanceofthefallibilityofwhatiscalledthemoralsense：fortheodiumtheologicum，inasincerebigot，isoneofthemostunequivocalcasesofmoralfeeling。ThosewhofirstbroketheyokeofwhatcalleditselftheUniversalChurch，wereingeneralaslittlewillingtopermitdifferenceofreligiousopinionasthatchurchitself。Butwhentheheatoftheconflictwasover，withoutgivingacompletevictorytoanyparty，andeachchurchorsectwasreducedtolimititshopestoretainingpossessionofthegrounditalreadyoccupied;minorities，seeingthattheyhadnochanceofbecomingmajorities，wereunderthenecessityofpleadingtothosewhomtheycouldnotconvert，forpermissiontodiffer。Itisaccordinglyonthisbattlefield，almostsolely，thattherightsoftheindividualagainstsocietyhavebeenassertedonbroadgroundsofprinciple，andtheclaimofsocietytoexerciseauthorityoverdissentientsopenlycontroverted。Thegreatwriterstowhomtheworldoweswhatreligiouslibertyitpossesses，havemostlyassertedfreedomofconscienceasanindefeasibleright，anddeniedabsolutelythatahumanbeingisaccountabletoothersforhisreligiousbelief。Yetsonaturaltomankindisintoleranceinwhatevertheyreallycareabout，thatreligiousfreedomhashardlyanywherebeenpracticallyrealised，exceptwherereligiousindifference，whichdislikestohaveitspeacedisturbedbytheologicalquarrels，hasaddeditsweighttothescale。Inthemindsofalmostallreligiouspersons，eveninthemosttolerantcountries，thedutyoftolerationisadmittedwithtacitreserves。Onepersonwillbearwithdissentinmattersofchurchgovernment，butnotofdogma;
　　anothercantolerateeverybody，shortofaPapistoraUnitarian;
　　anothereveryonewhobelievesinrevealedreligion;afewextendtheircharityalittlefurther，butstopatthebeliefinaGodandinafuturestate。Whereverthesentimentofthemajorityisstillgenuineandintense，itisfoundtohaveabatedlittleofitsclaimtobeobeyed。
　　InEngland，fromthepeculiarcircumstancesofourpoliticalhistory，thoughtheyokeofopinionisperhapsheavier，thatoflawislighter，thaninmostothercountriesofEurope;andthereisconsiderablejealousyofdirectinterference，bythelegislativeortheexecutivepower，withprivateconduct;notsomuchfromanyjustregardfortheindependenceoftheindividual，asfromthestillsubsistinghabitoflookingonthegovernmentasrepresentinganoppositeinteresttothepublic。Themajorityhavenotyetlearnttofeelthepowerofthegovernmenttheirpower，oritsopinionstheiropinions。Whentheydoso，individuallibertywillprobablybeasmuchexposedtoinvasionfromthegovernment，asitalreadyisfrompublicopinion。But，asyet，thereisaconsiderableamountoffeelingreadytobecalledforthagainstanyattemptofthelawtocontrolindividualsinthingsinwhichtheyhavenothithertobeenaccustomedtobecontrolledbyit;andthiswithverylittlediscriminationastowhetherthematteris，orisnot，withinthelegitimatesphereoflegalcontrol;insomuchthatthefeeling，highlysalutaryonthewhole，isperhapsquiteasoftenmisplacedaswellgroundedintheparticularinstancesofitsapplication。Thereis，infact，norecognisedprinciplebywhichtheproprietyorimproprietyofgovernmentinterferenceiscustomarilytested。Peopledecideaccordingtotheirpersonalpreferences。Some，whenevertheyseeanygoodtobedone，oreviltoberemedied，wouldwillinglyinstigatethegovernmenttoundertakethebusiness;whileothersprefertobearalmostanyamountofsocialevil，ratherthanaddonetothedepartmentsofhumaninterestsamenabletogovernmentalcontrol。Andmenrangethemselvesononeortheothersideinanyparticularcase，accordingtothisgeneraldirectionoftheirsentiments;oraccordingtothedegreeofinterestwhichtheyfeelintheparticularthingwhichitisproposedthatthegovernmentshoulddo，oraccordingtothebelieftheyentertainthatthegovernmentwould，orwouldnot，doitinthemannertheyprefer;butveryrarelyonaccountofanyopiniontowhichtheyconsistentlyadhere，astowhatthingsarefittobedonebyagovernment。Anditseemstomethatinconsequenceofthisabsenceofruleorprinciple，onesideisatpresentasofwrongastheother;theinterferenceofgovernmentis，withaboutequalfrequency，improperlyinvokedandimproperlycondemned。
　　TheobjectofthisEssayistoassertoneverysimpleprinciple，asentitledtogovernabsolutelythedealingsofsocietywiththeindividualinthewayofcompulsionandcontrol，whetherthemeansusedbephysicalforceintheformoflegalpenalties，orthemoralcoercionofpublicopinion。Thatprincipleis，thatthesoleendforwhichmankindarewarranted，individuallyorcollectively，ininterferingwiththelibertyofactionofanyoftheirnumber，isself—protection。Thattheonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilisedcommunity，againsthiswill，istopreventharmtoothers。Hisowngood，eitherphysicalormoral，isnotasufficientwarrant。Hecannotrightfullybecompelledtodoorforbearbecauseitwillbebetterforhimtodoso，becauseitwillmakehimhappier，because，intheopinionsofothers，todosowouldbewise，orevenright。Thesearegoodreasonsforremonstratingwithhim，orreasoningwithhim，orpersuadinghim，orentreatinghim，butnotforcompellinghim，orvisitinghimwithanyevilincasehedootherwise。Tojustifythat，theconductfromwhichitisdesiredtodeterhimmustbecalculatedtoproduceeviltosomeoneelse。Theonlypartoftheconductofanyone，forwhichheisamenabletosociety，isthatwhichconcernsothers。Inthepartwhichmerelyconcernshimself，hisindependenceis，ofright，absolute。Overhimself，overhisownbodyandmind，theindividualissovereign。
　　Itis，perhaps，hardlynecessarytosaythatthisdoctrineismeanttoapplyonlytohumanbeingsinthematurityoftheirfaculties。Wearenotspeakingofchildren，orofyoungpersonsbelowtheagewhichthelawmayfixasthatofmanhoodorwomanhood。
　　Thosewhoarestillinastatetorequirebeingtakencareofbyothers，mustbeprotectedagainsttheirownactionsaswellasagainstexternalinjury。Forthesamereason，wemayleaveoutofconsiderationthosebackwardstatesofsocietyinwhichtheraceitselfmaybeconsideredasinitsnonage。Theearlydifficultiesinthewayofspontaneousprogressaresogreat，thatthereisseldomanychoiceofmeansforovercomingthem;andarulerfullofthespiritofimprovementiswarrantedintheuseofanyexpedientsthatwillattainanend，perhapsotherwiseunattainable。Despotismisalegitimatemodeofgovernmentindealingwithbarbarians，providedtheendbetheirimprovement，andthemeansjustifiedbyactuallyeffectingthatend。
　　Liberty，asaprinciple，hasnoapplicationtoanystateofthingsanteriortothetimewhenmankindhavebecomecapableofbeingimprovedbyfreeandequaldiscussion。Untilthen，thereisnothingforthembutimplicitobediencetoanAkbaroraCharlemagne，iftheyaresofortunateastofindone。Butassoonasmankindhaveattainedthecapacityofbeingguidedtotheirownimprovementbyconvictionorpersuasion（aperiodlongsincereachedinallnationswithwhomweneedhereconcernourselves），compulsion，eitherinthedirectformorinthatofpainsandpenaltiesfornon—compliance，isnolongeradmissibleasameanstotheirowngood，andjustifiableonlyforthesecurityofothers。
　　ItispropertostatethatIforegoanyadvantagewhichcouldbederivedtomyargumentfromtheideaofabstractright，asathingindependentofutility。Iregardutilityastheultimateappealonallethicalquestions;butitmustbeutilityinthelargestsense，groundedonthepermanentinterestsofamanasaprogressivebeing。
　　Thoseinterests，Icontend，authorisethesubjectionofindividualspontaneitytoexternalcontrol，onlyinrespecttothoseactionsofeach，whichconcerntheinterestofotherpeople。Ifanyonedoesanacthurtfultoothers，thereisaprimafaciecaseforpunishinghim，bylaw，or，wherelegalpenaltiesarenotsafelyapplicable，bygeneraldisapprobation。Therearealsomanypositiveactsforthebenefitofothers，whichhemayrightfullybecompelledtoperform;
　　suchastogiveevidenceinacourtofjustice;tobearhisfairshareinthecommondefence，orinanyotherjointworknecessarytotheinterestofthesocietyofwhichheenjoystheprotection;andtoperformcertainactsofindividualbeneficence，suchassavingafellowcreature’slife，orinterposingtoprotectthedefencelessagainstill—usage，thingswhichwheneveritisobviouslyaman’sdutytodo，hemayrightfullybemaderesponsibletosocietyfornotdoing。Apersonmaycauseeviltoothersnotonlybyhisactionsbutbyhisinaction，andineithercaseheisjustlyaccountabletothemfortheinjury。Thelattercase，itistrue，requiresamuchmorecautiousexerciseofcompulsionthantheformer。Tomakeanyoneanswerablefordoingeviltoothersistherule;tomakehimanswerablefornotpreventingevilis，comparativelyspeaking，theexception。Yettherearemanycasesclearenoughandgraveenoughtojustifythatexception。Inallthingswhichregardtheexternalrelationsoftheindividual，heisdejureamenabletothosewhoseinterestsareconcerned，and，ifneedbe，tosocietyastheirprotector。Thereareoftengoodreasonsfornotholdinghimtotheresponsibility;butthesereasonsmustarisefromthespecialexpedienciesofthecase：eitherbecauseitisakindofcaseinwhichheisonthewholelikelytoactbetter，whenlefttohisowndiscretion，thanwhencontrolledinanywayinwhichsocietyhaveitintheirpowertocontrolhim;orbecausetheattempttoexercisecontrolwouldproduceotherevils，greaterthanthosewhichitwouldprevent。Whensuchreasonsastheseprecludetheenforcementofresponsibility，theconscienceoftheagenthimselfshouldstepintothevacantjudgmentseat，andprotectthoseinterestsofotherswhichhavenoexternalprotection;judginghimselfallthemorerigidly，becausethecasedoesnotadmitofhisbeingmadeaccountabletothejudgmentofhisfellowcreatures。
　　Butthereisasphereofactioninwhichsociety，asdistinguishedfromtheindividual，has，ifany，onlyanindirectinterest;
　　comprehendingallthatportionofaperson’slifeandconductwhichaffectsonlyhimself，orifitalsoaffectsothers，onlywiththeirfree，voluntary，andundeceivedconsentandparticipation。WhenI
　　sayonlyhimself，Imeandirectly，andinthefirstinstance;forwhateveraffectshimself，mayaffectothersthroughhimself;andtheobjectionwhichmaybegroundedonthiscontingency，willreceiveconsiderationinthesequel。This，then，istheappropriateregionofhumanliberty。Itcomprises，first，theinwarddomainofconsciousness;demandinglibertyofconscienceinthemostcomprehensivesense;libertyofthoughtandfeeling;absolutefreedomofopinionandsentimentonallsubjects，practicalorspeculative，scientific，moral，ortheological。Thelibertyofexpressingandpublishingopinionsmayseemtofallunderadifferentprinciple，sinceitbelongstothatpartoftheconductofanindividualwhichconcernsotherpeople;but，beingalmostofasmuchimportanceasthelibertyofthoughtitself，andrestingingreatpartonthesamereasons，ispracticallyinseparablefromit。
　　Secondly，theprinciplerequireslibertyoftastesandpursuits;offramingtheplanofourlifetosuitourowncharacter;ofdoingaswelike，subjecttosuchconsequencesasmayfollow：withoutimpedimentfromourfellowcreatures，solongaswhatwedodoesnotharmthem，eventhoughtheyshouldthinkourconductfoolish，perverse，orwrong。
　　Thirdly，fromthislibertyofeachindividual，followstheliberty，withinthesamelimits，ofcombinationamongindividuals;freedomtounite，foranypurposenotinvolvingharmtoothers：thepersonscombiningbeingsupposedtobeoffullage，andnotforcedordeceived。
　　Nosocietyinwhichtheselibertiesarenot，onthewhole，respected，isfree，whatevermaybeitsformofgovernment;andnoneiscompletelyfreeinwhichtheydonotexistabsoluteandunqualified。Theonlyfreedomwhichdeservesthename，isthatofpursuingourowngoodinourownway，solongaswedonotattempttodepriveothersoftheirs，orimpedetheireffortstoobtainit。
　　Eachistheproperguardianofhisownhealth，whetherbodily，ormentalandspiritual。Mankindaregreatergainersbysufferingeachothertoliveasseemsgoodtothemselves，thanbycompellingeachtoliveasseemsgoodtotherest。
　　Thoughthisdoctrineisanythingbutnew，and，tosomepersons，mayhavetheairofatruism，thereisnodoctrinewhichstandsmoredirectlyopposedtothegeneraltendencyofexistingopinionandpractice。Societyhasexpendedfullyasmucheffortintheattempt（accordingtoitslights）tocompelpeopletoconformtoitsnotionsofpersonalasofsocialexcellence。Theancientcommonwealthsthoughtthemselvesentitledtopractise，andtheancientphilosopherscountenanced，theregulationofeverypartofprivateconductbypublicauthority，onthegroundthattheStatehadadeepinterestinthewholebodilyandmentaldisciplineofeveryoneofitscitizens;amodeofthinkingwhichmayhavebeenadmissibleinsmallrepublicssurroundedbypowerfulenemies，inconstantperilofbeingsubvertedbyforeignattackorinternalcommotion，andtowhichevenashortintervalofrelaxedenergyandself—commandmightsoeasilybefatalthattheycouldnotaffordtowaitforthesalutarypermanenteffectsoffreedom。Inthemodernworld，thegreatersizeofpoliticalcommunities，and，aboveall，theseparationbetweenspiritualandtemporalauthority（whichplacedthedirectionofmen’sconsciencesinotherhandsthanthosewhichcontrolledtheirworldlyaffairs），preventedsogreataninterferencebylawinthedetailsofprivatelife;buttheenginesofmoralrepressionhavebeenwieldedmorestrenuouslyagainstdivergencefromthereigningopinioninself—regarding，thaneveninsocialmatters;religion，themostpowerfuloftheelementswhichhaveenteredintotheformationofmoralfeeling，havingalmostalwaysbeengovernedeitherbytheambitionofahierarchy，seekingcontrolovereverydepartmentofhumanconduct，orbythespiritofPuritanism。Andsomeofthosemodernreformerswhohaveplacedthemselvesinstrongestoppositiontothereligionsofthepast，havebeennowaybehindeitherchurchesorsectsintheirassertionoftherightofspiritualdomination：M。
　　Comte，inparticular，whosesocialsystem，asunfoldedinhisSystemedePolitiquePositive，aimsatestablishing（thoughbymoralmorethanbylegalappliances）adespotismofsocietyovertheindividual，surpassinganythingcontemplatedinthepoliticalidealofthemostrigiddisciplinarianamongtheancientphilosophers。
　　Apartfromthepeculiartenetsofindividualthinkers，thereisalsointheworldatlargeanincreasinginclinationtostretchundulythepowersofsocietyovertheindividual，bothbytheforceofopinionandevenbythatoflegislation;andasthetendencyofallthechangestakingplaceintheworldistostrengthensociety，anddiminishthepoweroftheindividual，thisencroachmentisnotoneoftheevilswhichtendspontaneouslytodisappear，but，onthecontrary，togrowmoreandmoreformidable。Thedispositionofmankind，whetherasrulersorasfellow—citizens，toimposetheirownopinionsandinclinationsasaruleofconductonothers，issoenergeticallysupportedbysomeofthebestandbysomeoftheworstfeelingsincidenttohumannature，thatitishardlyeverkeptunderrestraintbyanythingbutwantofpower;andasthepowerisnotdeclining，butgrowing，unlessastrongbarrierofmoralconvictioncanberaisedagainstthemischief，wemustexpect，inthepresentcircumstancesoftheworld，toseeitincrease。
　　Itwillbeconvenientfortheargument，if，insteadofatonceenteringuponthegeneralthesis，weconfineourselvesinthefirstinstancetoasinglebranchofit，onwhichtheprincipleherestatedis，ifnotfully，yettoacertainpoint，recognisedbythecurrentopinions。ThisonebranchistheLibertyofThought：fromwhichitisimpossibletoseparatethecognatelibertyofspeakingandofwriting。Althoughtheseliberties，tosomeconsiderableamount，formpartofthepoliticalmoralityofallcountrieswhichprofessreligioustolerationandfreeinstitutions，thegrounds，bothphilosophicalandpractical，onwhichtheyrest，areperhapsnotsofamiliartothegeneralmind，norsothoroughlyappreciatedbymanyevenoftheleadersofopinion，asmighthavebeenexpected。Thosegrounds，whenrightlyunderstood，areofmuchwiderapplicationthantoonlyonedivisionofthesubject，andathoroughconsiderationofthispartofthequestionwillbefoundthebestintroductiontotheremainder。ThosetowhomnothingwhichIamabouttosaywillbenew，maytherefore，Ihope，excuseme，ifonasubjectwhichfornowthreecenturieshasbeensooftendiscussed，Iventureononediscussionmore。
　　Chapter2。
　　OftheLibertyofThoughtandDiscussion。
　　THETIME，itistobehoped，isgoneby，whenanydefencewouldbenecessaryofthe"libertyofthepress"asoneofthesecuritiesagainstcorruptortyrannicalgovernment。Noargument，wemaysuppose，cannowbeneeded，againstpermittingalegislatureoranexecutive，notidentifiedininterestwiththepeople，toprescribeopinionstothem，anddeterminewhatdoctrinesorwhatargumentstheyshallbeallowedtohear。Thisaspectofthequestion，besides，hasbeensoofandsotriumphantlyenforcedbyprecedingwriters，thatitneedsnotbespeciallyinsistedoninthisplace。ThoughthelawofEngland，onthesubjectofthepress，isasserviletothisdayasitwasinthetimeoftheTudors，thereislittledangerofitsbeingactuallyputinforceagainstpoliticaldiscussion，exceptduringsometemporarypanic，whenfearofinsurrectiondrivesministersandjudgesfromtheirpropriety;*and，speakinggenerally，itisnot，inconstitutionalcountries，tobeapprehended，thatthegovernment，whethercompletelyresponsibletothepeopleornot，willoftenattempttocontroltheexpressionofopinion，exceptwhenindoingsoitmakesitselftheorganofthegeneralintoleranceofthepublic。
　　Letussuppose，therefore，thatthegovernmentisentirelyatonewiththepeople，andneverthinksofexertinganypowerofcoercionunlessinagreementwithwhatitconceivestobetheirvoice。ButI
　　denytherightofthepeopletoexercisesuchcoercion，eitherbythemselvesorbytheirgovernment。Thepoweritselfisillegitimate。
　　Thebestgovernmenthasnomoretitletoitthantheworst。Itisasnoxious，ormorenoxious，whenexertedinaccordancewithpublicopinion，thanwheninoppositiontoit。Ifallmankindminusonewereofoneopinion，andonlyonepersonwereofthecontraryopinion，mankindwouldbenomorejustifiedinsilencingthatoneperson，thanhe，ifhehadthepower，wouldbejustifiedinsilencingmankind。
　　Wereanopinionapersonalpossessionofnovalueexcepttotheowner;
　　iftobeobstructedintheenjoymentofitweresimplyaprivateinjury，itwouldmakesomedifferencewhethertheinjurywasinflictedonlyonafewpersonsoronmany。Butthepeculiarevilofsilencingtheexpressionofanopinionis，thatitisrobbingthehumanrace;
　　posterityaswellastheexistinggeneration;thosewhodissentfromtheopinion，stillmorethanthosewhoholdit。Iftheopinionisright，theyaredeprivedoftheopportunityofexchangingerrorfortruth：ifwrong，theylose，whatisalmostasgreatabenefit，theclearerperceptionandlivelierimpressionoftruth，producedbyitscollisionwitherror。
　　*Thesewordshadscarcelybeenwritten，when，asiftogivethemanemphaticcontradiction，occurredtheGovernmentPressProsecutionsof1858。Thatill—judgedinterferencewiththelibertyofpublicdiscussionhasnot，however，inducedmetoalterasinglewordinthetext，norhasitatallweakenedmyconvictionthat，momentsofpanicexcepted，theeraofpainsandpenaltiesforpoliticaldiscussionhas，inourowncountry，passedaway。For，inthefirstplace，theprosecutionswerenotpersistedin;and，inthesecond，theywerenever，properlyspeaking，politicalprosecutions。
　　Theoffencechargedwasnotthatofcriticisinginstitutions，ortheactsorpersonsofrulers，butofcirculatingwhatwasdeemedanimmoraldoctrine，thelawfulnessofTyrannicide。
　　Iftheargumentsofthepresentchapterareofanyvalidity，thereoughttoexistthefullestlibertyofprofessinganddiscussing，asamatterofethicalconviction，anydoctrine，howeverimmoralitmaybeconsidered。Itwould，therefore，beirrelevantandoutofplacetoexaminehere，whetherthedoctrineofTyrannicidedeservesthattitle。Ishallcontentmyselfwithsayingthatthesubjecthasbeenatalltimesoneoftheopenquestionsofmorals;thattheactofaprivatecitizeninstrikingdownacriminal，who，byraisinghimselfabovethelaw，hasplacedhimselfbeyondthereachoflegalpunishmentorcontrol，hasbeenaccountedbywholenations，andbysomeofthebestandwisestofmen，notacrime，butanactofexaltedvirtue;andthat，rightorwrong，itisnotofthenatureofassassination，butofcivilwar。Assuch，Iholdthattheinstigationtoit，inaspecificcase，maybeapropersubjectofpunishment，butonlyifanovertacthasfollowed，andatleastaprobableconnectioncanbeestablishedbetweentheactandtheinstigation。Eventhen，itisnotaforeigngovernment，buttheverygovernmentassailed，whichalone，intheexerciseofself—defence，canlegitimatelypunishattacksdirectedagainstitsownexistence。
　　Itisnecessarytoconsiderseparatelythesetwohypotheses，eachofwhichhasadistinctbranchoftheargumentcorrespondingtoit。Wecanneverbesurethattheopinionweareendeavouringtostifleisafalseopinion;andifweweresure，stiflingitwouldbeanevilstill。
　　First：theopinionwhichitisattemptedtosuppressbyauthoritymaypossiblybetrue。Thosewhodesiretosuppressit，ofcoursedenyitstruth;buttheyarenotinfallible。Theyhavenoauthoritytodecidethequestionforallmankind，andexcludeeveryotherpersonfromthemeansofjudging。Torefuseahearingtoanopinion，becausetheyaresurethatitisfalse，istoassumethattheircertaintyisthesamethingasabsolutecertainty。Allsilencingofdiscussionisanassumptionofinfallibility。Itscondemnationmaybeallowedtorestonthiscommonargument，nottheworseforbeingcommon。
　　Unfortunatelyforthegoodsenseofmankind，thefactoftheirfallibilityisfarfromcarryingtheweightintheirpracticaljudgmentwhichisalwaysallowedtoitintheory;forwhileeveryonewellknowshimselftobefallible，fewthinkitnecessarytotakeanyprecautionsagainsttheirownfallibility，oradmitthesuppositionthatanyopinion，ofwhichtheyfeelverycertain，maybeoneoftheexamplesoftheerrortowhichtheyacknowledgethemselvestobeliable。Absoluteprinces，orotherswhoareaccustomedtounlimiteddeference，usuallyfeelthiscompleteconfidenceintheirownopinionsonnearlyallsubjects。Peoplemorehappilysituated，whosometimesheartheiropinionsdisputed，andarenotwhollyunusedtobesetrightwhentheyarewrong，placethesameunboundedrelianceonlyonsuchoftheiropinionsasaresharedbyallwhosurroundthem，ortowhomtheyhabituallydefer;forinproportiontoaman’swantofconfidenceinhisownsolitaryjudgment，doesheusuallyrepose，withimplicittrust，ontheinfallibilityof"theworld"ingeneral。Andtheworld，toeachindividual，meansthepartofitwithwhichhecomesincontact;hisparty，hissect，hischurch，hisclassofsociety;themanmaybecalled，bycomparison，almostliberalandlarge—mindedtowhomitmeansanythingsocomprehensiveashisowncountryorhisownage。Norishisfaithinthiscollectiveauthorityatallshakenbyhisbeingawarethatotherages，countries，sects，churches，classes，andpartieshavethought，andevennowthink，theexactreverse。Hedevolvesuponhisownworldtheresponsibilityofbeingintherightagainstthedissentientworldsofotherpeople;anditnevertroubleshimthatmereaccidenthasdecidedwhichofthesenumerousworldsistheobjectofhisreliance，andthatthesamecauseswhichmakehimaChurchmaninLondon，wouldhavemadehimaBuddhistoraConfucianinPekin。Yetitisasevidentinitself，asanyamountofargumentcanmakeit，thatagesarenomoreinfalliblethanindividuals;everyagehavingheldmanyopinionswhichsubsequentageshavedeemednotonlyfalsebutabsurd;anditisascertainthatmanyopinionsnowgeneralwillberejectedbyfutureages，asitisthatmany，oncegeneral，arerejectedbythepresent。
　　Theobjectionlikelytobemadetothisargumentwouldprobablytakesomesuchformasthefollowing。Thereisnogreaterassumptionofinfallibilityinforbiddingthepropagationoferror，thaninanyotherthingwhichisdonebypublicauthorityonitsownjudgmentandresponsibility。Judgmentisgiventomenthattheymayuseit。
　　Becauseitmaybeusederroneously，arementobetoldthattheyoughtnottouseitatall？Toprohibitwhattheythinkpernicious，isnotclaimingexemptionfromerror，butfulfillingthedutyincumbentonthem，althoughfallible，ofactingontheirconscientiousconviction。Ifwewerenevertoactonouropinions，becausethoseopinionsmaybewrong，weshouldleaveallourinterestsuncaredfor，andallourdutiesunperformed。Anobjectionwhichappliestoallconductcanbenovalidobjectiontoanyconductinparticular。Itisthedutyofgovernments，andofindividuals，toformthetruestopinionstheycan;toformthemcarefully，andneverimposethemuponothersunlesstheyarequitesureofbeingright。Butwhentheyaresure（suchreasonersmaysay），itisnotconscientiousnessbutcowardicetoshrinkfromactingontheiropinions，andallowdoctrineswhichtheyhonestlythinkdangeroustothewelfareofmankind，eitherinthislifeorinanother，tobescatteredabroadwithoutrestraint，becauseotherpeople，inlessenlightenedtimes，havepersecutedopinionsnowbelievedtobetrue。Letustakecare，itmaybesaid，nottomakethesamemistake：butgovernmentsandnationshavemademistakesinotherthings，whicharenotdeniedtobefitsubjectsfortheexerciseofauthority：theyhavelaidonbadtaxes，madeunjustwars。Oughtwethereforetolayonnotaxes，and，underwhateverprovocation，makenowars？Men，andgovernments，mustacttothebestoftheirability。Thereisnosuchthingasabsolutecertainty，butthereisassurancesufficientforthepurposesofhumanlife。Wemay，andmust，assumeouropiniontobetruefortheguidanceofourownconduct：anditisassumingnomorewhenweforbidbadmentopervertsocietybythepropagationofopinionswhichweregardasfalseandpernicious。
　　Ianswer，thatitisassumingverymuchmore。Thereisthegreatestdifferencebetweenpresuminganopiniontobetrue，because，witheveryopportunityforcontestingit，ithasnotbeenrefuted，andassumingitstruthforthepurposeofnotpermittingitsrefutation。Completelibertyofcontradictinganddisprovingouropinionistheveryconditionwhichjustifiesusinassumingitstruthforpurposesofaction;andonnoothertermscanabeingwithhumanfacultieshaveanyrationalassuranceofbeingright。
　　Whenweconsidereitherthehistoryofopinion，ortheordinaryconductofhumanlife，towhatisittobeascribedthattheoneandtheotherarenoworsethantheyare？Notcertainlytotheinherentforceofthehumanunderstanding;for，onanymatternotself—evident，thereareninety—ninepersonstotallyincapableofjudgingofitforonewhoiscapable;andthecapacityofthehundredthpersonisonlycomparative;forthemajorityoftheeminentmenofeverypastgenerationheldmanyopinionsnowknowntobeerroneous，anddidorapprovednumerousthingswhichnoonewillnowjustify。Whyisit，then，thatthereisonthewholeapreponderanceamongmankindofrationalopinionsandrationalconduct？Iftherereallyisthispreponderance—whichtheremustbeunlesshumanaffairsare，andhavealwaysbeen，inanalmostdesperatestate—itisowingtoaqualityofthehumanmind，thesourceofeverythingrespectableinmaneitherasanintellectualorasamoralbeing，namely，thathiserrorsarecorrigible。Heiscapableofrectifyinghismistakes，bydiscussionandexperience。Notbyexperiencealone。Theremustbediscussion，toshowhowexperienceistobeinterpreted。Wrongopinionsandpracticesgraduallyyieldtofactandargument;butfactsandarguments，toproduceanyeffectonthemind，mustbebroughtbeforeit。Veryfewfactsareabletotelltheirownstory，withoutcommentstobringouttheirmeaning。Thewholestrengthandvalue，then，ofhumanjudgment，dependingontheoneproperty，thatitcanbesetrightwhenitiswrong，reliancecanbeplacedonitonlywhenthemeansofsettingitrightarekeptconstantlyathand。Inthecaseofanypersonwhosejudgmentisreallydeservingofconfidence，howhasitbecomeso？Becausehehaskepthismindopentocriticismofhisopinionsandconduct。Becauseithasbeenhispracticetolistentoallthatcouldbesaidagainsthim;toprofitbyasmuchofitaswasjust，andexpoundtohimself，anduponoccasiontoothers，thefallacyofwhatwasfallacious。Becausehehasfelt，thattheonlywayinwhichahumanbeingcanmakesomeapproachtoknowingthewholeofasubject，isbyhearingwhatcanbesaidaboutitbypersonsofeveryvarietyofopinion，andstudyingallmodesinwhichitcanbelookedatbyeverycharacterofmind。Nowisemaneveracquiredhiswisdominanymodebutthis;norisitinthenatureofhumanintellecttobecomewiseinanyothermanner。Thesteadyhabitofcorrectingandcompletinghisownopinionbycollatingitwiththoseofothers，sofarfromcausingdoubtandhesitationincarryingitintopractice，istheonlystablefoundationforajustrelianceonit：for，beingcognisantofallthatcan，atleastobviously，besaidagainsthim，andhavingtakenuphispositionagainstallgainsayers—knowingthathehassoughtforobjectionsanddifficulties，insteadofavoidingthem，andhasshutoutnolightwhichcanbethrownuponthesubjectfromanyquarter—hehasarighttothinkhisjudgmentbetterthanthatofanyperson，oranymultitude，whohavenotgonethroughasimilarprocess。
　　Itisnottoomuchtorequirethatwhatthewisestofmankind，thosewhoarebestentitledtotrusttheirownjudgment，findnecessarytowarranttheirrelyingonit，shouldbesubmittedtobythatmiscellaneouscollectionofafewwiseandmanyfoolishindividuals，calledthepublic。Themostintolerantofchurches，theRomanCatholicChurch，evenatthecanonisationofasaint，admits，andlistenspatientlyto，a"devil’sadvocate。"Theholiestofmen，itappears，cannotbeadmittedtoposthumoushonours，untilallthatthedevilcouldsayagainsthimisknownandweighed。IfeventheNewtonianphilosophywerenotpermittedtobequestioned，mankindcouldnotfeelascompleteassuranceofitstruthastheynowdo。Thebeliefswhichwehavemostwarrantforhavenosafeguardtoreston，butastandinginvitationtothewholeworldtoprovethemunfounded。Ifthechallengeisnotaccepted，orisacceptedandtheattemptfails，wearefarenoughfromcertaintystill;butwehavedonethebestthattheexistingstateofhumanreasonadmitsof;wehaveneglectednothingthatcouldgivethetruthachanceofreachingus：ifthelistsarekeptopen，wemayhopethatiftherebeabettertruth，itwillbefoundwhenthehumanmindiscapableofreceivingit;andinthemeantimewemayrelyonhavingattainedsuchapproachtotruthasispossibleinourownday。Thisistheamountofcertaintyattainablebyafalliblebeing，andthisthesolewayofattainingit。
　　Strangeitis，thatmenshouldadmitthevalidityoftheargumentsforfreediscussion，butobjecttotheirbeing"pushedtoanextreme";
　　notseeingthatunlessthereasonsaregoodforanextremecase，theyarenotgoodforanycase。Strangethattheyshouldimaginethattheyarenotassuminginfallibility，whentheyacknowledgethatthereshouldbefreediscussiononallsubjectswhichcanpossiblybedoubtful，butthinkthatsomeparticularprincipleordoctrineshouldbeforbiddentobequestionedbecauseitissocertain，thatis，becausetheyarecertainthatitiscertain。Tocallanypropositioncertain，whilethereisanyonewhowoulddenyitscertaintyifpermitted，butwhoisnotpermitted，istoassumethatweourselves，andthosewhoagreewithus，arethejudgesofcertainty，andjudgeswithouthearingtheotherside。
　　Inthepresentage—whichhasbeendescribedas"destituteoffaith，butterrifiedatscepticism"—inwhichpeoplefeelsure，notsomuchthattheiropinionsaretrue，asthattheyshouldnotknowwhattodowithoutthem—theclaimsofanopiniontobeprotectedfrompublicattackarerestednotsomuchonitstruth，asonitsimportancetosociety。Thereare，itisalleged，certainbeliefssouseful，nottosayindispensable，towell—beingthatitisasmuchthedutyofgovernmentstoupholdthosebeliefs，astoprotectanyotheroftheinterestsofsociety。Inacaseofsuchnecessity，andsodirectlyinthelineoftheirduty，somethinglessthaninfallibilitymay，itismaintained，warrant，andevenbind，governmentstoactontheirownopinion，confirmedbythegeneralopinionofmankind。Itisalsooftenargued，andstilloftenerthought，thatnonebutbadmenwoulddesiretoweakenthesesalutarybeliefs;andtherecanbenothingwrong，itisthought，inrestrainingbadmen，andprohibitingwhatonlysuchmenwouldwishtopractise。
　　Thismodeofthinkingmakesthejustificationofrestraintsondiscussionnotaquestionofthetruthofdoctrines，butoftheirusefulness;andflattersitselfbythatmeanstoescapetheresponsibilityofclaimingtobeaninfalliblejudgeofopinions。
　　Butthosewhothussatisfythemselves，donotperceivethattheassumptionofinfallibilityismerelyshiftedfromonepointtoanother。Theusefulnessofanopinionisitselfmatterofopinion：
　　asdisputable，asopentodiscussion，andrequiringdiscussionasmuchastheopinionitself。Thereisthesameneedofaninfalliblejudgeofopinionstodecideanopiniontobenoxious，astodecideittobefalse，unlesstheopinioncondemnedhasfullopportunityofdefendingitself。Anditwillnotdotosaythatthehereticmaybeallowedtomaintaintheutilityorharmlessnessofhisopinion，thoughforbiddentomaintainitstruth。Thetruthofanopinionispartofitsutility。Ifwewouldknowwhetherornotitisdesirablethatapropositionshouldbebelieved，isitpossibletoexcludetheconsiderationofwhetherornotitistrue？Intheopinion，notofbadmen，butofthebestmen，nobeliefwhichiscontrarytotruthcanbereallyuseful：andcanyoupreventsuchmenfromurgingthatplea，whentheyarechargedwithculpabilityfordenyingsomedoctrinewhichtheyaretoldisuseful，butwhichtheybelievetobefalse？
　　Thosewhoareonthesideofreceivedopinionsneverfailtotakeallpossibleadvantageofthisplea;youdonotfindthemhandlingthequestionofutilityasifitcouldbecompletelyabstractedfromthatoftruth：onthecontrary，itis，aboveall，becausetheirdoctrineis"thetruth，"thattheknowledgeorthebeliefofitisheldtobesoindispensable。Therecanbenofairdiscussionofthequestionofusefulnesswhenanargumentsovitalmaybeemployedononeside，butnotontheother。Andinpointoffact，whenlaworpublicfeelingdonotpermitthetruthofanopiniontobedisputed，theyarejustaslittletolerantofadenialofitsusefulness。Theutmosttheyallowisanextenuationofitsabsolutenecessity，orofthepositiveguiltofrejectingit。
　　Inordermorefullytoillustratethemischiefofdenyingahearingtoopinionsbecausewe，inourownjudgment，havecondemnedthem，itwillbedesirabletofixdownthediscussiontoaconcretecase;andIchoose，bypreference，thecaseswhichareleastfavourabletome—inwhichtheargumentagainstfreedomofopinion，bothonthescoreoftruthandonthatofutility，isconsideredthestrongest。LettheopinionsimpugnedbethebeliefinaGodandinafuturestate，oranyofthecommonlyreceiveddoctrinesofmorality。
　　Tofightthebattleonsuchgroundgivesagreatadvantagetoanunfairantagonist;sincehewillbesuretosay（andmanywhohavenodesiretobeunfairwillsayitinternally），Arethesethedoctrineswhichyoudonotdeemsufficientlycertaintobetakenundertheprotectionoflaw？IsthebeliefinaGodoneoftheopinionstofeelsureofwhichyouholdtobeassuminginfallibility？ButImustbepermittedtoobserve，thatitisnotthefeelingsureofadoctrine（beitwhatitmay）whichIcallanassumptionofinfallibility。Itistheundertakingtodecidethatquestionforothers，withoutallowingthemtohearwhatcanbesaidonthecontraryside。AndIdenounceandreprobatethispretensionnottheless，ifputforthonthesideofmymostsolemnconvictions。Howeverpositiveanyone’spersuasionmaybe，notonlyofthefalsitybutoftheperniciousconsequences—notonlyoftheperniciousconsequences，but（toadoptexpressionswhichI
　　altogethercondemn）theimmoralityandimpietyofanopinion;yetif，inpursuanceofthatprivatejudgment，thoughbackedbythepublicjudgmentofhiscountryorhiscontemporaries，hepreventstheopinionfrombeingheardinitsdefence，heassumesinfallibility。Andsofarfromtheassumptionbeinglessobjectionableorlessdangerousbecausetheopinioniscalledimmoralorimpious，thisisthecaseofallothersinwhichitismostfatal。Theseareexactlytheoccasionsonwhichthemenofonegenerationcommitthosedreadfulmistakeswhichexcitetheastonishmentandhorrorofposterity。Itisamongsuchthatwefindtheinstancesmemorableinhistory，whenthearmofthelawhasbeenemployedtorootoutthebestmenandthenoblestdoctrines;withdeplorablesuccessastothemen，thoughsomeofthedoctrineshavesurvivedtobe（asifinmockery）invokedindefenceofsimilarconducttowardsthosewhodissentfromthem，orfromtheirreceivedinterpretation。