Theargumentsuponwhichthisclaimwasfoundedandcombated，arenotmybusinesshere。Neverhasasubjectbeenmoreamplyandmorelearnedlyhandled，norupononeside，inmyopinion，moresatisfactorily;theywhoarenotconvincedbywhatisalreadywrittenwouldnotreceiveconvictionTHOUGHONEAROSEFROMTHEDEAD。
Itoohavethoughtonthissubject;butmypurposehere，isonlytoconsideritasapartofthefavouriteprojectofGovernment;toobserveonthemotiveswhichledtoit;andtotraceitspoliticalconsequences。
AviolentrageforthepunishmentofMr。Wilkeswasthepretenceofthewhole。Thisgentleman，bysettinghimselfstronglyinoppositiontotheCourtCabal，hadbecomeatonceanobjectoftheirpersecution，andofthepopularfavour。ThehatredoftheCourtpartypursuing，andthecountenanceofthepeopleprotectinghim，itverysoonbecamenotatallaquestionontheman，butatrialofstrengthbetweenthetwoparties。Theadvantageofthevictoryinthisparticularcontestwasthepresent，butnottheonly，norbyanymeans，theprincipal，object。ItsoperationuponthecharacteroftheHouseofCommonswasthegreatpointinview。ThepointtobegainedbytheCabalwasthis：thataprecedentshouldbeestablished，tendingtoshow，THATTHEFAVOUROFTHEPEOPLEWASNOT
SOSUREAROADASTHEFAVOUROFTHECOURTEVENTOPOPULARHONOURS
ANDPOPULARTRUSTS。Astrenuousresistancetoeveryappearanceoflawlesspower;aspiritofindependencecarriedtosomedegreeofenthusiasm;aninquisitivecharactertodiscover，andaboldonetodisplay，everycorruptionandeveryerrorofGovernment;thesearethequalitieswhichrecommendamantoaseatintheHouseofCommons，inopenandmerelypopularelections。Anindolentandsubmissivedisposition;adispositiontothinkcharitablyofalltheactionsofmeninpower，andtoliveinamutualintercourseoffavourswiththem;aninclinationrathertocountenanceastronguseofauthority，thantobearanysortoflicentiousnessonthepartofthepeople;theseareunfavourablequalitiesinanopenelectionforMembersofParliament。
Theinstinctwhichcarriesthepeopletowardsthechoiceoftheformer，isjustifiedbyreason;becauseamanofsuchacharacter，eveninitsexorbitancies，doesnotdirectlycontradictthepurposesofatrust，theendofwhichisacontrolonpower。Thelattercharacter，evenwhenitisnotinitsextreme，willexecutethistrustbutveryimperfectly;and，ifdeviatingtotheleastexcess，willcertainlyfrustrateinsteadofforwardingthepurposesofacontrolonGovernment。ButwhentheHouseofCommonswastobenewmodelled，thisprinciplewasnotonlytobechanged，butreversed。
Whistanyerrorscommittedinsupportofpowerwerelefttothelaw，witheveryadvantageoffavourableconstruction，ofmitigation，andfinallyofpardon;allexcessesonthesideofliberty，orinpursuitofpopularfavour，orindefenceofpopularrightsandprivileges，werenotonlytobepunishedbytherigouroftheknownlaw，butbyaDISCRETIONARYproceeding，whichbroughtonTHELOSSOF
THEPOPULAROBJECTITSELF。Popularitywastoberendered，ifnotdirectlypenal，atleasthighlydangerous。Thefavourofthepeoplemightleadeventoadisqualificationofrepresentingthem。Theirodiummightbecome，strainedthroughthemediumoftwoorthreeconstructions，themeansofsittingasthetrusteeofallthatwasdeartothem。Thisispunishingtheoffenceintheoffendingpart。
Untilthistime，theopinionofthepeople，throughthepowerofanAssembly，stillinsomesortpopular，ledtothegreatesthonoursandemolumentsinthegiftoftheCrown。Nowtheprincipleisreversed;andthefavouroftheCourtistheonlysurewayofobtainingandholdingthosehonourswhichoughttobeinthedisposalofthepeople。
Itsignifiesverylittlehowthismattermaybequibbledaway。
Example，theonlyargumentofeffectincivillife，demonstratesthetruthofmyproposition。Nothingcanaltermyopinionconcerningthepernicioustendencyofthisexample，untilIseesomemanforhisindiscretioninthesupportofpower，forhisviolentandintemperateservility，renderedincapableofsittinginparliament。
Forasitnowstands，thefaultofoverstrainingpopularqualities，and，irregularlyifyouplease，assertingpopularprivileges，hasledtodisqualification;theoppositefaultneverhasproducedtheslightestpunishment。ResistancetopowerhasshutthedooroftheHouseofCommonstooneman;obsequiousnessandservility，tonone。
NotthatIwouldencouragepopulardisorder，oranydisorder。ButI
wouldleavesuchoffencestothelaw，tobepunishedinmeasureandproportion。Thelawsofthiscountryareforthemostpartconstituted，andwiselyso，forthegeneralendsofGovernment，ratherthanforthepreservationofourparticularliberties。
Whateverthereforeisdoneinsupportofliberty，bypersonsnotinpublictrust，ornotactingmerelyinthattrust，isliabletobemoreorlessoutoftheordinarycourseofthelaw;andthelawitselfissufficienttoanimadvertuponitwithgreatseverity。
Nothingindeedcanhinderthatsevereletterfromcrushingus，exceptthetemperamentsitmayreceivefromatrialbyjury。ButifthehabitprevailsofGOINGBEYONDTHELAW，andsupersedingthisjudicature，ofcarryingoffences，realorsupposed，intothelegislativebodies，whoshallestablishthemselvesintoCOURTSOF
CRIMINALEQUITY，（soTHESTARCHAMBERhasbeencalledbyLordBacon，）alltheevilsoftheSTARChamberarerevived。Alargeandliberalconstructioninascertainingoffences，andadiscretionarypowerinpunishingthem，istheideaofcriminalequity;whichisintruthamonsterinJurisprudence。ItsignifiesnothingwhetheracourtforthispurposebeaCommitteeofCouncil，oraHouseofCommons，oraHouseofLords;thelibertyofthesubjectwillbeequallysubvertedbyit。ThetrueendandpurposeofthatHouseofParliamentwhichentertainssuchajurisdictionwillbedestroyedbyit。
Iwillnotbelieve，whatnoothermanlivingbelieves，thatMr。
Wilkeswaspunishedfortheindecencyofhispublications，ortheimpietyofhisransackedcloset。Ifhehadfalleninacommonslaughteroflibellersandblasphemers，Icouldwellbelievethatnothingmorewasmeantthanwaspretended。ButwhenIsee，that，foryearstogether，fullasimpious，andperhapsmoredangerouswritingstoreligion，andvirtue，andorder，havenotbeenpunished，northeirauthorsdiscountenanced;thatthemostaudaciouslibelsonRoyalMajestyhavepassedwithoutnotice;thatthemosttreasonableinvectivesagainstthelaws，liberties，andconstitutionofthecountry，havenotmetwiththeslightestanimadversion;Imustconsiderthisasashockingandshamelesspretence。Neverdidanenvenomedscurrilityagainsteverythingsacredandcivil，publicandprivate，ragethroughthekingdomwithsuchafuriousandunbridledlicence。Allthiswhilethepeaceofthenationmustbeshaken，toruinonelibeller，andtotearfromthepopulaceasinglefavourite。
Norisitthatvicemerelyskulksinanobscureandcontemptibleimpunity。Doesnotthepublicbeholdwithindignation，personsnotonlygenerallyscandalousintheirlives，buttheidenticalpersonswho，bytheirsociety，theirinstruction，theirexample，theirencouragement，havedrawnthismanintotheveryfaultswhichhavefurnishedtheCabalwithapretenceforhispersecution，loadedwitheverykindoffavour，honour，anddistinction，whichaCourtcanbestow？Addbutthecrimeofservility（thefoedumcrimemservitutis）toeveryothercrime，andthewholemassisimmediatelytransmutedintovirtue，andbecomesthejustsubjectofrewardandhonour。WhenthereforeIreflectuponthismethodpursuedbytheCabalindistributingrewardsandpunishments，ImustconcludethatMr。Wilkesistheobjectofpersecution，notonaccountofwhathehasdoneincommonwithotherswhoaretheobjectsofreward，butforthatinwhichhediffersfrommanyofthem：thatheispursuedforthespiriteddispositionswhichareblendedwithhisvices;forhisunconquerablefirmness，forhisresolute，indefatigable，strenuousresistanceagainstoppression。
Inthiscase，therefore，itwasnotthemanthatwastobepunished，norhisfaultsthatweretobediscountenanced。Oppositiontoactsofpowerwastobemarkedbyakindofcivilproscription。Thepopularitywhichshouldarisefromsuchanoppositionwastobeshownunabletoprotectit。Thequalitiesbywhichcourtismadetothepeople，weretorendereveryfaultinexpiable，andeveryerrorirretrievable。Thequalitiesbywhichcourtismadetopower，weretocoverandtosanctifyeverything。Hethatwillhaveasureandhonourableseat，intheHouseofCommons，musttakecarehowheadventurestocultivatepopularqualities;otherwisehemay，remembertheoldmaxim，BrevesetinfaustospopuliRomaniamores。
If，therefore，apursuitofpopularityexposeamantogreaterdangersthanadispositiontoservility，theprinciplewhichisthelifeandsoulofpopularelectionswillperishoutoftheConstitution。
ItbehovesthepeopleofEnglandtoconsiderhowtheHouseofCommonsundertheoperationoftheseexamplesmustofnecessitybeconstituted。OnthesideoftheCourtwillbe，allhonours，offices，emoluments;everysortofpersonalgratificationtoavariceorvanity;and，whatisofmoremomenttomostgentlemen，themeansofgrowing，byinnumerablepettyservicestoindividuals，intoaspreadinginterestintheircountry。Ontheotherhand，letussupposeapersonunconnectedwiththeCourt，andinoppositiontoitssystem。Forhisownperson，nooffice，oremolument，ortitle;
nopromotionecclesiastical，orcivil，ormilitary，ornaval，forchildren，orbrothers，orkindred。Invainanexpiringinterestinaboroughcallsforoffices，orsmalllivings，forthechildrenofmayors，andaldermen，andcapitalburgesses。Hiscourtrivalhasthemall。Hecandoaninfinitenumberofactsofgenerosityandkindness，andevenofpublicspirit。Hecanprocureindemnityfromquarters。Hecanprocureadvantagesintrade。Hecangetpardonsforoffences。Hecanobtainathousandfavours，andavertathousandevils。Hemay，whilehebetrayseveryvaluableinterestofthekingdom，beabenefactor，apatron，afather，aguardianangel，tohisborough。Theunfortunateindependentmemberhasnothingtooffer，butharshrefusal，orpitifulexcuse，ordespondentrepresentationofahopelessinterest。Exceptfromhisprivatefortune，inwhichhemaybeequalled，perhapsexceeded，byhisCourtcompetitor，hehasnowayofshowinganyonegoodquality，orofmakingasinglefriend。IntheHouse，hevotesforeverinadispiritedminority。Ifhespeaks，thedoorsarelocked。Abodyofloquaciousplacemengoouttotelltheworld，thatallheaimsat，istogetintooffice。Ifhehasnotthetalentofelocution，whichisthecaseofmanyaswiseandknowingmenasanyintheHouse，heisliabletoalltheseinconveniences，withouttheeclatwhichattendsuponanytolerablysuccessfulexertionofeloquence。Canweconceiveamorediscouragingpostofdutythanthis？Stripitofthepoorrewardofpopularity;suffereventheexcessescommittedindefenceofthepopularinteresttobecomeagroundforthemajorityofthatHousetoformadisqualificationoutofthelineofthelaw，andattheirpleasure，attendednotonlywiththelossofthefranchise，butwitheverykindofpersonaldisgrace;ifthisshallhappen，thepeopleofthiskingdommaybeassuredthattheycannotbefirmlyorfaithfullyservedbyanyman。Itisoutofthenatureofmenandthingsthattheyshould;andtheirpresumptionwillbeequaltotheirfolly，iftheyexpectit。Thepowerofthepeople，withinthelaws，mustshowitselfsufficienttoprotecteveryrepresentativeintheanimatedperformanceofhisduty，orthatdutycannotbeperformed。TheHouseofCommonscanneverbeacontrolonotherpartsofGovernment，unlesstheyarecontrolledthemselvesbytheirconstituents;andunlesstheseconstituentspossesssomerightinthechoiceofthatHouse，whichitisnotinthepowerofthatHousetotakeaway。Iftheysufferthispowerofarbitraryincapacitationtostand，theyhaveutterlypervertedeveryotherpoweroftheHouseofCommons。Thelateproceeding，Iwillnotsay，IScontrarytolaw;itMUSTbeso;forthepowerwhichisclaimedcannot，byanypossibility，bealegalpowerinanylimitedmemberofGovernment。
Thepowerwhichtheyclaim，ofdeclaringincapacities，wouldnotbeabovethejustclaimsofafinaljudicature，iftheyhadnotlaiditdownasaleadingprinciple，thattheyhadnoruleintheexerciseofthisclaimbuttheirownDISCRETION。Notoneoftheirabettorshaseverundertakentoassigntheprincipleofunfitness，thespeciesordegreeofdelinquency，onwhichtheHouseofCommonswillexpel，northemodeofproceedinguponit，northeevidenceuponwhichitisestablished。Thedirectconsequenceofwhichis，thatthefirstfranchiseofanEnglishman，andthatonwhichalltherestvitallydepend，istobeforfeitedforsomeoffencewhichnomanknows，andwhichistobeprovedbynoknownrulewhatsoeveroflegalevidence。Thisissoanomaloustoourwholeconstitution，thatIwillventuretosay，themosttrivialright，whichthesubjectclaims，neverwas，norcanbe，forfeitedinsuchamanner。
Thewholeoftheirusurpationisestablisheduponthismethodofarguing。Wedonotmakelaws。No;wedonotcontendforthispower。Weonlydeclarelaw;and，asweareatribunalbothcompetentandsupreme，whatwedeclaretobelawbecomeslaw，althoughitshouldnothavebeensobefore。Thusthecircumstanceofhavingnoappealfromtheirjurisdictionismadetoimplythattheyhavenoruleintheexerciseofit：thejudgmentdoesnotderiveitsvalidityfromitsconformitytothelaw;butpreposterouslythelawismadetoattendonthejudgment;andtheruleofthejudgmentisnootherthantheOCCASIONALWILLOFTHE
HOUSE。Anarbitrarydiscretionleads，legalityfollows;whichisjusttheverynatureanddescriptionofalegislativeact。
Thisclaimintheirhandswasnobarrentheory。Itwaspursuedintoitsutmostconsequences;andadangerousprinciplehasbegotacorrespondentpractice。Asystematicspirithasbeenshownuponbothsides。TheelectorsofMiddlesexchoseapersonwhomtheHouseofCommonshadvotedincapable;andtheHouseofCommonshastakeninamemberwhomtheelectorsofMiddlesexhadnotchosen。Byaconstructiononthatlegislativepowerwhichhadbeenassumed，theydeclaredthatthetruelegalsenseofthecountrywascontainedintheminority，onthatoccasion;andmight，onaresistancetoavoteofincapacity，becontainedinanyminority。
Whenanyconstructionoflawgoesagainstthespiritoftheprivilegeitwasmeanttosupport，itisaviciousconstruction。Itismaterialtoustoberepresentedreallyandbonafide，andnotinforms，intypes，andshadows，andfictionsoflaw。TherightofelectionwasnotestablishedmerelyasaMATTEROFFORM，tosatisfysomemethodandruleoftechnicalreasoning;itwasnotaprinciplewhichmightsubstituteaTitiusoraMaevius，aJohnDoeorRichardRoe，intheplaceofamanspeciallychosen;notaprinciplewhichwasjustaswellsatisfiedwithonemanaswithanother。Itisaright，theeffectofwhichistogivetothepeoplethatman，andthatmanonly，whombytheirvoices，actually，notconstructivelygiven，theydeclarethattheyknow，esteem，love，andtrust。Thisrightisamatterwithintheirownpowerofjudgingandfeeling;notanensrationisandcreatureoflaw：norcanthosedevices，bywhichanythingelseissubstitutedintheplaceofsuchanactualchoice，answerintheleastdegreetheendofrepresentation。
Iknowthatthecourtsoflawhavemadeasstrainedconstructionsinothercases。Suchistheconstructionincommonrecoveries。Themethodofconstructionwhichinthatcasegivestothepersonsinremainder，fortheirsecurityandrepresentative，thedoor—keeper，crier，orsweeperoftheCourt，orsomeothershadowybeingwithoutsubstanceoreffect，isafictionofaverycoarsetexture。Thiswashoweversuffered，bytheacquiescenceofthewholekingdom，forages;becausetheevasionoftheoldStatuteofWestminster，whichauthorisedperpetuities，hadmoresenseandutilitythanthelawwhichwasevaded。Butanattempttoturntherightofelectionintosuchafarceandmockeryasafictitiousfineandrecovery，will，I
hope，haveanotherfate;becausethelawswhichgiveitareinfinitelydeartous，andtheevasionisinfinitelycontemptible。
Thepeopleindeedhavebeentold，thatthispowerofdiscretionarydisqualificationisvestedinhandsthattheymaytrust，andwhowillbesurenottoabuseittotheirprejudice。UntilIfindsomethinginthisargumentdifferingfromthatonwhicheverymodeofdespotismhasbeendefended，Ishallnotbeinclinedtopayitanygreatcompliment。Thepeoplearesatisfiedtotrustthemselveswiththeexerciseoftheirownprivileges，anddonotdesirethiskindinterventionoftheHouseofCommonstofreethemfromtheburthen。Theyarecertainlyintheright。TheyoughtnottotrusttheHouseofCommonswithapowerovertheirfranchises;becausetheconstitution，whichplacedtwootherco—ordinatepowerstocontrolit，reposednosuchconfidenceinthatbody。Itwereafollywelldeservingservitudeforitspunishment，tobefullofconfidencewherethelawsarefullofdistrust;andtogivetoanHouseofCommons，arrogatingtoitssoleresolutionthemostharshandodiouspartoflegislativeauthority，thatdegreeofsubmissionwhichisdueonlytotheLegislatureitself。
WhentheHouseofCommons，inanendeavourtoobtainnewadvantagesattheexpenseoftheotherordersoftheState，forthebenefitsoftheCOMMONSATLARGE，havepursuedstrongmeasures;ifitwerenotjust，itwasatleastnatural，thattheconstituentsshouldconniveatalltheirproceedings;becausewewereourselvesultimatelytoprofit。Butwhenthissubmissionisurgedtous，inacontestbetweentherepresentativesandourselves，andwherenothingcanbeputintotheirscalewhichisnottakenfromours，theyfancyustobechildrenwhentheytellustheyareourrepresentatives，ourownfleshandblood，andthatallthestripestheygiveusareforourgood。Theverydesireofthatbodytohavesuchatrustcontrarytolawreposedinthem，showsthattheyarenotworthyofit。Theycertainlywillabuseit;becauseallmenpossessedofanuncontrolleddiscretionarypowerleadingtotheaggrandisementandprofitoftheirownbodyhavealwaysabusedit：andIseenoparticularsanctityinourtimes，thatisatalllikely，byamiraculousoperation，tooverrulethecourseofnature。
Butwemustpurposelyshutoureyes，ifweconsiderthismattermerelyasacontestbetweentheHouseofCommonsandtheElectors。
ThetruecontestisbetweentheElectorsoftheKingdomandtheCrown;theCrownactingbyaninstrumentalHouseofCommons。Itispreciselythesame，whethertheMinistersoftheCrowncandisqualifybyadependentHouseofCommons，orbyadependentcourtofSTARCHAMBER，orbyadependentcourtofKing’sBench。IfonceMembersofParliamentcanbepracticallyconvincedthattheydonotdependontheaffectionoropinionofthepeoplefortheirpoliticalbeing，theywillgivethemselvesover，withoutevenanappearanceofreserve，totheinfluenceoftheCourt。
Indeed，aParliamentunconnectedwiththepeople，isessentialtoaMinistryunconnectedwiththepeople;andthereforethosewhosawthroughwhatmightydifficultiestheinteriorMinistrywaded，andtheexteriorweredragged，inthisbusiness，willconceiveofwhatprodigiousimportance，thenewcorpsofKING’SMENheldthisprincipleofoccasionalandpersonalincapacitation，tothewholebodyoftheirdesign。
WhentheHouseofCommonswasthusmadetoconsideritselfasthemasterofitsconstituents，therewantedbutonethingtosecurethatHouseagainstallpossiblefuturedeviationtowardspopularity;
anunlimitedfundofmoneytobelaidoutaccordingtothepleasureoftheCourt。
TocompletetheschemeofbringingourCourttoaresemblancetotheneighbouringMonarchies，itwasnecessary，ineffect，todestroythoseappropriationsofrevenue，whichseemtolimittheproperty，astheotherlawshaddonethepowers，oftheCrown。Anopportunityforthispurposewastaken，uponanapplicationtoParliamentforpaymentofthedebtsoftheCivilList;whichin1769hadamountedto513，000pounds。Suchapplicationhadbeenmadeuponformeroccasions;buttodoitintheformermannerwouldbynomeansanswerthepresentpurpose。
WhenevertheCrownhadcometotheCommonstodesireasupplyforthedischargingofdebtsdueontheCivilList，itwasalwaysaskedandgrantedwithoneofthethreefollowingqualifications;
sometimeswithallofthem。EitheritwasstatedthattherevenuehadbeendivertedfromitspurposesbyParliament;orthatthosedutieshadfallenshortofthesumforwhichtheyweregivenbyParliament，andthattheintentionoftheLegislaturehadnotbeenfulfilled;orthatthemoneyrequiredtodischargetheCivilListdebtwastoberaisedchargeableontheCivilListduties。InthereignofQueenAnne，theCrownwasfoundindebt。ThelesseningandgrantingawaysomepartofherrevenuebyParliamentwasallegedasthecauseofthatdebt，andpleadedasanequitableground（suchitcertainlywas），fordischargingit。ItdoesnotappearthatthedutieswhichworethenappliedtotheordinaryGovernmentproducedclearabove580，000poundsayear;because，whentheywereafterwardsgrantedtoGeorgetheFirst，120，000poundswasadded，tocompletethewholeto700，000poundsayear。Indeeditwasthenasserted，and，Ihavenodoubt，truly，thatformanyyearsthenettproducedidnotamounttoabove550，000pounds。TheQueen’sextraordinarychargeswerebesidesveryconsiderable;equal，atleast，toanywehaveknowninourtime。TheapplicationtoParliamentwasnotforanabsolutegrantofmoney，buttoempowertheQueentoraiseitbyborrowingupontheCivilListfunds。
TheCivilListdebtwastwicepaidinthereignofGeorgetheFirst。
ThemoneywasgranteduponthesameplanwhichhadbeenfollowedinthereignofQueenAnne。TheCivilListrevenueswerethenmortgagedforthesumtoberaised，andstoodchargedwiththeransomoftheirowndeliverance。
GeorgetheSecondreceivedanadditiontohisCivilList。Dutiesweregrantedforthepurposeofraising800，000poundsayear。Itwasnotuntilhehadreignednineteenyears，andafterthelastrebellion，thathecalleduponParliamentforadischargeoftheCivilListdebt。Theextraordinarychargesbroughtonbytherebellion，accountfullyforthenecessitiesoftheCrown。However，theextraordinarychargesofGovernmentwerenotthoughtagroundfittobereliedon。AdeficiencyoftheCivilListdutiesforseveralyearsbeforewasstatedastheprincipal，ifnotthesole，groundonwhichanapplicationtoParliamentcouldbejustified。
Aboutthistimetheproduceofthesedutieshadfallenprettylow;
andevenuponanaverageofthewholereigntheyneverproduced800，000poundsayearcleartotheTreasury。
ThatPrincereignedfourteenyearsafterwards：notonlynonewdemandsweremade，butwithsomuchgoodorderwerehisrevenuesandexpensesregulated，that，althoughmanypartsoftheestablishmentoftheCourtwereuponalargerandmoreliberalscalethantheyhavebeensince，therewasaconsiderablesuminhand，onhisdecease，amountingtoabout170，000pounds，applicabletotheserviceoftheCivilListofhispresentMajesty。Sothat，ifthisreigncommencedwithagreaterchargethanusual，therewasenough，andmorethanenough，abundantlytosupplyalltheextraordinaryexpense。ThattheCivilListshouldhavebeenexceededinthetwoformerreigns，especiallyinthereignofGeorgetheFirst，wasnotatallsurprising。Hisrevenuewasbut700，000poundsannually;ifiteverproducedsomuchclear。Theprodigiousanddangerousdisaffectiontotheverybeingoftheestablishment，andthecauseofaPretenderthenpowerfullyabettedfromabroad，producedmanydemandsofanextraordinarynaturebothabroadandathome。Muchmanagementandgreatexpenseswerenecessary。ButthethroneofnoPrincehasstooduponmoreunshakenfoundationsthanthatofhispresentMajesty。
TohaveexceededthesumgivenfortheCivilList，andtohaveincurredadebtwithoutspecialauthorityofParliament，was，primafacie，acriminalact：assuchMinistersoughtnaturallyrathertohavewithdrawnitfromtheinspection，thantohaveexposedittothescrutiny，ofParliament。Certainlytheyought，ofthemselves，officiallytohavecomearmedwitheverysortofargument，which，byexplaining，couldexcuseamatterinitselfofpresumptiveguilt。
ButtheterrorsoftheHouseofCommonsarenolongerforMinisters。
Ontheotherhand，thepeculiarcharacteroftheHouseofCommons，astrusteeofthepublicpurse，wouldhaveledthemtocallwithapunctilioussolicitudeforeverypublicaccount，andtohaveexaminedintothemwiththemostrigorousaccuracy。
Thecapitaluseofanaccountis，thattherealityofthecharge，thereasonofincurringit，andthejusticeandnecessityofdischargingit，shouldallappearantecedenttothepayment。Nomaneverpaysfirst，andcallsforhisaccountafterwards;becausehewouldtherebyletoutofhishandstheprincipal，andindeedonlyeffectual，meansofcompellingafullandfairone。But，innationalbusiness，thereisanadditionalreasonforapreviousproductionofeveryaccount。Itisacheek，perhapstheonlyone，uponacorruptandprodigaluseofpublicmoney。Anaccountafterpaymentistonorationalpurposeanaccount。However，theHouseofCommonsthoughtallthesetobeantiquatedprinciples;theywereofopinionthatthemostParliamentarywayofproceedingwas，topayfirstwhattheCourtthoughtpropertodemand，andtotakeitschanceforanexaminationintoaccountsatsometimeofgreaterleisure。
Thenationhadsettled800，000poundsayearontheCrown，assufficientforthepurposeofitsdignity，upontheestimateofitsownMinisters。WhenMinisterscametoParliament，andsaidthatthisallowancehadnotbeensufficientforthepurpose，andthattheyhadincurredadebtof500，000pounds，woulditnothavebeennaturalforParliamentfirsttohaveasked，how，andbywhatmeans，theirappropriatedallowancecametobeinsufficient？Woulditnothavesavouredofsomeattentiontojustice，tohaveseeninwhatperiodsofAdministrationthisdebthadbeenoriginallyincurred;
thattheymightdiscover，andifneedwere，animadvertonthepersonswhowerefoundthemostculpable？Toputtheirhandsuponsucharticlesofexpenditureastheythoughtimproperorexcessive，andtosecure，infuture，againstsuchmisapplicationorexceeding？
Accountsforanyotherpurposesarebutamatterofcuriosity，andnogenuineParliamentaryobject。AlltheaccountswhichcouldansweranyParliamentaryendwererefused，orpostponedbypreviousquestions。Everyideaofpreventionwasrejected，asconveyinganimpropersuspicionoftheMinistersoftheCrown。
Wheneveryleadingaccounthadbeenrefused，manyothersweregrantedwithsufficientfacility。
Butwithgreatcandouralso，theHousewasinformed，thathardlyanyofthemcouldbereadyuntilthenextsession;someofthemperhapsnotsosoon。But，inorderfirmlytoestablishtheprecedentofPAYMENTPREVIOUSTOACCOUNT，andtoformitintoasettledruleoftheHouse，thegodinthemachinewasbroughtdown，nothinglessthanthewonder—workingLAWOFPARLIAMENT。Itwasalleged，thatitisthelawofParliament，whenanydemandcomesfromtheCrown，thattheHousemustgoimmediatelyintotheCommitteeofSupply;inwhichCommitteeitwasallowed，thattheproductionandexaminationofaccountswouldbequiteproperandregular。ItwasthereforecarriedthattheyshouldgointotheCommitteewithoutdelay，andwithoutaccounts，inordertoexaminewithgreatorderandregularitythingsthatcouldnotpossiblycomebeforethem。AfterthisstrokeoforderlyandParliamentarywitandhumour，theywentintotheCommittee，andverygenerouslyvotedthepayment。
Therewasacircumstanceinthatdebatetooremarkabletobeoverlooked。ThisdebtoftheCivilListwasallalongargueduponthesamefootingasadebtoftheState，contracteduponnationalauthority。Itspaymentwasurgedasequallypressinguponthepublicfaithandhonour;andwhenthewholeyear’saccountwasstated，inwhatiscalledTHEBUDGET，theMinistryvaluedthemselvesonthepaymentofsomuchpublicdebt，justasiftheyhaddischarged500，000poundsofnavyorexchequerbills。Though，intruth，theirpayment，fromtheSinkingFund，ofdebtwhichwasnevercontractedbyParliamentaryauthority，was，toallintentsandpurposes，somuchdebtincurred。Butsuchisthepresentnotionofpubliccreditandpaymentofdebt。Nowonderthatitproducessucheffects。
NorwastheHouseatallmoreattentivetoaprovidentsecurityagainstfuture，thanithadbeentoavindictiveretrospecttopast，mismanagements。IshouldhavethoughtindeedthataMinisterialpromise，duringtheirowncontinuanceinoffice，mighthavebeengiven，thoughthiswouldhavebeenbutapoorsecurityforthepublic。Mr。Pelhamgavesuchanassurance，andhekepthisword。
ButnothingwascapableofextortingfromourMinistersanythingwhichhadtheleastresemblancetoapromiseofconfiningtheexpensesoftheCivilListwithinthelimitswhichhadbeensettledbyParliament。ThisreserveoftheirsIlookupontobeequivalenttotheclearestdeclarationthattheywereresolveduponacontrarycourse。
However，toputthematterbeyondalldoubt，intheSpeechfromtheThrone，afterthankingParliamentforthereliefsoliberallygranted，theMinistersinformthetwoHousesthattheywillENDEAVOURtoconfinetheexpensesoftheCivilGovernment——withinwhatlimits，thinkyou？thosewhichthelawhadprescribed？Notintheleast——"suchlimitsastheHONOUROFTHECROWNcanpossiblyadmit。"
ThustheyestablishedanarbitrarystandardforthatdignitywhichParliamenthaddefinedandlimitedtoalegalstandard。Theygavethemselves，underthelaxandindeterminateideaoftheHONOUROF
THECROWN，afulllooseforallmannerofdissipation，andallmannerofcorruption。ThisarbitrarystandardtheywerenotafraidtoholdouttobothHouses;whileanidleandinoperativeActofParliament，estimatingthedignityoftheCrownat800，000pounds，andconfiningittothatsum，addstothenumberofobsoletestatuteswhichloadtheshelvesoflibrarieswithoutanysortofadvantagetothepeople。
Afterthisproceeding，IsupposethatnomancanbesoweakastothinkthattheCrownislimitedtoanysettledallowancewhatsoever。
ForiftheMinistryhas800，000poundsayearbythelawoftheland，andifbythelawofParliamentallthedebtswhichexceeditaretobepaidprevioustotheproductionofanyaccount，IpresumethatthisisequivalenttoanincomewithnootherlimitsthantheabilitiesofthesubjectandthemoderationoftheCourt——thatistosay，itissuchinincomeasispossessedbyeveryabsoluteMonarchinEurope。Itamounts，asapersonofgreatabilitysaidinthedebate，toanunlimitedpowerofdrawingupontheSinkingFund。Itseffectonthepubliccreditofthiskingdommustbeobvious;forinvainistheSinkingFundthegreatbuttressofalltherest，ifitbeinthepoweroftheMinistrytoresorttoitforthepaymentofanydebtswhichtheymaychoosetoincur，underthenameoftheCivilList，andthroughthemediumofacommittee，whichthinksitselfobligedbylawtovotesupplieswithoutanyotheraccountthanthatofthemoreexistenceofthedebt。
Fivehundredthousandpoundsisaserioussum。Butitisnothingtotheprolificprincipleuponwhichthesumwasvoted——aprinciplethatmaybewellcalled，THEFRUITFULMOTHEROFAHUNDREDMORE。
NeitheristhedamagetopubliccreditofverygreatconsequencewhencomparedwiththatwhichresultstopublicmoralsandtothesafetyoftheConstitution，fromtheexhaustlessmineofcorruptionopenedbytheprecedent，andtobewroughtbytheprincipleofthelatepaymentofthedebtsoftheCivilList。ThepowerofdiscretionarydisqualificationbyonelawofParliament，andthenecessityofpayingeverydebtoftheCivilListbyanotherlawofParliament，ifsufferedtopassunnoticed，mustestablishsuchafundofrewardsandterrorsaswillmakeParliamentthebestappendageandsupportofarbitrarypowerthateverwasinventedbythewitofman。Thisisfelt。ThequarrelisbegunbetweentheRepresentativesandthePeople。TheCourtFactionhaveatlengthcommittedthem。
Insuchastraitthewisestmaywellbeperplexed，andtheboldeststaggered。Thecircumstancesareinagreatmeasurenew。Wehavehardlyanylandmarksfromthewisdomofourancestorstoguideus。
Atbestwecanonlyfollowthespiritoftheirproceedinginothercases。Iknowthediligencewithwhichmyobservationsonourpublicdisordershavebeenmade。Iamverysureoftheintegrityofthemotivesonwhichtheyarepublished：Icannotbeequallyconfidentinanyplanfortheabsolutecureofthosedisorders，orfortheircertainfutureprevention。Myaimistobringthismatterintomorepublicdiscussion。Letthesagacityofothersworkuponit。Itisnotuncommonformedicalwriterstodescribehistoriesofdiseases，veryaccurately，onwhosecuretheycansaybutverylittle。
ThefirstideaswhichgenerallysuggestthemselvesforthecureofParliamentarydisordersare，toshortenthedurationofParliaments，andtodisqualifyall，oragreatnumberofplacemen，fromaseatintheHouseofCommons。Whateverefficacytheremaybeinthoseremedies，Iamsureinthepresentstateofthingsitisimpossibletoapplythem。Arestorationoftherightoffreeelectionisapreliminaryindispensabletoeveryotherreformation。Whatalterationsoughtafterwardstobemadeintheconstitutionisamatterofdeepanddifficultresearch。
IfIwrotemerelytopleasethepopularpalate，itwouldindeedbeaslittletroublesometomeastoanothertoextoltheseremedies，sofamousinspeculation，buttowhichtheirgreatestadmirershaveneverattemptedseriouslytoresortinpractice。Iconfessthem，thatIhavenosortofrelianceuponeitheraTriennialParliamentoraPlace—bill。Withregardtotheformer，perhaps，itmightratherservetocounteractthantopromotetheendsthatareproposedbyit。Tosaynothingofthehorribledisordersamongthepeopleattendingfrequentelections，Ishouldbefearfulofcommitting，everythreeyears，theindependentgentlemenofthecountryintoacontestwiththeTreasury。Itiseasytoseewhichofthecontendingpartieswouldberuinedfirst。Whoeverhastakenacarefulviewofpublicproceedings，soastoendeavourtogroundhisspeculationsonhisexperience，musthaveobservedhowprodigiouslygreaterthepowerofMinistryisinthefirstandlastsessionofaParliament，thanitisintheintermediateperiods，whenMemberssitalittleontheirseats。ThepersonsofthegreatestParliamentaryexperience，withwhomIhaveconversed，didconstantly，incanvassingthefateofquestions，allowsomethingtotheCourtside，uponaccountoftheelectionsdependingorimminent。
Theevilcomplainedof，ifitexistsinthepresentstateofthings，wouldhardlyberemovedbyatriennialParliament：for，unlesstheinfluenceofGovernmentinelectionscanbeentirelytakenaway，themorefrequentlytheyreturn，themoretheywillharassprivateindependence;themoregenerallymenwillbecompelledtoflytothesettledsystematicinterestofGovernment，andtotheresourcesofaboundlessCivilList。Certainlysomethingmaybedone，andoughttobedone，towardslesseningthatinfluenceinelections;andthiswillbenecessaryuponaplaneitheroflongerorshorterdurationofParliament。Butnothingcansoperfectlyremovetheevil，asnottorendersuchcontentions，footfrequentlyrepeated，utterlyruinous，firsttoindependenceoffortune，andthentoindependenceofspirit。AsIamonlygivinganopiniononthispoint，andnotatalldebatingitinanadverseline，IhopeImaybeexcusedinanotherobservation。WithgreattruthImayaverthatIneverremembertohavetalkedonthissubjectwithanymanmuchconversantwithpublicbusinesswhoconsideredshortParliamentsasarealimprovementoftheConstitution。Gentlemen，warminapopularcause，arereadyenoughtoattributeallthedeclarationsofsuchpersonstocorruptmotives。Butthehabitofaffairs，if，ononehand，ittendstocorruptthemind，furnishesit，ontheother，withthe，meansofbetterinformation。Theauthorityofsuchpersonswillalwayshavesomeweight。Itmaystanduponaparwiththespeculationsofthosewhoarelesspractisedinbusiness;andwho，withperhapspurerintentions，havenotsoeffectualmeansofjudging。ItisbesidesaneffectofvulgarandpuerilemalignitytoimaginethateveryStatesmanisofcoursecorrupt：andthathisopinion，uponeveryconstitutionalpoint，issolelyformeduponsomesinisterinterest。
ThenextfavouriteremedyisaPlace—bill。Thesameprincipleguidesinboth：Imeantheopinionwhichisentertainedbymanyoftheinfallibilityoflawsandregulations，inthecureofpublicdistempers。Withoutbeingasunreasonablydoubtfulasmanyareunwiselyconfident，Iwillonlysay，thatthisalsoisamatterverywellworthyofseriousandmaturereflection。ItisnoteasytoforeseewhattheeffectwouldbeofdisconnectingwithParliament，thegreatestpartofthosewhoholdcivilemployments，andofsuchmightyandimportantbodiesasthemilitaryandnavalestablishments。Itwerebetter，perhaps，thattheyshouldhaveacorruptinterestintheformsoftheconstitution，thantheyshouldhavenoneatall。ThisisaquestionaltogetherdifferentfromthedisqualificationofaparticulardescriptionofRevenueOfficersfromseatsinParliament;or，perhaps，ofallthelowersortsofthemfromvotesinelections。Intheformercase，onlythefewareaffected;inthelatter，onlytheinconsiderable。Butagreatofficial，agreatprofessional，agreatmilitaryandnavalinterest，allnecessarilycomprehendingmanypeopleofthefirstweight，ability，wealth，andspirit，hasbeengraduallyformedinthekingdom。Thesenewinterestsmustbeletintoashareofrepresentation，elsepossiblytheymaybeinclinedtodestroythoseinstitutionsofwhichtheyarenotpermittedtopartake。Thisisnotathingtobetrifledwith：norisiteverywell—meaningmanthatisfittoputhishandstoit。Manyotherseriousconsiderationsoccur。Idonotopenthemhere，becausetheyarenotdirectlytomypurpose;proposingonlytogivethereadersometasteofthedifficultiesthatattendallcapitalchangesintheConstitution;justtohinttheuncertainty，tosaynoworse，ofbeingabletopreventtheCourt，aslongasithasthemeansofinfluenceabundantlyinitspower，fromapplyingthatinfluencetoParliament;andperhaps，ifthepublicmethodwereprecluded，ofdoingitinsomeworseandmoredangerousmethod。Underhandandobliquewayswouldbestudied。Thescienceofevasion，alreadytolerablyunderstood，wouldthenbebroughttothegreatestperfection。Itisnoinconsiderablepartofwisdom，toknowhowmuchofaneviloughttobetolerated;lest，byattemptingadegreeofpurityimpracticableindegeneratetimesandmanners，insteadofcuttingoffthesubsistingillpractices，newcorruptionsmightbeproducedfortheconcealmentandsecurityoftheold。Itwerebetter，undoubtedly，thatnoinfluenceatallcouldaffectthemindofaMemberofParliament。Butofallmodesofinfluence，inmyopinion，aplaceundertheGovernmentistheleastdisgracefultothemanwhoholdsit，andbyfarthemostsafetothecountry。I
wouldnotshutoutthatsortofinfluencewhichisopenandvisible，whichisconnectedwiththedignityandtheserviceoftheState，whenitisnotinmypowertopreventtheinfluenceofcontracts，ofsubscriptions，ofdirectbribery，andthoseinnumerablemethodsofclandestinecorruption，whichareabundantlyinthehandsoftheCourt，andwhichwillbeappliedaslongasthesemeansofcorruption，andthedispositiontobecorrupted，haveexistenceamongstus。OurConstitutionstandsonaniceequipoise，withsteepprecipicesanddeepwatersuponallsidesofit。Inremovingitfromadangerousleaningtowardsoneside，theremaybeariskofoversettingitontheother。EveryprojectofamaterialchangeinaGovernmentsocomplicatedasours，combinedatthesametimewithexternalcircumstancesstillmorecomplicated，isamatterfullofdifficulties;inwhichaconsideratemanwillnotbetooreadytodecide;aprudentmantooreadytoundertake;oranhonestmantooreadytopromise。Theydonotrespectthepublicnorthemselves，whoengageformorethantheyaresurethattheyoughttoattempt，orthattheyareabletoperform。Thesearemysentiments，weakperhaps，buthonestandunbiassed;andsubmittedentirelytotheopinionofgravemen，wellaffectedtotheconstitutionoftheircountry，andofexperienceinwhatmaybestpromoteorhurtit。
Indeed，inthesituationinwhichwestand，withanimmenserevenue，anenormousdebt，mightyestablishments，Governmentitselfagreatbankerandagreatmerchant，IseenootherwayforthepreservationofadecentattentiontopublicinterestintheRepresentatives，butTHEINTERPOSITIONOFTHEBODYOFTHEPEOPLEITSELF，wheneveritshallappear，bysomeflagrantandnotoriousact，bysomecapitalinnovation，thattheseRepresentativesaregoingtoover—leapthefencesofthelaw，andtointroduceanarbitrarypower。Thisinterpositionisamostunpleasantremedy。But，ifitbealegalremedy，itisintendedonsomeoccasiontobeused;tobeusedthenonly，whenitisevidentthatnothingelsecanholdtheConstitutiontoitstrueprinciples。
ThedistempersofMonarchywerethegreatsubjectsofapprehensionandredress，inthelastcentury;inthis，thedistempersofParliament。ItisnotinParliamentalonethattheremedyforParliamentarydisorderscanbecompleted;hardly，indeed，canitbeginthere。UntilaconfidenceinGovernmentisre—established，thepeopleoughttobeexcitedtoamorestrictanddetailedattentiontotheconductoftheirRepresentatives。Standards，forjudgingmoresystematicallyupontheirconduct，oughttobesettledinthemeetingsofcountiesandcorporations。Frequentandcorrectlistsofthevotersinallimportantquestionsoughttobeprocured。
Bysuchmeanssomethingmaybedone。Bysuchmeansitmayappearwhothoseare，that，byanindiscriminatesupportofallAdministrations，havetotallybanishedallintegrityandconfidenceoutofpublicproceedings;haveconfoundedthebestmenwiththeworst;andweakenedanddissolved，insteadofstrengtheningandcompacting，thegeneralframeofGovernment。Ifanypersonismoreconcernedforgovernmentandorderthanforthelibertiesofhiscountry，evenheisequallyconcernedtoputanendtothiscourseofindiscriminatesupport。Itisthisblindandundistinguishingsupportthatfeedsthespringofthoseverydisorders，bywhichheisfrightedintothearmsofthefactionwhichcontainsinitselfthesourceofalldisorders，byenfeeblingallthevisibleandregularauthorityoftheState。Thedistemperisincreasedbyhisinjudiciousandpreposterousendeavours，orpretences，forthecureofit。
AnexteriorAdministration，chosenforitsimpotency，orafteritischosenpurposelyrenderedimpotent，inordertoberenderedsubservient，willnotbeobeyed。Thelawsthemselveswillnotberespected，whenthosewhoexecutethemaredespised：andtheywillbedespised，whentheirpowerisnotimmediatefromtheCrown，ornaturalinthekingdom。NeverwereMinistersbettersupportedinParliament。Parliamentarysupportcomesandgoeswithoffice，totallyregardlessoftheman，orthemerit。IsGovernmentstrengthened？Itgrowsweakerandweaker。Thepopulartorrentgainsuponiteveryhour。Letuslearnfromourexperience。ItisnotsupportthatiswantingtoGovernment，butreformation。WhenMinistryrestsuponpublicopinion，itisnotindeedbuiltuponarockofadamant;ithas，however，somestability。Butwhenitstandsuponprivatehumour，itsstructureisofstubble，anditsfoundationisonquicksand。Irepeatitagain——HethatsupportseveryAdministration，subvertsallGovernment。Thereasonisthis。
ThewholebusinessinwhichaCourtusuallytakesaninterestgoesonatpresentequallywell，inwhateverhands，whetherhighorlow，wiseorfoolish，scandalousorreputable;thereisnothing，therefore，toholditfirmtoanyonebodyofmen，ortoanyoneconsistentschemeofpolitics。NothinginterposestopreventthefulloperationofallthecapricesandallthepassionsofaCourtupontheservantsofthepublic。ThesystemofAdministrationisopentocontinualshocksandchanges，upontheprinciplesofthemeanestcabal，andthemostcontemptibleintrigue。Nothingcanbesolidandpermanent。Allgoodmenatlengthflywithhorrorfromsuchaservice。Menofrankandability，withthespiritwhichoughttoanimatesuchmeninafreestate，whiletheydeclinethejurisdictionofdarkcabalontheiractionsandtheirfortunes，will，forboth，cheerfullyputthemselvesupontheircountry。TheywilltrustaninquisitiveanddistinguishingParliament;becauseitdoesinquire，anddoesdistinguish。Iftheyactwell，theyknowthat，insuchaParliament，theywillbesupportedagainstanyintrigue;iftheyactill，theyknowthatnointriguecanprotectthem。Thissituation，howeverawful，ishonourable。Butinonehour，andintheself—sameAssembly，withoutanyassignedorassignablecause，tobeprecipitatedfromthehighestauthoritytothemostmarkedneglect，possiblyintothegreatestperiloflifeandreputation，isasituationfullofdanger，anddestituteofhonour。Itwillbeshunnedequallybyeverymanofprudence，andeverymanofspirit。
SucharetheconsequencesofthedivisionofCourtfromtheAdministration;andofthedivisionofpublicmenamongthemselves。
Bytheformerofthese，lawfulGovernmentisundone;bythelatter，alloppositiontolawlesspowerisrenderedimpotent。Governmentmayinagreatmeasureberestored，ifanyconsiderablebodiesofmenhavehonestyandresolutionenoughnevertoacceptAdministration，unlessthisgarrisonofKING’SMEN，whichisstationed，asinacitadel，tocontrolandenslaveit，beentirelybrokenanddisbanded，andeveryworktheyhavethrownupbelevelledwiththeground。Thedispositionofpublicmentokeepthiscorpstogether，andtoactunderit，ortoco—operatewithit，isatouchstonebywhicheveryAdministrationoughtinfuturetobetried。Therehasnotbeenonewhichhasnotsufficientlyexperiencedtheutterincompatibilityofthatfactionwiththepublicpeace，andwithalltheendsofgoodGovernment;since，iftheyopposedit，theysoonlosteverypowerofservingtheCrown;iftheysubmittedtoittheylostalltheesteemoftheircountry。
UntilMinistersgivetothepublicafullproofoftheirentirealienationfromthatsystem，howeverplausibletheirpretences，wemaybesuretheyaremoreintentontheemolumentsthanthedutiesofoffice。Iftheyrefusetogivethisproof，weknowofwhatstufftheyaremade。Inthisparticular，itoughttobetheelectors’
businesstolooktotheirRepresentatives。TheelectorsoughttoesteemitnolessculpableintheirMembertogiveasinglevoteinParliamenttosuchanAdministration，thantotakeanofficeunderit;toendureit，thantoactinit。ThenotoriousinfidelityandversatilityofMembersofParliament，intheiropinionsofmenandthings，oughtinaparticularmannertobeconsideredbytheelectorsintheinquirywhichisrecommendedtothem。Thisisoneoftheprincipalholdingsofthatdestructivesystemwhichhasendeavouredtounhingeallthevirtuous，honourable，andusefulconnectionsinthekingdom。
Thiscabalhas，withgreatsuccess，propagatedadoctrinewhichservesforacolourtothoseactsoftreachery;andwhilstitreceivesanydegreeofcountenance，itwillbeutterlysenselesstolookforavigorousoppositiontotheCourtParty。Thedoctrineisthis：Thatallpoliticalconnectionsareintheirnaturefactious，andassuchoughttobedissipatedanddestroyed;andthattheruleforformingAdministrationsismerepersonalability，ratedbythejudgmentofthiscabaluponit，andtakenbydraftsfromeverydivisionanddenominationofpublicmen。ThisdecreewassolemnlypromulgatedbytheheadoftheCourtcorps，theEarlofButehimself，inaspeechwhichhemade，intheyear1766，againstthethenAdministration，theonlyAdministrationwhich，hehaseverbeenknowndirectlyandpubliclytooppose。
Itisindeedinnowaywonderful，thatsuchpersonsshouldmakesuchdeclarations。Thatconnectionandfactionareequivalentterms，isanopinionwhichhasbeencarefullyinculcatedatalltimesbyunconstitutionalStatesmen。Thereasonisevident。Whilstmenarelinkedtogether，theyeasilyandspeedilycommunicatethealarmofanevildesign。Theyareenabledtofathomitwithcommoncounsel，andtoopposeitwithunitedstrength。Whereas，whentheyliedispersed，withoutconcert，order，ordiscipline，communicationisuncertain，counseldifficult，andresistanceimpracticable。Wheremenarenotacquaintedwitheachother’sprinciples，norexperiencedineachother’stalents，noratallpractisedintheirmutualhabitudesanddispositionsbyjointeffortsinbusiness;nopersonalconfidence，nofriendship，nocommoninterest，subsistingamongthem;itisevidentlyimpossiblethattheycanactapublicpartwithuniformity，perseverance，orefficacy。Inaconnection，themostinconsiderableman，byaddingtotheweightofthewhole，hashisvalue，andhisuse;outofit，thegreatesttalentsarewhollyunserviceabletothepublic。Noman，whoisnotinflamedbyvaingloryintoenthusiasm，canflatterhimselfthathissingle，unsupported，desultory，unsystematicendeavours，areofpowertodefeat，thesubtledesignsandunitedcabalsofambitiouscitizens。
Whenbadmencombine，thegoodmustassociate;elsetheywillfall，onebyone，anunpitiedsacrificeinacontemptiblestruggle。
Itisnotenoughinasituationoftrustinthecommonwealth，thatamanmeanswelltohiscountry;itisnotenoughthatinhissinglepersonheneverdidanevilact，butalwaysvotedaccordingtohisconscience，andevenharanguedagainsteverydesignwhichheapprehendedtoheprejudicialtotheinterestsofhiscountry。Thisinnoxiousandineffectualcharacter，thatseemsformeduponaplanofapologyanddisculpation，fallsmiserablyshortofthemarkofpublicduty。Thatdutydemandsandrequires，thatwhatisrightshouldnotonlybemadeknown，butmadeprevalent;thatwhatisevilshouldnotonlybedetected，butdefeated。Whenthepublicmanomitstoputhimselfinasituationofdoinghisdutywitheffect，itisanomissionthatfrustratesthepurposesofhistrustalmostasmuchasifhehadformallybetrayedit。Itissurelynoveryrationalaccountofaman’slifethathehasalwaysactedright;buthastakenspecialcaretoactinsuchamannerthathisendeavourscouldnotpossiblybeproductiveofanyconsequence。
Idonotwonderthatthebehaviourofmanypartiesshouldhavemadepersonsoftenderandscrupulousvirtuesomewhatoutofhumourwithallsortsofconnectioninpolitics。Iadmitthatpeoplefrequentlyacquireinsuchconfederaciesanarrow，bigoted，andproscriptivespirit;thattheyareapttosinktheideaofthegeneralgoodinthiscircumscribedandpartialinterest。But，wheredutyrendersacriticalsituationanecessaryone，itisourbusinesstokeepfreefromtheevilsattendantuponit，andnottoflyfromthesituationitself。Ifafortressisseatedinanunwholesomeair，anofficerofthegarrisonisobligedtobeattentivetohishealth，buthemustnotdeserthisstation。Everyprofession，notexceptingthegloriousoneofasoldier，orthesacredoneofapriest，isliabletoitsownparticularvices;which，however，formnoargumentagainstthosewaysoflife;norarethevicesthemselvesinevitabletoeveryindividualinthoseprofessions。Ofsuchanatureareconnectionsinpolitics;essentiallynecessaryforthefullperformanceofourpublicduty，accidentallyliabletodegenerateintofaction。Commonwealthsaremadeoffamilies，freeCommonwealthsofpartiesalso;andwemayaswellaffirm，thatournaturalregardsandtiesofbloodtendinevitablytomakemenbadcitizens，asthatthebondsofourpartyweakenthosebywhichweareheldtoourcountry。
SomelegislatorswentsofarastomakeneutralityinpartyacrimeagainsttheState。Idonotknowwhetherthismightnothavebeenrathertooverstraintheprinciple。Certainitis，thebestpatriotsinthegreatestcommonwealthshavealwayscommandedandpromotedsuchconnections。Idemsentirederepublica，waswiththemaprincipalgroundoffriendshipandattachment;nordoIknowanyothercapableofformingfirmer，dearer，morepleasing，morehonourable，andmorevirtuoushabitudes。TheRomanscarriedthisprincipleagreatway。Eventheholdingofofficestogether，thedispositionofwhicharosefromchance，notselection，gaverisetoarelationwhichcontinuedforlife。Itwascallednecessitudosortis;anditwaslookeduponwithasacredreverence。Breachesofanyofthesekindsofcivilrelationwereconsideredasactsofthemostdistinguishedturpitude。Thewholepeoplewasdistributedintopoliticalsocieties，inwhichtheyactedinsupportofsuchinterestsintheStateastheyseverallyaffected。Foritwasthenthoughtnocrime，toendeavourbyeveryhonestmeanstoadvancetosuperiorityandpowerthoseofyourownsentimentsandopinions。
Thiswisepeoplewasfarfromimaginingthatthoseconnectionshadnotie，andobligedtonoduty;butthatmenmightquitthemwithoutshame，uponeverycallofinterest。Theybelievedprivatehonourtobethegreatfoundationofpublictrust;thatfriendshipwasnomeansteptowardspatriotism;thathewho，inthecommonintercourseoflife，showedheregardedsomebodybesideshimself，whenhecametoactinapublicsituation，mightprobablyconsultsomeotherinterestthanhisown。Nevermaywebecomeplussagesquelessages，astheFrenchcomedianhashappilyexpressedit——wiserthanallthewiseandgoodmenwhohavelivedbeforeus。Itwastheirwish，toseepublicandprivatevirtues，notdissonantandjarring，andmutuallydestructive，butharmoniouslycombined，growingoutofoneanotherinanobleandorderlygradation，reciprocallysupportingandsupported。Inoneofthemostfortunateperiodsofourhistorythiscountrywasgovernedbyaconnection;ImeanthegreatconnectionofWhigsinthereignofQueenAnne。Theywerecomplimentedupontheprincipleofthisconnectionbyapoetwhowasinhighesteemwiththem。Addison，whoknewtheirsentiments，couldnotpraisethemforwhattheyconsideredasnopropersubjectofcommendation。Asapoetwhoknewhisbusiness，hecouldnotapplaudthemforathingwhichingeneralestimationwasnothighlyreputable。AddressinghimselftoBritain，"Thyfavouritesgrownotupbyfortune’ssport，OrfromthecrimesorfolliesofaCourt;
Onthefirmbasisofdeserttheyrise，Fromlong—triedfaith，andfriendship’sholyties。"
TheWhigsofthosedaysbelievedthattheonlypropermethodofrisingintopowerwasthroughbardessaysofpractisedfriendshipandexperimentedfidelity。Atthattimeitwasnotimaginedthatpatriotismwasabloodyidol，whichrequiredthesacrificeofchildrenandparents，ordearestconnectionsinprivatelife，andofallthevirtuesthatrisefromthoserelations。Theywerenotofthatingeniousparadoxicalmoralitytoimaginethataspiritofmoderationwasproperlyshowninpatientlybearingthesufferingsofyourfriends，orthatdisinterestednesswasclearlymanifestedattheexpenseofotherpeople’sfortune。Theybelievedthatnomencouldactwitheffectwhodidnotactinconcert;thatnomencouldactinconcertwhodidnotactwithconfidence;thatnomencouldactwithconfidencewhowerenotboundtogetherbycommonopinions，commonaffections，andcommoninterests。