Again，toseeiftheindignantmanisjealous，askwhoeachofthemis：forthenitwillbeobviouswhetherthestatementistrueorfalse；e。g。ifheis’jealous’whogrievesatthesuccessesofthegood，andheis’indignant’whogrievesatthesuccessesoftheevil，thenclearlytheindignantmanwouldnotbejealous。Amanshouldsubstitutedefinitionsalsoforthetermscontainedinhisdefinitions，andnotstopuntilhecomestoafamiliarterm：foroftenifthedefinitionberenderedwhole，thepointatissueisnotclearedup，whereasifforoneofthetermsusedinthedefinitionadefinitionbestated，itbecomesobvious。
　　Moreover，amanshouldmaketheproblemintoapropositionforhimself，andthenbringanegativeinstanceagainstit：forthenegativeinstancewillbeagroundofattackupontheassertion。
　　Thisruleisverynearlythesameastheruletolookintocaseswhereapredicatehasbeenattributedordenieduniversally：butitdiffersintheturnoftheargument。
　　Moreover，youshoulddefinewhatkindofthingsshouldbecalledasmostmencallthem，andwhatshouldnot。Forthisisusefulbothforestablishingandforoverthrowingaview：e。g。youshouldsaythatweoughttouseourtermstomeanthesamethingsasmostpeoplemeanbythem，butwhenweaskwhatkindofthingsareorarenotofsuchandsuchakind，weshouldnotheregowiththemultitude：e。g。
　　itisrighttocall’healthy’whatevertendstoproducehealth，asdomostmen：butinsayingwhethertheobjectbeforeustendstoproducehealthornot，weshouldadoptthelanguagenolongerofthemultitudebutofthedoctor。
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　　Moreover，ifatermbeusedinseveralsenses，andithasbeenlaiddownthatitisorthatitisnotanattributeofS，youshouldshowyourcaseofoneofitsseveralsenses，ifyoucannotshowitofboth。Thisruleistobeobservedincaseswherethedifferenceofmeaningisundetected；forsupposingthistobeobvious，thentheothermanwillobjectthatthepointwhichhehimselfquestionedhasnotbeendiscussed，butonlytheotherpoint。Thiscommonplaceruleisconvertibleforpurposesbothofestablishingandofoverthrowingaview。Forifwewanttoestablishastatement，weshallshowthatinonesensetheattributebelongs，ifwecannotshowitofbothsenses：whereasifweareoverthrowingastatement，weshallshowthatinonesensetheattributedoesnotbelong，ifwecannotshowitofbothsenses。Ofcourse，inoverthrowingastatementthereisnoneedtostartthediscussionbysecuringanyadmission，eitherwhenthestatementassertsorwhenitdeniestheattributeuniversally：forifweshowthatinanycasewhatevertheattributedoesnotbelong，weshallhavedemolishedtheuniversalassertionofit，andlikewisealsoifweshowthatitbelongsinasinglecase，weshalldemolishtheuniversaldenialofit。Whereasinestablishingastatementweoughttosecureapreliminaryadmissionthatifitbelongsinanycasewhatever，itbelongsuniversally，supposingthisclaimtobeaplausibleone。Foritisnotenoughtodiscussasingleinstanceinordertoshowthatanattributebelongsuniversally；e。g。toarguethatifthesoulofmanbeimmortal，theneverysoulisimmortal，sothatapreviousadmissionmustbesecuredthatifanysoulwhateverbeimmortal，theneverysoulisimmortal。Thisisnottobedoneineverycase，butonlywheneverwearenoteasilyabletoquoteanysingleargumentapplyingtoallcasesincommon，as（e。g。）thegeometriciancanarguethatthetrianglehasitsanglesequaltotworightangles。
　　If，again，thevarietyofmeaningsofatermbeobvious，distinguishhowmanymeaningsithasbeforeproceedingeithertodemolishortoestablishit：e。g。supposing’theright’tomean’theexpedient’or’thehonourable’，youshouldtryeithertoestablishortodemolishbothdescriptionsofthesubjectinquestion；e。g。byshowingthatitishonourableandexpedient，orthatitisneitherhonourablenorexpedient。Supposing，however，thatitisimpossibletoshowboth，youshouldshowtheone，addinganindicationthatitistrueintheonesenseandnotintheother。Thesameruleappliesalsowhenthenumberofsensesintowhichitisdividedismorethantwo。
　　Again，considerthoseexpressionswhosemeaningsaremany，butdiffernotbywayofambiguityofaterm，butinsomeotherway：
　　e。g。’Thescienceofmanythingsisone’：here’manythings’maymeantheendandthemeanstothatend，as（e。g。）medicineisthesciencebothofproducinghealthandofdieting；ortheymaybebothofthemends，asthescienceofcontrariesissaidtobethesame（forofcontrariestheoneisnomoreanendthantheother）；oragaintheymaybeanessentialandanaccidentalattribute，as（e。g。）theessentialfactthatthetrianglehasitsanglesequaltotworightangles，andtheaccidentalfactthattheequilateralfigurehasthemso：foritisbecauseoftheaccidentoftheequilateraltrianglehappeningtobeatrianglethatweknowthatithasitsanglesequaltotworightangles。If，then，itisnotpossibleinanysenseofthetermthatthescienceofmanythingsshouldbethesame，itclearlyisaltogetherimpossiblethatitshouldbeso；or，ifitispossibleinsomesense，thenclearlyitispossible。Distinguishasmanymeaningsasarerequired：e。g。ifwewanttoestablishaview，weshouldbringforwardallsuchmeaningsasadmitthatviewandshoulddividethemonlyintothosemeaningswhichalsoarerequiredfortheestablishmentofourcase：whereasifwewanttooverthrowaview，weshouldbringforwardallthatdonotadmitthatview，andleavetherestaside。Wemustdealalsointhesecasesaswellwithanyuncertaintyaboutthenumberofmeaningsinvolved。Further，thatonethingis，orisnot，’of’anothershouldbeestablishedbymeansofthesamecommonplacerules；e。g。thataparticularscienceisofaparticularthing，treatedeitherasanendorasameanstoitsend，orasaccidentallyconnectedwithit；oragainthatitisnot’of’
　　itinanyoftheaforesaidways。Thesameruleholdstruealsoofdesireandallothertermsthathavemorethanoneobject。Forthe’desireofX’maymeanthedesireofitasanend（e。g。thedesireofhealth）orasameanstoanend（e。g。thedesireofbeingdoctored），orasathingdesiredaccidentally，as，inthecaseofwine，thesweet—toothedpersondesiresitnotbecauseitiswinebutbecauseitissweet。Foressentiallyhedesiresthesweet，andonlyaccidentallythewine：forifitbedry，henolongerdesiresit。
　　Hisdesireforitisthereforeaccidental。Thisruleisusefulindealingwithrelativeterms：forcasesofthiskindaregenerallycasesofrelativeterms。
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　　Moreover，itiswelltoalteratermintoonemorefamiliar，e。g。tosubstitute’clear’for’exact’indescribingaconception，and’beingfussy’for’beingbusy’：forwhentheexpressionismademorefamiliar，thethesisbecomeseasiertoattack。Thiscommonplacerulealsoisavailableforbothpurposesalike，bothforestablishingandforoverthrowingaview。
　　Inordertoshowthatcontraryattributesbelongtothesamething，lookatitsgenus；e。g。ifwewanttoshowthatrightnessandwrongnessarepossibleinregardtoperception，andtoperceiveistojudge，whileitispossibletojudgerightlyorwrongly，theninregardtoperceptionaswellrightnessandwrongnessmustbepossible。
　　Inthepresentinstancetheproofproceedsfromthegenusandrelatestothespecies：for’tojudge’isthegenusof’to—perceive’；
　　forthemanwhoperceivesjudgesinacertainway。Butpercontraitmayproceedfromthespeciestothegenus：foralltheattributesthatbelongtothespeciesbelongtothegenusaswell；e。g。ifthereisabadandagoodknowledgethereisalsoabadandagooddisposition：
　　for’disposition’isthegenusofknowledge。Nowtheformercommonplaceargumentisfallaciousforpurposesofestablishingaview，whilethesecondistrue。Forthereisnonecessitythatalltheattributesthatbelongtothegenusshouldbelongalsotothespecies；
　　for’animal’isflyingandquadruped，butnotso’man’。Alltheattributes，ontheotherhand，thatbelongtothespeciesmustofnecessitybelongalsotothegenus；forif’man’isgood，thenanimalalsoisgood。Ontheotherhand，forpurposesofoverthrowingaview，theformerargumentistruewhilethelatterisfallacious；
　　foralltheattributeswhichdonotbelongtothegenusdonotbelongtothespecieseither；whereasallthosethatarewantingtothespeciesarenotofnecessitywantingtothegenus。
　　Sincethosethingsofwhichthegenusispredicatedmustalsoofnecessityhaveoneofitsspeciespredicatedofthem，andsincethosethingsthatarepossessedofthegenusinquestion，oraredescribedbytermsderivedfromthatgenus，mustalsoofnecessitybepossessedofoneofitsspeciesorbedescribedbytermsderivedfromoneofitsspecies（e。g。iftoanythingtheterm’scientificknowledge’beapplied，thenalsotherewillbeappliedtoittheterm’grammatical’or’musical’knowledge，orknowledgeofoneoftheothersciences；andifanyonepossessesscientificknowledgeorisdescribedbyatermderivedfrom’science’，thenhewillalsopossessgrammaticalormusicalknowledgeorknowledgeofoneoftheothersciences，orwillbedescribedbyatermderivedfromoneofthem，e。g。asa’grammarian’ora’musician’）—thereforeifanyexpressionbeassertedthatisinanywayderivedfromthegenus（e。g。
　　thatthesoulisinmotion），lookandseewhetheritbepossibleforthesoultobemovedwithanyofthespeciesofmotion；whether（e。g。）
　　itcangroworbedestroyedorcometobe，andsoforthwithalltheotherspeciesofmotion。Forifitbenotmovedinanyoftheseways，clearlyitdoesnotmoveatall。Thiscommonplaceruleiscommonforbothpurposes，bothforoverthrowingandforestablishingaview：forifthesoulmoveswithoneofthespeciesofmotion，clearlyitdoesmove；whileifitdoesnotmovewithanyofthespeciesofmotion，clearlyitdoesnotmove。
　　Ifyouarenotwellequippedwithanargumentagainsttheassertion，lookamongthedefinitions，realorapparent，ofthethingbeforeyou，andifoneisnotenough，drawuponseveral。Foritwillbeeasiertoattackpeoplewhencommittedtoadefinition：foranattackisalwaysmoreeasilymadeondefinitions。
　　Moreover，lookandseeinregardtothethinginquestion，whatitiswhoserealityconditionstherealityofthethinginquestion，orwhatitiswhoserealitynecessarilyfollowsifthethinginquestionbereal：ifyouwishtoestablishaviewinquirewhatthereisonwhoserealitytherealityofthethinginquestionwillfollow（foriftheformerbeshowntobereal，thenthethinginquestionwillalsohavebeenshowntobereal）；whileifyouwanttooverthrowaview，askwhatitisthatisrealifthethinginquestionbereal，forifweshowthatwhatfollowsfromthethinginquestionisunreal，weshallhavedemolishedthethinginquestion。
　　Moreover，lookatthetimeinvolved，toseeiftherebeanydiscrepancyanywhere：e。g。supposeamantohavestatedthatwhatisbeingnourishedofnecessitygrows：foranimalsarealwaysofnecessitybeingnourished，buttheydonotalwaysgrow。Likewise，also，ifhehassaidthatknowingisremembering：fortheoneisconcernedwithpasttime，whereastheotherhastodoalsowiththepresentandthefuture。Forwearesaidtoknowthingspresentandfuture（e。g。thattherewillbeaneclipse），whereasitisimpossibletorememberanythingsavewhatisinthepast。
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　　Moreover，thereisthesophisticturnofargument，wherebywedrawouropponentintothekindofstatementagainstwhichweshallbewellsuppliedwithlinesofargument。Thisprocessissometimesarealnecessity，sometimesanapparentnecessity，sometimesneitheranapparentnorarealnecessity。Itisreallynecessarywhenevertheanswererhasdeniedanyviewthatwouldbeusefulinattackingthethesis，andthequestionerthereuponaddresseshisargumentstothesupportofthisview，andwhenmoreovertheviewinquestionhappenstobeoneofakindonwhichhehasagoodstockoflinesofargument。
　　Likewise，also，itisreallynecessarywheneverhe（thequestioner）
　　first，byaninductionmadebymeansoftheviewlaiddown，arrivesatacertainstatementandthentriestodemolishthatstatement：forwhenoncethishasbeendemolished，thevieworiginallylaiddownisdemolishedaswell。Itisanapparentnecessity，whenthepointtowhichthediscussioncomestobedirectedappearstobeuseful，andrelevanttothethesis，withoutbeingreallyso；whetheritbethatthemanwhoisstandinguptotheargumenthasrefusedtoconcedesomething，orwhetherhe（thequestioner）hasfirstreacheditbyaplausibleinductionbaseduponthethesisandthentriestodemolishit。Theremainingcaseiswhenthepointtowhichthediscussioncomestobedirectedisneitherreallynorapparentlynecessary，anditistheanswerer’slucktobeconfutedonameresideissueYoushouldbewareofthelastoftheaforesaidmethods；foritappearstobewhollydisconnectedfrom，andforeignto，theartofdialectic。Forthisreason，moreover，theanswerershouldnotlosehistemper，butassenttothosestatementsthatareofnouseinattackingthethesis，addinganindicationwheneverheassentsalthoughhedoesnotagreewiththeview。For，asarule，itincreasestheconfusionofquestionersif，afterallpropositionsofthiskindhavebeengrantedthem，theycanthendrawnoconclusion。
　　Moreover，anyonewhohasmadeanystatementwhateverhasinacertainsensemadeseveralstatements，inasmuchaseachstatementhasanumberofnecessaryconsequences：e。g。themanwhosaid’Xisaman’hasalsosaidthatitisananimalandthatitisanimateandabipedandcapableofacquiringreasonandknowledge，sothatbythedemolitionofanysingleoneoftheseconsequences，ofwhateverkind，theoriginalstatementisdemolishedaswell。Butyoushouldbewareheretooofmakingachangetoamoredifficultsubject：forsometimestheconsequence，andsometimestheoriginalthesis，istheeasiertodemolish。
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　　Inregardtosubjectswhichmusthaveoneandoneonlyoftwopredicates，as（e。g。）amanmusthaveeitheradiseaseorhealth，supposingwearewellsuppliedasregardstheoneforarguingitspresenceorabsence，weshallbewellequippedasregardstheremainingoneaswell。Thisruleisconvertibleforbothpurposes：forwhenwehaveshownthattheoneattributebelongs，weshallhaveshownthattheremainingonedoesnotbelong；whileifweshowthattheonedoesnotbelong，weshallhaveshownthattheremainingonedoesbelong。Clearlythentheruleisusefulforbothpurposes。
　　Moreover，youmaydevisealineofattackbyreinterpretingaterminitsliteralmeaning，withtheimplicationthatitismostfittingsototakeitratherthaninitsestablishedmeaning：e。g。theexpression’strongatheart’willsuggestnotthecourageousman，accordingtotheusenowestablished，butthemanthestateofwhoseheartisstrong；justasalsotheexpression’ofagoodhope’maybetakentomeanthemanwhohopesforgoodthings。Likewisealso’well—starred’maybetakentomeanthemanwhosestarisgood，asXenocratessays’well—starredishewhohasanoblesoul’。’Foraman’sstarishissoul。
　　Somethingsoccurofnecessity，othersusually，othershoweveritmaychance；ifthereforeanecessaryeventhasbeenassertedtooccurusually，orifausualevent（or，failingsuchaneventitself，itscontrary）hasbeenstatedtooccurofnecessity，italwaysgivesanopportunityforattack。Forifanecessaryeventhasbeenassertedtooccurusually，clearlythespeakerhasdeniedanattributetobeuniversalwhichisuniversal，andsohasmadeamistake：andsohehasifhehasdeclaredtheusualattributetobenecessary：
　　forthenhedeclaresittobelonguniversallywhenitdoesnotsobelong。Likewisealsoifhehasdeclaredthecontraryofwhatisusualtobenecessary。Forthecontraryofausualattributeisalwaysacomparativelyrareattribute：e。g。ifmenareusuallybad，theyarecomparativelyseldomgood，sothathismistakeisevenworseifhehasdeclaredthemtobegoodofnecessity。Thesameistruealsoifhehasdeclaredamerematterofchancetohappenofnecessityorusually；
　　forachanceeventhappensneitherofnecessitynorusually。Ifthethinghappensusually，thenevensupposinghisstatementdoesnotdistinguishwhetherhemeantthatithappensusuallyorthatithappensnecessarily，itisopentoyoutodiscussitontheassumptionthathemeantthatithappensnecessarily：e。g。ifhehasstatedwithoutanydistinctionthatdisinheritedpersonsarebad，youmayassumeindiscussingitthathemeansthattheyaresonecessarily。
　　Moreover，lookandseealsoifhehasstatedathingtobeanaccidentofitself，takingittobeadifferentthingbecauseithasadifferentname，asProdicususedtodividepleasuresintojoyanddelightandgoodcheer：forallthesearenamesofthesamething，towit，Pleasure。Ifthenanyonesaysthatjoyfulnessisanaccidentalattributeofcheerfulness，hewouldbedeclaringittobeanaccidentalattributeofitself。
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　　Inasmuchascontrariescanbeconjoinedwitheachotherinsixways，andfouroftheseconjunctionsconstituteacontrariety，wemustgraspthesubjectofcontraries，inorderthatitmayhelpusbothindemolishingandinestablishingaview。Wellthen，thatthemodesofconjunctionaresixisclear：foreither（1）eachofthecontraryverbswillbeconjoinedtoeachofthecontraryobjects；andthisgivestwomodes：e。g。todogoodtofriendsandtodoeviltoenemies，orpercontratodoeviltofriendsandtodogoodtoenemies。Orelse（2）bothverbsmaybeattachedtooneobject；andthistoogivestwomodes，e。g。todogoodtofriendsandtodoeviltofriends，ortodogoodtoenemiesandtodoeviltoenemies。Or（3）asingleverbmaybeattachedtobothobjects：andthisalsogivestwomodes；e。g。todogoodtofriendsandtodogoodtoenemies，ortodoeviltofriendsandeviltoenemies。
　　Thefirsttwothenoftheaforesaidconjunctionsdonotconstituteanycontrariety；forthedoingofgoodtofriendsisnotcontrarytothedoingofeviltoenemies：forbothcoursesaredesirableandbelongtothesamedisposition。Noristhedoingofeviltofriendscontrarytothedoingofgoodtoenemies：forbothoftheseareobjectionableandbelongtothesamedisposition：andoneobjectionablethingisnotgenerallythoughttobethecontraryofanother，unlesstheonebeanexpressiondenotinganexcess，andtheotheranexpressiondenotingadefect：foranexcessisgenerallythoughttobelongtotheclassofobjectionablethings，andlikewisealsoadefect。Buttheotherfourallconstituteacontrariety。Fortodogoodtofriendsiscontrarytothedoingofeviltofriends：foritproceedsfromthecontrarydisposition，andtheoneisdesirable，andtheotherobjectionable。Thecaseisthesamealsoinregardtotheotherconjunctions：forineachcombinationtheonecourseisdesirable，andtheotherobjectionable，andtheonebelongstoareasonabledispositionandtheothertoabad。Clearly，then，fromwhathasbeensaid，thesamecoursehasmorethanonecontrary。Forthedoingofgoodtofriendshasasitscontraryboththedoingofgoodtoenemiesandthedoingofeviltofriends。Likewise，ifweexaminetheminthesameway，weshallfindthatthecontrariesofeachoftheothersalsoaretwoinnumber。Selectthereforewhicheverofthetwocontrariesisusefulinattackingthethesis。
　　Moreover，iftheaccidentofathinghaveacontrary，seewhetheritbelongstothesubjecttowhichtheaccidentinquestionhasbeendeclaredtobelong：forifthelatterbelongstheformercouldnotbelong；foritisimpossiblethatcontrarypredicatesshouldbelongatthesametimetothesamething。
　　Oragain，lookandseeifanythinghasbeensaidaboutsomething，ofsuchakindthatifitbetrue，contrarypredicatesmustnecessarilybelongtothething：e。g。ifhehassaidthatthe’Ideas’existinus。
　　Forthentheresultwillbethattheyarebothinmotionandatrest，andmoreoverthattheyareobjectsbothofsensationandofthought。ForaccordingtotheviewsofthosewhoposittheexistenceofIdeas，thoseIdeasareatrestandareobjectsofthought；whileiftheyexistinus，itisimpossiblethattheyshouldbeunmoved：forwhenwemove，itfollowsnecessarilythatallthatisinusmoveswithusaswell。Clearlyalsotheyareobjectsofsensation，iftheyexistinus：foritisthroughthesensationofsightthatwerecognizetheFormpresentineachindividual。
　　Again，iftherebepositedanaccidentwhichhasacontrary，lookandseeifthatwhichadmitsoftheaccidentwilladmitofitscontraryaswell：forthesamethingadmitsofcontraries。Thus（e。g。）
　　ifhehasassertedthathatredfollowsanger，hatredwouldinthatcasebeinthe’spiritedfaculty’：forthatiswhereangeris。Youshouldthereforelookandseeifitscontrary，towit，friendship，bealsointhe’spiritedfaculty’：forifnot—iffriendshipisinthefacultyofdesire—thenhatredcouldnotfollowanger。Likewisealsoifhehasassertedthatthefacultyofdesireisignorant。Forifitwerecapableofignorance，itwouldbecapableofknowledgeaswell：andthisisnotgenerallyheld—Imeanthatthefacultyofdesireiscapableofknowledge。Forpurposes，then，ofoverthrowingaview，ashasbeensaid，thisruleshouldbeobserved：butforpurposesofestablishingone，thoughtherulewillnothelpyoutoassertthattheaccidentactuallybelongs，itwillhelpyoutoassertthatitmaypossiblybelong。Forhavingshownthatthethinginquestionwillnotadmitofthecontraryoftheaccidentasserted，weshallhaveshownthattheaccidentneitherbelongsnorcanpossiblybelong；whileontheotherhand，ifweshowthatthecontrarybelongs，orthatthethingiscapableofthecontrary，weshallnotindeedasyethaveshownthattheaccidentasserteddoesbelongaswell；ourproofwillmerelyhavegonetothispoint，thatitispossibleforittobelong。
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　　Seeingthatthemodesofoppositionarefourinnumber，youshouldlookforargumentsamongthecontradictoriesofyourterms，convertingtheorderoftheirsequence，bothwhendemolishingandwhenestablishingaview，andyoushouldsecurethembymeansofinduction—sucharguments（e。g。）asthatmanbeananimal，whatisnotananimalisnotaman’：andlikewisealsoinotherinstancesofcontradictories。Forinthosecasesthesequenceisconverse：for’animal’followsupon’manbut’not—animal’doesnotfollowupon’not—man’，butconversely’not—man’upon’not—animal’。Inallcases，therefore，apostulateofthissortshouldbemade，（e。g。）that’Ifthehonourableispleasant，whatisnotpleasantisnothonourable，whileifthelatterbeuntrue，soistheformer’。Likewise，also，’Ifwhatisnotpleasantbenothonourable，thenwhatishonourableispleasant’。Clearly，then，theconversionofthesequenceformedbycontradictionofthetermsofthethesisisamethodconvertibleforbothpurposes。
　　ThenlookalsoatthecaseofthecontrariesofSandPinthethesis，andseeifthecontraryoftheonefollowsuponthecontraryoftheother，eitherdirectlyorconversely，bothwhenyouaredemolishingandwhenyouareestablishingaview：secureargumentsofthiskindaswellbymeansofinduction，sofarasmayberequired。
　　Nowthesequenceisdirectinacasesuchasthatofcourageandcowardice：forupontheoneofthemvirtuefollows，andviceupontheother；andupontheoneitfollowsthatitisdesirable，whileupontheotheritfollowsthatitisobjectionable。Thesequence，therefore，inthelattercasealsoisdirect；forthedesirableisthecontraryoftheobjectionable。Likewisealsoinothercases。Thesequenceis，ontheotherhand，converseinsuchacaseasthis：
　　Healthfollowsuponvigour，butdiseasedoesnotfollowupondebility；
　　ratherdebilityfollowsupondisease。Inthiscase，then，clearlythesequenceisconverse。Conversesequenceis，however，rareinthecaseofcontraries；usuallythesequenceisdirect。If，therefore，thecontraryoftheonetermdoesnotfollowuponthecontraryoftheothereitherdirectlyorconversely，clearlyneitherdoestheonetermfollowupontheotherinthestatementmade：whereasiftheonefollowedtheotherinthecaseofthecontraries，itmustofnecessitydosoaswellintheoriginalstatement。
　　Youshouldlookalsointocasesoftheprivationorpresenceofastateinlikemannertothecaseofcontraries。Only，inthecaseofsuchprivationstheconversesequencedoesnotoccur：thesequenceisalwaysboundtobedirect：e。g。assensationfollowssight，whileabsenceofsensationfollowsblindness。Fortheoppositionofsensationtoabsenceofsensationisanoppositionofthepresencetotheprivationofastate：fortheoneofthemisastate，andtheothertheprivationofit。
　　Thecaseofrelativetermsshouldalsobestudiedinlikemannertothatofastateanditsprivation：forthesequenceoftheseaswellisdirect；e。g。if3/1isamultiple，then1/3isafraction：for3/1isrelativeto1/3，andsoisamultipletoafraction。Again，ifknowledgebeaconceiving，thenalsotheobjectofknowledgeisanobjectofconception；andifsightbeasensation，thenalsotheobjectofsightisanobjectofsensation。Anobjectionmaybemadethatthereisnonecessityforthesequencetotakeplace，inthecaseofrelativeterms，inthewaydescribed：fortheobjectofsensationisanobjectofknowledge，whereassensationisnotknowledge。Theobjectionis，however，notgenerallyreceivedasreallytrue；formanypeopledenythatthereisknowledgeofobjectsofsensation。Moreover，theprinciplestatedisjustasusefulforthecontrarypurpose，e。g。toshowthattheobjectofsensationisnotanobjectofknowledge，onthegroundthatneitherissensationknowledge。
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　　Againlookatthecaseoftheco—ordinatesandinflectedformsofthetermsinthethesis，bothindemolishingandinestablishingit。
　　Byco—ordinates’aremeanttermssuchasthefollowing：’Justdeeds’
　　andthe’justman’arecoordinatesof’justice’，and’courageousdeeds’andthe’courageousman’areco—ordinatesofcourage。
　　Likewisealsothingsthattendtoproduceandtopreserveanythingarecalledco—ordinatesofthatwhichtheytendtoproduceandtopreserve，ase。g。’healthyhabits’areco—ordinatesof’health’anda’vigorousconstitutional’ofa’vigorousconstitution’andsoforthalsoinothercases。’Co—ordinate’，then，usuallydescribescasessuchasthese，whereas’inflectedforms’aresuchasthefollowing：’justly’，’courageously’，’healthily’，andsuchasareformedinthisway。Itisusuallyheldthatwordswhenusedintheirinflectedformsaswellareco—ordinates，as（e。g。）’justly’inrelationtojustice，and’courageously’tocourage；andthen’co—ordinate’describesallthemembersofthesamekindredseries，e。g。’justice’，’just’，ofamanoranact，’justly’。Clearly，then，whenanyonemember，whateveritskind，ofthesamekindredseriesisshowntobegoodorpraiseworthy，thenalltherestaswellcometobeshowntobeso：e。g。if’justice’besomethingpraiseworthy，thensowill’just’，ofamanorthing，and’justly’connotesomethingpraiseworthy。Then’justly’willberenderedalso’praiseworthily’，derivedwillbythesameinflexionfrom’thepraiseworthy’whereby’justly’isderivedfrom’justice’。
　　Looknotonlyinthecaseofthesubjectmentioned，butalsointhecaseofitscontrary，forthecontrarypredicate：e。g。arguethatgoodisnotnecessarilypleasant；forneitherisevilpainful：orthat，ifthelatterbethecase，soistheformer。Also，ifjusticebeknowledge，theninjusticeisignorance：andif’justly’means’knowingly’and’skilfully’，then’unjustly’means’ignorantly’and’unskilfully’：whereasifthelatterbenottrue，neitheristheformer，asintheinstancegivenjustnow：for’unjustly’ismorelikelytoseemequivalentto’skilfully’thanto’unskilfully’。Thiscommonplacerulehasbeenstatedbeforeindealingwiththesequenceofcontraries；forallweareclaimingnowisthatthecontraryofP
　　shallfollowthecontraryofS。
　　Moreover，lookatthemodesofgenerationanddestructionofathing，andatthethingswhichtendtoproduceortodestroyit，bothindemolishingandinestablishingaview。Forthosethingswhosemodesofgenerationrankamonggoodthings，arethemselvesalsogood；andiftheythemselvesbegood，soalsoaretheirmodesofgeneration。If，ontheotherhand，theirmodesofgenerationbeevil，thentheythemselvesalsoareevil。Inregardtomodesofdestructiontheconverseistrue：forifthemodesofdestructionrankasgoodthings，thentheythemselvesrankasevilthings；whereasifthemodesofdestructioncountasevil，theythemselvescountasgood。
　　Thesameargumentappliesalsotothingstendingtoproduceanddestroy：forthingswhoseproductivecausesaregood，themselvesalsorankasgood；whereasifcausesdestructiveofthemaregood，theythemselvesrankasevil。
　　10
　　Again，lookatthingswhicharelikethesubjectinquestion，andseeiftheyareinlikecase；e。g。ifonebranchofknowledgehasmorethanoneobject，soalsowilloneopinion；andiftopossesssightbetosee，thenalsotopossesshearingwillbetohear。Likewisealsointhecaseofotherthings，boththosewhichareandthosewhicharegenerallyheldtobelike。Theruleinquestionisusefulforbothpurposes；forifitbeasstatedinthecaseofsomeonelikething，itissowiththeotherlikethingsaswell，whereasifitbenotsointhecaseofsomeoneofthem，neitherisitsointhecaseoftheothers。Lookandseealsowhetherthecasesarealikeasregardsasinglethingandanumberofthings：forsometimesthereisadiscrepancy。Thus，ifto’know’athingbeto’thinkof’it，thenalsoto’knowmanythings’isto’bethinkingofmanythings’；whereasthisisnottrue；foritispossibletoknowmanythingsbutnottobethinkingofthem。If，then，thelatterpropositionbenottrue，neitherwastheformerthatdealtwithasinglething，viz。thatto’know’athingisto’thinkof’it。
　　Moreover，arguefromgreaterandlessdegrees。Inregardtogreaterdegreestherearefourcommonplacerules。Oneis：Seewhetheragreaterdegreeofthepredicatefollowsagreaterdegreeofthesubject：e。g。ifpleasurebegood，seewhetheralsoagreaterpleasurebeagreatergood：andiftodoawrongbeevil，seewhetheralsotodoagreaterwrongisagreaterevil。Nowthisruleisofuseforbothpurposes：forifanincreaseoftheaccidentfollowsanincreaseofthesubject，aswehavesaid，clearlytheaccidentbelongs；whileifitdoesnotfollow，theaccidentdoesnotbelong。
　　Youshouldestablishthisbyinduction。Anotherruleis：Ifonepredicatebeattributedtotwosubjects；thensupposingitdoesnotbelongtothesubjecttowhichitisthemorelikelytobelong，neitherdoesitbelongwhereitislesslikelytobelong；whileifitdoesbelongwhereitislesslikelytobelong，thenitbelongsaswellwhereitismorelikely。Again：Iftwopredicatesbeattributedtoonesubject，theniftheonewhichismoregenerallythoughttobelongdoesnotbelong，neitherdoestheonethatislessgenerallythoughttobelong；or，iftheonethatislessgenerallythoughttobelongdoesbelong，soalsodoestheother。Moreover：Iftwopredicatesbeattributedtotwosubjects，theniftheonewhichismoreusuallythoughttobelongtotheonesubjectdoesnotbelong，neitherdoestheremainingpredicatebelongtotheremainingsubject；or，iftheonewhichislessusuallythoughttobelongtotheonesubjectdoesbelong，sotoodoestheremainingpredicatetotheremainingsubject。
　　Moreover，youcanarguefromthefactthatanattributebelongs，orisgenerallysupposedtobelong，inalikedegree，inthreeways，viz。thosedescribedinthelastthreerulesgiveninregardtoagreaterdegree。’Forsupposingthatonepredicatebelongs，orissupposedtobelong，totwosubjectsinalikedegree，thenifitdoesnotbelongtotheone，neitherdoesitbelongtotheother；whileifitbelongstotheone，itbelongstotheremainingoneaswell。Or，supposingtwopredicatestobelonginalikedegreetothesamesubject，then，iftheonedoesnotbelong，neitherdoestheremainingone；whileiftheonedoesbelong，theremainingonebelongsaswell。Thecaseisthesamealsoiftwopredicatesbelonginalikedegreetotwosubjects；foriftheonepredicatedoesnotbelongtotheonesubject，neitherdoestheremainingpredicatebelongtotheremainingsubject，whileiftheonepredicatedoesbelongtotheonesubject，theremainingpredicatebelongstotheremainingsubjectaswell。
　　11
　　Youcanargue，then，fromgreaterorlessorlikedegreesoftruthintheaforesaidnumberofways。Moreover，youshouldarguefromtheadditionofonethingtoanother。Iftheadditionofonethingtoanothermakesthatothergoodorwhite，whereasformerlyitwasnotwhiteorgood，thenthethingaddedwillbewhiteorgood—itwillpossessthecharacteritimpartstothewholeaswell。Moreover，ifanadditionofsomethingtoagivenobjectintensifiesthecharacterwhichithadasgiven，thenthethingaddedwillitselfaswellbeofthatcharacter。Likewise，also，inthecaseofotherattributes。
　　Theruleisnotapplicableinallcases，butonlyinthoseinwhichtheexcessdescribedasan’increasedintensity’isfoundtotakeplace。Theaboveruleis，however，notconvertibleforoverthrowingaview。Forifthethingaddeddoesnotmaketheothergood，itisnottherebymadeclearwhetherinitselfitmaynotbegood：fortheadditionofgoodtoevildoesnotnecessarilymakethewholegood，anymorethantheadditionofwhitetoblackmakesthewholewhite。
　　Again，anypredicateofwhichwecanspeakofgreaterorlessdegreesbelongsalsoabsolutely：forgreaterorlessdegreesofgoodorofwhitewillnotbeattributedtowhatisnotgoodorwhite：forabadthingwillneverbesaidtohaveagreaterorlessdegreeofgoodnessthananother，butalwaysofbadness。Thisruleisnotconvertible，either，forthepurposeofoverthrowingapredication：
　　forseveralpredicatesofwhichwecannotspeakofagreaterdegreebelongabsolutely：fortheterm’man’isnotattributedingreaterandlessdegrees，butamanisamanforallthat。
　　Youshouldexamineinthesamewaypredicatesattributedinagivenrespect，andatagiventimeandplace：forifthepredicatebepossibleinsomerespect，itispossiblealsoabsolutely。Likewise，also，iswhatispredicatedatagiventimeorplace：forwhatisabsolutelyimpossibleisnotpossibleeitherinanyrespectoratanyplaceortime。Anobjectionmayberaisedthatinagivenrespectpeoplemaybegoodbynature，e。g。theymaybegenerousortemperatelyinclined，whileabsolutelytheyarenotgoodbynature，becausenooneisprudentbynature。Likewise，also，itispossibleforadestructiblethingtoescapedestructionatagiventime，whereasitisnotpossibleforittoescapeabsolutely。Inthesamewayalsoitisagoodthingatcertainplacestofollowseeandsuchadiet，e。g。ininfectedareas，thoughitisnotagoodthingabsolutely。Moreover，incertainplacesitispossibletolivesinglyandalone，butabsolutelyitisnotpossibletoexistsinglyandalone。Inthesamewayalsoitisincertainplaceshonourabletosacrificeone’sfather，e。g。amongtheTriballi，whereas，absolutely，itisnothonourable。Orpossiblythismayindicatearelativitynottoplacesbuttopersons：foritisallthesamewherevertheymaybe：foreverywhereitwillbeheldhonourableamongtheTriballithemselves，justbecausetheyareTriballi。
　　Again，atcertaintimesitisagoodthingtotakemedicines，e。g。
　　whenoneisill，butitisnotsoabsolutely。Orpossiblythisagainmayindicatearelativitynottoacertaintime，buttoacertainstateofhealth：foritisallthesamewheneveritoccurs，ifonlyonebeinthatstate。Athingis’absolutely’sowhichwithoutanyadditionyouarepreparedtosayishonourableorthecontrary。Thus（e。g。）youwilldenythattosacrificeone’sfatherishonourable：
　　itishonourableonlytocertainpersons：itisnotthereforehonourableabsolutely。Ontheotherhand，tohonourthegodsyouwilldeclaretobehonourablewithoutaddinganything，becausethatishonourableabsolutely。Sothatwhateverwithoutanyadditionisgenerallyaccountedtobehonourableordishonourableoranythingelseofthatkind，willbesaidtobeso’absolutely’。
　　BookIII
　　1
　　THEquestionwhichisthemoredesirable，orthebetter，oftwoormorethings，shouldbeexamineduponthefollowinglines：onlyfirstofallitmustbeclearlylaiddownthattheinquirywearemakingconcernsnotthingsthatarewidelydivergentandthatexhibitgreatdifferencesfromoneanother（fornobodyraisesanydoubtwhetherhappinessorwealthismoredesirable），butthingsthatarenearlyrelatedandaboutwhichwecommonlydiscussforwhichofthetwoweoughtrathertovote，becausewedonotseeanyadvantageoneithersideascomparedwiththeother。Clearly，insuchcasesifwecanshowasingleadvantage，ormorethanone，ourjudgementwillrecordourassentthatwhicheversidehappenstohavetheadvantageisthemoredesirable。
　　First，then，thatwhichismorelastingorsecureismoredesirablethanthatwhichislessso：andsoisthatwhichismorelikelytobechosenbytheprudentorbythegoodmanorbytherightlaw，orbymenwhoaregoodinanyparticularline，whentheymaketheirchoiceassuch，orbytheexpertsinregardtoanyparticularclassofthings；i。e。eitherwhatevermostofthemorwhatallofthemwouldchoose；e。g。inmedicineorincarpentrythosethingsaremoredesirablewhichmost，orall，doctorswouldchoose；or，ingeneral，whatevermostmenorallmenorallthingswouldchoose，e。g。thegood：foreverythingaimsatthegood。Youshoulddirecttheargumentyouintendtoemploytowhateverpurposeyourequire。Ofwhatis’better’or’moredesirable’theabsolutestandardistheverdictofthebetterscience，thoughrelativelytoagivenindividualthestandardmaybehisownparticularscience。
　　Inthesecondplace，thatwhichisknownas’anx’ismoredesirablethanthatwhichdoesnotcomewithinthegenus’x’—e。g。justicethanajustman；fortheformerfallswithinthegenus’good’，whereastheotherdoesnot，andtheformeriscalled’agood’，whereasthelatterisnot：fornothingwhichdoesnothappentobelongtothegenusinquestioniscalledbythegenericname；e。g。a’whiteman’isnot’acolour’。Likewisealsoinothercases。
　　Also，thatwhichisdesiredforitselfismoredesirablethanthatwhichisdesiredforsomethingelse；e。g。healthismoredesirablethangymnastics：fortheformerisdesiredforitself，thelatterforsomethingelse。Also，thatwhichisdesirableinitselfismoredesirablethanwhatisdesirableperaccidens；e。g。justiceinourfriendsthanjusticeinourenemies：fortheformerisdesirableinitself，thelatterperaccidens：forwedesirethatourenemiesshouldbejustperaccidens，inorderthattheymaydousnoharm。Thislastprincipleisthesameastheonethatprecedesit，with，however，adifferentturnofexpression。Forwedesirejusticeinourfriendsforitself，eventhoughitwillmakenodifferencetous，andeventhoughtheybeinIndia；whereasinourenemieswedesireitforsomethingelse，inorderthattheymaydousnoharm。
　　Also，thatwhichisinitselfthecauseofgoodismoredesirablethanwhatissoperaccidens，e。g。virtuethanluck（fortheformerinitself，andthelatterperaccidens，thecauseofgoodthings），andsoinothercasesofthesamekind。Likewisealsointhecaseofthecontrary；forwhatisinitselfthecauseofevilismoreobjectionablethanwhatissoperaccidens，e。g。viceandchance：
　　fortheoneisbadinitself，whereaschanceissoperaccidens。
　　Also，whatisgoodabsolutelyismoredesirablethanwhatisgoodforaparticularperson，e。g。recoveryofhealththanasurgicaloperation；fortheformerisgoodabsolutely，thelatteronlyforaparticularperson，viz。themanwhoneedsanoperation。Sotoowhatisgoodbynatureismoredesirablethanthegoodthatisnotsobynature，e。g。justicethanthejustman；fortheoneisgoodbynature，whereasintheothercasethegoodnessisacquired。Alsotheattributeismoredesirablewhichbelongstothebetterandmorehonourablesubject，e。g。toagodratherthantoaman，andtothesoulratherthantothebody。Sotoothepropertyofthebetterthingisbetterthanthepropertyoftheworse；e。g。thepropertyofGodthanthepropertyofman：forwhereasinrespectofwhatiscommoninbothofthemtheydonotdifferatallfromeachother，inrespectoftheirpropertiestheonesurpassestheother。Alsothatisbetterwhichisinherentinthingsbetterorpriorormorehonourable：thus（e。g。）
　　healthisbetterthanstrengthandbeauty：fortheformerisinherentinthemoistandthedry，andthehotandthecold，infactinalltheprimaryconstituentsofananimal，whereastheothersareinherentinwhatissecondary，strengthbeingafeatureofthesinewsandbones，whilebeautyisgenerallysupposedtoconsistinacertainsymmetryofthelimbs。Alsotheendisgenerallysupposedtobemoredesirablethanthemeans，andoftwomeans，thatwhichliesnearertheend。Ingeneral，too，ameansdirectedtowardstheendoflifeismoredesirablethanameanstoanythingelse，e。g。thatwhichcontributestohappinessthanthatwhichcontributestoprudence。Alsothecompetentismoredesirablethantheincompetent。
　　Moreover，oftwoproductiveagentsthatoneismoredesirablewhoseendisbetter；whilebetweenaproductiveagentandanendwecandecidebyaproportionalsumwhenevertheexcessoftheoneendovertheotherisgreaterthanthatofthelatteroveritsownproductivemeans：e。g。supposingtheexcessofhappinessoverhealthtobegreaterthanthatofhealthoverwhatproduceshealth，thenwhatproduceshappinessisbetterthanhealth。Forwhatproduceshappinessexceedswhatproduceshealthjustasmuchashappinessexceedshealth。Buthealthexceedswhatproduceshealthbyasmalleramount；ergo，theexcessofwhatproduceshappinessoverwhatproduceshealthisgreaterthanthatofhealthoverwhatproduceshealth。
　　Clearly，therefore，whatproduceshappinessismoredesirablethanhealth：foritexceedsthesamestandardbyagreateramount。
　　Moreover，whatisinitselfnoblerandmorepreciousandpraiseworthyismoredesirablethanwhatislessso，e。g。friendshipthanwealth，andjusticethanstrength。Fortheformerbelonginthemselvestotheclassofthingspreciousandpraiseworthy，whilethelatterdosonotinthemselvesbutforsomethingelse：fornooneprizeswealthforitselfbutalwaysforsomethingelse，whereasweprizefriendshipforitself，eventhoughnothingelseislikelytocometousfromit。
　　2
　　Moreover，whenevertwothingsareverymuchlikeoneanother，andwecannotseeanysuperiorityintheoneovertheotherofthem，weshouldlookatthemfromthestandpointoftheirconsequences。Fortheonewhichisfollowedbythegreatergoodisthemoredesirable：or，iftheconsequencesbeevil，thatismoredesirablewhichisfollowedbythelessevil。Forthoughbothmaybedesirable，yettheremaypossiblybesomeunpleasantconsequenceinvolvedtoturnthescale。Oursurveyfromthepointofviewofconsequencesliesintwodirections，fortherearepriorconsequencesandlaterconsequences：
　　e。g。ifamanlearns，itfollowsthathewasignorantbeforeandknowsafterwards。Asarule，thelaterconsequenceisthebettertoconsider。Youshouldtake，therefore，whicheveroftheconsequencessuitsyourpurpose。
　　Moreover，agreaternumberofgoodthingsismoredesirablethanasmaller，eitherabsolutelyorwhentheoneisincludedintheother，viz。thesmallernumberinthegreater。Anobjectionmayberaisedsupposeinsomeparticularcasetheoneisvaluedforthesakeoftheother；forthenthetwotogetherarenotmoredesirablethantheone；e。g。recoveryofhealthandhealth，thanhealthalone，inasmuchaswedesirerecoveryofhealthforthesakeofhealth。Alsoitisquitepossibleforwhatisnotgood，togetherwithwhatis，tobemoredesirablethanagreaternumberofgoodthings，e。g。thecombinationofhappinessandsomethingelsewhichisnotgoodmaybemoredesirablethanthecombinationofjusticeandcourage。Also，thesamethingsaremorevaluableifaccompaniedthanifunaccompaniedbypleasure，andlikewisewhenfreefrompainthanwhenattendedwithpain。
　　Also，everythingismoredesirableattheseasonwhenitisofgreaterconsequence；e。g。freedomfrompaininoldagemorethaninyouth：foritisofgreaterconsequenceinoldage。Onthesameprinciplealso，prudenceismoredesirableinoldage；fornomanchoosestheyoungtoguidehim，becausehedoesnotexpectthemtobeprudent。Withcourage，theconverseisthecase，foritisinyouththattheactiveexerciseofcourageismoreimperativelyrequired。
　　Likewisealsowithtemperance；fortheyoungaremoretroubledbytheirpassionsthanaretheirelders。
　　Also，thatismoredesirablewhichismoreusefulateveryseasonoratmostseasons，e。g。justiceandtemperanceratherthancourage：
　　fortheyarealwaysuseful，whilecourageisonlyusefulattimes。
　　Also，thatoneoftwothingswhichifallpossess，wedonotneedtheotherthing，ismoredesirablethanthatwhichallmaypossessandstillwewanttheotheroneaswell。Takethecaseofjusticeandcourage；ifeverybodywerejust，therewouldbenouseforcourage，whereasallmightbecourageous，andstilljusticewouldbeofuse。
　　Moreover，judgebythedestructionsandlossesandgenerationsandacquisitionsandcontrariesofthings：forthingswhosedestructionismoreobjectionablearethemselvesmoredesirable。Likewisealsowiththelossesandcontrariesofthings；forathingwhoselossorwhosecontraryismoreobjectionableisitselfmoredesirable。Withthegenerationsoracquisitionsofthingstheoppositeisthecase：forthingswhoseacquisitionorgenerationismoredesirablearethemselvesalsodesirable。Anothercommonplaceruleisthatwhatisnearertothegoodisbetterandmoredesirable，i。e。whatmorenearlyresemblesthegood：thusjusticeisbetterthanajustman。Also，thatwhichismorelikethananotherthingtosomethingbetterthanitself，ase。g。somesaythatAjaxwasabettermanthanOdysseusbecausehewasmorelikeAchilles。Anobjectionmayberaisedtothisthatitisnottrue：foritisquitepossiblethatAjaxdidnotresembleAchillesmorenearlythanOdysseusinthepointswhichmadeAchillesthebestofthem，andthatOdysseuswasagoodman，thoughunlikeAchilles。Lookalsotoseewhethertheresemblancebethatofacaricature，liketheresemblanceofamonkeytoaman，whereasahorsebearsnone：forthemonkeyisnotthemorehandsomecreature，despiteitsnearerresemblancetoaman。Again，inthecaseoftwothings，ifoneismorelikethebetterthingwhileanotherismoreliketheworse，thenthatislikelytobebetterwhichismorelikethebetter。Thistoo，however，admitsofanobjection：forquitepossiblytheoneonlyslightlyresemblesthebetter，whiletheotherstronglyresemblestheworse，e。g。supposingtheresemblanceofAjaxtoAchillestobeslight，whilethatofOdysseustoNestorisstrong。Alsoitmaybethattheonewhichislikethebettertypeshowsadegradinglikeness，whereastheonewhichisliketheworsetypeimprovesuponit：witnessthelikenessofahorsetoadonkey，andthatofamonkeytoaman。
　　Anotherruleisthatthemoreconspicuousgoodismoredesirablethanthelessconspicuous，andthemoredifficultthantheeasier：forweappreciatebetterthepossessionofthingsthatcannotbeeasilyacquired。Alsothemorepersonalpossessionismoredesirablethanthemorewidelyshared。Also，thatwhichismorefreefromconnexionwithevil：forwhatisnotattendedbyanyunpleasantnessismoredesirablethanwhatissoattended。
　　Moreover，ifAbewithoutqualificationbetterthanB，thenalsothebestofthemembersofAisbetterthanthebestofthemembersofB；e。g。ifManbebetterthanHorse，thenalsothebestmanisbetterthanthebesthorse。Also，ifthebestinAbebetterthanthebestinB，thenalsoAisbetterthanBwithoutqualification；
　　e。g。ifthebestmanbebetterthanthebesthorse，thenalsoManisbetterthanHorsewithoutqualification。
　　Moreover，thingswhichourfriendscansharearemoredesirablethanthosetheycannot。Also，thingswhichwelikerathertodotoourfriendaremoredesirablethanthoseweliketodotothemaninthestreet，e。g。justdealingandthedoingofgoodratherthanthesemblanceofthem：forwewouldratherreallydogoodtoourfriendsthanseemtodoso，whereastowardsthemaninthestreettheconverseisthecase。
　　Also，superfluitiesarebetterthannecessities，andaresometimesmoredesirableaswell：forthegoodlifeisbetterthanmerelife，andgoodlifeisasuperfluity，whereasmerelifeitselfisanecessity。Sometimes，though，whatisbetterisnotalsomoredesirable：forthereisnonecessitythatbecauseitisbetteritshouldalsobemoredesirable：atleasttobeaphilosopherisbetterthantomakemoney，butitisnotmoredesirableforamanwholacksthenecessitiesoflife。Theexpression’superfluity’
　　applieswheneveramanpossessesthenecessitiesoflifeandsetstoworktosecureaswellothernobleacquisitions。Roughlyspeaking，perhaps，necessitiesaremoredesirable，whilesuperfluitiesarebetter。
　　Also，whatcannotbegotfromanotherismoredesirablethanwhatcanbegotfromanotheraswell，as（e。g。）isthecaseofjusticecomparedwithcourage。Also，AismoredesirableifAisdesirablewithoutB，butnotBwithoutA：power（e。g。）isnotdesirablewithoutprudence，butprudenceisdesirablewithoutpower。Also，ifoftwothingswerepudiatetheoneinordertobethoughttopossesstheother，thenthatoneismoredesirablewhichwewishtobethoughttopossess；thus（e。g。）werepudiatetheloveofhardworkinorderthatpeoplemaythinkusgeniuses。
　　Moreover，thatismoredesirableinwhoseabsenceitislessblameworthyforpeopletobevexed；andthatismoredesirableinwhoseabsenceitismoreblameworthyforamannottobevexed。
　　3
　　Moreover，ofthingsthatbelongtothesamespeciesonewhichpossessesthepeculiarvirtueofthespeciesismoredesirablethanonewhichdoesnot。Ifbothpossessit，thentheonewhichpossessesitinagreaterdegreeismoredesirable。
　　Moreover，ifonethingmakesgoodwhateverittouches，whileanotherdoesnot，theformerismoredesirable，justasalsowhatmakesthingswarmiswarmerthanwhatdoesnot。Ifbothdoso，thenthatoneismoredesirablewhichdoessoinagreaterdegree，orifitrendergoodthebetterandmoreimportantobject—if（e。g。），theonemakesgoodthesoul，andtheotherthebody。
　　Moreover，judgethingsbytheirinflexionsandusesandactionsandworks，andjudgethesebythem：fortheygowitheachother：
　　e。g。if’justly’meanssomethingmoredesirablethan’courageously’，thenalsojusticemeanssomethingmoredesirablethancourage；andifjusticebemoredesirablethancourage，thenalso’justly’meanssomethingmoredesirablethan’courageously’。Similarlyalsointheothercases。
　　Moreover，ifonethingexceedswhiletheotherfallsshortofthesamestandardofgood，theonewhichexceedsisthemoredesirable；oriftheoneexceedsanevenhigherstandard。Naymore，iftherebetwothingsbothpreferabletosomething，theonewhichismorehighlypreferabletoitismoredesirablethanthelesshighlypreferable。Moreover，whentheexcessofathingismoredesirablethantheexcessofsomethingelse，thatthingisitselfalsomoredesirablethantheother，as（e。g。）friendshipthanmoney：foranexcessoffriendshipismoredesirablethananexcessofmoney。Soalsothatofwhichamanwouldratherthatitwerehisbyhisowndoingismoredesirablethanwhathewouldrathergetbyanother’sdoing，e。g。friendsthanmoney。Moreover，judgebymeansofanaddition，andseeiftheadditionofAtothesamethingasBmakesthewholemoredesirablethandoestheadditionofB。Youmust，however，bewareofadducingacaseinwhichthecommontermuses，orinsomeotherwayhelpsthecaseof，oneofthethingsaddedtoit，butnottheother，as（e。g。）ifyoutookasawandasickleincombinationwiththeartofcarpentry：forinthecombinationthesawisamoredesirablething，butitisnotamoredesirablethingwithoutqualification。Again，athingismoredesirableif，whenaddedtoalessergood，itmakesthewholegreatergood。Likewise，also，youshouldjudgebymeansofsubtraction：forthethinguponwhosesubtractiontheremainderisalessergoodmaybetakentobeagreatergood，whicheveritbewhosesubtractionmakestheremainderalessergood。
　　Also，ifonethingbedesirableforitself，andtheotherforthelookofit，theformerismoredesirable，as（e。g。）healththanbeauty。Athingisdefinedasbeingdesiredforthelookofitif，supposingnooneknewofit，youwouldnotcaretohaveit。Also，itismoredesirablebothforitselfandforthelookofit，whiletheotherthingisdesirableontheonegroundalone。Also，whicheveristhemorepreciousforitself，isalsobetterandmoredesirable。A
　　thingmaybetakentobemorepreciousinitselfwhichwechooseratherforitself，withoutanythingelsebeinglikelytocomeofit。
　　Moreover，youshoulddistinguishinhowmanysenses’desirable’isused，andwithaviewtowhatends，e。g。expediencyorhonourorpleasure。Forwhatisusefulforallormostofthemmaybetakentobemoredesirablethanwhatisnotusefulinlikemanner。Ifthesamecharactersbelongtoboththingsyoushouldlookandseewhichpossessesthemmoremarkedly，i。e。whichofthetwoisthemorepleasantormorehonourableormoreexpedient。Again，thatismoredesirablewhichservesthebetterpurpose，e。g。thatwhichservestopromotevirtuemorethanthatwhichservestopromotepleasure。
　　Likewisealsointhecaseofobjectionablethings；forthatismoreobjectionablewhichstandsmoreinthewayofwhatisdesirable，e。g。diseasemorethanugliness：fordiseaseisagreaterhindrancebothtopleasureandtobeinggood。
　　Moreover，arguebyshowingthatthethinginquestionisinlikemeasureobjectionableanddesirable：forathingofsuchacharacterthatamanmightwelldesireandobjecttoitalikeislessdesirablethantheotherwhichisdesirableonly。