32。Amongothers，DeLange’saccount。
33。OftheFamilyofSourniama，EdifyingLetters，coll。xviii。
34。SeeinFatherDuHaldehowthemissionariesavailedthemselvesoftheauthorityofCanhitosilencethemandarins，whoconstantlydeclaredthatbythelawsofthecountrynoforeignworshipcouldbeestablishedintheempire。
35。SeeLettrespersanes，210。
36。SeetheorderofTsongtoufortillingtheland，intheEdifyingLetters，coll。xxi。
BookIX。OfLawsintheRelationTheyBeartoaDefensiveForce1。InwhatMannerRepublicsprovidefortheirSafety。Ifarepublicbesmall，itisdestroyedbyaforeignforce；ifitbelarge，itisruinedbyaninternalimperfection。
Tothistwofoldinconveniencedemocraciesandaristocraciesareequallyliable，whethertheybegoodorbad。Theevilisintheverythingitself，andnoformcanredressit。
Itis，therefore，veryprobablethatmankindwouldhavebeen，atlength，obligedtoliveconstantlyunderthegovernmentofasingleperson，hadtheynotcontrivedakindofconstitutionthathasalltheinternaladvantagesofarepublican，togetherwiththeexternalforceofamonarchical，government。Imeanaconfederaterepublic。
Thisformofgovernmentisaconventionbywhichseveralpettystatesagreetobecomemembersofalargerone，whichtheyintendtoestablish。
Itisakindofassemblageofsocieties，thatconstituteanewone，capableofincreasingbymeansoffurtherassociations，tilltheyarriveatsuchadegreeofpowerastobeabletoprovideforthesecurityofthewholebody。
ItwastheseassociationsthatsolongcontributedtotheprosperityofGreece。BythesetheRomansattackedthewholeglobe，andbythesealonethewholeglobewithstoodthem；forwhenRomehadarrivedatherhighestpitchofgrandeur，itwastheassociationsbeyondtheDanubeandtheRhine——associationsformedbytheterrorofherarms——thatenabledthebarbarianstoresisther。
HenceitproceedsthatHolland，[1]Germany，andtheSwisscantonsareconsideredinEuropeasperpetualrepublics。
Theassociationsofcitieswereformerlymorenecessarythaninourtimes。Aweak，defencelesstownwasexposedtogreaterdanger。Byconquestitwasdeprivednotonlyoftheexecutiveandlegislativepower，asatpresent，butmoreoverofallhumanproperty。[2]
Arepublicofthiskind，abletowithstandanexternalforce，maysupportitselfwithoutanyinternalcorruption；theformofthissocietypreventsallmannerofinconveniences。
Ifasinglemembershouldattempttousurpthesupremepower，hecouldnotbesupposedtohaveanequalauthorityandcreditinalltheconfederatestates。Werehetohavetoogreataninfluenceoverone，thiswouldalarmtherest；werehetosubdueapart，thatwhichwouldstillremainfreemightopposehimwithforcesindependentofthosewhichhehadusurped，andoverpowerhimbeforehecouldbesettledinhisusurpation。
Shouldapopularinsurrectionhappeninoneoftheconfederatestates，theothersareabletoquellit。Shouldabusescreepintoonepart，theyarereformedbythosethatremainsound。Thestatemaybedestroyedononeside，andnotontheother；theconfederacymaybedissolved，andtheconfederatespreservetheirsovereignty。
Asthisgovernmentiscomposedofpettyrepublics，itenjoystheinternalhappinessofeach；andwithregardtoitsexternalsituation，bymeansoftheassociation，itpossessesalltheadvantagesoflargemonarchies。
2。ThataconfederateGovernmentoughttobecomposedofStatesofthesameNature，especiallyoftherepublicanKind。TheCanaanitesweredestroyedbyreasonthattheywerepettymonarchies，thathadnounionorconfederacyfortheircommondefence；and，indeed，aconfederacyisnotagreeabletothenatureofpettymonarchies。
AstheconfederaterepublicofGermanyconsistsoffreecities，andofpettystatessubjecttodifferentprinces，experienceshowsusthatitismuchmoreimperfectthanthatofHollandandSwitzerland。
Thespiritofmonarchyiswarandenlargementofdominion：peaceandmoderationarethespiritofarepublic。Thesetwokindsofgovernmentcannotnaturallysubsistinaconfederaterepublic。
Thusweobserve，intheRomanhistory，thatwhentheVeienteshadchosenaking，theywereimmediatelyabandonedbyalltheotherpettyrepublicsofTuscany。GreecewasundoneassoonasthekingsofMacedonobtainedaseatamongtheAmphyktyons。
TheconfederaterepublicofGermany，composedofprincesandfreetowns，subsistsbymeansofachief，whois，insomerespects，themagistrateoftheunion，inothers，themonarch。
3。OtherRequisitesinaconfederateRepublic。IntherepublicofHollandoneprovincecannotconcludeanalliancewithouttheconsentoftheothers。Thislaw，whichisanexcellentone，andevennecessaryinaconfederaterepublic，iswantingintheGermanicconstitution，whereitwouldpreventthemisfortunesthatmayhappentothewholeconfederacy，throughtheimprudence，ambition，oravariceofasinglemember。A
republicunitedbyapoliticalconfederacyhasgivenitselfentirelyup，andhasnothingmoretoresign。
Itisdifficultfortheunitedstatestobeallofequalpowerandextent。TheLycian[3]republicwasanassociationoftwenty—threetowns；
thelargeoneshadthreevotesinthecommoncouncil，themiddlingonestwo，andthesmalltownsone。TheDutchrepublicconsistsofsevenprovincesofdifferentextentofterritory，whichhaveeachonevoice。
ThecitiesofLycia[4]contributedtotheexpensesofthestate，accordingtotheproportionofsuffrages。TheprovincesoftheUnitedNetherlandscannotfollowthisproportion；theymustbedirectedbythatoftheirpower。
InLycia[5]thejudgesandtownmagistrateswereelectedbythecommoncouncil，andaccordingtotheproportionalreadymentioned。IntherepublicofHollandtheyarenotchosenbythecommoncouncil，buteachtownnamesitsmagistrates。WereItogiveamodelofanexcellentconfederaterepublic，IshouldpitchuponthatofLycia。
4。InwhatMannerdespoticGovernmentsprovidefortheirSecurity。Asrepublicsprovidefortheirsecuritybyuniting，despoticgovernmentsdoitbyseparating，andbykeepingthemselves，asitwere，single。Theysacrificeapartofthecountry；andbyravaginganddesolatingthefrontierstheyrendertheheartoftheempireinaccessible。
Itisareceivedaxiomingeometrythatthegreatertheextentofbodies，themoretheircircumferenceisrelativelysmall。Thispractice，therefore，oflayingthefrontierswasteismoretolerableinlargethaninmiddlingstates。
Adespoticgovernmentdoesallthemischieftoitselfthatcouldbecommittedbyacruelenemy，whosearmsitwereunabletoresist。
Itpreservesitselflikewisebyanotherkindofseparation，whichisbyputtingthemostdistantprovincesintothehandsofagreatvassal。TheMogul，thekingofPersia，andtheemperorsofChinahavetheirfeudatories；andtheTurkshavefoundtheiraccountinputtingtheTartars，theMoldavians，theWallachians，andformerlytheTransylvanians，betweenthemselvesandtheirenemies。
5。InwhatManneraMonarchicalGovernmentprovidesforitsSecurity。A
monarchyneverdestroysitselflikeadespoticgovernment。Butakingdomofamoderateextentisliabletosuddeninvasions：itmustthereforehavefortressestodefenditsfrontiers；andtroopstogarrisonthosefortresses。Theleastspotofgroundisdisputedwithmilitaryskillandresolution。Despoticstatesmakeincursionsagainstoneanother；itismonarchiesonlythatwagewar。
Fortressesareproperformonarchies；despoticgovernmentsareafraidofthem。Theydarenotentrusttheirofficerswithsuchacommand，asnoneofthemhaveanyaffectionfortheprinceorhisgovernment。
6。OfthedefensiveForceofStatesingeneral。Topreserveastateinitsdueforce，itmusthavesuchanextentastoadmitofaproportionbetweentheceleritywithwhichitmaybeinvaded，andthatwithwhichitmaydefeattheinvasion。Asaninvadermayappearoneveryside，itisrequisitethatthestateshouldbeabletomakeoneverysideitsdefence；consequentlyitshouldbeofamoderateextent，proportionedtothedegreeofvelocitythatnaturehasgiventoman，toenablehimtomovefromoneplacetoanother。
FranceandSpainareexactlyofaproperextent。Theyhavesoeasyacommunicationfortheirforcesastobeabletoconveythemimmediatelytowhatparttheyhaveamind；thearmiesuniteandpasswithrapidityfromonefrontiertoanother，withoutanyapprehensionofsuchdifficultiesasrequiretimetoremove。
ItisextremelyhappyforFrancethatthecapitalstandsneartothedifferentfrontiersinproportiontotheirweakness；andtheprincehasabetterviewofeachpartofhiscountryaccordingasitismoreexposed。
Butwhenavastempire，likePersia，isattacked，itisseveralmonthsbeforethetroopsareassembledinabody；andthentheyarenotabletomakesuchforcedmarches，forthatspaceoftime，astheycouldforfifteendays。Shouldthearmyonthefrontiersbedefeated，itissoondispersed，becausethereisnoneighbouringplaceofretreat。Thevictor，meetingwithnoresistance，advanceswithallexpedition，sitsdownbeforethecapital，andlayssiegetoit，whenthereisscarcelytimesufficienttosummonthegovernorsoftheprovincestoitsrelief。
Thosewhoforeseeanapproachingrevolutionhastenitbytheirdisobedience。Formenwhosefidelityisentirelyowingtothedangerofpunishmentareeasilycorruptedassoonasitbecomesdistant；theiraimistheirownprivateinterest。Theempireissubverted，thecapitaltaken，andtheconquerordisputestheseveralprovinceswiththegovernors。
Therealpowerofaprincedoesnotconsistsomuchinthefacilityhemeetswithinmakingconquestsasinthedifficultyanenemyfindsinattackinghim，and，ifImaysospeak，intheimmutabilityofhiscondition。Buttheincreaseofterritoryobligesagovernmenttolayitselfmoreopentoanenemy。
Asmonarchsthereforeoughttobeenduedwithwisdominordertoincreasetheirpower，theyoughtlikewisetohaveanequalshareofprudencetoconfineitwithinbounds。Uponremovingtheinconveniencesoftoosmallaterritory，theyshouldhavetheireyeconstantlyontheinconvenienceswhichattenditsextent。
7。AReflection。Theenemiesofagreatprince，whosereignwasprotractedtoanunusuallength，haveveryoftenaccusedhim，rather，I
believe，fromtheirownfearsthanuponanysolidfoundation，ofhavingformedandcarriedonaprojectofuniversalmonarchy。Hadheattainedhisaim，nothingwouldhavebeenmorefataltohissubjects，tohimself，tohisfamily，andtoallEurope。Heaven，thatknowsourtrueinterests，favouredhimmorebypreventingthesuccessofhisarmsthanitcouldhavedonebycrowninghimwithvictories。InsteadofraisinghimtobetheonlysovereigninEurope，itmadehimhappierbyrenderinghimthemostpowerful。
Thesubjectsofthisprince，whointravellingabroadareneveraffectedbutwithwhattheyhaveleftathome；whoonquittingtheirownhabitationslookupongloryastheirchiefobject，andindistantcountriesasanobstacletotheirreturn；whodisgustyouevenbytheirgoodqualities，becausetheyaretaintedwithsomuchvanity；whoarecapableofsupportingwounds，perils，andfatigues，butnotofforegoingtheirpleasures；whoaresupremelyfondofgaiety，andcomfortthemselvesforthelossofabattlebyasonguponthegeneral：thosesubjects，Isay，wouldneverhavethesolidityrequisiteforanenterpriseofthiskind，whichifdefeatedinonecountrywouldbeunsuccessfuleverywhereelse；andifonceunsuccessful，wouldbesoforever。
8。AparticularCaseinwhichthedefensiveForceofaStateisinferiortotheoffensive。ItwasasayingoftheLordofCoucytoKingCharlesV
thattheEnglishareneverweaker，normoreeasilyovercome，thanintheirowncountry。ThesamewasobservedoftheRomans；thesameoftheCarthaginians；andthesamewillhappentoeverypowerthatsendsarmiestodistantcountries，inordertoreunitebydisciplineandmilitaryforcethosewhoaredividedamongthemselvesbypoliticalorcivilinterests。Thestatefindsitselfweakenedbythedisorderthatstillcontinues，andmoresobytheremedy。
TheLordofCoucy’smaximisanexceptiontothegeneralrule，whichdisapprovesofwarsagainstdistantcountries。Andthisexceptionconfirmslikewisetherulebecauseittakesplaceonlywithregardtothosebywhomsuchwarsareundertaken。
9。OftherelativeForceofStates。Allgrandeur，force，andpowerarerelative。Carethereforemustbetakenthatinendeavouringtoincreasetherealgrandeur，therelativebenotdiminished。
DuringthereignofLouisXIVFrancewasatitshighestpitchofrelativegrandeur。Germanyhadnotyetproducedsuchpowerfulprincesashavesinceappearedinthatcountry。Italywasinthesamecase。EnglandandScotlandwerenotyetformedintooneunitedkingdom。AragonwasnotjoinedtoCastile：thedistantbranchesoftheSpanishmonarchywereweakenedbyit，andweakeneditintheirturn；andMuscovywasaslittleknowninEuropeasCrimTartary。
10。OftheWeaknessofneighbouringStates。Whensoeverastateliescontiguoustoanotherthathappenstobeinitsdecline，theformeroughttotakeparticularcarenottoprecipitatetheruinofthelatter，becausethisisthehappiestsituationimaginable；nothingbeingsoconvenientasforoneprincetobenearanother，whoreceivesforhimalltherebuffsandinsultsoffortune。Anditseldomhappensthatbysubduingsuchastatetherealpoweroftheconquerorisasmuchincreasedastherelativeisdiminished。
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1。Itiscomposedofaboutfiftydifferentrepublics，alldifferentfromoneanother。——M。Janisson，StateoftheUnitedProvinces。
2。Civilliberty，goods，wives，children，temples，andevenburying—places。
3。Strabo，xiv。
4。Ibid。
5。Ibid。
BookX。OfLawsintheRelationTheyBeartoOffensiveForce1。OfoffensiveForce。Offensiveforceisregulatedbythelawofnations，whichisthepoliticallawofeachcountryconsideredinitsrelationtoeveryother。
2。OfWar。Thelifeofgovernmentsislikethatofman。Thelatterhasarighttokillincaseofnaturaldefence：theformerhavearighttowagewarfortheirownpreservation。
InthecaseofnaturaldefenceIhavearighttokill，becausemylifeisinrespecttomewhatthelifeofmyantagonististohim：inthesamemannerastatewageswarbecauseitspreservationislikethatofanyotherbeing。
Withindividualstherightofnaturaldefencedoesnotimplyanecessityofattacking。Insteadofattackingtheyneedonlyhaverecoursetopropertribunals。Theycannotthereforeexercisethisrightofdefencebutinsuddencases，whenimmediatedeathwouldbetheconsequenceofwaitingfortheassistanceofthelaw。Butwithstatestherightofnaturaldefencecarriesalongwithitsometimesthenecessityofattacking；asforinstance，whenonenationseesthatacontinuanceofpeacewillenableanothertodestroyher，andthattoattackthatnationinstantlyistheonlywaytopreventherowndestruction。
Thenceitfollowsthatpettystateshaveoftenerarighttodeclarewarthangreatones，becausetheyareoftenerinthecaseofbeingafraidofdestruction。
Therightofwar，therefore，isderivedfromnecessityandstrictjustice。Ifthosewhodirecttheconscienceorcouncilsofprincesdonotabidebythismaxim，theconsequenceisdreadful：whentheyproceedonarbitraryprinciplesofglory，convenience，andutility，torrentsofbloodmustoverspreadtheearth。
But，aboveall，letthemnotpleadsuchanidlepretextasthegloryoftheprince：hisgloryisnothingbutpride；itisapassion，andnotalegitimateright。
Itistruethefameofhispowermightincreasethestrengthofhisgovernment；butitmightbeequallyincreasedbythereputationofhisjustice。
3。OftheRightofConquest。Fromtherightofwarcomesthatofconquest；whichistheconsequenceofthatright，andoughtthereforetofollowitsspirit。
Therighttheconquerorhasoveraconqueredpeopleisdirectedbyfoursortsoflaws：thelawofnature，whichmakeseverythingtendtothepreservationofthespecies；thelawofnaturalreason，whichteachesustodotootherswhatwewouldhavedonetoourselves；thelawthatformspoliticalsocieties，whosedurationnaturehasnotlimited；and，infine，thelawderivedfromthenatureofthethingitself。Conquestisanacquisition，andcarrieswithitthespiritofpreservationanduse，notofdestruction。
Theinhabitantsofaconqueredcountryaretreatedbytheconquerorinoneofthefourfollowingways：Eitherhecontinuestorulethemaccordingtotheirownlaws，andassumestohimselfonlytheexerciseofthepoliticalandcivilgovernment；orhegivesthemnewpoliticalandcivilgovernment；orhedestroysanddispersesthesociety；or，infine，heexterminatesthepeople。
Thefirstwayisconformabletothelawofnationsnowfollowed；thefourthismoreagreeabletothelawofnationsfollowedbytheRomans：
inrespecttowhichIleavethereadertojudgehowfarwehaveimprovedupontheancients。Wemustgiveduecommendationstoourmodernrefinementsinreason，religion，philosophy，andmanners。
Theauthorsofourpubliclaw，guidedbyancienthistories，withoutconfiningthemselvestocasesofstrictnecessity，havefallenintoverygreaterrors。Theyhaveadoptedtyrannicalandarbitraryprinciples，bysupposingtheconquerorstobeinvestedwithIknownotwhatrighttokill：thencetheyhavedrawnconsequencesasterribleastheveryprinciple，andestablishedmaximswhichtheconquerorsthemselves，whenpossessedoftheleastgrainofsense，neverpresumedtofollow。Itisaplaincasethatwhentheconquestiscompleted，theconquerorhasnolongerarighttokill，becausehehasnolongerthepleaofnaturaldefenceandself—preservation。
Whathasledthemintothismistakeis，thattheyimaginedaconquerorhadarighttodestroythestate；whencetheyinferredthathehadarighttodestroythementhatcomposeit：awrongconsequencefromafalseprinciple。Forfromthedestructionofthestateitdoesnotatallfollowthatthepeoplewhocomposeitoughttobealsodestroyed。
Thestateistheassociationofmen，andnotthementhemselves；thecitizenmayperish，andthemanremain。
Fromtherightofkillinginthecaseofconquest，politicianshavedrawnthatofreducingtoslavery——aconsequenceasill—groundedastheprinciple。
Thereisnosuchthingasarightofreducingpeopletoslavery，savewhenitbecomesnecessaryforthepreservationoftheconquest。
Preservation，andnotservitude，istheendofconquest；thoughservitudemayhappensometimestobeanecessarymeansofpreservation。
Eveninthatcaseitiscontrarytothenatureofthingsthattheslaveryshouldbeperpetual。Thepeopleenslavedoughttoberenderedcapableofbecomingsubjects。Slaveryinconquestsisanaccidentalthing。Whenaftertheexpirationofacertainspaceoftimeallthepartsoftheconqueringstateareconnectedwiththeconquerednation，bycustom，marriages，laws，associations，andbyacertainconformityofdisposition，thereoughttobeanendoftheslavery。Fortherightsoftheconquerorarefoundedentirelyontheoppositionbetweenthetwonationsinthoseveryarticles，whenceprejudicesarise，andthewantofmutualconfidence。
Aconqueror，therefore，whoreducestheconqueredpeopletoslavery，oughtalwaystoreservetohimselfthemeans（formeanstherearewithoutnumber）ofrestoringthemtotheirliberty。
Thesearefarfrombeingvagueanduncertainnotions。Thusourancestorsacted，thoseancestorswhoconqueredtheRomanempire。Thelawstheymadeintheheatandtransportofpassionandintheinsolenceofvictoryweregraduallysoftened；thoselawswereatfirstsevere，butwereafterwardsrenderedimpartial。TheBurgundians，Goths，andLombardswouldhavetheRomanscontinueaconqueredpeople；butthelawsofEuric，Gundebald，andRotharismadetheRomansandbarbariansfellow—citizens。[1]
Charlemagne，totametheSaxons，deprivedthemoftheirlibertyandproperty。LouistheDebonnairemadethemafreepeople，[2]andthiswasoneofthemostprudentregulationsduringhiswholereign。Timeandservitudehadsoftenedtheirmanners，andtheyeverafteradheredtohimwiththegreatestfidelity。
4。SomeAdvantagesofaconqueredPeople。Insteadofinferringsuchdestructiveconsequencesfromtherightofconquest，muchbetterwouldithavebeenforpoliticianstomentiontheadvantageswhichthisveryrightmaysometimesgivetoaconqueredpeople——advantageswhichwouldbemoresensiblyandmoreuniversallyexperiencedwereourlawofnationsexactlyfollowed，andestablishedineverypartoftheglobe。
Conqueredcountriesare，generallyspeaking，degeneratedfromtheiroriginalinstitution。Corruptionhascreptin，theexecutionofthelawshasbeenneglected，andthegovernmenthasgrownoppressive。Whocanquestionbutsuchastatewouldbeagainer，andderivesomeadvantagesfromtheveryconquestitself，ifitdidnotprovedestructive？Whenagovernmenthasarrivedatthatdegreeofcorruptionastobeincapableofreformingitself，itwouldnotlosemuchbybeingnewlymoulded。A