BookXI。OftheLawsWhichEstablishPoliticalLiberty，withRegardtotheConstitution1。AgeneralIdea。Imakeadistinctionbetweenthelawsthatestablishpoliticalliberty，asitrelatestotheconstitution，andthosebywhichitisestablished，asitrelatestothecitizen。Theformershallbethesubjectofthisbook；thelatterIshallexamineinthenext。
　　2。DifferentSignificationsofthewordLiberty。Thereisnowordthatadmitsofmorevarioussignifications，andhasmademorevariedimpressionsonthehumanmind，thanthatofliberty。Somehavetakenitasameansofdeposingapersononwhomtheyhadconferredatyrannicalauthority；othersforthepowerofchoosingasuperiorwhomtheyareobligedtoobey；othersfortherightofbearingarms，andofbeingtherebyenabledtouseviolence；others，infine，fortheprivilegeofbeinggovernedbyanativeoftheirowncountry，orbytheirownlaws。[1]Acertainnationforalongtimethoughtlibertyconsistedintheprivilegeofwearingalongbeard。[2]Somehaveannexedthisnametooneformofgovernmentexclusiveofothers：thosewhohadarepublicantasteappliedittothisspeciesofpolity；thosewholikedamonarchicalstategaveittomonarchy。[3]Thustheyhaveallappliedthenameoflibertytothegovernmentmostsuitabletotheirowncustomsandinclinations：andasinrepublicsthepeoplehavenotsoconstantandsopresentaviewofthecausesoftheirmisery，andasthemagistratesseemtoactonlyinconformitytothelaws，hencelibertyisgenerallysaidtoresideinrepublics，andtobebanishedfrommonarchies。Infine，asindemocraciesthepeopleseemtoactalmostastheyplease，thissortofgovernmenthasbeendeemedthemostfree，andthepowerofthepeoplehasbeenconfoundedwiththeirliberty。
　　3。InwhatLibertyconsists。Itistruethatindemocraciesthepeopleseemtoactastheyplease；butpoliticallibertydoesnotconsistinanunlimitedfreedom。Ingovernments，thatis，insocietiesdirectedbylaws，libertycanconsistonlyinthepowerofdoingwhatweoughttowill，andinnotbeingconstrainedtodowhatweoughtnottowill。
　　Wemusthavecontinuallypresenttoourmindsthedifferencebetweenindependenceandliberty。Libertyisarightofdoingwhateverthelawspermit，andifacitizencoulddowhattheyforbidhewouldbenolongerpossessedofliberty，becauseallhisfellow—citizenswouldhavethesamepower。
　　4。ThesameSubjectcontinued。Democraticandaristocraticstatesarenotintheirownnaturefree。Politicallibertyistobefoundonlyinmoderategovernments；andevenintheseitisnotalwaysfound。Itisthereonlywhenthereisnoabuseofpower。Butconstantexperienceshowsusthateverymaninvestedwithpowerisapttoabuseit，andtocarryhisauthorityasfarasitwillgo。Isitnotstrange，thoughtrue，tosaythatvirtueitselfhasneedoflimits？
　　Topreventthisabuse，itisnecessaryfromtheverynatureofthingsthatpowershouldbeachecktopower。Agovernmentmaybesoconstituted，asnomanshallbecompelledtodothingstowhichthelawdoesnotobligehim，norforcedtoabstainfromthingswhichthelawpermits。
　　5。OftheEndorViewofdifferentGovernments。Thoughallgovernmentshavethesamegeneralend，whichisthatofpreservation，yeteachhasanotherparticularobject。IncreaseofdominionwastheobjectofRome；
　　war，thatofSparta；religion，thatoftheJewishlaws；commerce，thatofMarseilles；publictranquillity，thatofthelawsofChina：[4]
　　navigation，thatofthelawsofRhodes；naturalliberty，thatofthepolicyoftheSavages；ingeneral，thepleasuresoftheprince，thatofdespoticstates；thatofmonarchies，theprince’sandthekingdom’sglory；theindependenceofindividualsistheendaimedatbythelawsofPoland，thenceresultstheoppressionofthewhole。[5]
　　Onenationthereisalsointheworldthathasforthedirectendofitsconstitutionpoliticalliberty。Weshallpresentlyexaminetheprinciplesonwhichthislibertyisfounded；iftheyaresound，libertywillappearinitshighestperfection。
　　Todiscoverpoliticallibertyinaconstitution，nogreatlabourisrequisite。Ifwearecapableofseeingitwhereitexists，itissoonfound，andweneednotgofarinsearchofit。
　　6。OftheConstitutionofEngland。Ineverygovernmenttherearethreesortsofpower：thelegislative；theexecutiveinrespecttothingsdependentonthelawofnations；andtheexecutiveinregardtomattersthatdependonthecivillaw。
　　Byvirtueofthefirst，theprinceormagistrateenactstemporaryorperpetuallaws，andamendsorabrogatesthosethathavebeenalreadyenacted。Bythesecond，hemakespeaceorwar，sendsorreceivesembassies，establishesthepublicsecurity，andprovidesagainstinvasions。Bythethird，hepunishescriminals，ordeterminesthedisputesthatarisebetweenindividuals。Thelatterweshallcallthejudiciarypower，andtheothersimplytheexecutivepowerofthestate。
　　Thepoliticallibertyofthesubjectisatranquillityofmindarisingfromtheopinioneachpersonhasofhissafety。Inordertohavethisliberty，itisrequisitethegovernmentbesoconstitutedasonemanneednotbeafraidofanother。
　　Whenthelegislativeandexecutivepowersareunitedinthesameperson，orinthesamebodyofmagistrates，therecanbenoliberty；becauseapprehensionsmayarise，lestthesamemonarchorsenateshouldenacttyrannicallaws，toexecutetheminatyrannicalmanner。
　　Again，thereisnoliberty，ifthejudiciarypowerbenotseparatedfromthelegislativeandexecutive。Wereitjoinedwiththelegislative，thelifeandlibertyofthesubjectwouldbeexposedtoarbitrarycontrol；
　　forthejudgewouldbethenthelegislator。Wereitjoinedtotheexecutivepower，thejudgemightbehavewithviolenceandoppression。
　　Therewouldbeanendofeverything，werethesamemanorthesamebody，whetherofthenoblesorofthepeople，toexercisethosethreepowers，thatofenactinglaws，thatofexecutingthepublicresolutions，andoftryingthecausesofindividuals。
　　MostkingdomsinEuropeenjoyamoderategovernmentbecausetheprincewhoisinvestedwiththetwofirstpowersleavesthethirdtohissubjects。InTurkey，wherethesethreepowersareunitedintheSultan’sperson，thesubjectsgroanunderthemostdreadfuloppression。
　　IntherepublicsofItaly，wherethesethreepowersareunited，thereislesslibertythaninourmonarchies。HencetheirgovernmentisobligedtohaverecoursetoasviolentmethodsforitssupportaseventhatoftheTurks；witnessthestateinquisitors，[6]andthelion’smouthintowhicheveryinformermayatallhoursthrowhiswrittenaccusations。
　　Inwhatasituationmustthepoorsubjectbeinthoserepublics！Thesamebodyofmagistratesarepossessed，asexecutorsofthelaws，ofthewholepowertheyhavegiventhemselvesinqualityoflegislators。Theymayplunderthestatebytheirgeneraldeterminations；andastheyhavelikewisethejudiciarypowerintheirhands，everyprivatecitizenmayberuinedbytheirparticulardecisions。
　　Thewholepowerishereunitedinonebody；andthoughthereisnoexternalpompthatindicatesadespoticsway，yetthepeoplefeeltheeffectsofiteverymoment。
　　HenceitisthatmanyoftheprincesofEurope，whoseaimhasbeenlevelledatarbitrarypower，haveconstantlysetoutwithunitingintheirownpersonsallthebranchesofmagistracy，andallthegreatofficesofstate。
　　IallowindeedthatthemerehereditaryaristocracyoftheItalianrepublicsdoesnotexactlyanswertothedespoticpoweroftheEasternprinces。Thenumberofmagistratessometimesmoderatesthepowerofthemagistracy；thewholebodyofthenoblesdonotalwaysconcurinthesamedesign；anddifferenttribunalsareerected，thattempereachother。ThusatVenicetlielegislativepowerisinthecouncil，theexecutiveinthepregadi，andthejudiciaryinthequarantia。Butthemischiefis，thatthesedifferenttribunalsarecomposedofmagistratesallbelongingtothesamebody；whichconstitutesalmostoneandthesamepower。
　　Thejudiciarypoweroughtnottobegiventoastandingsenate；itshouldbeexercisedbypersonstakenfromthebodyofthepeople[7]atcertaintimesoftheyear，andconsistentlywithaformandmannerprescribedbylaw，inordertoerectatribunalthatshouldlastonlysolongasnecessityrequires。
　　Bythismethodthejudicialpower，soterribletomankind，notbeingannexedtoanyparticularstateorprofession，becomes，asitwere，invisible。Peoplehavenotthenthejudgescontinuallypresenttotheirview；theyfeartheoffice，butnotthemagistrate。
　　Inaccusationsofadeepandcriminalnature，itisproperthepersonaccusedshouldhavetheprivilegeofchoosing，insomemeasure，hisjudges，inconcurrencewiththelaw；oratleastheshouldhavearighttoexceptagainstsogreatanumberthattheremainingpartmaybedeemedhisownchoice。
　　Theothertwopowersmaybegivenrathertomagistratesorpermanentbodies，becausetheyarenotexercisedonanyprivatesubject；onebeingnomorethanthegeneralwillofthestate，andtheothertheexecutionofthatgeneralwill。
　　Butthoughthetribunalsoughtnottobefixed，thejudgmentsought；andtosuchadegreeastobeeverconformabletotheletterofthelaw。
　　Weretheytobetheprivateopinionofthejudge，peoplewouldthenliveinsociety，withoutexactlyknowingthenatureoftheirobligations。
　　Thejudgesoughtlikewisetobeofthesamerankastheaccused，or，inotherwords，hispeers；totheendthathemaynotimagineheisfallenintothehandsofpersonsinclinedtotreathimwithrigour。
　　Ifthelegislatureleavestheexecutivepowerinpossessionofarighttoimprisonthosesubjectswhocangivesecurityfortheirgoodbehaviour，thereisanendofliberty；unlesstheyaretakenup，inordertoanswerwithoutdelaytoacapitalcrime，inwhichcasetheyarereallyfree，beingsubjectonlytothepowerofthelaw。
　　Butshouldthelegislaturethinkitselfindangerbysomesecretconspiracyagainstthestate，orbyacorrespondencewithaforeignenemy，itmightauthorisetheexecutivepower，forashortandlimitedtime，toimprisonsuspectedpersons，whointhatcasewouldlosetheirlibertyonlyforawhile，topreserveitforever。
　　AndthisistheonlyreasonablemethodthatcanbesubstitutedtothetyrannicalmagistracyoftheEphori，andtothestateinquisitorsofVenice，whoarealsodespotic。
　　Asinacountryofliberty，everymanwhoissupposedafreeagentoughttobehisowngovernor；thelegislativepowershouldresideinthewholebodyofthepeople。Butsincethisisimpossibleinlargestates，andinsmallonesissubjecttomanyinconveniences，itisfitthepeopleshouldtransactbytheirrepresentativeswhattheycannottransactbythemselves。
　　Theinhabitantsofaparticulartownaremuchbetteracquaintedwithitswantsandintereststhanwiththoseofotherplaces；andarebetterjudgesofthecapacityoftheirneighboursthanofthatoftherestoftheircountrymen。Themembers，therefore，ofthelegislatureshouldnotbechosenfromthegeneralbodyofthenation；butitisproperthatineveryconsiderableplacearepresentativeshouldbeelectedbytheinhabitants。[8]
　　Thegreatadvantageofrepresentativesis，theircapacityofdiscussingpublicaffairs。Forthisthepeoplecollectivelyareextremelyunfit，whichisoneofthechiefinconveniencesofademocracy。
　　Itisnotatallnecessarythattherepresentativeswhohavereceivedageneralinstructionfromtheirconstituentsshouldwaittobedirectedoneachparticularaffair，asispractisedinthedietsofGermany。Trueitisthatbythiswayofproceedingthespeechesofthedeputiesmightwithgreaterproprietybecalledthevoiceofthenation；but，ontheotherhand，thiswouldoccasioninfinitedelays；wouldgiveeachdeputyapowerofcontrollingtheassembly；and，onthemosturgentandpressingoccasions，thewheelsofgovernmentmightbestoppedbythecapriceofasingleperson。
　　Whenthedeputies，asMr。Sidneywellobserves，representabodyofpeople，asinHolland，theyoughttobeaccountabletotheirconstituents；butitisadifferentthinginEngland，wheretheyaredeputedbyboroughs。
　　Alltheinhabitantsoftheseveraldistrictsoughttohavearightofvotingattheelectionofarepresentative，exceptsuchasareinsomeanasituationastobedeemedtohavenowilloftheirown。
　　Onegreatfaulttherewasinmostoftheancientrepublics，thatthepeoplehadarighttoactiveresolutions，suchasrequiresomeexecution，athingofwhichtheyareabsolutelyincapable。Theyoughttohavenoshareinthegovernmentbutforthechoosingofrepresentatives，whichiswithintheirreach。Forthoughfewcantelltheexactdegreeofmen’scapacities，yettherearenonebutarecapableofknowingingeneralwhetherthepersontheychooseisbetterqualifiedthanmostofhisneighbours。
　　Neitheroughttherepresentativebodytobechosenfortheexecutivepartofgovernment，forwhichitisnotsofit；butfortheenactingoflaws，ortoseewhetherthelawsinbeingaredulyexecuted，athingsuitedtotheirabilities，andwhichnoneindeedbutthemselvescanproperlyperform。
　　Insuchastatetherearealwayspersonsdistinguishedbytheirbirth，riches，orhonours：butweretheytobeconfoundedwiththecommonpeople，andtohaveonlytheweightofasinglevoteliketherest，thecommonlibertywouldbetheirslavery，andtheywouldhavenointerestinsupportingit，asmostofthepopularresolutionswouldbeagainstthem。Thesharetheyhave，therefore，inthelegislatureoughttobeproportionedtotheirotheradvantagesinthestate；whichhappensonlywhentheyformabodythathasarighttocheckthelicentiousnessofthepeople，asthepeoplehavearighttoopposeanyencroachmentoftheirs。
　　Thelegislativepoweristhereforecommittedtothebodyofthenobles，andtothatwhichrepresentsthepeople，eachhavingtheirassembliesanddeliberationsapart，eachtheirseparateviewsandinterests。
　　Ofthethreepowersabovementioned，thejudiciaryisinsomemeasurenexttonothing：thereremain，therefore，onlytwo；andasthesehaveneedofaregulatingpowertomoderatethem，thepartofthelegislativebodycomposedofthenobilityisextremelyproperforthispurpose。
　　Thebodyofthenobilityoughttobehereditary。Inthefirstplaceitissoinitsownnature；andinthenexttheremustbeaconsiderableinteresttopreserveitsprivileges——privilegesthatinthemselvesareobnoxioustopopularenvy，andofcourseinafreestatearealwaysindanger。
　　Butasahereditarypowermightbetemptedtopursueitsownparticularinterests，andforgetthoseofthepeople，itisproperthatwhereasingularadvantagemaybegainedbycorruptingthenobility，asinthelawsrelatingtothesupplies，theyshouldhavenoothershareinthelegislationthanthepowerofrejecting，andnotthatofresolving。
　　BythepowerofresolvingImeantherightofordainingbytheirownauthority，orofamendingwhathasbeenordainedbyothers。BythepowerofrejectingIwouldbeunderstoodtomeantherightofannullingaresolutiontakenbyanother；whichwasthepowerofthetribunesatRome。Andthoughthepersonpossessedoftheprivilegeofrejectingmaylikewisehavetherightofapproving，yetthisapprobationpassesfornomorethanadeclarationthatheintendstomakenouseofhisprivilegeofrejecting，andisderivedfromthatveryprivilege。
　　Theexecutivepoweroughttobeinthehandsofamonarch，becausethisbranchofgovernment，havingneedofdespatch，isbetteradministeredbyonethanbymany：ontheotherhand，whateverdependsonthelegislativepowerisoftentimesbetterregulatedbymanythanbyasingleperson。
　　Butiftherewerenomonarch，andtheexecutivepowershouldbecommittedtoacertainnumberofpersonsselectedfromthelegislativebody，therewouldbeanendthenofliberty；byreasonthetwopowerswouldbeunited，asthesamepersonswouldsometimespossess，andwouldbealwaysabletopossess，ashareinboth。
　　Werethelegislativebodytobeaconsiderabletimewithoutmeeting，thiswouldlikewiseputanendtoliberty。Foroftwothingsonewouldnaturallyfollow：eitherthattherewouldbenolongeranylegislativeresolutions，andthenthestatewouldfallintoanarchy；orthattheseresolutionswouldbetakenbytheexecutivepower，whichwouldrenderitabsolute。
　　Itwouldbeneedlessforthelegislativebodytocontinuealwaysassembled。Thiswouldbetroublesometotherepresentatives，and，moreover，wouldcutouttoomuchworkfortheexecutivepower，soastotakeoffitsattentiontoitsoffice，andobligeittothinkonlyofdefendingitsownprerogatives，andtherightithastoexecute。
　　Again，werethelegislativebodytobealwaysassembled，itmighthappentobekeptuponlybyfillingtheplacesofthedeceasedmemberswithnewrepresentatives；andinthatcase，ifthelegislativebodywereoncecorrupted，theevilwouldbepastallremedy。Whendifferentlegislativebodiessucceedoneanother，thepeoplewhohaveabadopinionofthatwhichisactuallysittingmayreasonablyentertainsomehopesofthenext：butwereittobealwaysthesamebody，thepeopleuponseeingitoncecorruptedwouldnolongerexpectanygoodfromitslaws；andofcoursetheywouldeitherbecomedesperateorfallintoastateofindolence。
　　Thelegislativebodyshouldnotmeetofitself。Forabodyissupposedtohavenowillbutwhenitismet；andbesides，wereitnottomeetunanimously，itwouldbeimpossibletodeterminewhichwasreallythelegislativebody；thepartassembled，ortheother。Andifithadarighttoprorogueitself，itmighthappennevertobeprorogued；whichwouldbeextremelydangerous，incaseitshouldeverattempttoencroachontheexecutivepower。Besides，thereareseasons，somemoreproperthanothers，forassemblingthelegislativebody：itisfit，therefore，thattheexecutivepowershouldregulatethetimeofmeeting，aswellasthedurationofthoseassemblies，accordingtothecircumstancesandexigenciesofastateknowntoitself。
　　Weretheexecutivepowernottohavearightofrestrainingtheencroachmentsofthelegislativebody，thelatterwouldbecomedespotic；
　　forasitmightarrogatetoitselfwhatauthorityitpleased，itwouldsoondestroyalltheotherpowers。
　　Butitisnotproper，ontheotherhand，thatthelegislativepowershouldhavearighttostaytheexecutive。Forastheexecutionhasitsnaturallimits，itisuselesstoconfineit；besides，theexecutivepowerisgenerallyemployedinmomentaryoperations。Thepower，therefore，oftheRomantribuneswasfaulty，asitputastopnotonlytothelegislation，butlikewisetotheexecutivepartofgovernment；
　　whichwasattendedwithinfinitemischief。
　　Butifthelegislativepowerinafreestatehasnorighttostaytheexecutive，ithasarightandoughttohavethemeansofexamininginwhatmanneritslawshavebeenexecuted；anadvantagewhichthisgovernmenthasoverthatofCreteandSparta，wheretheCosmi[9]andtheEphori[10]gavenoaccountoftheiradministration。
　　Butwhatevermaybetheissueofthatexamination，thelegislativebodyoughtnottohaveapowerofarraigningtheperson，nor，ofcourse，theconduct，ofhimwhoisentrustedwiththeexecutivepower。Hispersonshouldbesacred，becauseasitisnecessaryforthegoodofthestatetopreventthelegislativebodyfromrenderingthemselvesarbitrary，themomentheisaccusedortriedthereisanendofliberty。
　　Inthiscasethestatewouldbenolongeramonarchy，butakindofrepublic，thoughnotafreegovernment。Butasthepersonentrustedwiththeexecutivepowercannotabuseitwithoutbadcounsellors，andsuchashavethelawsasministers，thoughthelawsprotectthemassubjects，thesemenmaybeexaminedandpunished——anadvantagewhichthisgovernmenthasoverthatofGnidus，wherethelawallowedofnosuchthingascallingtheAmymones[11]toanaccount，evenaftertheiradministration；[12]andthereforethepeoplecouldneverobtainanysatisfactionfortheinjuriesdonethem。
　　Though，ingeneral，thejudiciarypoweroughtnottobeunitedwithanypartofthelegislative，yetthisisliabletothreeexceptions，foundedontheparticularinterestofthepartyaccused。
　　Thegreatarealwaysobnoxioustopopularenvy；andweretheytobejudgedbythepeople，theymightbeindangerfromtheirjudges，andwould，moreover，bedeprivedoftheprivilegewhichthemeanestsubjectispossessedofinafreestate，ofbeingtriedbyhispeers。Thenobility，forthisreason，oughtnottobecitedbeforetheordinarycourtsofjudicature，butbeforethatpartofthelegislaturewhichiscomposedoftheirownbody。
　　Itispossiblethatthelaw，whichisclearsightedinonesense，andblindinanother，might，insomecases，betoosevere。Butaswehavealreadyobserved，thenationaljudgesarenomorethanthemouththatpronouncesthewordsofthelaw，merepassivebeings，incapableofmoderatingeitheritsforceorrigour。Thatpart，therefore，ofthelegislativebody，whichwehavejustnowobservedtobeanecessarytribunalonanotheroccasion，isalsoanecessarytribunalinthis；itbelongstoitssupremeauthoritytomoderatethelawinfavourofthelawitself，bymitigatingthesentence。
　　Itmightalsohappenthatasubjectentrustedwiththeadministrationofpublicaffairsmayinfringetherightsofthepeople，andbeguiltyofcrimeswhichtheordinarymagistrateseithercouldnotorwouldnotpunish。But，ingeneral，thelegislativepowercannottrycauses：andmuchlesscanittrythisparticularcase，whereitrepresentsthepartyaggrieved，whichisthepeople。Itcanonly，therefore，impeach。Butbeforewhatcourtshallitbringitsimpeachment？Mustitgoanddemeanitselfbeforetheordinarytribunals，whichareitsinferiors，and，beingcomposed，moreover，ofmenwhoarechosenfromthepeopleaswellasitself，willnaturallybeswayedbytheauthorityofsopowerfulanaccuser？No：inordertopreservethedignityofthepeople，andthesecurityofthesubject，thelegislativepartwhichrepresentsthepeoplemustbringinitschargebeforethelegislativepartwhichrepresentsthenobility，whohaveneitherthesameinterestsnorthesamepassions。
　　Hereisanadvantagewhichthisgovernmenthasovermostoftheancientrepublics，wherethisabuseprevailed，thatthepeoplewereatthesametimebothjudgeandaccuser。