WearesurprisedatthepunishmentoftheAreopagiteforkillingasparrowwhich，toescapethepursuitofahawk，hadtakenshelterinhisbosom。SurprisedwearealsothatanAreopagiteshouldputhissontodeathforputtingouttheeyesofalittlebird。Butletusreflectthatthequestionheredoesnotrelatetoacriminalsentence，buttoajudgmentconcerningmannersinarepublicfoundedonmanners。
Inmonarchiesthereshouldbenocensors；theformerarefoundedonhonour，andthenatureofhonouristohavethewholeworldforitscensor。Everymanwhofailsinthisarticleissubjecttothereproachesevenofthosewhoarevoidofhonour。
Herethecensorswouldbespoiledbytheverypeoplewhomtheyoughttocorrect：theycouldnotprevailagainstthecorruptionofamonarchy；
thecorruptionratherwouldbetoostrongagainstthem。
Henceitisobviousthatthereoughttobenocensorsindespoticgovernments。TheexampleofChinaseemstoderogatefromthisrule；butweshallsee，inthecourseofthiswork，theparticularreasonsofthatinstitution。
______
1。Plutarch，Solon。
2。Ibid。
3。PhilolausofCorinthmadealawatAthensthatthenumberoftheportionsoflandandthatofinheritancesshouldbealwaysthesame。——
Aristotle，Politics，ii。7，12。
4。Laws，xi。
5。CorneliusNepos，preface。Thiscustombeganintheearliesttimes。
ThusAbrahamsaysofSarah，"Sheismysister，myfather’sdaughter，butnotmymother’s。"Thesamereasonsoccasionedtheestablishingthesamelawamongdifferentnations。
6。Despecialibuslegibusqu？pertinentadpr？ceptarDecalogi。
7。Bookx。
8。Athenisdimidiumlicet，Alexandri？totum。——Seneca，DeMorteClaudii。
9。Platohasalawofthiskind。Laws，v。
10。Aristotle。ii。7。
11。Solonmadefourclasses：thefirst，ofthosewhohadanincomeof500minaseitherincornorliquidfruits；thesecond，ofthosewhohad300，andwereabletokeepahorse；thethird，ofsuchashadonly200；
thefourth，ofallthosewholivedbytheirmanuallabour。——Plutarch，Solon。
12。Solonexcludesfrompublicemploymentsallthoseofthefourthclass。
13。Theyinsisteduponalargerdivisionoftheconqueredlands。——
Plutarch，LivesoftheancientKingsandCommanders。
14。Inthese，theportionsorfortunesofwomenoughttobeverymuchlimited。
15。Themagistratestherewereannual，andthesenatorsforlife。
16。Lycurgus，saysXenophon，DeRepub。Laced？m。，10。§1，2，ordainedthatthesenatorsshouldbechosenfromamongsttheoldmen，totheendthattheymightnotbeneglectedinthedeclineoflife；thusbymakingthemjudgesofthecourageofyoungpeople，herenderedtheoldageoftheformermorehonourablethanthestrengthandvigourofthelatter。
17。EventheAreopagusitselfwassubjecttotheircensure。
18。DeRepub。Laced？m。，8。
19。WemayseeintheRomanHistoryhowusefulthispowerwastotherepublic。Ishallgiveaninstanceeveninthetimeofitsgreatestcorruption。AulusFulviuswassetoutonhisjourneyinordertojoinCatiline；hisfathercalledhimback，andputhimtodeath。——Sallust，DeBelloCatil。，xxxiv。
20。InourdaystheVenetians，whoinmanyrespectsmaybesaidtohaveaverywisegovernment，decidedadisputebetweenanobleVenetianandagentlemanofTerraFirmainrespecttoprecedencyinachurch，bydeclaringthatoutofVeniceanobleVenetianhadnopre—eminenceoveranyothercitizen。
21。Itwasinsertedbythedecemvirsinthetwolasttables。SeeDionysiusHelicarnassus，x。
22。Asinsomearistocraciesinourtime；nothingismoreprejudicialtothegovernment。
23。SeeinStrabo，xiv。，inwhatmannertheRhodiansbehavedinthisrespect。
24。AmelotdelaHoussaye，OftheGovernmentofVenice，partIII。TheClaudianlawforbadethesenatorstohaveanyshipatseathatheldabovefortybushels。——Livy，xxi。63。
25。Theinformersthrowtheirscrollsintoit。
26。SeeLivy，xlix。Acensorcouldnotbetroubledevenbyacensor；
eachmadehisremarkwithouttakingtheopinionofhiscolleague；andwhenitotherwisehappened，thecensorshipwasinamannerabolished。
27。AtAthenstheLogist？，whomadeallthemagistratesaccountablefortheirconduct，gavenoaccountthemselves。
28。ItissopractisedatVenice。——AmelotdelaHoussaye，pp。30，31。
29。Themaindesignofsomearistocraciesseemstobelessthesupportofthestatethanoftheirnobility。
30。Itistoleratedonlyinthecommonpeople。SeeLeg。3，Cod。decomm。
etmercatoribus，whichisfullofgoodsense。
31。Testamentpolit。
32。Barbariscunctatioservilis，statimexequiregiumvidetur。——
Tacitus，Annals。，v。32。
33。MemoirsofCardinaldeRetz，andotherhistories。
34。Testamentpolit。
35。EdifyingLetters，coll。ii，p。315。
36。ContinuationofPufendorf，IntroductiontotheHistoryofEurope，inthearticleonSweden，10。
37。AccordingtoSirJohnChardin，thereisnocouncilofstateinPersia。
38。SeeRicaut，StateoftheOttomanEmpire，p。196。
39。SeeconcerningtheinheritancesoftheTurks，AncientandModernSparta。SeealsoRicautontheOttomanempire。
40。CollectionofVoyagesthatContributedtotheEstablishmentoftheEastIndiaCompany，i。ThelawofPeguislesscruel；iftherehappentobechildren，thekingsucceedsonlytotwo—thirds。Ibid。，iii，p。1。
41。Seethedifferentconstitutions，especiallythatof1722。
42。SeeJustin。
43。Seethebookoflawsasrelativetothenatureoftheclimate。Bookxiv，below。
44。Laquilletiere，AncientandModernSparta，p。463。
45。Thesamemaybesaidofcompositionsinregardtofairbankrupts。
46。TherewasnosuchestablishmentmadetilltheJulianlaw，DeCessionebonorum；whichpreservedthemfromprisonandfromanignominiousdivisionoftheirgoods。——Cod。，ii。tit。12。
47TheyseemtohavebeentoofondofconfiscationsintherepublicofAthens。
48。Authenticabonadamnatorum。——Cod。debon。proscript。seudamn。
49。DelaRepublique，v。3。
50。UtessePhoebidulciuslumensoletJamjamcadentis——Seneca，Troas，V。i。1。
51。CollectionofVoyagesthatContributedtotheEstablishmentoftheEastIndiaCompany，i，p。80。
52。Laws，xii。
53。Leg。6，§2；Dig。adleg。Jul。repet。
54。Munuscula。
55。Plato，inhisRepublic，viii，rankstheserefusalsamongthemarksofthecorruptionofarepublic。InhisLaws，vi，heordersthemtobepunishedbyafine；atVenicetheyarepunishedwithbanishment。
56。VictorAmadeus。
57。Somecenturionshavingappealedtothepeoplefortheemploymentswhichtheyhadbeforeenjoyed，"Itisjust，mycomrades，"saidacenturion，"thatyoushouldlookuponeverypostashonourableinwhichyouhaveanopportunityofdefendingtherepublic。"——Livy，dec。5，xlii，34。
58。Neimperiumadoptimosnobiliumtransferretur，SenatummilitiavetuitGallienus，etiamadireexercitum。——AureliusVictor，DeC？saribus。
59。Augustusdeprivedthesenators，proconsuls，andgovernorsoftheprivilegeofwearingarms。——Dio，xxxiii。
60。Constantine。SeeZozimus，ii。
61。AmmianusMarcellinus，xxvi，EtCivilia，moreveterum，etbellarecturo。
62。Republic，viii。
63。WeseethelazinessofSpain，whereallpublicemploymentsaregivenaway。
BookVI。ConsequencesofthePrinciplesofDifferentGovernmentswithRespecttotheSimplicityofCivilandCriminalLaws，theFormofJudgments，andtheInflictingofPunishments1。OftheSimplicityofCivilLawsindifferentGovernments。Monarchiesdonotpermitofsogreatasimplicityoflawsasdespoticgovernments。
Forinmonarchiestheremustbecourtsofjudicature；thesemustgivetheirdecisions；thedecisionsmustbepreservedandlearned，thatwemayjudgeinthesamemannerto—dayasyesterday，andthatthelivesandpropertyofthecitizensmaybeascertainandfixedastheveryconstitutionofthestate。
Inmonarchies，theadministrationofjustice，whichdecidesnotonlyinwhateverbelongstolifeandproperty，butlikewisetohonour，demandsveryscrupulousinquiries。Thedelicacyofthejudgeincreasesinproportiontotheincreaseofhistrust，andoftheimportanceoftheinterestsonwhichhedetermines。
Wemustnot，therefore，besurprisedtofindsomanyrules，restrictions，andextensionsinthelawsofthosecountries——rulesthatmultiplytheparticularcases，andseemtomakeofreasonitselfanart。
Thedifferenceofrank，birth，andconditionestablishedinmonarchicalgovernmentsisfrequentlyattendedwithdistinctionsinthenatureofproperty；andthelawsrelatingtotheconstitutionofthisgovernmentmayaugmentthenumberofthesedistinctions。Hence，amongusgoodsaredividedintorealestates，purchases，dowries，paraphernalia，paternalandmaternalinheritances；movablesofdifferentkinds；estatesheldinfee—simple，orintail；acquiredbydescentorconveyance；allodial，orheldbysoccage；groundrents；orannuities。Eachsortofgoodsissubjecttoparticularrules，whichmustbecompliedwithinthedisposalofthem。Thesethingsmustneedsdiminishthesimplicityofthelaws。
Inourgovernmentsthefiefshavebecomehereditary。Itwasnecessarythatthenobilityshouldhaveafixedproperty，thatis，thefiefshouldhaveacertainconsistency，totheendthattheproprietormightbealwaysinacapacityofservingtheprince。Thismusthavebeenproductiveofgreatvarieties；forinstance，therearecountrieswherefiefscouldnotbedividedamongthebrothers；inothers，theyoungerbrothersmaybeallowedamoregeneroussubsistence。
Themonarchwhoknowseachofhisprovincesmayestablishdifferentlaws，ortoleratedifferentcustoms。Butasthedespoticprinceknowsnothing，andcanattendtonothing，hemusttakegeneralmeasures，andgovernbyarigidandinflexiblewill，whichthroughouthiswholedominionsproducesthesameeffect；inshort，everythingbendsunderhisfeet。
Inproportionasthedecisionsofthecourtsofjudicaturearemultipliedinmonarchies，thelawisloadedwithdecreesthatsometimescontradictoneanother；eitherbecausesucceedingjudgesareofadifferentwayofthinking，orbecausethesamecausesaresometimeswell，andatothertimesill，defended；or，infine，byreasonofaninfinitenumberofabuses，towhichallhumanregulationsareliable。
Thisisanecessaryevil，whichthelegislatorredressesfromtimetotime，ascontraryeventothespiritofmoderategovernments。Forwhenpeopleareobligedtohaverecoursetocourtsofjudicature，thisshouldcomefromthenatureoftheconstitution，andnotfromthecontradictionoruncertaintyofthelaw。
Ingovernmentswheretherearenecessarydistinctionsofpersons，theremustlikewisebeprivileges。Thisalsodiminishesthesimplicity，andcreatesathousandexceptions。
Oneoftheprivilegesleastburdensometosociety，andespeciallytohimwhoconfersit，isthatofpleadinginonecourtinpreferencetoanother。Herenewdifficultiesarise，whenitbecomesaquestionbeforewhichcourtweshallplead。
Fardifferentisthecaseofthepeopleunderdespoticgovernments。InthosecountriesIcanseenothingthatthelegislatorisabletodecree，orthemagistratetojudge。Asthelandsbelongtotheprince，itfollowsthattherearescarcelyanycivillawsinregardtolandedproperty。Fromtherightthesovereignhastosuccessions，itfollows，likewise，thattherearenonerelatingtoinheritances。Themonopoliesestablishedbytheprinceforhimselfinsomecountriesrenderallsortsofcommerciallawsquiteuseless。Themarriageswhichtheyusuallycontractwithfemaleslavesarethecausethattherearescarcelyanycivillawsrelatingtodowries，ortotheparticularadvantageofmarriedwomen。Fromtheprodigiousmultitudeofslaves，itfollows，likewise，thatthereareveryfewwhohaveanysuchthingasawilloftheirown，andofcourseareanswerablefortheirconductbeforeajudge。Mostmoralactionsthatareonlyinconsequenceofafather’s，ahusband’s，oramaster’swill，areregulatedbythem，andnotbythemagistrates。
Iforgottoobservethataswhatwecallhonourisathinghardlyknowninthosecountries，theseveraldifficultiesrelatingtothisarticle，thoughofsuchimportancewithus，arewiththemquiteoutofthequestion。Despoticpowerisself—sufficient；rounditthereisanabsolutevacuum。Henceitisthatwhentravellersfavouruswiththedescriptionofcountrieswherearbitraryswayprevails，theyseldommakementionofcivillaws。[1]
Alloccasions，therefore，ofwranglingandlaw—suitsarehereremoved。
Andtothisinpartisitowingthatlitigiouspeopleinthosecountriesaresoroughlyhandled。Astheinjusticeoftheirdemandisneitherscreened，palliated，norprotectedbyaninfinitenumberoflaws，ofcourseitisimmediatelydiscovered。
2。OftheSimplicityofCriminalLawsindifferentGovernments。Wehearitgenerallysaid，thatjusticeoughttobeadministeredwithusasinTurkey。Isitpossible，then，thatthemostignorantofallnationsshouldbethemostclear—sightedonapointwhichitmostbehovesmankindtoknow？
Ifweexaminethesetformsofjusticewithrespecttothetroublethesubjectundergoesinrecoveringhisproperty，orinobtainingsatisfactionforaninjuryoraffront，weshallfindthemdoubtlesstoonumerous：butifweconsiderthemintherelationtheybeartothelibertyandsecurityofeveryindividual，weshalloftenfindthemtoofew；andbeconvincedthatthetrouble，expense，delays，andeventheverydangersofourjudiciaryproceedings，arethepricethateachsubjectpaysforhisliberty。
InTurkey，wherelittleregardisshowntothehonour，life，orestateofthesubject，allcausesarespeedilydecided。Themethodofdeterminingthemisamatterofindifference，providedtheybedetermined。Thepasha，afteraquickhearing，orderswhichpartyhepleasestobebastinadoed，andthensendsthemabouttheirbusiness。
Hereitwouldbedangeroustobeofalitigiousdisposition；thissupposesastrongdesireofobtainingjustice，asettledaversion，anactivemind，andasteadinessinpursuingone’spoint。Allthisshouldbeavoidedinagovernmentwherefearoughttobetheonlyprevailingsentiment，andinwhichpopulardisturbancesarefrequentlyattendedwithsuddenandunforeseenrevolutions。Hereeverymanoughttoknowthatthemagistratemustnothearhisnamementioned，andthathissecuritydependsentirelyonhisbeingreducedtoakindofannihilation。
Butinmoderategovernments，wherethelifeofthemeanestsubjectisdeemedprecious，nomanisstrippedofhishonourorpropertyuntilafteralonginquiry；andnomanisbereftoflifetillhisverycountryhasattackedhim——anattackthatisnevermadewithoutleavinghimallpossiblemeansofmakinghisdefence。
Henceitisthatwhenapersonrendershimselfabsolute，[2]heimmediatelythinksofreducingthenumberoflaws。Inagovernmentthusconstitutedtheyaremoreaffectedwithparticularinconveniencesthanwiththelibertyofthesubject，whichisverylittleminded。
Inrepublics，itisplainthatasmanyformalitiesatleastarenecessaryasinmonarchies。Inbothgovernmentstheyincreaseinproportiontothevaluewhichissetonthehonour，fortune，liberty，andlifeofthesubject。
Inrepublicangovernments，menareallequal；equaltheyarealsoindespoticgovernments：intheformer，becausetheyareeverything；inthelatter，becausetheyarenothing。
3。InwhatGovernmentsandinwhatCasestheJudgesoughttodetermineaccordingtotheexpressLetteroftheLaw。Theneareragovernmentapproachestowardsarepublic，themorethemannerofjudgingbecomessettledandfixed；henceitwasafaultintherepublicofSpartafortheEphoritopasssucharbitraryjudgmentswithouthavinganylawstodirectthem。ThefirstconsulsatRomepronouncedsentenceinthesamemannerastheEphori；buttheinconvenienceofthisproceedingwassoonfelt，andtheywereobligedtohaverecoursetoexpressanddeterminatelaws。
Indespoticgovernmentstherearenolaws；thejudgehimselfishisownrule。Therearelawsinmonarchies；andwheretheseareexplicit，thejudgeconformstothem；wheretheyareotherwise，heendeavourstoinvestigatetheirspirit。Inrepublics，theverynatureoftheconstitutionrequiresthejudgestofollowtheletterofthelaw；
otherwisethelawmightbeexplainedtotheprejudiceofeverycitizen，incaseswheretheirhonour，property，orlifeisconcerned。
AtRomethejudgeshadnomoretodothantodeclarethatthepersonsaccusedwereguiltyofaparticularcrime，andthenthepunishmentwasfoundinthelaws，asmaybeseenindiverslawsstillextant。InEnglandthejurygivetheirverdictwhetherthefactbroughtundertheircognisancebeprovedornot；ifitbeproved，thejudgepronouncesthepunishmentinflictedbythelaw，andforthisheneedsonlytoopenhiseyes。
4。OftheMannerofpassingJudgment。Hencearisethedifferentmodesofpassingjudgment。Inmonarchiesthejudgeschoosethemethodofarbitration；theydeliberatetogether，theycommunicatetheirsentimentsforthesakeofunanimity；theymoderatetheiropinions，inordertorenderthemconformabletothoseofothers：andthelessernumberareobligedtogivewaytothemajority。Butthisisnotagreeabletothenatureofarepublic。AtRome，andinthecitiesofGreece，thejudgesneverenteredintoaconsultation；eachgavehisopinioninoneofthesethreeways："Iabsolve，""Icondemn，""Itdoesnotappearcleartome"；[3]thiswasbecausethepeoplejudged，orweresupposedtojudge。
Butthepeoplearefarfrombeingcivilians；alltheserestrictionsandmethodsofarbitrationareabovetheirreach；theymusthaveonlyoneobjectandonesinglefactsetbeforethem；andthentheyhaveonlytoseewhethertheyoughttocondemn，toacquit，ortosuspendtheirjudgment。
TheRomansintroducedsetformsofactions，[4]aftertheexampleoftheGreeks，andestablishedarulethateachcauseshouldbedirectedbyitsproperaction。Thiswasnecessaryintheirmannerofjudging；itwasnecessarytofixthestateofthequestion，thatthepeoplemighthaveitalwaysbeforetheireyes。Otherwise，inalongprocess，thisstateofthequestionwouldcontinuallychange，andbenolongerdistinguished。
HenceitfollowedthattheRomanjudgesgrantedonlythesimpledemand，withoutmakinganyaddition，deduction，orlimitation。Butthepr？torsdevisedotherformsofactions，whichwerecalledexbonafide，inwhichthemethodofpronouncingsentencewaslefttothedispositionofthejudge。Thiswasmoreagreeabletothespiritofmonarchy。HenceitisasayingamongtheFrenchlawyers，thatinFrance[5]allactionsareexbonafide。
5。InwhatGovernmentstheSovereignmaybeJudge。Machiavel[6]
attributesthelossofthelibertyofFlorencetothepeople’snotjudginginabodyincasesofhightreasonagainstthemselves，aswascustomaryatRome。Forthispurposetheyhadeightjudges："butthefew，"saysMachiavel，"arecorruptedbyafew。"Ishouldwillinglyadoptthemaximofthisgreatman。Butasinthosecasesthepoliticalinterestprevailsinsomemeasureoverthecivil（foritisalwaysaninconveniencethatthepeopleshouldbejudgesintheirowncause），inordertoremedythisevil，thelawsmustprovideasmuchaspossibleforthesecurityofindividuals。
WiththisviewtheRomanlegislatorsdidtwothings：theygavethepersonsaccusedpermissiontobanishthemselves[7]beforesentencewaspronounced；[8]andtheyordainedthatthegoodsofthosewhowerecondemnedshouldbesacred，topreventtheirbeingconfiscatedtothepeople。WeshallseeinBookXItheotherlimitationsthatweresettothejudicatorypowerresidinginthepeople。
Solonknewhowtopreventtheabusewhichthepeoplemightmakeoftheirpowerincriminaljudgments。HeordainedthattheCourtofAreopagusshouldre—examinetheaffair；thatiftheybelievedthepartyaccusedwasunjustlyacquitted[9]theyshouldimpeachhimagainbeforethepeople；thatiftheybelievedhimunjustlycondemned[10]theyshouldpreventtheexecutionofthesentence，andmakethemrejudgetheproceeding——anadmirablelaw，thatsubjectedthepeopletothecensureofthemagistracywhichtheymostrevered，andeventotheirown！
Inaffairsofthiskinditisalwayspropertothrowinsomedelays，especiallywhenthepartyaccusedisunderconfinement；totheendthatthepeoplemaygrowcalmandgivetheirjudgmentcoolly。
Indespoticgovernments，theprincehimselfmaybejudge。Butinmonarchiesthiscannotbe；theconstitutionbysuchmeanswouldbesubverted，andthedependentintermediatepowersannihilated；allsetformsofjudgmentwouldcease；fearwouldtakepossessionofthepeople’sminds，andpalenessspreaditselfovereverycountenance：themoreconfidence，honour，affection，andsecurityinthesubject，themoreextendedisthepowerofthemonarch。
Weshallgivehereafewmorereflectionsonthispoint。Inmonarchies，theprinceisthepartythatprosecutesthepersonaccused，andcauseshimtobepunishedoracquitted。Now，werehehimselftosituponthetrial，hewouldbebothjudgeandparty。
Inthisgovernmenttheprincehasfrequentlythebenefitofconfiscation，sothathereagain，bydeterminingcriminalcauses，hewouldbebothjudgeandparty。
Further，bythismethodhewoulddeprivehimselfofthemostgloriousattributeofsovereignty，namely，thatofgrantingpardon，[11]foritwouldbequiteridiculousofhimtomakeandunmakehisdecisions；
surelyhewouldnotchoosetocontradicthimself。
Besides，thiswouldbeconfoundingallideas；itwouldbeimpossibletotellwhetheramanwasacquitted，orreceivedhispardon。
LouisXIIIbeingdesiroustositinjudgmentuponthetrialoftheDukedelaValette，[12]sentforsomemembersoftheparliamentandoftheprivycouncil，todebatethematter；upontheirbeingorderedbythekingtogivetheiropinionconcerningthewarrantforhisarrest，thepresident，DeBelievre，said"thathefounditverystrangethataprinceshouldpasssentenceuponasubject；thatkingshadreservedtothemselvesthepowerofpardoning，andleftthatofcondemningtotheirofficers；thathismajestywantedtoseebeforehimatthebarapersonwho，byhisdecision，wastobehurriedawayintotheotherworld！Thattheprince’scountenanceshouldinspirewithhopes，andnotconfoundwithfears；thathispresencealoneremovedecclesiasticcensures；andthatsubjectsoughtnottogoawaydissatisfiedfromthesovereign。"
Whensentencewaspassed，thesamemagistratedeclared，"Thisisanunprecedentedjudgmenttosee，contrarytotheexampleofpastages——akingofFrance，inthequalityofajudge，condemningagentlemantodeath。"[13]
Again，sentencespassedbytheprincewouldbeaninexhaustiblesourceofinjusticeandabuse；thecourtiersbytheirimportunitywouldalwaysbeabletoextorthisdecisions。SomeRomanemperorsweresomadastositasjudgesthemselves；theconsequencewasthatnoreignseversosurprisedtheworldwithoppressionandinjustice。
"Claudius，"saysTacitus，[14]"havingappropriatedtohimselfthedeterminationoflawsuits，andthefunctionofmagistrates，gaveoccasiontoallmannerofrapine。"ButNero，uponcomingtotheempireafterClaudius，endeavouredtoconciliatethemindsofthepeoplebydeclaring"thathewouldtakecarenottobejudgehimselfinprivatecauses，thatthepartiesmightnotbeexposedwithinthewallsofapalacetotheiniquitousinfluenceofafewfreedmen。"[15]
"UnderthereignofArcadius，"saysZozimus，[16]"aswarmofcalumniatorsspreadthemselvesoneveryside，andinfestedthecourt。
Uponaperson’sdecease，itwasimmediatelysupposedhehadleftnochildren；[17]and，inconsequenceofthis，hispropertywasgivenawaybyarescript。Forastheprincewassurprisinglystupid，andtheempressexcessivelyenterprising，shewasaslavetotheinsatiableavariceofherdomesticsandconfidants；insomuchthattoanhonestmannothingcouldbemoredesirablethandeath。"
"Formerly，"saysProcopius[18]"thereusedtobeveryfewpeopleatcourt；butinJustinian’sreign，asthejudgeshadnolongerthelibertyofadministeringjustice，theirtribunalsweredeserted，whiletheprince’spalaceresoundedwiththelitigiousclamoursoftheseveralparties。"Everybodyknowswhataprostitutiontherewasofpublicjudgments，andevenoftheverylawsthemselves，atthatemperor’scourt。
Thelawsaretheeyeoftheprince；bythemheseeswhatwouldotherwiseescapehisobservation。Shouldheattemptthefunctionofajudge，hewouldnotthenlabourforhimself，butforimpostors，whoseaimistodeceivehim。
6。ThatinMonarchiesMinistersoughtnottositasJudges。Itislikewiseaverygreatinconvenienceinmonarchiesfortheministersoftheprincetositasjudges。Wehavestillinstancesofstateswherethereareagreatnumberofjudgestodecideexchequercauses，andwheretheministersnevertheless（athingmostincredible！）wouldfaindeterminethem。Manyarethereflectionsthatherearise；butthissingleonewillsufficeformypurpose。
Thereisintheverynatureofthingsakindofcontrastbetweenaprince’scouncilandhiscourtsofjudicature。Theking’scounciloughttobecomposedofafewpersons，andthecourtsofjudicatureofagreatmany。Thereasonis，intheformer，thingsshouldbeundertakenandconductedwithakindofwarmthandpassion，whichcanhardlybeexpectedbutfromfourorfivemenwhomakeittheirsolebusiness。Onthecontrary，incourtsofjudicatureacertaincoolnessinrequisite，andanindifference，insomemeasure，toallmannerofaffairs。
7。OfasingleMagistrate。Amagistracyofthiskindcannottakeplacebutinadespoticgovernment。WehaveaninstanceintheRomanhistoryhowfarasinglemagistratemayabusehispower。MightitnotbeverywellexpectedthatAppiusonhistribunalshouldcontemnalllaws，afterhavingviolatedthatofhisownenacting？[19]LivyhasgivenustheiniquitousdistinctionoftheDecemvir。HehadsubornedamantoreclaimVirginiainhispresenceashisslave；Virginia’srelativesinsistedthatbyvirtueofhisownlawsheshouldbeconsignedtothem，tillthedefinitivejudgmentwaspassed。Uponwhichhedeclaredthathislawhadbeenenactedonlyinfavourofthefather，andthatasVirginiuswasabsent，noapplicationcouldbemadeofittothepresentcase。[20]
8。OfAccusationindifferentGovernments。AtRome[21]itwaslawfulforonecitizentoaccuseanother。Thiswasagreeabletothespiritofarepublic，whereeachcitizenoughttohaveanunlimitedzealforthepublicgood，andissupposedtoholdalltherightsofhiscountryinhisownhands。Undertheemperors，therepublicanmaximswerestillpursued；andinstantlyappearedapernicioustribe，aswarmofinformers。Crafty，wickedmen，whocouldstooptoanyindignitytoservethepurposesoftheirambition，weresuretobusythemselvesinthesearchofcriminalswhosecondemnationmightbeagreeabletotheprince；
thiswastheroadtohonourandpreferment，[22]butluckilywearestrangerstoitinourcountry。
Wehaveatpresentanadmirablelaw，namely，thatbywhichtheprince，whoisestablishedfortheexecutionofthelaws，appointsanofficerineachcourtofjudicaturetoprosecuteallsortsofcrimesinhisname；
hencetheprofessionofinformersisathingunknowntous，forifthispublicavengerweresuspectedtoabusehisoffice，hewouldsoonbeobligedtomentionhisauthor。
ByPlato’sLaws[23]thosewhoneglecttoinformorto。assistthemagistratesareliabletopunishment。Thiswouldnotbesoproperinourdays。Thepublicprosecutorwatchesforthesafetyofthecitizens；heproceedsinhisofficewhiletheyenjoytheirquietandease。
9。OftheSeverityofPunishmentsindifferentGovernments。Theseverityofpunishmentsisfitterfordespoticgovernments，whoseprincipleisterror，thanforamonarchyorarepublic，whosespringishonourandvirtue。
Inmoderategovernments，theloveofone’scountry，shame，andthefearofblamearerestrainingmotives，capableofpreventingamultitudeofcrimes。Herethegreatestpunishmentofabadactionisconviction。Thecivillawshavethereforeasofterwayofcorrecting，anddonotrequiresomuchforceandseverity。