Itispossiblethatanindividualmaylaydownasystemofprinciples,onwhichgovernmentshallbeconstitutionallyestablishedtoanyextentofterritory。Thisisnomorethananoperationofthemind,actingbyitsownpowers。Butthepracticeuponthoseprinciples,asapplyingtothevariousandnumerouscircumstancesofanation,itsagriculture,manufacture,trade,commerce,etc。,etc。,aknowledgeofadifferentkind,andwhichcanbehadonlyfromthevariouspartsofsociety。Itisanassemblageofpracticalknowledge,whichnoindividualcanpossess;andthereforethemonarchicalformisasmuchlimited,inusefulpractice,fromtheincompetencyofknowledge,aswasthedemocraticalform,fromthemultiplicityofpopulation。Theonedegenerates,byextension,intoconfusion;theother,intoignoranceandincapacity,ofwhichallthegreatmonarchiesareanevidence。Themonarchicalform,therefore,couldnotbeasubstituteforthedemocratical,becauseithasequalinconveniences。
Muchlesscoulditwhenmadehereditary。Thisisthemosteffectualofallformstoprecludeknowledge。Neithercouldthehighdemocraticalmindhavevoluntarilyyieldeditselftobegovernedbychildrenandidiots,andallthemotleyinsignificanceofcharacter,whichattendssuchamereanimalsystem,thedisgraceandthereproachofreasonandofman。
Astothearistocraticalform,ithasthesamevicesanddefectswiththemonarchical,exceptthatthechanceofabilitiesisbetterfromtheproportionofnumbers,butthereisstillnosecurityfortherightuseandapplicationofthem。*[17]
Referringthemtotheoriginalsimpledemocracy,itaffordsthetruedatafromwhichgovernmentonalargescalecanbegin。Itisincapableofextension,notfromitsprinciple,butfromtheinconvenienceofitsform;andmonarchyandaristocracy,fromtheirincapacity。Retaining,then,democracyastheground,andrejectingthecorruptsystemsofmonarchyandaristocracy,therepresentativesystemnaturallypresentsitself;remedyingatoncethedefectsofthesimpledemocracyastoform,andtheincapacityoftheothertwowithrespecttoknowledge。
Simpledemocracywassocietygoverningitselfwithouttheaidofsecondarymeans。Byingraftingrepresentationupondemocracy,wearriveatasystemofgovernmentcapableofembracingandconfederatingallthevariousinterestsandeveryextentofterritoryandpopulation;andthatalsowithadvantagesasmuchsuperiortohereditarygovernment,astherepublicoflettersistohereditaryliterature。
ItisonthissystemthattheAmericangovernmentisfounded。Itisrepresentationingraftedupondemocracy。Ithasfixedtheformbyascaleparallelinallcasestotheextentoftheprinciple。
WhatAthenswasinminiatureAmericawillbeinmagnitude。
Theonewasthewonderoftheancientworld;theotherisbecomingtheadmirationofthepresent。Itistheeasiestofalltheformsofgovernmenttobeunderstoodandthemosteligibleinpractice;
andexcludesatoncetheignoranceandinsecurityofthehereditarymode,andtheinconvenienceofthesimpledemocracy。
Itisimpossibletoconceiveasystemofgovernmentcapableofactingoversuchanextentofterritory,andsuchacircleofinterests,asisimmediatelyproducedbytheoperationofrepresentation。
France,greatandpopulousasitis,isbutaspotinthecapaciousnessofthesystem。Itispreferabletosimpledemocracyeveninsmallterritories。Athens,byrepresentation,wouldhaveoutrivalledherowndemocracy。
Thatwhichiscalledgovernment,orratherthatwhichweoughttoconceivegovernmenttobe,isnomorethansomecommoncenterinwhichallthepartsofsocietyunite。Thiscannotbeaccomplishedbyanymethodsoconducivetothevariousinterestsofthecommunity,asbytherepresentativesystem。Itconcentratestheknowledgenecessarytotheinterestoftheparts,andofthewhole。Itplacesgovernmentinastateofconstantmaturity。Itis,ashasalreadybeenobserved,neveryoung,neverold。Itissubjectneithertononage,nordotage。Itisneverinthecradle,noroncrutches。Itadmitsnotofaseparationbetweenknowledgeandpower,andissuperior,asgovernmentalwaysoughttobe,toalltheaccidentsofindividualman,andisthereforesuperiortowhatiscalledmonarchy。
Anationisnotabody,thefigureofwhichistoberepresentedbythehumanbody;butislikeabodycontainedwithinacircle,havingacommoncenter,inwhicheveryradiusmeets;andthatcenterisformedbyrepresentation。Toconnectrepresentationwithwhatiscalledmonarchy,iseccentricgovernment。Representationisofitselfthedelegatedmonarchyofanation,andcannotdebaseitselfbydividingitwithanother。
Mr。Burkehastwoorthreetimes,inhisparliamentaryspeeches,andinhispublications,madeuseofajingleofwordsthatconveynoideas。Speakingofgovernment,hesays,"Itisbettertohavemonarchyforitsbasis,andrepublicanismforitscorrective,thanrepublicanismforitsbasis,andmonarchyforitscorrective。"—Ifhemeansthatitisbettertocorrectfollywithwisdom,thanwisdomwithfolly,Iwillnootherwisecontendwithhim,thanthatitwouldbemuchbettertorejectthefollyentirely。
ButwhatisthisthingwhichMr。Burkecallsmonarchy？Willheexplainit？Allmencanunderstandwhatrepresentationis;andthatitmustnecessarilyincludeavarietyofknowledgeandtalents。
Butwhatsecurityisthereforthesamequalitiesonthepartofmonarchy？or,whenthemonarchyisachild,wherethenisthewisdom？
Whatdoesitknowaboutgovernment？Whothenisthemonarch,orwhereisthemonarchy？Ifitistobeperformedbyregency,itprovestobeafarce。Aregencyisamockspeciesofrepublic,andthewholeofmonarchydeservesnobetterdescription。
Itisathingasvariousasimaginationcanpaint。
Ithasnoneofthestablecharacterthatgovernmentoughttopossess。
Everysuccessionisarevolution,andeveryregencyacounter—revolution。Thewholeofitisasceneofperpetualcourtcabalandintrigue,ofwhichMr。Burkeishimselfaninstance。
Torendermonarchyconsistentwithgovernment,thenextinsuccessionshouldnotbebornachild,butamanatonce,andthatmanaSolomon。Itisridiculousthatnationsaretowaitandgovernmentbeinterruptedtillboysgrowtobemen。
WhetherIhavetoolittlesensetosee,ortoomuchtobeimposedupon;
whetherIhavetoomuchortoolittlepride,orofanythingelse,Ileaveoutofthequestion;butcertainitis,thatwhatiscalledmonarchy,alwaysappearstomeasilly,contemptiblething。Icompareittosomethingkeptbehindacurtain,aboutwhichthereisagreatdealofbustleandfuss,andawonderfulairofseemingsolemnity;butwhen,byanyaccident,thecurtainhappenstobeopen—andthecompanyseewhatitis,theyburstintolaughter。
Intherepresentativesystemofgovernment,nothingofthiscanhappen。
Likethenationitself,itpossessesaperpetualstamina,aswellofbodyasofmind,andpresentsitselfontheopentheatreoftheworldinafairandmanlymanner。Whateverareitsexcellencesordefects,theyarevisibletoall。Itexistsnotbyfraudandmystery;itdealsnotincantandsophistry;butinspiresalanguagethat,passingfromhearttoheart,isfeltandunderstood。
Wemustshutoureyesagainstreason,wemustbaselydegradeourunderstanding,nottoseethefollyofwhatiscalledmonarchy。Natureisorderlyinallherworks;butthisisamodeofgovernmentthatcounteractsnature。Itturnstheprogressofthehumanfacultiesupsidedown。Itsubjectsagetobegovernedbychildren,andwisdombyfolly。
Onthecontrary,therepresentativesystemisalwaysparallelwiththeorderandimmutablelawsofnature,andmeetsthereasonofmanineverypart。Forexample:
IntheAmericanFederalGovernment,morepowerisdelegatedtothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesthantoanyotherindividualmemberofCongress。Hecannot,therefore,beelectedtothisofficeundertheageofthirty—fiveyears。Bythistimethejudgmentofmanbecomesmorematured,andhehaslivedlongenoughtobeacquaintedwithmenandthings,andthecountrywithhim。—Butonthemonarchialplan（exclusiveofthenumerouschancesthereareagainsteverymanbornintotheworld,ofdrawingaprizeinthelotteryofhumanfaculties）,thenextinsuccession,whateverhemaybe,isputattheheadofanation,andofagovernment,attheageofeighteenyears。Doesthisappearlikeanactionofwisdom？Isitconsistentwiththeproperdignityandthemanlycharacterofanation？Whereistheproprietyofcallingsuchaladthefatherofthepeople？—Inallothercases,apersonisaminoruntiltheageoftwenty—oneyears。
Beforethisperiod,heisnottrustedwiththemanagementofanacreofland,orwiththeheritablepropertyofaflockofsheep,oranherdofswine;but,wonderfultotell！hemay,attheageofeighteenyears,betrustedwithanation。
Thatmonarchyisallabubble,amerecourtartificetoprocuremoney,isevident（atleasttome）ineverycharacterinwhichitcanbeviewed。Itwouldbeimpossible,ontherationalsystemofrepresentativegovernment,tomakeoutabillofexpensestosuchanenormousamountasthisdeceptionadmits。Governmentisnotofitselfaverychargeableinstitution。ThewholeexpenseofthefederalgovernmentofAmerica,founded,asIhavealreadysaid,onthesystemofrepresentation,andextendingoveracountrynearlytentimesaslargeasEngland,isbutsixhundredthousanddollars,oronehundredandthirty—fivethousandpoundssterling。
IpresumethatnomaninhissobersenseswillcomparethecharacterofanyofthekingsofEuropewiththatofGeneralWashington。Yet,inFrance,andalsoinEngland,theexpenseofthecivillistonly,forthesupportofoneman,iseighttimesgreaterthanthewholeexpenseofthefederalgovernmentinAmerica。
Toassignareasonforthis,appearsalmostimpossible。
ThegeneralityofpeopleinAmerica,especiallythepoor,aremoreabletopaytaxes,thanthegeneralityofpeopleeitherinFranceorEngland。
Butthecaseis,thattherepresentativesystemdiffusessuchabodyofknowledgethroughoutanation,onthesubjectofgovernment,astoexplodeignoranceandprecludeimposition。Thecraftofcourtscannotbeactedonthatground。Thereisnoplaceformystery;nowhereforittobegin。Thosewhoarenotintherepresentation,knowasmuchofthenatureofbusinessasthosewhoare。Anaffectationofmysteriousimportancewouldtherebescouted。Nationscanhavenosecrets;andthesecretsofcourts,likethoseofindividuals,arealwaystheirdefects。
Intherepresentativesystem,thereasonforeverythingmustpubliclyappear。Everymanisaproprietoringovernment,andconsidersitanecessarypartofhisbusinesstounderstand。Itconcernshisinterest,becauseitaffectshisproperty。Heexaminesthecost,andcomparesitwiththeadvantages;andaboveall,hedoesnotadopttheslavishcustomoffollowingwhatinothergovernmentsarecalledLeaders。
Itcanonlybebyblindingtheunderstandingofman,andmakinghimbelievethatgovernmentissomewonderfulmysteriousthing,thatexcessiverevenuesareobtained。Monarchyiswellcalculatedtoensurethisend。Itisthepoperyofgovernment;athingkeptuptoamusetheignorant,andquietthemintotaxes。
Thegovernmentofafreecountry,properlyspeaking,isnotinthepersons,butinthelaws。Theenactingofthoserequiresnogreatexpense;andwhentheyareadministered,thewholeofcivilgovernmentisperformed—therestisallcourtcontrivance。
CHAPTERIV
OfConstitutionsThatmenmeandistinctandseparatethingswhentheyspeakofconstitutionsandofgovernments,isevident;orwhyarethosetermsdistinctlyandseparatelyused？Aconstitutionisnottheactofagovernment,butofapeopleconstitutingagovernment;
andgovernmentwithoutaconstitution,ispowerwithoutaright。
Allpowerexercisedoveranation,musthavesomebeginning。Itmusteitherbedelegatedorassumed。Therearenoothersources。Alldelegatedpoweristrust,andallassumedpowerisusurpation。
Timedoesnotalterthenatureandqualityofeither。
Inviewingthissubject,thecaseandcircumstancesofAmericapresentthemselvesasinthebeginningofaworld;andourenquiryintotheoriginofgovernmentisshortened,byreferringtothefactsthathaveariseninourownday。Wehavenooccasiontoroamforinformationintotheobscurefieldofantiquity,norhazardourselvesuponconjecture。Wearebroughtatoncetothepointofseeinggovernmentbegin,asifwehadlivedinthebeginningoftime。Therealvolume,notofhistory,butoffacts,isdirectlybeforeus,unmutilatedbycontrivance,ortheerrorsoftradition。
IwillhereconciselystatethecommencementoftheAmericanconstitutions;
bywhichthedifferencebetweenconstitutionsandgovernmentswillsufficientlyappear。
ItmaynotappearimpropertoremindthereaderthattheUnitedStatesofAmericaconsistofthirteenseparatestates,eachofwhichestablishedagovernmentforitself,afterthedeclarationofindependence,donethe4thofJuly,1776。Eachstateactedindependentlyoftherest,informingitsgovernments;butthesamegeneralprinciplepervadesthewhole。Whentheseveralstategovernmentswereformed,theyproceededtoformthefederalgovernment,thatactsoverthewholeinallmatterswhichconcerntheinterestofthewhole,orwhichrelatetotheintercourseoftheseveralstateswitheachother,orwithforeignnations。Iwillbeginwithgivinganinstancefromoneofthestategovernments（thatofPennsylvania）andthenproceedtothefederalgovernment。
ThestateofPennsylvania,thoughnearlyofthesameextentofterritoryasEngland,wasthendividedintoonlytwelvecounties。
EachofthosecountieshadelectedacommitteeatthecommencementofthedisputewiththeEnglishgovernment;andasthecityofPhiladelphia,whichalsohaditscommittee,wasthemostcentralforintelligence,itbecamethecenterofcommunicationtotheseveralcountrycommittees。Whenitbecamenecessarytoproceedtotheformationofagovernment,thecommitteeofPhiladelphiaproposedaconferenceofallthecommittees,tobeheldinthatcity,andwhichmetthelatterendofJuly,1776。
Thoughthesecommitteeshadbeendulyelectedbythepeople,theywerenotelectedexpresslyforthepurpose,norinvestedwiththeauthorityofformingaconstitution;andastheycouldnot,consistentlywiththeAmericanideaofrights,assumesuchapower,theycouldonlyconferuponthematter,andputitintoatrainofoperation。Theconferees,therefore,didnomorethanstatethecase,andrecommendtotheseveralcountiestoelectsixrepresentativesforeachcounty,tomeetinconventionatPhiladelphia,withpowerstoformaconstitution,andproposeitforpublicconsideration。
Thisconvention,ofwhichBenjaminFranklinwaspresident,havingmetanddeliberated,andagreeduponaconstitution,theynextorderedittobepublished,notasathingestablished,butfortheconsiderationofthewholepeople,theirapprobationorrejection,andthenadjournedtoastatedtime。Whenthetimeofadjournmentwasexpired,theconventionre—assembled;andasthegeneralopinionofthepeopleinapprobationofitwasthenknown,theconstitutionwassigned,sealed,andproclaimedontheauthorityofthepeopleandtheoriginalinstrumentdepositedasapublicrecord。Theconventionthenappointedadayforthegeneralelectionoftherepresentativeswhoweretocomposethegovernment,andthetimeitshouldcommence;andhavingdonethistheydissolved,andreturnedtotheirseveralhomesandoccupations。
Inthisconstitutionwerelaiddown,first,adeclarationofrights;
thenfollowedtheformwhichthegovernmentshouldhave,andthepowersitshouldpossess—theauthorityofthecourtsofjudicature,andofjuries—themannerinwhichelectionsshouldbeconducted,andtheproportionofrepresentativestothenumberofelectors—
thetimewhicheachsucceedingassemblyshouldcontinue,whichwasoneyear—themodeoflevying,andofaccountingfortheexpenditure,ofpublicmoney—ofappointingpublicofficers,etc。,etc。,etc。
Noarticleofthisconstitutioncouldbealteredorinfringedatthediscretionofthegovernmentthatwastoensue。Itwastothatgovernmentalaw。Butasitwouldhavebeenunwisetoprecludethebenefitofexperience,andinorderalsotopreventtheaccumulationoferrors,ifanyshouldbefound,andtopreserveanunisonofgovernmentwiththecircumstancesofthestateatalltimes,theconstitutionprovidedthat,attheexpirationofeverysevenyears,aconventionshouldbeelected,fortheexpresspurposeofrevisingtheconstitution,andmakingalterations,additions,orabolitionstherein,ifanysuchshouldbefoundnecessary。
Hereweseearegularprocess—agovernmentissuingoutofaconstitution,formedbythepeopleintheiroriginalcharacter;andthatconstitutionserving,notonlyasanauthority,butasalawofcontroltothegovernment。Itwasthepoliticalbibleofthestate。Scarcelyafamilywaswithoutit。Everymemberofthegovernmenthadacopy;andnothingwasmorecommon,whenanydebatearoseontheprincipleofabill,orontheextentofanyspeciesofauthority,thanforthememberstotaketheprintedconstitutionoutoftheirpocket,andreadthechapterwithwhichsuchmatterindebatewasconnected。
Havingthusgivenaninstancefromoneofthestates,IwillshowtheproceedingsbywhichthefederalconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesaroseandwasformed。
Congress,atitstwofirstmeetings,inSeptember1774,andMay1775,wasnothingmorethanadeputationfromthelegislaturesoftheseveralprovinces,afterwardsstates;andhadnootherauthoritythanwhatarosefromcommonconsent,andthenecessityofitsactingasapublicbody。IneverythingwhichrelatedtotheinternalaffairsofAmerica,congresswentnofurtherthantoissuerecommendationstotheseveralprovincialassemblies,whoatdiscretionadoptedthemornot。Nothingonthepartofcongresswascompulsive;yet,inthissituation,itwasmorefaithfullyandaffectionatelyobeyedthanwasanygovernmentinEurope。Thisinstance,likethatofthenationalassemblyinFrance,sufficientlyshows,thatthestrengthofgovernmentdoesnotconsistinanythingitself,butintheattachmentofanation,andtheinterestwhichapeoplefeelinsupportingit。Whenthisislost,governmentisbutachildinpower;
andthough,liketheoldgovernmentinFrance,itmayharassindividualsforawhile,itbutfacilitatesitsownfall。
Afterthedeclarationofindependence,itbecameconsistentwiththeprincipleonwhichrepresentativegovernmentisfounded,thattheauthorityofcongressshouldbedefinedandestablished。Whetherthatauthorityshouldbemoreorlessthancongressthendiscretionarilyexercisedwasnotthequestion。Itwasmerelytherectitudeofthemeasure。
Forthispurpose,theact,calledtheactofconfederation（whichwasasortofimperfectfederalconstitution）,wasproposed,and,afterlongdeliberation,wasconcludedintheyear1781。Itwasnottheactofcongress,becauseitisrepugnanttotheprinciplesofrepresentativegovernmentthatabodyshouldgivepowertoitself。Congressfirstinformedtheseveralstates,ofthepowerswhichitconceivedwerenecessarytobeinvestedintheunion,toenableittoperformthedutiesandservicesrequiredfromit;andthestatesseverallyagreedwitheachother,andconcentratedincongressthosepowers。
Itmaynotbeimpropertoobservethatinboththoseinstances（theoneofPennsylvania,andtheotheroftheUnitedStates）,thereisnosuchthingastheideaofacompactbetweenthepeopleononeside,andthegovernmentontheother。Thecompactwasthatofthepeoplewitheachother,toproduceandconstituteagovernment。Tosupposethatanygovernmentcanbeapartyinacompactwiththewholepeople,istosupposeittohaveexistencebeforeitcanhavearighttoexist。Theonlyinstanceinwhichacompactcantakeplacebetweenthepeopleandthosewhoexercisethegovernment,is,thatthepeopleshallpaythem,whiletheychoosetoemploythem。
Governmentisnotatradewhichanyman,oranybodyofmen,hasarighttosetupandexerciseforhisownemolument,butisaltogetheratrust,inrightofthosebywhomthattrustisdelegated,andbywhomitisalwaysresumeable。Ithasofitselfnorights;theyarealtogetherduties。
Havingthusgiventwoinstancesoftheoriginalformationofaconstitution,Iwillshowthemannerinwhichbothhavebeenchangedsincetheirfirstestablishment。
Thepowersvestedinthegovernmentsoftheseveralstates,bythestateconstitutions,werefound,uponexperience,tobetoogreat;andthosevestedinthefederalgovernment,bytheactofconfederation,toolittle。Thedefectwasnotintheprinciple,butinthedistributionofpower。
Numerouspublications,inpamphletsandinthenewspapers,appeared,ontheproprietyandnecessityofnewmodellingthefederalgovernment。Aftersometimeofpublicdiscussion,carriedonthroughthechannelofthepress,andinconversations,thestateofVirginia,experiencingsomeinconveniencewithrespecttocommerce,proposedholdingacontinentalconference;inconsequenceofwhich,adeputationfromfiveorsixstateassembliesmetatAnnapolis,inMaryland,in1786。Thismeeting,notconceivingitselfsufficientlyauthorisedtogointothebusinessofareform,didnomorethanstatetheirgeneralopinionsoftheproprietyofthemeasure,andrecommendthataconventionofallthestatesshouldbeheldtheyearfollowing。
TheconventionmetatPhiladelphiainMay,1787,ofwhichGeneralWashingtonwaselectedpresident。Hewasnotatthattimeconnectedwithanyofthestategovernments,orwithcongress。Hedelivereduphiscommissionwhenthewarended,andsincethenhadlivedaprivatecitizen。
Theconventionwentdeeplyintoallthesubjects;andhaving,afteravarietyofdebateandinvestigation,agreedamongthemselvesupontheseveralpartsofafederalconstitution,thenextquestionwas,themannerofgivingitauthorityandpractice。
Forthispurposetheydidnot,likeacabalofcourtiers,sendforaDutchStadtholder,oraGermanElector;buttheyreferredthewholemattertothesenseandinterestofthecountry。
Theyfirstdirectedthattheproposedconstitutionshouldbepublished。
Secondly,thateachstateshouldelectaconvention,expresslyforthepurposeoftakingitintoconsideration,andofratifyingorrejectingit;andthatassoonastheapprobationandratificationofanyninestatesshouldbegiven,thatthosestatesshallproceedtotheelectionoftheirproportionofmemberstothenewfederalgovernment;andthattheoperationofitshouldthenbegin,andtheformerfederalgovernmentcease。
Theseveralstatesproceededaccordinglytoelecttheirconventions。
Someofthoseconventionsratifiedtheconstitutionbyverylargemajorities,andtwoorthreeunanimously。Inothersthereweremuchdebateanddivisionofopinion。IntheMassachusettsconvention,whichmetatBoston,themajoritywasnotabovenineteenortwenty,inaboutthreehundredmembers;butsuchisthenatureofrepresentativegovernment,thatitquietlydecidesallmattersbymajority。AfterthedebateintheMassachusettsconventionwasclosed,andthevotetaken,theobjectingmembersroseanddeclared,"Thatthoughtheyhadarguedandvotedagainstit,becausecertainpartsappearedtotheminadifferentlighttowhattheyappearedtoothermembers;yet,asthevotehaddecidedinfavouroftheconstitutionasproposed,theyshouldgiveitthesamepracticalsupportasiftheyhadforit。"