Itmayindeedbeobjectedthattheeducationofchildrenisoneofthoseexpenseswhichparents，evenofthelabouringclass，oughttodefray;thatitisdesirablethattheyshouldfeelitincumbentonthemtoprovidebytheirownmeansforthefulfilmentoftheirduties，andthatbygivingeducationatthecostofothers，justasmuchbygivingsubsistence，thestandardofnecessarywagesisproportionallylowered，andthespringsofexertionandself—restraintissomuchrelaxed。Thisargumentcould，atbest，beonlyvalidifthequestionwerethatofsubstitutingapublicprovisionforwhatindividualswouldotherwisedoforthemselves;ifallparentsinthelabouringclassrecognizedandpractisedthedutyofgivinginstructiontotheirchildrenattheirownexpense。Butinasmuchasparentsdonotpractisethisduty，anddonotincludeeducationamongthosenecessaryexpenseswhichtheirwagesmustprovidefor，thereforethegeneralrateofwagesisnothighenoughtobearthoseexpenses，andtheymustbebornefromsomeothersource。Andthisisnotoneofthecasesinwhichthetenderofhelpperpetuatesthestateofthingswhichrendershelpnecessary。Instruction，whenitisreallysuch，doesnotenervate，butstrengthensaswellasenlargestheactivefaculties:inwhatevermanneracquired，itseffectonthemindisfavourabletothespiritofindependence:andwhen，unlesshadgratuitously，itwouldnotbehadatall，helpinthisformhastheoppositetendencytothatwhichinsomanyothercasesmakesitobjectionable;itishelptowardsdoingwithouthelp。
　　InEngland，andmostEuropeancountries，elementaryinstructioncannotbepaidfor，atitsfullcost，fromthecommonwagesofunskilledlabour，andwouldnotifitcould。Thealternative，therefore，isnotbetweengovernmentandprivatespeculation，butbetweenagovernmentprovisionandvoluntarycharity:betweeninterferencebygovernment，andinterferencebyassociationsofindividuals，subscribingtheirownmoneyforthepurpose，likethetwogreatSchoolSocieties。Itis，ofcourse，notdesirablethatanythingshouldbedonebyfundsderivedfromcompulsorytaxation，whichisalreadysufficientlywelldonebyindividualliberality。Howfarthisisthecasewithschoolinstruction，is，ineachparticularinstance，aquestionoffact。
　　Theeducationprovidedinthiscountryonthevoluntaryprinciplehasoflatebeensomuchdiscussed，thatitisneedlessinthisplacetocriticizeitminutely，andIshallmerelyexpressmyconviction，thateveninquantityitis，andislikelytoremain，altogetherinsufficient，whileinquality，thoughwithsomeslighttendencytoimprovement，itisnevergoodexceptbysomerareaccident，andgenerallysobadastobelittlemorethannominal。Iholditthereforethedutyofthegovernmenttosupplythedefect，bygivingpecuniarysupporttoelementaryschools，suchastorenderthemaccessibletoallthechildrenofthepoor，eitherfreely，orforapaymenttooinconsiderabletobesensiblyfelt。
　　Onethingmustbestrenuouslyinsistedon;thatthegovernmentmustclaimnomonopolyforitseducation，eitherinthelowerorinthehigherbranches;mustexertneitherauthoritynorinfluencetoinducethepeopletoresorttoitsteachersinpreferencetoothers，andmustconfernopeculiaradvantagesonthosewhohavebeeninstructedbythem。Thoughthegovernmentteacherswillprobablybesuperiortotheaverageofprivateinstructors，theywillnotembodyalltheknowledgeandsagacitytobefoundinallinstructorstakentogether，anditisdesirabletoleaveopenasmanyroadsaspossibletothedesiredend。Itisnotendurablethatagovernmentshould，eitherdejureordefacto，haveacompletecontrolovertheeducationofthepeople。Topossesssuchacontrol，andactuallyexertit，istobedespotic。Agovernmentwhichcanmouldtheopinionsandsentimentsofthepeoplefromtheiryouthupwards，candowiththemwhateveritpleases。Thoughagovernment，therefore，may，andinmanycasesoughtto，establishschoolsandcolleges，itmustneithercompelnorbribeanypersontocometothem;noroughtthepowerofindividualstosetuprivalestablishments，todependinanydegreeuponitsauthorization。Itwouldbejustifiedinrequiringfromallthepeoplethattheyshallpossessinstructionincertainthings，butnotinprescribingtothemhoworfromwhomtheyshallobtainit。
　　9。Inthematterofeducation，theinterventionofgovernmentisjustifiable，becausethecaseisnotoneinwhichtheinterestandjudgmentoftheconsumerareasufficientsecurityforthegoodnessofthecommodity。Letusnowconsideranotherclassofcases，wherethereisnopersoninthesituationofaconsumer，andwheretheinterestandjudgmenttobereliedonarethoseoftheagenthimself;asintheconductofanybusinessinwhichheisexclusivelyinterested，orinenteringintoanycontractorengagementbywhichhehimselfistobebound。
　　Thegroundofthepracticalprincipleofnon—interferencemustherebe，thatmostpersonstakeajusterandmoreintelligentviewoftheirowninterest，andofthemeansofpromotingit，thancaneitherbeprescribedtothembyageneralenactmentofthelegislature，orpointedoutintheparticularcasebyapublicfunctionary。Themaximisunquestionablysoundasageneralrule;butthereisnodifficultyinperceivingsomeverylargeandconspicuousexceptionstoit。Thesemaybeclassedunderseveralheads。
　　First:——Theindividualwhoispresumedtobethebestjudgeofhisowninterestsmaybeincapableofjudgingoractingforhimself;maybealunatic，anidiot，aninfant:orthoughnotwhollyincapable，maybeofimmatureyearsandjudgment。Inthiscasethefoundationofthelaisser。faireprinciplebreaksdownentirely。Thepersonmostinterestedisnotthebestjudgeofthematter，noracompetentjudgeatall。Insanepersonsareeverywhereregardedasproperobjectsofthecareofthestate。（6*）Inthecaseofchildrenandyoungpersons，itiscommontosay，thatthoughtheycannotjudgeforthemselves，theyhavetheirparentsorotherrelativestojudgeforthem。Butthisremovesthequestionintoadifferentcategory;makingitnolongeraquestionwhetherthegovernmentshouldinterferewithindividualsinthedirectionoftheirownconductandinterests，butwhetheritshouldleaveabsolutelyintheirpowertheconductandinterestsofsomebodyelse。Parentalpowerisassusceptibleofabuseasanyotherpower，andis，asamatteroffact，constantlyabused。Iflawsdonotsucceedinpreventingparentsfrombrutallyill—treating，andevenfrommurderingtheirchildren，farlessoughtittobepresumedthattheinterestsofchildrenwillneverbesacrificed，inmorecommonplaceandlessrevoltingways，totheselfishnessortheignoranceoftheirparents。Whateveritcanbeclearlyseenthatparentsoughttodoorforbearfortheinterestofchildren，thelawiswarranted，ifitisable，incompellingtobedoneorforborne，andisgenerallyboundtodoso。Totakeanexamplefromthepeculiarprovinceofpoliticaleconomy;itisrightthatchildren，andyoungpersonsnotyetarrivedatmaturity，shouldbeprotectedsofarastheeyeandhandofthestatecanreach，frombeingover—worked。Labouringfortoomanyhoursintheday，oronworkbeyondtheirstrength，shouldnotbepermittedtothem，forifpermitteditmayalwaysbecompelled。Freedom，ofcontract，inthecaseofchildren，isbutanotherwordforfreedomofcoercion。Educationalso，thebestwhichcircumstancesadmitoftheirreceiving，isnotathingwhichparentsorrelatives，fromindifference，jealousy，oravarice，shouldhaveitintheirpowertowithhold。
　　Thereasonsforlegalinterventioninfavourofchildren，applynotlessstronglytothecaseofthoseunfortunateslavesandvictimsofthemostbrutalpartofmankind，theloweranimals。Itisbythegrossestmisunderstandingoftheprinciplesofliberty，thattheinflictionofexemplarypunishmentonruffianismpractisedtowardsthesedefencelesscreatures，hasbeentreatedasameddlingbygovernmentwiththingsbeyonditsprovince;aninterferencewithdomesticlife。Thedomesticlifeofdomestictyrantsisoneofthethingswhichitisthemostimperativeonthelawtointerferewith;anditistoberegrettedthatmetaphysicalscruplesrespectingthenatureandsourceoftheauthorityofgovernment，shouldinducemanywarmsupportersoflawsagainstcrueltytoanimals，toseekforajustificationofsuchlawsintheincidentalconsequencesoftheindulgenceofferocioushabitstotheinterestsofhumanbeings，ratherthanintheintrinsicmeritsofthecaseitself。Whatitwouldbethedutyofahumanbeing，possessedoftherequisitephysicalstrength，topreventbyforceifattemptedinhispresence，itcannotbelessincumbentonsocietygenerallytorepress。TheexistinglawsofEnglandonthesubjectarechieflydefectiveinthetrifling，oftenalmostnominal，maximum，towhichthepenaltyevenintheworstcasesislimited。
　　Amongthosemembersofthecommunitywhosefreedomofcontractoughttobecontrolledbythelegislaturefortheirownprotection，onaccount（itissaid）oftheirdependentposition，itisfrequentlyproposedtoincludewomen:andintheexistingFactoryActs，theirlabour，incommonwiththatofyoungpersons，hasbeenplacedunderpeculiarrestrictions。Buttheclassingtogether，forthisandotherpurposes，ofwomenandchildren，appearstomebothindefensibleinprincipleandmischievousinpractice。Childrenbelowacertainagecannotjudgeoractforthemselves;uptoaconsiderablygreateragetheyareinevitablymoreorlessdisqualifiedfordoingso;butwomenareascapableasmenofappreciatingandmanagingtheirownconcerns，andtheonlyhindrancetotheirdoingsoarisesfromtheinjusticeoftheirpresentsocialposition。Whenthelawmakeseverythingwhichthewifeacquires，thepropertyofthehusband，whilebycompellinghertolivewithhimitforceshertosubmittoalmostanyamountofmoralandevenphysicaltyrannywhichhemaychosetoinflict，thereissomegroundforregardingeveryactdonebyherasdoneundercoercion:butitisthegreaterrorofreformersandphilanthropistsinourtime，tonibbleattheconsequencesofunjustpower，insteadofredressingtheinjusticeitself。Ifwomenhadasabsoluteacontrolasmenhave，overtheirownpersonsandtheirownpatrimonyoracquisitions，therewouldbenopleaforlimitingtheirhoursoflabouringforthemselves，inorderthattheymighthavetimetolabourforthehusband，inwhatiscalled，bytheadvocatesofrestriction，hishome。Womenemployedinfactoriesaretheonlywomeninthelabour。ingrankoflifewhosepositionisnotthatofslavesanddrudges;preciselybecausetheycannoteasilybecompelledtoworkandearnwagesinfactoriesagainsttheirwill。Forimprovingtheconditionofwomen，itshould，inthecontrary，beanobjecttogivethemthereadiestaccesstoindependentindustrialemployment，insteadofclosing，eitherentirelyorpartially，thatwhichisalreadyopentothem。
　　10。Asecondexceptiontothedoctrinethatindividualsarethebestjudgesoftheirowninterest，iswhenanindividualattemptstodecideirrevocablynow，whatwillbebestforhisinterestatsomefutureanddistanttime。Thepresumptioninfavourofindividualjudgmentisonlylegitimate，wherethejudgmentisgroundedonactual，andespeciallyonpresent，personalexperience;notwhereitisformedantecedentlytoexperience，andnotsufferedtobereversedevenafterexperiencehascondemnedit。Whenpersonshaveboundthemselvesbyacontract，notsimplytodosomeonething，buttocontinuedoingsomethingforeverorforaprolongedperiod，withoutanypowerofrevokingtheengagement，thepresumptionwhichtheirperseveranceinthatcourseofconductwouldotherwiseraiseinfavourofitsbeingadvantageoustothem，doesnotexist;andanysuchpresumptionwhichcanbegroundedontheirhavingvoluntarilyenteredintothecontract，perhapsatanearlyage，andwithoutanyrealknowledgeofwhattheyundertook，iscommonlynexttonull。Thepracticalmaximofleavingcontractsfree，isnotapplicablewithoutgreatlimitationsincaseofengagementinperpetuity;andthelawshouldbeextremelyjealousofsuchengagements;shouldrefuseitssanctiontothem，whentheobligationstheyimposearesuchasthecontractingpartycannotbeacompetentjudgeof;ifiteverdoessanctionthem，itshouldtakeeverypossiblesecurityfortheirbeingcontractedwithforesightanddeliberation;andincompensationfornotpermittingthepartiesthemselvestorevoketheirengagement，shouldgrantthemareleasefromit，onasufficientcasebeingmadeoutbeforeanimpartialauthority。Theseconsiderationsareeminentlyapplicabletomarriage，themostimportantofallcasesofengagementforlife。
　　11。ThethirdexceptionwhichIshallnotice，tothedoctrinethatgovernmentcannotmanagetheaffairsofindividualsaswellastheindividualsthemselves，hasreferencetothegreatclassofcasesinwhichtheindividualscanonlymanagetheconcernbydelegatedagency，andinwhichtheso—calledprivatemanagementis，inpointoffact，hardlybetterentitledtobecalledmanagementbythepersonsinterested，thanadministrationbyapublicofficer。Whatever，iflefttospontaneousagency，canonlybedonebyjoint—stockassociations，willoftenbeaswell，andsometimesbetterdone，asfarastheactualworkisconcerned，bythestate。Governmentmanagementis，indeed，proverbiallyjobbing，careless，andineffective，butsolikewisehasgenerallybeenjoint—stockmanagement。Thedirectorsofajoint。stockcompany，itistrue，arealwaysshareholders;butalsothemembersofagovernmentareinvariablytaxpayers;andinthecaseofdirectors，nomorethaninthatofgovernments，istheirproportionalshareofthebenefitsofgoodmanagement，equaltotheinteresttheymaypossiblyhaveinmismanagement，evenwithoutreckoningtheinterestoftheircase。Itmaybeobjected，thattheshareholders，intheircollectivecharacter，exerciseacertaincontroloverthedirectors，andhavealmostalwaysfullpowertoremovethemfromoffice。Practically，however，thedifficultyofexercisingthispowerisfoundtobesogreat，thatitishardlyeverexercisedexceptincasesofsuchflagrantlyunskilful，or，atleast，unsuccessfulmanagement，aswouldgenerallyproducetheejectionfromofficeofmanagersappointedbythegovernment。Againsttheveryineffectualsecurityaffordedbymeetingsofshareholders，andbytheirindividualinspectionandinquiries，maybeplacedthegreaterpublicityandmoreactivediscussionandcomment，tobeexpectedinfreecountrieswithregardtoaffairsinwhichthegeneralgovernmenttakespart。Thedefects，therefore，ofgovernmentmanagement，donotseemtobenecessarilymuchgreater，ifnecessarilygreateratall，thanthoseofmanagementbyjoint—stock。
　　Thetruereasonsinfavourofleavingtovoluntaryassociationsallsuchthingsastheyarecompetenttoperform，wouldexistinequalstrengthifitwerecertainthattheworkitselfwouldbeaswellorbetterdonebypublicofficers。Thesereasonshavebeenalreadypointedout:themischiefofoverloadingthechieffunctionariesofgovernmentwithdemandsontheirattention，anddivertingthemfromdutieswhichtheyalonecandischarge，toobjectswhichcanbesufficientlywellattainedwithoutthem;thedangerofunnecessarilyswellingthedirectpowerandin。directinfluenceofgovernment，andmultiplyingoccasionsofcollisionbetweenitsagentsandprivatecitizens;
　　andtheinexpediencyofconcentratinginadominantbureaucracy，alltheskillandexperienceinthemanagementoflargeinterests，andallthepoweroforganizedaction，existinginthecommunity;apracticewhichkeepsthecitizensinarelationtothegovernmentlikethatofchildrentotheirguardians，andisamaincauseoftheinferiorcapacityforpoliticallifewhichhashithertocharacterizedtheover—governedcountriesoftheContinent，whetherwithorwithouttheformsofrepresentativegovernment。（7*）Butalthough，forthesereasons，mostthingswhicharelikelytobeeventolerablydonebyvoluntaryassociations，should，generallyspeaking，belefttothem;itdoesnotfollowthatthemannerinwhichthoseassociationsperformtheirworkshouldbeentirelyuncontrolledbythegovernment。Therearemanycasesinwhichtheagency，ofwhatevernature，bywhichaserviceisperformed，iscertain，fromthenatureofthecase，tobevirtuallysingle;inwhichapracticalmonopoly，withallthepoweritconfersoftaxingthecommunity，cannotbepreventedfromexisting。Ihavealreadymorethanonceadvertedtothecaseofthegasandwatercompanies，amongwhich，thoughperfectfreedomisallowedtocompetition，nonereallytakesplace，andpracticallytheyarefoundtobeevenmoreirresponsible，andunapproachablebyindividualcomplaints，thanthegovernment。Therearetheexpenseswithouttheadvantagesofpluralityofagency;andthechargemadeforserviceswhichcannotbedispensedwith，is，insubstance，quiteasmuchcompulsorytaxationasifimposedbylaw;therearefewhouseholderswhomakeanydistinctionbetweentheir’waterrate’
　　andotherlocaltaxes。Inthecaseoftheseparticularservices，thereasonspreponderateinfavouroftheirbeingperformed，likethepavingandcleansingofthestreets，notcertainlybythegeneralgovernmentofthestate，butbythemunicipalauthoritiesofthetown，andtheexpensedefrayed，asevennowitinfactis，byalocalrate。Butinthemanyanalogouscaseswhichitisbesttoresigntovoluntaryagency，thecommunityneedssomeothersecurityforthefitperformanceoftheservicethantheinterestofthemanagers;anditisthepartofthegovernment，eithertosubjectthebusinesstoreasonableconditionsforthegeneraladvantage，ortoretainsuchpoweroverit，thattheprofitsofthemonopolymayatleastbeobtainedforthepublic。Thisappliesinthecaseofaroad，acanal，orarailway。Thesearealways，inagreatdegree，practicalmonopolies;andagovernmentwhichconcedessuchmonopolyunreservedlytoaprivatecompany，doesmuchthesamethingasifitallowedanindividualoranassociationtolevyanytaxtheychose，fortheirownbenefit，onallthemaltproducedinthecountry，oronallthecottonimportedintoit。Tomaketheconcessionforalimitedtimeisgenerallyjustifiable，ontheprinciplewhichjustifiespatentsforinvention:butthestateshouldeitherreservetoitselfareversionarypropertyinsuchpublicworks，orshouldretain，andfreelyexercise，therightoffixingamaximumoffaresandcharges，and，fromtimetotime，varyingthatmaximum。Itisperhapsnecessarytoremark，thatthestatemaybetheproprietorofcanalsorrailwayswithoutitselfworkingthem;andthattheywillalmostalwaysbebetterworkedbymeansofacompany，rentingtherailwayorcanalforalimitedperiodfromthestate。
　　12。ToafourthcaseofexceptionImustrequestparticularattention，itbeingonetowhichasitappearstome，theattentionofpoliticaleconomistshasnotyetbeensufficientlydrawn。Therearemattersinwhichtheinterferenceoflawisrequired，nottooverrulethejudgmentofindividualsrespectingtheirowninterest，buttogiveeffecttothatjudgment:theybeingunabletogiveeffecttoitexceptbyconcert，whichconcertagaincannotbeeffectualunlessitreceivesvalidityandsanctionfromthelaw。Forillustration，andwithoutprejudgingtheparticularpoint，Imayadverttothequestionofdiminishingthehoursoflabour。Letussuppose，whatisatleastsupposable，whetheritbethefactornot——thatageneralreductionofthehoursoffactorylabour，sayfromtentonine，wouldbefortheadvantageoftheworkpeople:thattheywouldreceiveashighwages，ornearlyashigh，forninehours。labourastheyreceiveforten。Ifthiswouldbetheresult，andiftheoperativesgenerallyareconvincedthatitwould，thelimitation，somemaysay，willbeadoptedspontaneously。Ianswer，thatitwillnotbeadoptedunlessthebodyofoperativesbindthemselvestooneanothertoabidebyit。Aworkmanwhorefusedtoworkmorethanninehourswhiletherewereotherswhoworkedten，wouldeithernotbeemployedatall，orifemployed，mustsubmittoloseone—tenthofhiswages。Howeverconvinced，therefore，hemaybethatitistheinterestoftheclasstoworkshorttime，itiscontrarytohisowninteresttosettheexample，unlessheiswellassuredthatallormostotherswillfollowit。Butsupposeageneralagreementofthewholeclass:mightnotthisbeeffectualwithoutthesanctionoflaw？Notunlessenforcedbyopinionwitharigourpracticallyequaltothatoflaw。Forhoweverbeneficialtheobservanceoftheregulationmightbetotheclasscollectively，theimmediateinterestofeveryindividualwouldlieinviolatingit:andthemorenumerousthosewerewhoadheredtotherule，themorewouldindividualsgainbydepartingfromit。Ifnearlyallrestrictedthemselvestoninehours，thosewhochosetoworkfortenwouldgainalltheadvantagesoftherestriction，togetherwiththeprofitfrominfringingit;theywouldgettenhours’wagesforninehours’
　　work，andanhour’swagesbesides。Igrantthatifalargemajorityadheredtotheninehours，therewouldbenoharmdone;
　　thebenefitwouldbe，inthemain，securedtotheclass，whilethoseindividualswhopreferredtoworkharderandearnmore，wouldhaveanopportunityofdoingso。Thiscertainlywouldbethestateofthingstobewished，for;andassumingthatareductionofhourswithoutanydiminutionofwagescouldtakeplacewithoutexpellingthecommodityfromsomeofitsmarkets——
　　whichisineveryparticularinstanceaquestionoffact，notofprinciple——themannerinwhichitwouldbemostdesirablethatthiseffectshouldbebroughtabout，wouldbebyaquietchangeinthegeneralcustomofthetrade;shorthoursbecoming，byspontaneouschoice，thegeneralpractice，butthosewhochosetodeviatefromithavingthefullestlibertytodoso。Probably，however，somanywouldpreferthetenhours’workontheimprovedterms，thatthelimitationcouldnotbemaintainedasageneralpractice:whatsomedidfromchoice，otherswouldsoonbeobligedtodofromnecessity，andthosewhohadchosenlonghoursforthesakeofincreasedwages，wouldbeforcedintheendtoworklonghoursfornogreaterwagesthanbefore。Assumingthenthatitreallywouldbetheinterestofeachtoworkonlyninehoursifhecouldbeassuredthatallotherswoulddothesame，theremightbenomeansofattainingthisobjectbutbyconvertingtheirsupposedmutualagreementintoanengagementunderpenalty，byconsentingtohaveitenforcedbylaw。Iamnotexpressinganyopinioninfavourofsuchanenactment，whichhasneverinthiscountrybeendemanded，andwhichIcertainlyshouldnot，inpresentcircumstances，recommend:butitservestoexemplifythemannerinwhichclassesofpersonsmayneedtheassistanceoflaw，togiveeffecttotheirdeliberatecollectiveopinionoftheirowninterest，byaffordingtoeveryindividualaguaranteethathiscompetitorswillpursuethesamecourse，withoutwhichhecannotsafelyadoptithimself。
　　AnotherexemplificationofthesameprincipleisaffordedbywhatisknownastheWakefieldsystemofcolonization。Thissystemisgroundedontheimportantprinciple，thatthedegreeofproductivenessoflandandlabourdependsontheirbeinginadueproportiontooneanother;thatifafewpersonsinanewly—settledcountryattempttooccupyandappropriatealargedistrict，orifeachlabourerbecomestoosoonanoccupierandcultivatorofland，thereisalossofproductivepower，andagreatretardationoftheprogressofthecolonyinwealthandcivilization:thatneverthelesstheinstinct（asitmayalmostbecalled）ofappropriation，andthefeelingsassociatedinoldcountrieswithlandedproprietorship，inducealmosteveryemigranttotakepossessionofasmuchlandashehasthemeansofacquiring，andeverylabourertobecomeatonceaproprietor，cultivatinghisownlandwithnootheraidthanthatofhisfamily。Ifthispropensitytotheimmediatepossessionoflandcouldbeinsomedegreerestrained，andeachlabourerinducedtoworkacertainnumberofyearsonhirebeforehebecamealandedproprietor，aperpetualstockofhiredlabourerscouldbemaintained，availableforroads，canals，worksofirrigation，&c。，andfortheestablishmentandcarryingonofthedifferentbranchesoftownindustry;wherebythelabourer，whenhedidatlastbecomealandedproprietor，wouldfindhislandmuchmorevaluable，throughaccesstomarkets，andfacilityofobtaininghiredlabour。MrWakefieldthereforeproposedtochecktheprematureoccupationofland，anddispersionofthepeople，byputtinguponallunappropriatedlandsaratherhighprice，theproceedsofwhichweretobeexpendedinconveyingemigrantlabourersfromthemothercountry。
　　Thissalutaryprovision，however，hasbeenobjectedto，inthenameandontheauthorityofwhatwasrepresentedasthegreatprincipleofpoliticaleconomy，thatindividualsarethebestjudgesoftheirowninterest。Itwassaid，thatwhenthingsarelefttothemselves，landisappropriatedandoccupiedbythespontaneouschoiceofindividuals，inthequantitiesandatthetimesmostadvantageoustoeachperson，andthereforetothecommunitygenerally;andthattointerposeartificialobstaclestotheirobtainingland，istopreventthemfromadoptingthecoursewhichintheirownjudgmentismostbeneficialtothem，fromaself。conceitednotionofthelegislator，thatheknowswhatismostfortheirinterest，betterthantheydothemselves。
　　Nowthisisacompletemisunderstanding，eitherofthesystemitself，oroftheprinciplewithwhichitisallegedtoconflict。
　　Theoversightissimilartothatwhichwehavejustseenexemplifiedonthesubjectofhoursoflabour。Howeverbeneficialitmightbetothecolonyintheaggregate，andtoeachindividualcomposingit，thatnooneshouldoccupymorelandthanhecanproperlycultivate，norbecomeaproprietoruntilthereareotherlabourersreadytotakehisplaceinworkingforhire;
　　itcanneverbetheinterestofanindividualtoexercisethisforbearance，unlessheisassuredthatotherswilldosotoo。
　　Surroundedbysettlerswhohaveeachtheirthousandacres，howishebenefitedbyrestrictinghimselftofifty？orwhatdoesalabourergainbydeferringtheacquisitionaltogetherforafewyears，ifallotherlabourersrushtoconverttheirfirstearningsintoestatesinthewilderness，severalmilesapartfromoneanother？Ifthey，byseizingonland，preventtheformationofaclassoflabourersforwages，hewillnot，bypostponingthetimeofhisbecomingaproprietor，beenabledtoemploythelandwithanygreateradvantagewhenhedoesobtainit;towhatendthereforeshouldheplacehimselfinwhatwillappeartohimandothersapositionofinferiority，byremainingahiredlabourer，whenallaroundhimareproprietors？Itistheinterestofeachtodowhatisgoodforall，butonlyifotherswilldolikewise。
　　Theprinciplethateachisthebestjudgeofhisowninterest，understoodastheseobjectorsunderstandit，wouldprovethatgovernmentsoughtnottofulfilanyoftheiracknowledgedduties——oughtnot，infact，toexistatall。Itisgreatlytheinterestofthecommunity，collectivelyandindividually，nottorobordefraudoneanother。butthereisnotthelessnecessityforlawstopunishrobberyandfraud;because，thoughitistheinterestofeachthatnobodyshouldroborcheat，itisnotanyone’sinteresttorefrainfromrobbingandcheatingotherswhenallothersarepermittedtorobandcheathim。Penallawsexistatall，chieflyforthisreason——becauseevenanunanimousopinionthatacertainlineofconductisforthegeneralinterest，doesnotalwaysmakeitpeople’sindividualinteresttoadheretothatlineofconduct。
　　13。Fifthly;theargumentagainstgovernmentinterferencegroundedonthemaximthatindividualsarethebestjudgesoftheirowninterest，cannotapplytotheverylargeclassofcases，inwhichthoseactsofindividualswithwhichthegovernmentclaimstointerfere，arenotdonebythoseindividualsfortheirowninterest，butfortheinterestofotherpeople。
　　Thisincludes，amongotherthings，theimportantandmuchagitatedsubjectofpubliccharity。Thoughindividualsshould，ingeneral，belefttodoforthemselveswhateveritcanreasonablybeexpectedthattheyshouldbecapableofdoing，yetwhentheyareatanyratenottobelefttothemselves，buttobehelpedbyotherpeople，thequestionariseswhetheritisbetterthattheyshouldreceivethishelpexclusivelyfromindividuals，andthereforeuncertainlyandcasually，orbysystematicarrangements，inwhichsocietyactsthroughitsorgan，thestate。
　　ThisbringsustothesubjectofPoorLaws;asubjectwhichwouldbeofveryminorimportanceifthehabitsofallclassesofthepeopleweretemperateandprudent，andthediffusionofpropertysatisfactory;butofthegreatestmomentinastateofthingssomuchthereverseofthis，inbothpoints，asthatwhichtheBritishislandspresent。
　　Apartfromanymetaphysicalconsiderationsrespectingthefoundationofmoralsorofthesocialunion，itwillbeadmittedtoberightthathumanbeingsshouldhelponeanother;andthemoreso，inproportiontotheurgencyoftheneed:andnoneneedshelpsourgentlyasonewhoisstarving。Theclaimtohelp，therefore，createdbydestitution，isoneofthestrongestwhichcanexist;andthereisprimafacietheamplestreasonformakingthereliefofsoextremeanexigencyascertaintothosewhorequireit，asbyanyarrangementsofsocietyitcanbemade。
　　Ontheotherhand，inallcasesofhelping，therearetwosetsofconsequencestobeconsidered;theconsequencesoftheassistance，andtheconsequencesofrelyingontheassistance。
　　Theformeraregenerallybeneficial，butthelatter，forthemostpart，injurious;somuchso，inmanycases，asgreatlytooutweighthevalueofthebenefit。Andthisisnevermorelikelytohappenthanintheverycaseswheretheneedofhelpisthemostintense。Therearefewthingsforwhichitismoremischievousthatpeopleshouldrelyonthehabitualaidofothers，thanforthemeansofsubsistence，andunhappilythereisnolessonwhichtheymoreeasilylearn。Theproblemtobesolvedisthereforeoneofpeculiarnicetyaswellasimportance;howtogivethegreatestamountofneedfulhelp，withthesmallestencouragementtounduerelianceonit。
　　Energyandself—dependenceare，however，liabletobeimpairedbytheabsenceofhelp，aswellasbyitsexcess。Itisevenmorefataltoexertiontohavenohopeofsucceedingbyit，thantobeassuredofsucceedingwithoutit。Whentheconditionofanyoneissodisastrousthathisenergiesareparalysedbydiscouragement，assistanceisatonic，notasedative:itbracesinsteadofdeadeningtheactivefaculties:alwaysprovidedthattheassistanceisnotsuchastodispensewithself—help，bysubstitutingitselffortheperson’sownlabour，skill，andprudence，butislimitedtoaffordinghimabetterhopeofattainingsuccessbythoselegitimatemeans。Thisaccordinglyisatesttowhichallplansofphilanthropyandbenevolenceshouldbebrought，whetherintendedforthebenefitofindividualsorofclasses，andwhetherconductedonthevoluntaryoronthegovernmentprinciple。
　　Insofarasthesubjectadmitsofanygeneraldoctrineormaxim，itwouldappeartobethis——thatifassistanceisgiveninsuchamannerthattheconditionofthepersonhelpedisasdesirableasthatofthepersonwhosucceedsindoingthesamethingwithouthelp，theassistance，ifcapableofbeingpreviouslycalculatedon，ismischievous:butif，whileavailabletoevery。body，itleavestoeveryoneastrongmotivetodowithoutitifhecan，itisthenforthemostpartbeneficial。
　　Thisprinciple，appliedtoasystemofpubliccharity，isthatofthePoorLawof1834。Iftheconditionofapersonreceivingreliefismadeaseligibleasthatofthelabourerwhosupportshimselfbyhisownexertions，thesystemstrikesattherootofallindividualindustryandself—government;and，iffullyactedupto，wouldrequireasitssupplementanorganizedsystemofcompulsion，forgoverningandsettingtoworklikecattle，thosewhohadbeenremovedfromtheinfluenceofthemotivesthatactonhumanbeings。Butif，consistentlywithguaranteeingallpersonsagainstabsolutewant，theconditionofthosewhoaresupportedbylegalcharitycanbekeptconsiderablylessdesirablethantheconditionofthosewhofindsupportforthemselves，nonebutbeneficialconsequencescanarisefromalawwhichrendersitimpossibleforanyperson，exceptbyhisownchoice，todiefrominsufficiencyoffood。ThatinEnglandatleastthissuppositioncanberealized，isprovedbytheexperienceofalongperiodprecedingthecloseofthelastcentury，aswellasbythatofmanyhighlypauperizeddistrictsinmorerecenttimes，whichhavebeendispauperizedbyadoptingstrictrulesofpoor—lawadministration，tothegreatandpermanentbenefitofthewholelabouringclass。Thereisprobablynocountryinwhich，byvaryingthemeanssuitablytothecharacterofthepeople，alegalprovisionforthedestitutemightnotbemadecompatiblewiththeobservanceoftheconditionsnecessarytoitsbeinginnocuous。
　　Subjecttotheseconditions，Iconceiveittobehighlydesirable，thatthecertaintyofsubsistenceshouldbeheldoutbylawtothedestituteable—bodied，ratherthanthattheirreliefshoulddependonvoluntarycharity。Inthefirstplace，charityalmostalwaysdoestoomuchortoolittle:itlavishesitsbountyinoneplace，andleavespeopletostarveinanother。
　　Secondly，sincethestatemustnecessarilyprovidesubsistenceforthecriminalpoorwhileundergoingpunishment，nottodothesameforthepoorwhohavenotoffendedistogiveapremiumoncrime。Andlastly，ifthepoorarelefttoindividualcharity，avastamountofmendacityisinevitable。Whatthestatemayandshouldabandontoprivatecharity，isthetaskofdistinguishingbetweenonecaseofrealnecessityandanother。Privatecharitycangivemoretothemoredeserving。Thestatemustactbygeneralrules。Itcannotundertaketodiscriminatebetweenthedeservingandtheundeservingindigent。Itowesnomorethansubsistencetothefirst，andcangivenolesstothelast。Whatissaidabouttheinjusticeofalawwhichhasnobettertreatmentforthemerelyunfortunatepoorthanfortheill—conducted，isfoundedonamisconceptionoftheprovinceoflawandpublicauthority。Thedispensersofpublicreliefhavenobusinesstobeinquisitors。Guardiansandoverseersarenotfittobetrustedtogiveorwithholdotherpeople’smoneyaccordingtotheirverdictonthemoralityofthepersonsolicitingit;anditwouldshowmuchignoranceofthewaysofmankindtosupposethatsuchpersons，eveninthealmostimpossiblecaseoftheirbeingqualified，willtakethetroubleofascertainingandsiftingthepastconductofapersonindistress，soastoformarationaljudgmentonit。Privatecharitycanmakethesedistinctions;andinbestowingitsownmoney，isentitledtodosoaccordingtoitsownjudgment。Itshouldunderstandthatthisisitspeculiarandappropriateprovince，andthatitiscommendableorthecontrary，asitexercisesthefunctionwithmoreorlessdiscernment。Buttheadministratorsofapublicfundoughtnottoberequiredtodomoreforanybody，thanthatminimumwhichisdueeventotheworst。Iftheyare，theindulgenceveryspeedilybecomestherule，andrefusalthemoreorlesscapriciousortyrannicalexception。
　　14。Anotherclassofcaseswhichfallwithinthesamegeneralprincipleasthecaseofpubliccharity，arethoseinwhichtheactsdonebyindividuals，thoughintendedsolelyfortheirownbenefit，involveconsequencesextendingindefinitelybeyondthem，tointerestsofthenationorofposterity，forwhichsocietyinitscollectivecapacityisaloneable，andalonebound，toprovide。OneofthesecasesisthatofColonization。Ifitisdesirable，asnoonewilldenyittobe，thattheplantingofcoloniesshouldbeconducted，notwithanexclusiveviewtotheprivateinterestsofthefirstfounders，butwithadeliberateregardtothepermanentwelfareofthenationsafterwardstoarisefromthesesmallbeginnings;suchregardcanonlybesecuredbyplacingtheenterprise，fromitscommencement，underregulationsconstructedwiththeforesightandenlargedviewsofphilosophicallegislators;andthegovernmentalonehaspowereithertoframesuchregulations，ortoenforcetheirobservance。
　　ThequestionofgovernmentinterventionintheworkofColonizationinvolvesthefutureandpermanentinterestsofcivilizationitself，andfaroutstretchesthecomparativelynarrowlimitsofpurelyeconomicalconsiderations。Butevenwithaviewtothoseconsiderationsalone，theremovalofpopulationfromtheovercrowdedtotheunoccupiedpartsoftheearth’ssurfaceisoneofthoseworksofeminentsocialusefulness，whichmostrequire，andwhichatthesametimebestrepay，theinterventionofgovernment。
　　Toappreciatethebenefitsofcolonization，itshouldbeconsideredinitsrelation，nottoasinglecountry，buttothecollectiveeconomicalinterestsofthehumanrace。Thequestionisingeneraltreatedtooexclusivelyasoneofdistribution;ofrelievingonelabourmarketandsupplyinganother。Itisthis，butitisalsoaquestionofproduction，andofthemostefficientemploymentoftheproductiveresourcesoftheworld。
　　Muchhasbeensaidofthegoodeconomyofimportingcommoditiesfromtheplacewheretheycanbeboughtcheapest;whilethegoodeconomyofproducingthemwheretheycanbeproducedcheapest，iscomparativelylittlethoughtof。Iftocarryconsumablegoodsfromtheplaceswheretheyaresuperabundanttothosewheretheyarescarce，isagoodpecuniaryspeculation，isitnotanequallygoodspeculationtodothesamethingwithregardtolabourandinstruments？Theexportationoflabourersandcapitalfromoldtonewcountries，fromaplacewheretheirproductivepowerisless，toaplacewhereitisgreater，increasesbysomuchtheaggregateproduceofthelabourandcapitaloftheworld。Itaddstothejointwealthoftheoldandthenewcountry，whatamountsinashortperiodtomanytimesthemerecostofeffectingthetransport。ThereneedsbenohesitationinaffirmingthatColonization，inthepresentstateoftheworld，isthebestaffairofbusiness，inwhichthecapitalofanoldandwealthycountrycanengage。
　　Itisequallyobvious，however，thatColonizationonagreatscalecanbeundertaken，asanaffairofbusiness，onlybythegovernment，orbysomecombinationofindividualsincompleteunderstandingwiththegovernment;exceptundersuchverypeculiarcircumstancesasthosewhichsucceededtheIrishfamine。
　　Emigrationonthevoluntaryprinciplerarelyhasanymaterialinfluenceinlighteningthepressureofpopulationintheoldcountry，thoughasfarasitgoesitisdoubtlessabenefittothecolony。Thoselabouringpersonswhovoluntarilyemigrateareseldomtheverypoor;theyaresmallfarmerswithsomelittlecapital，orlabourerswhohavesavedsomething，andwho，inremovingonlytheirownlabourfromthecrowdedlabourmarket，withdrawfromthecapitalofthecountryafundwhichmaintainedandemployedmorelabourersthanthemselves。Besides，thisportionofthecommunityissolimitedinnumber，thatitmightberemovedentirely，withoutmakinganysensibleimpressionuponthenumbersofthepopulation，orevenupontheannualincrease。
　　Anyconsiderableemigrationoflabourisonlypracticable，whenitscostisdefrayed，oratleastadvanced，byothersthantheemigrantsthemselves。Whothenistoadvanceit？Naturally，itmaybesaid，thecapitalistsofthecolony，whorequirethelabour，andwhointendtoemployit。Buttothisthereistheobstacle，thatacapitalist，aftergoingtotheexpenseofcarryingoutlabourers，hasnosecuritythatheshallbethepersontoderiveanybenefitfromthem。Ifallthecapitalistsofthecolonyweretocombine，andbeartheexpensebysubscription，theywouldstillhavenosecuritythatthelabourers，whenthere，wouldcontinuetoworkforthem。Afterworkingforashorttimeandearningafewpounds，theyalways，unlesspreventedbythegovernment，squatonunoccupiedland，andworkonlyforthemselves。Theexperimenthasbeenrepeatedlytriedwhetheritwaspossibletoenforcecontractsforlabour，ortherepaymentofthepassagemoneyofemigrantstothosewhoadvancedit，andthetroubleandexpensehavealwaysexceededtheadvantage。Theonlyotherresourceisthevoluntarycontributionsofparishesorindividuals，toridthemselvesofsurpluslabourerswhoarealready，orwhoarelikelytobecome，locallychargeableonthepoor。rate。Werethisspeculationtobecomegeneral，itmightproduceasufficientamountofemigrationtoclearofftheexistingunemployedpopulation，butnottoraisethewagesoftheemployed:andthesamethingwouldrequiretobedoneoveragaininlessthananothergeneration。
　　OneoftheprincipalreasonswhyColonizationshouldbeanationalundertaking，isthatinthismanneralone，saveinhighlyexceptionalcases，canemigrationbeself—supporting。Theexportationofcapitalandlabourtoanewcountrybeing，asbeforeobserved，oneofthebestofallaffairsofbusiness，itisabsurdthatitshouldnot，likeotheraffairsofbusiness，repayitsownexpenses。Ofthegreatadditionwhichitmakestotheproduceoftheworld，therecanbenoreasonwhyasufficientportionshouldnotbeintercepted，andemployedinreimbursingtheoutlayincurredineffectingit。Forreasonsalreadygiven，noindividual，orbodyofindividuals，canreimbursethemselvesfortheexpense;thegovernment，however，can。Itcantakefromtheannualincreaseofwealth，causedbytheemigration，thefractionwhichsufficestorepaywithinterestwhattheemigrationhascost。Theexpensesofemigrationtoacolonyoughttobebornebythecolony;andthis，ingeneral，isonlypossiblewhentheyarebornebythecolonialgovernment。
　　Ofthemodesinwhichafundforthesupportofcolonizationcanberaisedinthecolony，noneiscomparableinadvantagetothatwhichwasfirstsuggested，andsoablyandperseveringlyadvocated，byMrWakefield:theplanofputtingapriceonallunoccupiedland，anddevotingtheproceedstoemigration。Theunfoundedandpedanticobjectionstothisplanhavebeenansweredinaformerpartofthischapter:wehavenowtospeakofitsadvantages。First，itavoidsthedifficultiesanddiscontentsincidenttoraisingalargeannualamountbytaxation;athingwhichisalmostuselesstoattemptwithascatteredpopulationofsettlersinthewilderness，who，asexperienceproves，canseldombecompelledtopaydirecttaxes，exceptatacostexceedingtheiramount;whileinaninfantcommunityindirecttaxationsoonreachesitslimit。Thesaleoflandsisthusbyfartheeasiestmodeofraisingtherequisitefunds。Butithasotherandstillgreaterrecommendations。Itisabeneficialcheckuponthetendencyofapopulationofcoloniststoadoptthetastesandinclinationsofsavagelife，andtodispersesowidelyastolosealltheadvantagesofcommerce，ofmarkets，ofseparationofemployments，andcombinationoflabour。Bymakingitnecessaryforthosewhoemigrateattheexpenseofthefund，toearnaconsiderablesumbeforetheycanbecomelandedproprietors，itkeepsupaperpetualsuccessionoflabourersforhire，whoineverycountryareamostimportantauxiliaryeventopeasantproprietors:andbydiminishingtheeagernessofagriculturalspeculatorstoaddtotheirdomain，itkeepsthesettlerswithinreachofeachotherforpurposesofco—operation，arrangesanumerousbodyofthemwithineasydistanceofeachcentreofforeigncommerceandnon—agriculturalindustry，andinsurestheformationandrapidgrowthoftownsandtownproducts。Thisconcentration，comparedwiththedispersionwhichuniformlyoccurswhenunoccupiedlandcanbehadfornothing，greatlyacceleratestheattainmentofprosperity，andenlargesthefundwhichmaybedrawnuponforfurtheremigration。BeforetheadoptionoftheWakefieldsystem，theearlyyearsofallnewcolonieswerefullofhardshipanddifficulty:thelastcolonyfoundedontheoldprinciple，theSwanRiversettlement，beingoneofthemostcharacteristicinstances。Inallsubsequentcolonization，theWakefieldprinciplehasbeenactedupon，thoughimperfectly，apartonlyoftheproceedsofthesaleoflandbeingdevotedtoemigration:yetwhereverithasbeenintroducedatall，asinSouthAustralia，Victoria，andNewZealand，therestraintputuponthedispersionofthesettlers，andtheinfluxofcapitalcausedbytheassuranceofbeingabletoobtainhiredlabour，has，inspiteofmanydifficultiesandmuchmismanagement，producedasuddennessandrapidityofprosperitymorelikefablethanreality。（8*）
　　Theself—supportingsystemofColonization，onceestablished，wouldincreaseinefficiencyeveryyear;itseffectwouldtendtoincreaseingeometricalprogression:forsinceeveryable—bodiedemigrant，untilthecountryisfullypeopled，addsinaveryshorttimetoitswealth，overandabovehisownconsumption，asmuchaswoulddefraytheexpenseofbringingoutanotheremigrant，itfollowsthatthegreaterthenumberalreadysent，thegreaternumbermightcontinuetobesent，eachemigrantlayingthefoundationofasuccessionofotheremigrantsatshortintervalswithoutfreshexpense，untilthecolonyisfilledup。
　　Itwouldthereforebeworthwhile，tothemothercountry，toacceleratetheearlystagesofthisprogression，byloanstothecoloniesforthepurposeofemigration，repayablefromthefundformedbythesalesofland。Inthusadvancingthemeansofaccomplishingalargeimmediateemigration，itwouldbeinvestingthatamountofcapitalinthemode，ofallothers，mostbeneficialtothecolony;andthelabourandsavingsoftheseemigrantswouldhastentheperiodatwhichalargesumwouldbeavailablefromsalesofland。Itwouldbenecessary，inordernottooverstockthelabourmarket，toactinconcertwiththepersonsdisposedtoremovetheirowncapitaltothecolony。Theknowledgethatalargeamountofhiredlabourwouldbeavailable，insoproductiveafieldofemployment，wouldinsurealargeemigrationofcapitalfromacountry，likeEngland，oflowprofitsandrapidaccumulation:anditwouldonlybenecessarynottosendoutagreaternumberoflabourersatonetime，thanthiscapitalcouldabsorbandemployathighwages。