Thusbeliefnotonlydependsupon，butactuallyisassociation。’Itisnoteasy，’hesays，’totreatofmemory，belief，andjudgmentseparately。’72AsJ。S。Millnaturallyasks，’Howisitpossibletotreatofbeliefwithoutincludinginitmemoryandjudgment?’Memoryisacaseofbelief，andjudgmentan’actofbelief。’73ToJamesMill，however，itappearsthatasthesedifferentfunctionsallinvolveassociation，theymayberesolvedintovaryingapplicationsofthatuniversalpower。Memoryinvolves’anideaofmypresentself’andan’ideaofmypastself，’andtorememberisto’runovertheinterveningstatesofconsciousnesscalledupbyassociation。’74Beliefinvolvesassociationateverystep。Thebeliefinexternalobjectsis，as’allmenadmit……’whollyresolvableintoassociation。’75’Thatacausemeansandcanmeannothingtothehumanmindbutconstantantecedence’andtherefore’inseparableassociation，’ashethinks’isnolongerapointindispute。’76Association，itistrue，mayproducewrongaswellasrightbeliefs；rightbeliefswhen’inconformitywiththeconnectionsofthings，’77andwrongbeliefswhennotinconformity。Inbothcasesthebeliefisproducedby’custom，’though，happily，therightcustomisbyfarthecommonest。The’strengthoftheassociationfollowsthefrequency。’Thecrowflieseastaswellaswest；
　　butthestonealwaysfallsdownwards。78HenceIforman’inseparableassociation’correspondingtoabeliefingravitation，buthavenoparticularbeliefaboutthedirectionofacrow’sflight。
　　Thisgivesthedoctrineof’indissolubleassociation’——thepivotofthewholescheme——thedoctrine，saysJ。S。Mill，which，’ifitcanbeproved，isthegreatestofallthetriumphsoftheAssociationPhilosophy。’79TheyoungerMillalwaysinsisteduponthevastimportanceoftheprinciple；buthehereadmitsadifficulty。Inalongnote80uponJamesMill’schapteron’Belief，’conspicuousforhisusualcandour，heconfessestheinadequacyofhisfather’sview。Thecommentindicatesthepointofdivergenceandyetshowscuriouslythegroundcommontoboth。JamesMill’stheorystatesfactsinsomesenseundeniable。Our’ideas’cohereandcombinetoformatissue：animageryorseriesofpictureswhichformthecontentandaresomehowthegroundofourbeliefs。Theprocessofformationclearlyinvolves’association。’Thescentoftheroseisassociatedwiththecolour：bothwiththevisibleformandsoforth。Butisthisprocessthesamethingasbelieving，orhavewetoexplainthebeliefbysomementalactivitydifferentfrom，howevercloselyconnectedwith，theimagination，orinhisphrasethe’ideation’?HereJ。S。Millfindsadifficulty。Thestatement，’Ibelievethatthunderwillfollowlightning，’issomethingmorethanthestatement，’thesightsuggestsorcallsupthesound。’Thementalpictureconsideredbyitselfmaybedescribedasafact，withoutconsideringwhatbelief，orwhetheranybelief，isimplied。J。S。Millthereforemakesadistinctionintendedtoclearuphisfather’sconfusion。Thereisadifference，hesays，betweenremembering’arealfact’andrememberinga’thought。’81HeillustratesthisbythedifferencebetweentheideaofLafayetteandtheideaofFalstaff。Lafayettewasreal，andhadbeenseenbytherememberer。
　　Falstaffisafigmentwho，havingneverexisted，canneverhavebeenseen。
　　YettheideaofFalstaffmaybequiteasvividastheideaofLafayette。
　　What，then，isthedifferencebetweenthetwostatesofmind?One，saysJ。S。Mill，isabeliefabout’realfacts’；theotherabout’thoughts。’
　　This，heobserves，correspondstoJamesMill’sdistinctionbetweena’sensation’
　　andan’idea，’82adifferencewhichhehadadmittedtobe’primordial。’
　　Then，saysJ。S。Mill，wemayaswelladmitthatthereisan’element’
　　intheremembranceofarealfactnotimpliedintheremembranceofathoughtandnotdependentonanydifferenceinthe’ideas’themselves。It，too，maybetakenas’primordial，’orincapableoffurtheranalysis。ThisdoctrinebecomesimportantinsomeofMill’slogicalspeculations，83andisconnectedwithhiswholetheoryofbeliefinanexternalworld。
　　IthasanuncomfortablelikenesstoReid’s’common-sense’view，andeventothehated’intuitionism’；andMilldeservesthemorecreditforhiscandour。
　　Meanwhileitseemsclearthatthecriticismimpliesanimportantconfusion。Thelineofdistinctionisdrawninthewrongplace，Sofarasthesimple’imagination’isconcerned，theremaybenoquestionofbeliefordisbelief。ThepictureofFalstafforofLafayette，ahorseoracentaur，arisesequally，andisputtogether，letussuppose，bysimpleassociation。ButassoonasIthinkabouteitherIbelieveordisbelieve，andequallywhetherIjudgetheobjecttobeathoughtortobea’realfact，’whetherIsaythatIcouldhaveseenLafayette，orthatIcouldnothaveseenFalstaff。Itisnotaquestionbetweenrealityorunreality，butbetweentwoclassesofreality。Adreamisarealdream，justasamanisarealman。Thequestionissimplywhereorhowitexists，notwhetheritexists。Thepictureis，inonecase，puttogetherbymymind；intheother，duetoastimulusfromwithout；butitexistsinbothcases；andbeliefisequallypresentwhetherIputitinoneclassofrealityortheother：asweformajudgmentequallywhenwepronounceamantobelying，andwhenwepronouncehimtobespeakingthetruth。J。S。MillseemstosupposethatassociationcanexplaintheimaginationofacentauroraFalstaff，butcannotexplainthebeliefinahorseorLafayette。Theimaginationor’ideation，’heshouldhavesaid，accountsinbothcasesforthemerecontentsofthethought；butinneithercasecanitbyitselfexplainthejudgmentasto’reality。’Thatistosay，JamesMillmayhavedescribedaccuratelyapartoftheprocessbywhichthementalpictureisconstructed，buthasomittedtoexplaintheactionoftheminditself。
　　Belief，wemayagree，isa’primordial’orultimatefaculty；butwemustnotinterpretitasbeliefina’realfact’asdistinguishedfrombeliefin’athought’：thatisasecondaryandincidentaldistinction。
　　Thisconfusion，asIhavesaid，apparentlypreventsJ。S。Millfromseeinghowdeeplyhisveryfrankadmissionscutintotheverystructureofhisfather’ssystem。Hehas，asIhavesaid，remarkeduponthesingularabsenceofanyreferenceto’belief，’’abstraction，’andsoforth；buthescarcelyobserveshowmuchisimpliedbytheomission。Hiscriticismshouldhavegonefurther。JamesMillhasnotonlyomittedafacultywhichenablesustodistinguishbetween’thoughts’and’things，’imagesoffancyandpicturesofreality，butalsothefacultywhichisequallypresentwheneverweproperlythinkinsteadofsimplyseeingimagespassively；andequallywhetherwereferanimagetofactorfancy。His’analysisofthemind’seemstogetridoftheminditself。
　　Theomissionbecomesimportantatthenextstep。’Underthemodesttitleofanexplanationofthemeaningofseveralnames，’sayshisson，JamesMilldiscusses’someofthedeepestandmostintricatequestionsinallmetaphysics。’Atreatiseonchemistrymightalmostaswellbe’describedasanexplanationofthenames，air，water，potass，sulphuricacid，andsoforth。’84Whydoesthechaptercomeinthisplaceandinthispeculiarform?ProbablybecauseJamesMillwaspartlyconsciousoftheinadequacyofhispreviouschapters。
　　Theproblemswhichhehasbeenconsideringcouldnotbeadequatelytreatedbyregardingideasas’things’boundtogetherbyassociation。What，afterall，isaproposition?Whatismeantby’true’or’false，’asdistinguishedfromrealandunreal?Ifanassociationactuallyisatruth，whatisthedifferencebetweenrightandwrongassociations?Botharefacts，andtheverywords’right’and’wrong，’thatis，trueandfalse，applynottofactsbuttopropositions。85thejudgmentistestedinsomewaybycorrespondencetothe’orderofNature，’orofoursensationsandideas。
　　Whatpreciselyismeantbythisorder?Sofaraswehavegone，itseemsasifideasmightbecombinedinanyorderwhatever，andthemostvariousbeliefsgeneratedindifferentminds。Perhaps，however，theprincipleofassociationitselfmayrevealsomethingastothepossiblemodesofcoalescence。
　　Millmakescontiguityanultimategroundofassociation；andcontiguityimpliesthatthingshavecertainrelationsexpressibleintermsofspaceandtimeandsoforth。Theseprimitiverelationsnowcomeupforconsideration，andshouldenableustosaymorepreciselywhatkindoforderispossible。
　　Infact，Millnowendeavourstoanalysethemeaningsofsuchwordsasrelationingeneral，time，space，number，likeness，personalidentityandothers。
　　Theeffectofhisanalysisisthattheprinciples，whatevertheymaybe，whichmightbesupposedtounderlieassociationappeartobeproductsofassociation。Hebeginsbyaskingwhatisthemeaningof’relativeterms。’
　　Theirpeculiarityisthatthey’alwaysexistinpairs，’suchas’fatherandson，’’highandlow，’’rightandleft。’’Ifitisasked，Whydowegivenamesinpairs?thegeneralanswerimmediatelysuggestsitself。Itisbecausethethingsnamedpresentthemselvesinpairs，thatis，arejoinedbyassociation。’86J。S。MillthinksthatnopartoftheAnalysisismorevaluablethanthe’simpleexplanation’whichfollows，thereisno’mysticalbondcalledarelation’betweentwothings，but’averysimplepeculiarityintheconcretefact’markedbythenames。In’ordinarynamesofobjects，thefactconnotedbyanameconcernsoneobjectonly’；inthecaseofrelativenames，’thefactconnotedconcernstwoobjects，andcannotbeunderstoodwithoutthinkingofthemboth。’A’factconcerninganobject’
　　isacuriouslyawkwardexpression；butonepointisclear。Ifthetwoobjectsconcernedarethesame，whetherconsideredapartortogether，the’relation’
　　mustbesomethingmorethanthefacts，andthereforerequirestobespecified。
　　Iftheyare，infact，onething，orpartsofacontinuousprocess，wemustaskhowtheycometobedistinguished，andwhatgroundthereisforspeakingofassociation。JamesMill，byconsideringtheproblemasamerequestionof’names，’seemstointimatethattherelationisamerefigment。Infact，asJ。S。Millperceives，the’explanations’becomenugatory。Theysimplyrepeatthethingtobeexplained。Hebeginswith’resemblance。’Tofeeltwothingstobealikeis，hesays，thesamethingastohavethetwofeelings。
　　Hemeanstosay，apparently，thatwhentherearetwo’ideas’thereisnotalsoathirdideaof’likeness。’ThatwouldbewhatBenthamcalleda’fictitiousentity。’Butthiscannot’explain’thelikenessoftheideas。’Theirbeingalike，’ashissoninterprets，’isnothingbuttheirbeingfelttobealikewhichdoesnothelpus。’87So’antecedenceandconsequence’
　　are’explained’bysayingthatoneoftwofeelingscallsuptheother；
　　or，asthesonagainremarks，antecedenceisexplainedbyantecedence，andsuccessionbysuccession。Antecedenceandconsequence，likelikenessandunlikeness，musttherefore，accordingtoJ。S，Mill，be’postulatedasuniversalconditionsofNature，inherentinall，ourfeelingswhetherofexternalorinternalconsciousness。’88Inotherwords，apparently，timeisanultimateformofthought。Timeandspace，generally，asJamesMillthinks，arethe’abstractnames’respectivelyofsuccessiveandsimultaneousorder，whichbecome’indissolublyassociatedwiththeideaofeveryobject。’89Space，ofcourse，issaidtobeaproductoftouchandmuscularsensations，andtheproblemastohowthesevaryingsensationsandthesealonegiverisetoapparentlynecessaryandinvariablebeliefsisnottakenintoconsideration。
　　MillisheredealingwiththequestionswhichKantattemptedtoanswerbyshowinghowthemindimposesitsformsuponsense-givenmaterials，formsthemintoconcepts，andcombinestheconceptsintojudgmentsandreasoning，Millevadesthemysteriousandtranscendentalatthecostofomittingreasonaltogether。Herepresentstheresultofacceptingonehornofadilemma，whichpressesuponphilosophiesofloftierpretensions。Thosewhoaccepttheotherhornspeakofa’fact’asthoughitwereatruth，andargueasthoughtheworldcouldbespunoutofpurelogic，oratissuebemadeofrelationswithoutanythingstoberelated。Mill，withscarcelyaglanceatsuchdoctrines，triessystematicallytospeakofatruthasifitwereafact。Theworldforhimismadeupofideasstickingtogether；andnothingelseexists。Therelationisthefact；beliefistheassociation；consciousnessandreflection，consideredapart，arenothingbutthesensations，ideas，clusters，andtrains。Theattempttobasealltruthuponexperience，tobringphilosophyintoharmonywithsciencewas，asIhold，perfectlyright。
　　Only，upontheseassumptionsitcouldnotbecarriedout。Millhadthemeritwhichisimpliedevenbyanunsuccessfulattempttoholdbyfact。
　　Heraisesanumberofinterestingquestions；andIthinkthatitismoreremarkablethatsomanyofhisobservationshavestillaninterestforpsychologiststhanthatsomuchisobviouslywrong。Mill，itmaybesaid，tookanessayuponassociationforatreatiseuponpsychologyingeneral。
　　Hewas’writingwhatmightbeoneimportantchapterinsuchatreatise，andsupposesthathehaswrittenthewhole，andcandeduce’philosophy’
　　fromit，if，indeed，anyphilosophycanbesaidtoremain。Meanwhile，I
　　mayobserve，thatbypushinghisprinciplestoextremes，evenhis’association’
　　doctrineisendangered。HisAnalysisseemstodestroyeventheelementswhichareneededtogivethesimplestlawsofassociation。Itisratherdifficulttosaywhatismeantbythe’contiguity，’’sequence，’and’resemblance，’