Thereisnoconnectionwhateverbetweenthesoundoftheword’man’andthe’ideas’whichthewordexcites,beyondthefactthatthesoundhasbeenpreviouslyheardwhentheideaswereexcited。Here,then,isaphenomenontobeexplainedorgeneralised。Wehaveincountlesscasesacertainconnectionestablishedforwhichnofurtherreasoncanbeassignedthanthefactofitspreviousoccurrence。Onsuchaground,webelievethatfireburns,thatbreadiswholesome,thatstonesfall;andbutforsuchbeliefscouldknownothingoftheoutsideworld。’Contingent’truth,therefore,ortruthderivedfrommerecontact。pervades,ifitdoesnotconstitute,thewholefabricofourwholeknowledge。Toprovethatallourknowledgeisderivedfromexperienceis,accordingtoMill,toprovethatinsomesenseorotherassociationofideasliesatthebaseofallintellectualprocesses。WhenLockeintroducedachapterupon’AssociationofIdeas’intothefourtheditionofhisessay,hetreateditastheexceptionalcase。Someideashadaconnectiontraceablebyreason;otherswereonlyconnectedby’chanceandcustom。’Associationdoesnotexplainreasoning,onlythedeviationsfromreasoning。ButwithHumeandHartleytherelationisinverted。Theprinciple,insteadofbeinganexceptionalcase,issimplytheuniversalrulefromwhichlogicalconnectionmaybededucedasaspecialcase。
ThefactsuponwhichMillrelied,andtheaccountofthemwhichhegave,requirenoticeandembodimentinanyroundpsychology。Insomeshapeorothertheyformthestarting-pointofalllatersystems。Mill’svigorousapplicationofhisprinciple,workedoutwithimperfectappreciationandwithmanyoversights,hadtherefrom,atleast,themeritofpreparingthegroundforamorescientificmethod。
Inanycase,however,hisconclusions,sofarassound,mustbeplacedinadifferentframeworkoftheory。Itbecomesnecessarytodwellchieflyuponthecuriousdefectsofhistheory,iftakenashewishedittobetaken,foranultimatescientificstatement。Thefactthatthereisasynthesisandananalysisisexpressedby’association。’Butwhatmorecanwesay?
Whatarethe’laws’ofassociation?Unlesssomerulecanbegiven,weshallgetnothingthatcanbecalledatheory。Oneideaisnotsuggestedbytheotherthroughanylogicalprocess。Theyarestill’conjoined’butnot’connected。’
Theconnection,therefore,mustbegivenbysomethingdifferentfromtheideasthemselves。Nowtheorderoftheoriginal’sensations’dependsuponthe’objectsofnature,’andisthereforeleftto’physicalphilosophy。’53Theyoccur,however,eitherin’synchronous’orin’successive’order。
Then’ideas’springupintheorderof’sensations,’andthisisthe’generallawofassociationofideas。’54Thesynchronoussensationsproducesynchronousideasandthesuccessivesensationssuccessiveideas。Finally,thestrengthoftheassociationbetweentheideasdependsupon’thevividnessoftheassociatedfeelings,andthefrequencyoftheassociation。’55Humehadsaidthatassociationdependeduponthreeprinciples,’contiguityintimeandplace,’’causation,’and’resemblance。’Contiguityintimecorrespondstothesuccessive,andcontiguityinplacetothesynchronous,order。Causation,asBrownhadfinallyproved,56meanssimplyantecedenceandconsequence。’Resemblance’remainsandis,asMillafterwardssays,57amostimportantprinciple;butinanunluckymomentheishalfinclinedtoreduceeven’resemblance’to’contiguity。’58Resemblanceis,heevensuggests,merely’acaseoffrequency,’becausewegenerallyseelikethingstogether。Whenweseeonetreeorsheep,wegenerallyseeseveraltreesorsheep。J。S。Millmildlyremarksuponthisquaintsuggestionasthe’leastsuccessfulsimplification’inthebook。
Hearguesthepointgravely。Sheep,itisclear,arenotseentobelikebecausetheyoftencomposeaflock,butareconsideredtobeaflockbecausetheyareseentobelike。TodoJamesMilljustice,hedropstheargumentassoonashehasstruckitout。Itisonlyworthnoticeasshowinghisaim。’Likeness’seemstoimplyarelationdependentontheideasthemselves;
notpurelyexternalandarbitrary。Ifwecouldgetridoflikeness,allassociationwouldultimatelybe’contiguity。’’Thefundamentallawofassociation,’
ashesayselsewhere,59’isthatwhentwothingshavebeenfrequentlyfoundtogether,weneverperceiveorthinkoftheonewithoutthinkingoftheother。’Thetwoideasareassociatedastwoballsareassociatedwhentheyareinthesamebox。Sofarastheyarethemselvesconcerned,theymightbeseparatedwithoutanyalterationintheirownproperties。
What,then,correspondstothe’box’?Associationdependsuponrelationsoftimeandspace。Thingsareassociatedbyoccurringinsuccessionortogether;theredcolourofaroseisinthesameplacewiththeshapeoftheleaf。Thescentisperceivedatthesametimewiththecolour。Thethunderfollowsthelightning。What,then,hemightask,are’time’and’space’?Arethey’ideas’or’sensations’orqualitiesoftheobjects?
or,inanycase,assupplyingtheultimateprincipleofassociation,dotheynotrequireinvestigation?Beforecomingtothatproblem,however,wehavetosettleotherknottypoints。Wemustclearawayillusionswhichseemtointroducesomethingmorethanassociation。Elementsofthoughtnotatfirstsightexpressiblesimplyintermsofsensationsandideasmustbeanalysedtoshowthattheyareonlydisguisesfordifferentcombinationsofthefacts。Reasoning,accordingtomostlogicians,supposes,first,concepts,andthereforesomeprocessofclassificationoftheobjectsofthought;and,secondly,someprocessofcombiningtheseconceptstobringouthithertounknowntruths。What,then,isthemeaningofthegeneralorabstractsymbolsemployedintheprocess?Mill’sprovisionofrawmaterialsconsistssofarofsensationsandideas,whichareworkedupsoastoform’clusters’thewordistakenfromHartleyand’trains。’Thiscorrespondstosynchronousandsuccessiveassociations。Howdoesthelogicalterminologyexpressthese’clusters’and’trains’?Millanswersbyatheoryof’naming。’
Languagefulfilstwopurposes;itisrequiredinordertomakeourideasknowntoothers;andinordertofixourownideas。Ideasarefluctuating,transitory,and’comeintothemindunbidden。’Wemustcatchandmakeanoteoftheseshiftingcrowdsofimpalpableentities。Wethereforeputmarksuponthesimplesensationsoruponthe’clusters。’Weticketthemasatradesmanticketsbundlesofgoodsinhiswarehouse,andcanrefertothemforourownpurposesorthoseofothers。Asthenumberofobjectstobemarkedisenormous,astherearecountlessideasandclustersandclustersofclustersofendlessvarietytobearrangedinvariousways,onemainobjectofnamingiseconomy。Asinglewordhastobeusedtomarkagreatnumberofindividuals。Thiswillaccountforsuchgeneralnamesasarerepresentedbynoun-substantives;man,horse,dog,andsoforth。
Millthenproceeds,withthehelpofHorneTooke,toexplaintheothergrammaticalforms。Anadjectiveisanotherkindofnounmakingacrossdivision。Verbs,again,areadjectivesmarkingothersetsoffacts,andenablingustogetridofthenecessityofusinganewmarkforeveryindividualorconceivablecombinationintoclusters。J。S。Millremarksthatthisomitsthespecialfunctionofverbs——their’employmentinpredication。’60JamesMill,however,hashisownviewof’predication。’’Man’isamarkofJohn,Peter,Thomas,andtherest。WhenIsay’Johnisaman,’Imeanthat’manisanothermarktothatideaofwhichJohnisamark。’61Iamthenabletomakeastatementwhichwillapplytoalltheindividuals,andsavethetroubleofrepeatingtheassertionabouteach。’Predication,’
therefore,issimplyasubstitutionofonenameforanother。So,forexample,arithmeticissimplynaming。WhatIcalltwoandtwo,Ialsocallfour。
Theseriesofthoughtsinthiscaseismerely’aseriesofnamesapplicabletothesamethingandmeaningthesamething。’62Thisdoctrine,asJ。S。Millremarks,isderivedfromHobbes,whomLeibnizinconsequencecalledplusquamnominalis。63MybeliefthattwoandtwomakefourexplainswhyIgivethesamenametocertainnumbers;butthegivingthenamedoesnotexplainthebelief。Meanwhile,ifaclassnamebesimplythemarkwhichisputuponabundleofthings,wehavegotridofapuzzle。
Milltriumphsovertheunfortunaterealistswhoheldthataclassmeantamysteriousentity,existingsomewhereapartfromalltheindividualsinwhichitisembodied。Thereisreallynothingmysterious;anameisfirstthemarkofanindividual,theindividualcorrespondingtoa’cluster’
orasetof’simpleideas,concretedintoacomplexidea。’64Thenthenameandthecomplexideaareassociatedreciprocally;each’callsup’theother。Thecomplexideais’associated’withotherresemblingideas。
Thenamebecomesatalismancallinguptheideasofanindefinitenumberofresemblingindividuals,andthenameappliedtooneinthefirstinstancebecomesamarkwhichcallsupall,or,ashesays,isthe’nameofthewholecombination。’Classification,therefore,’ismerelyaprocessofnaming,andisallresolvableintoassociation。’65Thepeculiarityofthistheory,ashiscommentatorsagainremark,isthatitexpresslyomitsanyreferencetoabstraction。Theclasssimplymeanstheaggregateofresemblingindividualswithoutanyselectionofthecommonattributeswhichare,inJ。S。Mill’sphrase,’connoted’bytheclass-name。Abstraction,asJamesMillexplains,isasubsidiaryprocess,correspondingtothe’formationofsub-species。’66
Millhasnowshownhowthevariousformsoflanguagecorrespondtoideas,formedintoclustersofvariousordersbytheprincipleofassociation。Thenextstepwillnaturallybetoshowhowtheseclustersareconnectedintheprocessofreasoning。
Herethedifficultyaboutpredicationrecurs。J。S。Mill67remarksthathisfather’stheoryofpredicationconsistentlyomits’theelementBelief。’WhenIsay,’Johnisaman,’Imakeanaffirmationorassertabelief。Idonotsimplymeantocallupinthemindofmyheareracertain’cluster’ortwocoincidentclustersofideas,buttoconveyknowledgeoftruths。Theomissionofreferencetobeliefiscertainlynotrifle。
Millhasclassifiedthevariousideasandcombinationsofideaswhichareusedinjudgment,buttheprocessofjudgmentitselfseemstohaveslippedoutofaccount。Hemayhavegivenus,orbeabletogiveus,areasonedcatalogueofthecontentsofourminds,buthasnotexplainedhowtheminditselfacts。Itisamerepassiverecipientofideas,orratheritselfaclusterofideascoheringinvariousways,withoutenergyofitsown。
Oneidea,ashetellsus,callsupanother’byitsownassociatingpower。’68Ideasarethingswhichsomehowsticktogetherandreviveeachother,withoutreferencetothemindinwhichtheyexistorwhichtheycompose。Thisexplainshisfrequentinsistenceupononeassertion。Asweapproachthequestionofjudgmenthefindsitessential。’Havingasensationandhavingafeeling,’
hesays,’arenottwothings。’To’feelanideaandbeconsciousofthatfeelingarenottwothings;thefeelingandtheconsciousnessarebuttwonamesforthesamething。’69So,again,’tohaveasensationandtobelievethatwehaveit,arenotdistinguishablethings。’70Locke’sreflectionthusbecomesnothingbutsimpleconsciousness,andhavingafeelingisthesameasattendingtoit。71Thepointisessential。
Itamountstosayingthatwecanspeakofathoughtasthoughitweresimplyathing。