theoracletowhomallmenmightappealwithconfidence，thoughalittletoo，apttofindoutthatallsideswereintheright。WhenhewenttoIndiahetookwithhimsomeofthescholasticwritersandtheworksofKantandFichte，thenknowntofewEnglishmen。OneofMacaulay’sexperiencesatHollandHousewasavisionofMackintoshverifyingaquotationfromAquinas。104Itmusthavebeendelightful。Theethical’dissertation，’
　　however，hadtobeshortenedbyomittingallreferencetoGermanphilosophy，andtheaccountoftheschoolmeniscursory。ItiseasytoseewhythesuaveandamiableMackintoshappearedtoMilltobea’dandy’philosopher，anunctuousspinnerofplatitudestoimposeuponthefrequentersofHollandHouse，andhopelesslyconfusedintheattempttomakecompromisesbetweencontradictorytheories。ItisequallyeasytoseewhytoMackintoshthethoroughgoingandstrenuousMillappearedtobeaone-sidedfanatic，blindtothemeritsofallsystemsoutsidethenarrowlimitsofBenthamism，andmakingevenphilanthropyhateful。HadMackintoshlivedtoreadMill’sFragment，hewouldcertainlyhavethoughtitaproofthattheUtilitarianswereasdogmaticandacridashehadeverasserted。
　　Mackintosh’spositioninethicsexplainsMill’santagonism。NeitherAquinasnorKantnorFichteinfluencedhim。HisdoctrineisthenaturaloutcomeoftheScottishphilosophy。
　　HutchesonhadbothinventedBentham’ssacredformula，andtaughtthe’MoralSense’theorywhichBenthamattacked。Tostudythemoralityfromthepointofviewof’inductivepsychology’istostudythemoralfaculty，andtorejectthepurely’intellectual’system。Toassignthepositionofthemoralfacultyinthepsychologicalsystemistoshowitsutility。Ontheotherhand，itwastheveryaimoftheschooltoavoidthescepticalconclusionsofHumeinphilosophy，andinethicstoavoidthecompleteidentificationofmoralitywithutility。Theremustbeadistinctionbetweenthejudgments，’thisisright，’and’thisisuseful’even’usefultomeningeneral。’
　　Hence，ontheonehand，moralityisimmediatelydictatedbyaspecialsenseorfaculty，andyetitsdictatescoincidewiththedictatesofutility。
　　IhavespokenofthisviewasrepresentedbyDugaldStewart；andBrownhad，accordingtohiscustom，movedastepfurtherbydiminishingthelistoforiginalfirstprinciples，andmaking’virtue’simplyequivalentto’feelings’ofapprovalanddisapproval。105Virtue，hesaid，isuseful；theutility’accompaniesourmoralapprobation；buttheperceptionofthatutilitydoesnotconstituteourmoralapprobation，norisitnecessarilypresupposedbyit。’106HecomparesthecoincidencebetweenvirtueandutilitytoLeibniz’spre-establishedharmony。107Thepositionisfamiliar。Theadaptationofanorganismtoitsconditionsmaybetakeneitherasanexplanationofitsdevelopmentorasaproofofacreativepurpose。
　　Mackintoshtakesnearlythesameposition。Ethicalinquiries，hesays，relateto’twoperfectlydistinctsubjects。’Wehavetheproblemofthe’criterion’Whatisthedistinctionbetweenrightandwrong?andtheproblemofthe’moralsentiments’Whatarethefeelingsproducedbythecontemplationofrightandwrong?。Intreatingofthefeelings，again，wemustavoidtheconfusioncausedintheolderphilosophybythereductionof’feeling’to’thought。’108Reasonandsensationaredistinctthoughinseparablycombined；andhence，heargues，itisafallacytospeakwithClarkeasifreasoncouldbyitselfbeamotive。Anargumenttoinfluenceconductmustalwaysbeinthelastresortanappealtoa’feeling。’109Itisidletotellamanthatconductisinfamousunlesshefeelsinfamytobepainful。Wehavethentoaskwhatarethefeelingswhichprompttomorality。Sofarasthecriterionisconcerned，MackintoshfullyagreeswithHume，whosetheorythat’generalutilityconstitutesageneralgroundofmoraldistinctionscanneverbeimpugneduntilsomeexamplecanbeproducedofavirtuegenerallyperniciousoravicegenerallybeneficial。’110Hume，however，overlooksthe’rightfulsupremacyofthemoralfacultyovereveryotherprincipleofhumanaction。’Mackintoshthoughtthathisbestservice，ashetoldMacveyNapier，111hadbeenhis’endeavourtoslipinafoundationunderButler’sdoctrineofthesupremacyoftheconscience，whichheleftbaseless。’Toslipinafoundationisaverydelicateoperationinlogicalasinmaterialarchitecture；andthenewfoundationseemsheretobeindangerofinvertingtheedifice。The’supremacyofconscience’112meanswithhimthatthe’moralsentiments’formaseparateclass。Theyarethefeelingswithwhichwecontemplatevoluntaryactionsingeneral，andthereforethosearousedbythecharacterandconductoftheagent。
　　Mackintoshthustakesanaestheticviewofmorality。Wehavea’moraltaste’
　　orperceptionofbeauty。Thesamequalitieswhichmakeahorsebeautifulmakehimalsoswiftandsafe，butweperceivethebeautywithoutthinkingoftheutility，orratherwhenwedonotthinkofit。Soweadmireaheroormartyrforthebeautyofhischaracterwithoutreferencetohisservicestous。113Thismoraltaste，thoughnotidenticalwiththeconscience，becomes’absorbedintoit。’Theconsciencediffersfromthe’moraltaste’
　　becauseitactsuponthewill。Butitssupremacyseemstobethisqualitywhichitshareswithorderivesfromthetaste——itsimmediateandspontaneousoperation。Itis，heseemstomean，adirectperceptionofbeautyincharacterappliedtotheregulationofconduct。Virtuecorrespondstoaninstinctiveandsofarultimateappreciationofbeautyofcharacter，MackintoshinsistsuponthisintrinsiccharmofvirtueinthelanguagewhichstruckMillassimplyfoppishaffectation。Thepleasureof’benevolence’itself，saysMackintosh，isinfinitelysuperiortothepleasurestowhichitmaylead。
　　Coulditbecome’lastingandintense，’itwouldconverttheheartintoaheaven。114Tolovevirtue，youmustloveit’foritsownsake。’115Thedelightsofbeingvirtuousasheinterpretsthephrasearegreaterthananydelightfromtheconsequencesofvirtue。AndheholdsupasamodelFletcherofSaltoun，whowould，losehislifetoservehiscountry，butwouldnotdoabasethingtosaveit。’116
　　How，then，isthisviewtobereconciledwiththeunreservedadmissionof’utility’asthe’criterion’
　　ofrightandwrong?OneansweristhatMackintoshfullyacceptsHartley’sdoctrineofassociation。Heevencriticisespreviousphilosophersfornotpushingitfarenough。Hesaysthatassociation，insteadofmerelycombininga’thought’anda’feeling，’’formsthemintoanewcompound，inwhichthepropertiesofthecomponentpartsarenolongerdiscoverable，andwhichmayitselfbecomeasubstantiveprincipleofhumanvirtue。’117Thequestionoforigin，therefore，isdifferentfromthequestionofnature。
　　HefollowsHartleyintracingthedevelopmentofvariousdesires，andinshowinghowthe’secondarydesires’aregraduallyformedfromtheprimitivebytransferencetodifferentobjects。118Wemuststartfromfeelingswhichliebeneathanyintellectualprocess，andthusthejudgmentofutilityisfromthefirstsecondary。Wearriveatthehigherfeelingswhichare’asindependentasiftheywereunderived，’119andyet，ashappinesshasbeeninvolvedateverystageasanendofeachdesire，itisnowonderthattheultimateresultshouldbetomakethegeneralhappinesstheend。Thecoincidence，then，ofthecriterionwiththeendofthemoralsentimentsis’notarbitrary，’butarisesnecessarilyfrom’thelawsofhumannatureandthecircumstancesinwhichmankindareplaced。’120Hencewereachthedoctrinewhich’hasescapedHartleyaswellaseveryotherphilosopher。’121Thatdoctrineisthatthemoralfacultyisone；itiscompound，indeed，initsorigin；butbecomesanindependentunit，whichcannolongerberesolvedeveninthoughtintoitsconstituentelements。
　　Thedoctrineapproximates，itwouldseem，toMill’s；butwasallthemoreunpalatabletohimonthataccount。Theagreementimpliesplagiarism，andthedifferencehopelessstupidity。ToMillBenthamwasthelegitimatedevelopmentofHartley，whiletoMackintoshBenthamwastheplausibleperverterofHartley。MillregardedMackintoshasasophist，whoseaimwastomisleadhonestUtilitariansintothepathsoforthodoxy，andwhoalsoignoredthemeritsofMillhimself。
　　’ItwasMr。Mill，’hesays，’whofirstmadeknownthegreatimportanceoftheprincipleoftheindissolubleassociation’；122’Mr。Mill’
　　whohadtakenupHartley’sspeculationsand，prosecutedtheinquirytoitsend’；123’Mr。Mill’whoexplainedaffectionsandmotivesanddispositions；124and’Mr。Mill，whohadclearedupmistakesaboutclassificationwhich’haddonemoretoperpetuatedarknessonthesubjectofmindthananyothercause，perhapsthanallothercausestakentogether。’125SirJamesblunderedbecausehehadnotreadMill’sbook，ashepretendedtohavedone。Milldoesnotsayallthisfromvanity；
　　heissimplystatinganobviousmatteroffact。
　　Mill’spolemicagainsttheMoralSensetheory，evenagainstamoralsenseproducedbyassociation，revealsthereallycriticalpointsofthetrueUtilitariandoctrine。Millwouldcutdownthemoralsenserootandbranch。The’moralsense’meansa’particularfaculty’necessarytodiscernrightandwrong。Butnoparticularfacultyisnecessarytodiscern’utility。’126Hencethedistinctionbetweenthe’criterion’andthe’moralsentiments’isabsurd。Theutilityisnotthe’criterion’ofthemoralitybutitselfconstitutesthemorality，tosaythatconductisright，accordingtotheUtilitarians，isthesamethingastosaythatitproduceshappiness。Ifthemoralsenseordersconductopposedtothecriterion，itissofarbad。Ifitneverorderssuchconduct，itissuperfluous，Happiness，aswithBentham，isadefinitething——acurrencyofsolidbullion；and’virtue’meansnothingexceptascalculatedinthiscurrency。Mill，again，likeBentham，regardsthe’utility’principleasgivingthesole’objective’test。Thecomplaintthatitsanctions’expediency’
　　isasimplefallacy。
　　Ifyoudonotlovevirtue’foritsownsake，’saidMackintosh，youwillbreakagenerallawwhereverthelawproducesabalanceofpainfulconsequences。Millreplieswithgreatvigour。127Allgeneralrules，itistrue，implyexceptions，butonlywhentheyconflictwiththesupremerule，’thereisnoexceptiontoaruleofmorality，’saysMill，’butwhatismadebyaruleofmorality。’128Therearenumerouscasesinwhichtheparticularlawsconflict；andonelawmustthenbebroken。Thequestionwhichtobreakmustthenbedecidedbythesameunequivocaltest，’utility。’Ifaruleforincreasingutilitydiminishesutilityinagivencase，itmustbebrokeninthatcase。Mackintosh’sFletcherofSaltounillustratesthepoint。129Whatisthe’base’
　　thingwhichFletcherwouldnotdotosavehiscountry?Wouldhenotbethebasestofmenifhedidnotsavehiscountryatanycost?Todestroyhalfapopulationandreducetheotherhalftomiseryhasbeenthoughtasacrificenottoogreatforsuchanend。WouldnotMackintoshhimselfallowFletcher，whenintrustedwithanimportantfortress，tosacrificethelivesandpropertiesofinnocentpeopleindefenceofhisposition?130What，then，doestheloveofvirtue，foritsownsake’cometo’?Ifyourefusetosaveyourcountry，becauseyouthinkthemeansbase，yourmoralityismischievous，thatis，immoral。If，ontheotherhand，youadmitthatthemeansceasetobebase，thesupposedsupremacyisanemptybrag。Thedoctrineisthenverballymaintained，butinterpretedsoastoconformtothecriterionofutility。Inotherwords，Mackintoshcannotreconcilehisadmissionofutilityasa’criterion’withhissupportofamoralsenseentitledtooverridethecriterion。Mackintosh’smoralsenseismeanttodistinguishthemoralmotivefrom’expediency。’Tothis，again，Millhasaveryforcibleanswer。Amanisblameablewhomakesexceptionstolawsinhisownprivateinterest。Butifamanconsistentlyandinvariablyactedforthe’greatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber，’andpaidnomoreattentiontohisownhappinessthantootherpeople’s，hewouldcertainlyhaveaveryloftyandinflexibletest，assuming——aswemustallowMilltoassume——thatwecancalculatetheeffectofconductuponhappinessatlarge。