Again，upontheassumptionthat’moral’isequivalentto’felicific，’wegetageneralruleentitledtooverrideanyindividualtastesorfancies，suchasMillsupposestobemeantbythe’MoralSense。’Theruleisderivedfromtheinterestsofall，andgivesanultimate’objectivecriterion。’
　　J。S。Mill，describinghisfather’ssystem，observesthattheteachingofsuchamanwasnotlikelytoerron’thesideoflaxityorindulgence。’131Itcertainlydidnot。And，infact，hiscriterion，howeverobtained，hadinhiseyesthecertaintyofascientificlaw。Thisorthatisrightassurelyasthisorthatfoodiswholesome。Mytastehasnothingtodowithit。And，moreover，thecriterioncertainlygivesamoralground。IfIknowthatanyconductwillproducemorehappinessthanmiserythatisamoralreasonforadoptingit。A’moralsense’whichshouldberadicallyinconsistentwiththatcriterion，whichshouldordermetoinflictsufferingassuffering，orwithoutsomeulteriorreason，wouldbecertainlyatfault。Mackintoshindeedwouldhaveagreedtothis，though，ifMillwasright，attheexpenseofconsistency。
　　Mill，however，deducesfromhiscriteriondoctrineswhichinvolvearemarkableparadox。Themodeinwhichheisledtothemischaracteristicofthewholemethod。Mill，likeBentham，putsmoralityuponthesameplanewithlaw。Conductisinfluencedeitherbythe’communityinitsconjunctcapacity’——thatis，bylaw；
　　orby’individualsintheirindividualcapacity’——thatis，bymorality。132Thesanctionofone，wemayinfer，isforce；oftheother，approvalanddisapproval。WiththiswemusttakeanotherBenthamitedoctrine，ofwhichIhavealreadyspoken。133’Mr。Benthamdemonstrated，’saysMill，’thatthemoralityofanactdoesnotdependuponthemotive，’and，further，thatit’isaltogetherdependentontheintention。’134Uponthisheconstantlyinsists。Mackintosh’sviewthatvirtuedependsuponmotivewillbe’scornedbyeverymanwhohasanyknowledgeofthephilosophyofthehumanmind……Thevirtuedoesnotdependuponthemotive。Thereisnobadmotive。Everymotiveisthedesireofgood；totheagenthimselfortosomeoneelse。’135Hegivesananalysisofactiontoputthepointbeyonddoubt。Actionsupposesa’motive，’a’volition，’andan’externalact’ormuscularcontraction。Sofarthereisnothingmoral。
　　Butthenanacthasconsequences，goodorbad，tohumanbeings，whichconstituteitsutility。Tomakeitmoral，theagentmustanticipate’beneficialconsequences，’
　　andmusthavenoreasontoanticipateabalanceofevilconsequences。Intentionmeansthecalculationofconsequences，andwithoutthatcalculationtherecanbenomorality。136Hencethemoralityisequivalenttoa’convictionofthegeneralutility’oftheaction。137’Allthis，’
　　heconcludes，’issettledbyuniversalconsent。Itisvain，therefore，tothinkofdisputingit。’Onemay，however，askwhatitmeans。Ihavealreadyobservedthattheviewofthenon-moralcharacterofmotivewasanaturalcorollaryfromthepurelylegalpointofview。Imustnowconsidertheresultsofapplyingitunreservedlyintheinappropriatesphereofethics。
　　Inthefirstplace，thedenialofanymoralqualityinmotiveseemstobeinconsistentwithMill’sownprinciples。TheUtilitarian，accordingtohim，holdsthatthemorallawisessentiallythestatementthatcertainconductproducesgeneralhappiness。
　　If，then，weask，Whoisagoodman?wefirstreplythatheisamanwhoseconductproduceshappiness。Anotherconclusionisobviouslynecessary，andisimpliedinMill’sstatementthatthe’intention’isessentialtomorality。Theman，thatis，mustforeseethathisconductwillproducehappiness。The’calculation’ispreciselywhatmakesanactionmoralaswellasaccidentallyuseful。Inotherwords，themanisgoodtowhomtheknowledgethatanactwillproducehappinessisthesamethingasacommandtoperformtheact。The’intention’couldnotaffectconductwithoutthecorrespondingmotive，andMillcanattimesrecognisetheobviousconsequence。
　　The’physicallaw’meaningthelawenforcedbyphysicalcoercion，hesaysincidentally，has’extrinsic’sanctions；138themorallawisdifferent，becauseitsanctionsgoodactionsfortheirgoodness。’Moralapproval’mustthereforeincludeapprovalofcharacter。Aman，tobemoral，mustbeonewhodoesusefulthingssimplybecausetheyareuseful。Hemustthen，itwouldseem，beatleastbenevolent。Thesamethingisimpliedbythedoctrineof’intention’or’calculation。’Anactionmaybeusefulorthereversewithoutbeingmoralwhentheconsequencesareunknowntotheagent。Tomakeitmoralhemustknowtheconsequences——forotherwiseheismerelyactingatrandom；andtheforeseenconsequencesconstitutethe’intention。’TothisMilladdsthathemusthavetakenintoaccounttheconsequenceswhich’mighthavebeenforeseen。’139Otherwiseweshouldhavetoexcuseamanbecausehehadneglectedtocalculate，whereastocalculateistheveryessenceofvirtue。Amanwhofiredagundownacrowdedstreetwouldnotbeexcusablebecausehehadnotthoughtoftheresult。He’ought’tohavethoughtofit。Thequestionofmoralapprovalofanygivenactionturnsuponthesequestions。Didamanforeseeevilconsequencesanddisregardthem?Heisthencruel。Didheneglecttoconsiderthem?Heisthenculpablycareless，thoughnotactuallymalignant。Weretheconsequencesaltogetherbeyondthepowersofreasonablecalculation?
　　Thenhemaybeblameless，thewholemoralquestion，therefore，dependsuponthecharacterindicated；thatis，uponthemotiveswhichinduceamantocalculateconsequencesandwhichdeterminehisconductwhenthecalculationismade。
　　Thetruthis，Ithink，anditischaracteristicofMill’smodesofanalysis，thatheismakinganimpossibleabstraction。Heisseparatingpartsofasingleprocessandtreatingthemasindependent。Ifactionsarebadbecausetheyhavebadconsequences，motivesarebadbecausetheyarecausesofbadactions。Youcannotsuppresstheeffectwithoutsuppressingthecause，andthereforethecauseofthecause。Millrelieschieflyupononeargument，thesameconductwillproducethesameconsequenceswhateverthemotives。Thatisundeniable。ItisthesametomewhetherIamburntbecausethepersecutorlovesmysoulorbecausehehatesmeasarebeltohisauthority。Butwhenisconduct’thesame’?Ifweclassifyactsasthelegislatorhastoclassifythemby’external’or’objective’relations，weputtogetherthemanwhoishonestsolelyfromfearofthegallowsandthemanwhoishonestfromhatredofstealing。Solongasbothactalike，the’consequences’totheirneighboursarealike。Neitherislegallypunishable。Butifactsareclassifiedbytheirmotives，oneisarogueandtheothervirtuous；anditisonlythenthatthequestionofmoralityproperlyarises。Inthatcase，itisidletoseparatethequestionofmotiveandconsequences，becausethecharacterdeterminesthemotiveandthereforetheaction。NobodyshouldhaveseenthismoreclearlythanMillasagood’determinist。’Conductandcharacterarerelatedastheconvexandconcaveofthecurve；conductissimplythemanifestationofcharacter，andtoseparatethemisabsurd。
　　Whydidhenotseethis?
　　Forreasons，Ithink，whichillustratehiswholemethod。Fromascientificpointofview，theethicalproblemraisesthewidequestions，Whatarethemoralsentiments?and，Whatfunctionsdotheydischargeinregardtothesocietyortoitsindividualmembers?Wemightholdthatmoralityisjustifiedby’utility’inthesensethatthemoralrulesandthecharacterwhichtheyindicateareessentialtothewelfareoftheraceoritsindividualconstituents。ButtoMillthispropositionisinterpretedasidenticalwiththepropositionthatconductmustbeestimatedbyits’consequences。’
　　Wearetoconsidernottheactionitself，butitseffects；andtheeffectsareclearlyindependentofthemotivewhenoncetheactionhasbeendone。
　　Wemaythereforegetacalculusof’utility’：generalrulesstatingwhatactionswillbeusefulconsideredabstractedlyfromtheirmotives。Themethod，again，mightbeplausibleifwecouldfurtherassumethatallmenwerethesameanddifferedonlyinexternalcircumstances。ThatisthepointofviewtowhichMill，likeBentham，isalwaysmoreorlessconsciouslyinclining。Themoralandthepositivelawareequallyenforcedby’sanctions’；
　　bysomethingnotdependentuponthemanhimself，andwhichheisinclinedtosupposewilloperateequallyuponallmen。Suchlanguagecouldbejustifiableonlyofanaverageanduniform’man，’akindofconstantunit，whosevaryingbehaviourmustalwaysbeexplainedbydifferenceincircumstance。Wehavesufficientlyseentheresultselsewhere，andinthisethicaldoctrinetheyareespeciallymanifest。
　　Mackintoshrecognisedthefactthatmoralityisessentiallyafunctionofcharacter。Millcannotfullyadmitthat，becausehevirtuallyassumesallcharactertobethesame。Regardingmoralityassomethingco-ordinatewithlaw，hedoesnotperceivethattheverypossibilityoflawimpliesthemoralinstincts，whichcorrespondtotheconstitutionofcharacter，andbelongtoasphereunderlying，notonthesameplanewith，thelegislativesphere。Theyarethesourceofallorder；notthemselvestheproductoftheorder。Itisimpossibletodeducethem，therefore，fromtheorganisationwhichpresupposesthem。Now，inonedirection，Mill’stheoryleads，ashissonremarked，nottolaxitybuttoexcessivestrictness。The’criterion’islaiddownabsolutely。The’moralsense’isrejectedbecauseitmeansanautocraticfaculty，entitledtooverridethecriterionbyitsownauthority。Toappealto’motives’istoallowtheindividualtomakehisownfeelingtheultimatetestofrightandwrong。IfwefollowMillinthiswearenotreallyassumingthemoralneutralityofmotiveortheindifference，butanimpossibleprofessionofcharacter。Menarenotgovernedbyabstractprinciplesbutbytheirpassionsandaffections。Theemotions，asMackintoshrightlysaid，cannotberesolvedintothemerelogic。Utilitymaygivethetruecriterionofmorality，butitdoesnotfollowthattheperceptionofutilityisimpliedinmoralconduct。Themotivesaregoodwhichinfactproduceusefulconduct，thoughtheagentdoesnotcontemplatetheabstractprinciple。Itisimpossiblethatmenshouldbemovedsimplybyadesireforthe’greatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber。’Whatdoesandalwaysmustguidemenistheirpersonalrelationtothelittlecirclewhichtheyactuallyinfluence。Thegoodmanisthemansoconstitutedthathewillspontaneouslyfulfilhisduties。
　　Themorallaw，thatis，willbealsothelawofhischaracterandconduct。
　　Themotherisgoodbecauseshelovesherchild，notbecausesheseesthatcareofherchildisdictatedbythegeneralmaximofutility。The’utility’
　　ofcharactermeansthefitnessoftheagenttobeanefficientmemberofthesocialstructuretowhichhebelongs。InparticularcasesthismayleadtosuchproblemsasthatofFletcherofSaltoun。Hissenseofhonourandhisgeneralbenevolence，thoughbothuseful，mightcomeintocollision；
　　andthemostdifficultofallquestionsofcasuistryarisefromsuchconflictsbetweenprivateandpublicaffections。Millisjustifiedinholdingthatasenseofhonourcannotgiveanultimateandautocraticdecision。Undersomepretextorother，weshallhavetoasktheUtilitarianquestionwhetheronthewholeitmaynotbecausingmoremiserythanthevirtuousactionisworth。Butthatonlymeansthatthecharactermustbesobalancedastogivedueweighttoeachmotive；notthatwecanabstractfromcharacteraltogether，asthoughhumanbeingscouldbemerecolourlessanduniformatoms，embodyingabstractformulae。
　　MillisfollowingBentham，andonlybringsoutmoreclearlythepsychologicalassumptions。Aman，hesays，actsfromthe’samemotive’whetherhestealsfiveshillingsorearnsitbyaday’slabour。Themotive，inthissense，regardsonlyoneconsequence，whereasthe’intention’regardsall。The’motive，’thatis，isonlyoneofthemotivesorapartofthecharacter，andthiswayofspeakingisoneoftheawkwardresultsofturning’motives’into’things。’
　　TheobviousansweristhatwhichMillhimselfmakestoMackintosh。MackintoshandButler，hethinks，personifyparticular’appetites。’140itisnotreallythe’conscience’whichdecides，buttheman。Thatisquitetrue，andsimilarlyitisthewholemanwhostealsorworks，notthe’personified’
　　motive；anditisaccordinglyfromthewholecharacterthatwejudge。Wehavetoconsidertherelationoftheloveoffiveshillingstotheotherqualitiesofindustryandhonesty。ThesameviewappearsinMill’scharacteristicdislikeof’sentimentalism。’WishingtoattackMackintosh’srhetoricaboutthedelightofvirtuousfeeling，heforoncequotesanoveltoillustratethispoint。WhenParsonAdamsdefinedcharityasa’generousdispositiontorelievethedistressed，’PeterPounceapproved；’itis，asyousay，adisposition，anddoesnotsomuchconsistintheactasinthedispositiontodoit。’141When，therefore，Mackintoshsaysthathefindsitdifficulttoseparatethevirtuefromtheact，Millrepliesthatnothingiseasier。Thevirtueis’intheactanditsconsequences’；thefeelingamereremovableaddition。ApparentlyhewouldholdthatthegoodSamaritanandthePhariseehadthesamefeeling，thoughitpromptedonetorelievethesuffererandtheothertorelievehimselfofthesightofthesufferer。
　　Theyhad，ofcourse，afeelingincommon，butafeelingwhichproduceddiametricallyoppositeeffects，becauseenteringintototallydifferentcombinations。