afacultynotconstructedoutofindependentpainsandpleasures——andthesystembecomesaviciouscircle。ConscienceonanyreallyUtilitarianschememustbeaderivative,notanultimate,faculty。If,asMillseemstosay,theomissionisablunder,Bentham’sUtilitarianismatleastmustbeanerroneoussystem。
Wehavenowourlistbothofpainsandpleasuresandofthegeneralmodesofvariationbywhichtheirvalueistobemeasured。Wemustalsoallowforthevaryingsensibilitiesofdifferentpersons。Benthamaccordinglygivesalistofthirty-two’circumstancesinfluencingsensibility。’39*Humanbeingsdifferinconstitution,character,education,sex,race,andsoforth,andintheirdegreesofsensibilitytoallthevariousclassesofpainsandpleasures;theconsiderationofthesevarietiesisofthehighestutilityforthepurposesofthejudgeandthelegislator。40*The’sanctions’willoperatedifferentlyindifferentcases。Ablowwillhavedifferenteffectsuponthesickanduponthehealthy;thesamefineimposedupontherichandthepoorwillcauseverydifferentpains;andalawwhichisbeneficentinEuropemaybeascourgeinAmerica。
Wehavethusour’pathology’ortheoryofthepassivesensibilitiesofman。Weknowwhatarethe’springsofaction,’howtheyvaryingeneral,andhowtheyvaryfromonemantoanother。Wecanthereforepasstothedynamics。41*
Wehavedescribedthemachineryinrest,andcannowconsideritinmotion。
Weproceedasbeforebyfirstconsideringactioningeneral:whichleadstoconsiderationofthe’intention’andthe’motive’impliedbyanyconsciousaction:andhenceoftherelationofthesetothe’springsofaction’asalreadydescribed。Thediscussionisminuteandelaborate;andBenthamimprovesashecomesnearertotheactualproblemsoflegislationandfurtherfromtheostensiblebasesofpsychology。Theanalysisofconduct,andofthesanctionsbywhichconductismodified,involvesaviewofmoralsandoftherelationsbetweenthespheresofmoralityandlegislationwhichisofcriticalimportanceforthewholeUtilitariancreed。’Morallaws’anda’Positivelaw’bothaffecthumanaction。Howdotheydiffer?Bentham’streatmentoftheproblemshows,Ithink,aclearerappreciationofsomedifficultiesthanmightbeinferredfromhislaterutterances。Inanycase,itbringsintoclearreliefamoraldoctrinewhichdeeplyaffectedhissuccessors。
III。THESANCTIONS
Letusfirsttakehisdefinitionsofthefundamentalconceptions。Allactionofreasonablebeingsimpliestheexpectationofconsequences。Theagent’s’intention’isdefinedbytheconsequencesactuallycontemplated。
Thecauseofactionisthehopeoftheconsequentpleasuresorthedreadoftheconsequentpains。Thisanticipatedpleasureorpainconstitutesthe’internalmotive’aphraseusedbyBenthamtoexcludethe’externalmotive’
oreventwhichcausestheanticipation。42*Themotive,or’internalmotive,’
istheanticipationofpaintobeavoidedorpleasuretobegained。Actionsaregoodorbadsimplyandsolelyastheyareonthewhole’productiveofabalanceofpleasureorpain。’Theproblemofthelegislatorishowtoregulateactionssoastoinclinethebalancetotherightside。Hisweaponsare’sanctions’
whichmodify’motives。’Whatmotives,then,shouldbestrengthenedorchecked?
Herewemustbeguidedbyaprinciplewhichis,infact,thelogicalresultofthedoctrinesalreadylaiddown。Weareboundtoapplyour’felicificcalculus’withabsoluteimpartiality。Wemustthereforeassignequalvaluetoallmotives。’Nomotives,’hesays,43*are’constantlygoodorconstantlybad。’Pleasureisitselfagood;painitselfanevil:nay,theyare’theonlygoodandtheonlyevil。’Thisistrueofeverysortofpainandpleasure,evenofthepainsandpleasuresofillwill。Thepleasuresof’malevolence’
areplacedinhis’table’bythesideofpleasuresof’benevolence。’Henceit’followsimmediatelyandincontestably,thatthereisnosuchthingasanysortofmotivethatisinitselfabadone。’ThedoctrineisnodoubtalogicaldeductionfromBentham’sassumptions,andheproceedstoillustrateitsmeaning。A’motive’correspondstooneofhis’springsofaction。’Heshowshoweveryoneofthemotivesincludedinhistablemayleadeithertogoodortobadconsequences。Thedesireofwealthmayleadmetokillaman’senemyortoploughhisfieldforhim;thefearofGodmayprompttofanaticismortocharity;illwillmayleadtomaliciousconductormaytaketheformofproper’resentment,’as,forexample,whenIsecurethepunishmentofmyfather’smurderer。Thoughoneact,hesays,isapprovedandtheothercondemned,theyspringfromthesamemotive,namely,illwill。44*
Headmits,however,thatsomemotivesaremorelikelythanotherstoleadto’useful’conduct;andthusarrangestheminacertain’orderofpre-eminence。’45*
Itisobviousthat’goodwill,’’loveofreputation,’andthe’desireofamity’
aremorelikelythanotherstopromotegeneralhappiness。’Thedictatesofutility,’asheobserves,aresimplythe’dictatesofthemostextensiveandenlightenedthatis,welladvisedbenevolence。’Itwould,therefore,seemmoreappropriatetocallthe’motive’good;thoughnoonedoubtsthatwhendirectedbyanerroneousjudgmentitmayincidentallybemischievous。
Thedoctrinethatmoralitydependsupon’consequences’andnotupon’motives’
becameacharacteristicUtilitariandogma,andIshallhavetoreturntothequestion。Meanwhile,itwasbothanaturaland,Ithink,insomesenses,acorrectview,whenstrictlyconfinedtotheprovinceoflegislation。Forreasonstooobvioustoexpand,thelegislatormustoftenbeindifferenttothequestionofmotives。Hecannotknowwithcertaintywhatareaman’smotives。
Hemustenforcethelawwhatevermaybethemotivesforbreakingit;andpunishrebellion,forexample,evenifheattributesittomisguidedphilanthropy。
Hecan,inanycase,punishonlysuchcrimesasarefoundout;andmustdefinecrimesbypalpable’external’marks。Hemustpunishbysuchcoarsemeansasthegallowsandthegaol:forhisthreatsmustappealtothegoodandthebadalike。Hedepends,therefore,upon’external’sanctions,sanctions,thatis,whichworkmainlyuponthefearsofphysicalpain;andevenifhispunishmentsaffectthewickedalone,theyclearlycannotreachthewickedaswicked,norinproportiontotheirwickedness。Thatisquiteenoughtoshowwhyinpositivelawmotivesarenoticedindirectlyornotatall。Itshowsalsothattheanalogybetweenthepositiveandthemorallawistreacherous。
Theexclusionofmotivejustifiableinlawmaytakeallmeaningoutofmorality。
TheUtilitarians,asweshallsee,weretoomuchdisposedtooverlookthedifference,andattempttoapplypurelylegaldoctrineinthetotallyuncongenialsphereofethicalspeculation。Toacceptthelegalclassificationofactionsbytheirexternalcharacteristicsis,infact,tobegthequestioninadvanceAnyoutwardcriterionmustgrouptogetheractionsspringingfromdifferent’motives’andtherefore,asothermoralistswouldsay,ethicallydifferent。
Thereis,however,anothermeaninginthisdoctrinewhichismoretothepurposehere。Benthamwasaimingataprinciplewhich,trueorfalse,isimpliedinallethicalsystemsbaseduponexperienceinsteadofpurelogicorapriori’intuitions。’Suchsystemsmustaccepthumannatureasafact,andasthebasisofascientifictheory。Theydonotaimatcreatingangelsbutatdevelopingtheexistingconstitutionofmankind。Sofarasanactionspringsfromoneoftheprimitiveoressentialinstinctsofmankind,itsimplyprovestheagenttobehuman,nottobeviciousorvirtuous,andthereforeisnogroundforanymoraljudgment。IfBentham’sanalysiscouldbeaccepted,thiswouldbetrueofhis’springsofaction。’Thenaturalappetiteshavenotinthemselvesamoralquality:theyaresimplynecessaryandoriginaldataintheproblem。TheperplexityisintroducedbyBentham’sassumptionthatconductcanbeanalysedsothatthe’motive’isaseparateentitywhichcanberegardedasthesolecauseofacorrespondingaction。Thatinvolvesanirrelevantabstraction。Thereisnosuchthingasasingle’motive。’Oneofhiscasesisamotherwholetsherchilddieforloveof’ease。’Wedonotcondemnherbecauseshelovesease,whichisamotivecommontoallmenandthereforeunmoral,notimmoral。Butneitherdowecondemnhermerelyforthebadconsequencesofaparticularaction。Wecondemnherbecausesheloveseasebetterthanshelovesherchild:thatis,becauseherwholecharacteris’unnatural’orill-balanced,notonaccountofaparticularelementtakenbyitself。Moralityisconcernedwithconcretehumanbeings,andnotwith’motives’runningaboutbythemselves。Bentham’smeaning,ifwemakethenecessarycorrection,wouldthusbeexpressedbysayingthatwedon’tblameamanbecausehehasthe’natural’passions,butbecausetheyaresomehowwronglyproportionedorthemanhimselfwronglyconstituted。Passionswhichmaymakeamanviciousmayalsobeessentialtothehighestvirtue。Thatisquitetrue;butthepassionisnotaseparateagent,onlyoneconstituentofthecharacter。
Benthamadmitsthisinhisownfashion。If’motives’cannotbeproperlycalledgoodorbad,isthere,heasks,nothinggoodorbadinthemanwhoonagivenoccasionobeysacertainmotive?’Yes,certainly,’hereplies,’hisdisposition。’46*Thedisposition,headds,isa’fictitiousentity,anddesignedfortheconvenienceofdiscourseinordertoexpresswhatthereissupposedtobepermanentinaman’sframeofmind。’By’fictitious,’aswehaveseen,hemeansnot’unreal’butsimplynottangible,weighable,ormeasurable-likesticksandstones,orlikepainsandpleasures。’Fictitious’
astheymaybe,therefore,thefictionenablesustoexpressrealtruths,andtostatefactswhichareofthehighestimportancetothemoralistandthelegislator。Benthamdiscussessomecasesofcasuistryinordertoshowtherelationbetweenthetendencyofanactionandtheintentionandmotivesoftheagent。Ravaillacmurdersagoodking;Ravaillac’ssonenableshisfathertoescapepunishment,orconveyspoisontohisfathertoenablehimtoavoidtorturebysuicide。47*Whatistheinferenceastotheson’sdispositionineithercase?Thesolutionashesubstantiallyand,Ithink,rightlysuggests
willhavetobereachedbyconsideringwhetherthefactsindicatethattheson’sdispositionwasmischievousorotherwise;whetheritindicatespoliticaldisloyaltyorfilialaffection,andsoforth,andinwhatproportions。Themostinterestingcaseperhapsisthatofreligiouspersecution,wherethereligiousmotiveistakentobegood,andtheactiontowhichitleadsisyetadmittedtobemischievous。Theproblemisoftenpuzzling,butwearevirtuallymakinganinferenceastothegoodnessorbadnessofthe’disposition’
impliedbythegivenactionunderallthesupposedcircumstances。ThisgiveswhatBenthamcallsthe’meritoriousness’48*ofthedisposition。The’intention’
iscausedbythe’motive。’The’disposition’isthe’sumoftheintentions’;
thatistosay,itexpressestheagent’ssensibilitytovariousclassesofmotives;andthemeritthereforewillbeinproportiontothetotalgoodnessorbadnessofthedispositionthusindicated。Thequestionofmeritleadstointerestingmoralproblems。Bentham,however,observesthatheisnotherespeakingfromthepointofviewofthemoralistbutofthelegislator。
Still,asalegislatorhehastoconsiderwhatisthe’depravity’ofdispositionindicatedbydifferentkindsofconduct。Thisconsiderationisofgreatimportance。