Hewhoseknowledgegoesnofurthermayperhapsgatherroundhimabandoffools;buthewillneverfoundanempire，andhisextravaganceswillquicklyperishwithhim。Idletricksformapassingtie;onlywisdomcanmakeitlasting。TheJudaiclaw，whichstillsubsists，andthatofthechildofIshmael，which，fortencenturies，hasruledhalftheworld，stillproclaimthegreatmenwholaidthemdown;and，whiletheprideofphilosophyortheblindspiritoffactionseesinthemnomorethanluckyimpostures，thetruepoliticaltheoristadmires，intheinstitutionstheysetup，thegreatandpowerfulgeniuswhichpresidesoverthingsmadetoendure。
Weshouldnot，withWarburton，concludefromthisthatpoliticsandreligionhaveamongusacommonobject，butthat，inthefirstperiodsofnations，theoneisusedasaninstrumentfortheother。8。THEPEOPLEAS，beforeputtingupalargebuilding，thearchitectsurveysandsoundsthesitetoseeifitwillbeartheweight，thewiselegislatordoesnotbeginbylayingdownlawsgoodinthemselves，butbyinvestigatingthefitnessofthepeople，forwhichtheyaredestined，toreceivethem。PlatorefusedtolegislatefortheArcadiansandtheCyrenæans，becauseheknewthatbothpeopleswererichandcouldnotputupwithequality;andgoodlawsandbadmenwerefoundtogetherinCrete，becauseMinoshadinflicteddisciplineonapeoplealreadyburdenedwithvice。
Athousandnationshaveachievedearthlygreatness，thatcouldneverhaveenduredgoodlaws;evensuchascouldhaveenduredthemcouldhavedonesoonlyforaverybriefperiodoftheirlonghistory。Mostpeoples，likemostmen，aredocileonlyinyouth;astheygrowoldtheybecomeincorrigible。
Whenoncecustomshavebecomeestablishedandprejudicesinveterate，itisdangerousanduselesstoattempttheirreformation;thepeople，likethefoolishandcowardlypatientswhoraveatsightofthedoctor，cannolongerbearthatanyoneshouldlayhandsonitsfaultstoremedythem。
ThereareindeedtimesinthehistoryofStateswhen，justassomekindsofillnessturnmen’sheadsandmakethemforgetthepast，periodsofviolenceandrevolutionsdotopeopleswhatthesecrisesdotoindividuals：horrorofthepasttakestheplaceofforgetfulness，andtheState，setonfirebycivilwars，isbornagain，sotospeak，fromitsashes，andtakesonanew，freshfromthejawsofdeath，thevigourofyouth。SuchwereSpartaatthetimeofLycurgus，RomeaftertheTarquins，and，inmoderntimes，HollandandSwitzerlandaftertheexpulsionofthetyrants。
Butsucheventsarerare;theyareexceptions，thecauseofwhichisalwaystobefoundintheparticularconstitutionoftheStateconcerned。
Theycannotevenhappentwicetothesamepeople，foritcanmakeitselffreeaslongasitremainsbarbarous，butnotwhenthecivicimpulsehaslostitsvigour。Thendisturbancesmaydestroyit，butrevolutionscannotmendit：itneedsamaster，andnotaliberator。Freepeoples，bemindfulofthismaxim："Libertymaybegained，butcanneverberecovered。"
Youthisnotinfancy。Thereisfornations，asformen，aperiodofyouth，or，shallwesay，maturity，beforewhichtheyshouldnotbemadesubjecttolaws;butthematurityofapeopleisnotalwayseasilyrecognisable，and，ifitisanticipated，theworkisspoilt。Onepeopleisamenabletodisciplinefromthebeginning;another，notaftertencenturies。Russiawillneverbereallycivilised，becauseitwascivilisedtoosoon。Peterhadageniusforimitation;buthelackedtruegenius，whichiscreativeandmakesallfromnothing。Hedidsomegoodthings，butmostofwhathedidwasoutofplace。Hesawthathispeoplewasbarbarous，butdidnotseethatitwasnotripeforcivilisation：hewantedtociviliseitwhenitneededonlyhardening。HisfirstwishwastomakeGermansorEnglishmen，whenheoughttohavebeenmakingRussians;andhepreventedhissubjectsfromeverbecomingwhattheymighthavebeenbypersuadingthemthattheywerewhattheyarenot。InthisfashiontooaFrenchteacherturnsouthispupiltobeaninfantprodigy，andfortherestofhislifetobenothingwhatsoever。TheempireofRussiawillaspiretoconquerEurope，andwillitselfbeconquered。TheTartars，itssubjectsorneighbours，willbecomeitsmastersandours，byarevolutionwhichIregardasinevitable。Indeed，allthekingsofEuropeareworkinginconcerttohastenitscoming。9。THEPEOPLE（continued）Asnaturehassetboundstothestatureofawell-mademan，and，outsidethoselimits，makesnothingbutgiantsordwarfs，similarly，fortheconstitutionofaStatetobeatitsbest，itispossibletofixlimitsthatwillmakeitneithertoolargeforgoodgovernment，nortoosmallforself-maintenance。
Ineverybodypoliticthereisamaximumstrengthwhichitcannotexceedandwhichitonlylosesbyincreasinginsize。Everyextensionofthesocialtiemeansitsrelaxation;and，generallyspeaking，asmallStateisstrongerinproportionthanagreatone。
Athousandargumentscouldbeadvancedinfavourofthisprinciple。
First，longdistancesmakeadministrationmoredifficult，justasaweightbecomesheavierattheendofalongerlever。Administrationthereforebecomesmoreandmoreburdensomeasthedistancegrowsgreater;for，inthefirstplace，eachcityhasitsown，whichispaidforbythepeople：
eachdistrictitsown，stillpaidforbythepeople：thencomeseachprovince，andthenthegreatgovernments，satrapies，andvice-royalties，alwayscostingmorethehigheryougo，andalwaysattheexpenseoftheunfortunatepeople。
Lastofallcomesthesupremeadministration，whicheclipsesalltherest。
Alltheseoverchargesareacontinualdrainuponthesubjects;sofarfrombeingbettergovernedbyallthesedifferentorders，theyareworsegovernedthaniftherewereonlyasingleauthorityoverthem。Inthemeantime，therescarceremainresourcesenoughtomeetemergencies;and，whenrecoursemustbehadtothese，theStateisalwaysontheeveofdestruction。
Thisisnotall;notonlyhasthegovernmentlessvigourandpromptitudeforsecuringtheobservanceofthelaws，preventingnuisances，correctingabuses，andguardingagainstseditiousundertakingsbegunindistantplaces;
thepeoplehaslessaffectionforitsrulers，whomitneversees，foritscountry，which，toitseyes，seemsliketheworld，andforitsfellow-citizens，mostofwhomareunknowntoit。Thesamelawscannotsuitsomanydiverseprovinceswithdifferentcustoms，situatedinthemostvariousclimates，andincapableofenduringauniformgovernment。Differentlawsleadonlytotroubleandconfusionamongpeopleswhich，livingunderthesamerulersandinconstantcommunicationonewithanother，intermingleandintermarry，and，comingundertheswayofnewcustoms，neverknowiftheycancalltheirverypatrimonytheirown。Talentisburied，virtueunknownandviceunpunished，amongsuchamultitudeofmenwhodonotknowoneanother，gatheredtogetherinoneplaceattheseatofthecentraladministration。
Theleaders，overwhelmedwithbusiness，seenothingforthemselves;theStateisgovernedbyclerks。Finally，themeasureswhichhavetobetakentomaintainthegeneralauthority，whichallthesedistantofficialswishtoescapeortoimposeupon，absorballtheenergyofthepublic，sothatthereisnoneleftforthehappinessofthepeople。Thereishardlyenoughtodefenditwhenneedarises，andthusabodywhichistoobigforitsconstitutiongiveswayandfallscrushedunderitsownweight。
Again，theStatemustassureitselfasafefoundation，ifitistohavestability，andtobeabletoresisttheshocksitcannothelpexperiencing，aswellastheeffortsitwillbeforcedtomakeforitsmaintenance;forallpeopleshaveakindofcentrifugalforcethatmakesthemcontinuallyactoneagainstanother，andtendtoaggrandisethemselvesattheirneighbours’
expense，likethevorticesofDescartes。Thustheweakruntheriskofbeingsoonswallowedup;anditisalmostimpossibleforanyonetopreserveitselfexceptbyputtingitselfinastateofequilibriumwithall，sothatthepressureisonallsidespracticallyequal。
Itmaythereforebeseenthattherearereasonsforexpansionandreasonsforcontraction;anditisnosmallpartofthestatesman’sskilltohitbetweenthemthemeanthatismostfavourabletothepreservationoftheState。Itmaybesaidthatthereasonforexpansion，beingmerelyexternalandrelative，oughttobesubordinatetothereasonsforcontraction，whichareinternalandabsolute。Astrongandhealthyconstitutionisthefirstthingtolookfor;anditisbettertocountonthevigourwhichcomesofgoodgovernmentthanontheresourcesagreatterritoryfurnishes。
ItmaybeaddedthattherehavebeenknownStatessoconstitutedthatthenecessityofmakingconquestsenteredintotheirveryconstitution，andthat，inordertomaintainthemselves，theywereforcedtoexpandceaselessly。
Itmaybethattheycongratulatedthemselvesgreatlyonthisfortunatenecessity，whichnonethelessindicatedtothem，alongwiththelimitsoftheirgreatness，theinevitablemomentoftheirfall。10。THEPEOPLE（continued）ABODYpoliticmaybemeasuredintwoways？eitherbytheextentofitsterritory，orbythenumberofitspeople;andthereis，betweenthesetwomeasurements，arightrelationwhichmakestheStatereallygreat。ThemenmaketheState，andtheterritorysustainsthemen;therightrelationthereforeisthatthelandshouldsufficeforthemaintenanceoftheinhabitants，andthatthereshouldbeasmanyinhabitantsasthelandcanmaintain。Inthisproportionliesthemaximumstrengthofagivennumberofpeople;for，ifthereistoomuchland，itistroublesometoguardandinadequatelycultivated，producesmorethanisneeded，andsoongivesrisetowarsofdefence;ifthereisnotenough，theStatedependsonitsneighboursforwhatitneedsoverandabove，andthissoongivesrisetowarsofoffence。Everypeople，towhichitssituationgivesnochoicesavethatbetweencommerceandwar，isweakinitself：itdependsonitsneighbours，andoncircumstances;
itsexistencecanneverbemorethanshortanduncertain。Iteitherconquersothers，andchangesitssituation，oritisconqueredandbecomesnothing。
Onlyinsignificanceorgreatnesscankeepitfree。
Nofixedrelationcanbestatedbetweentheextentofterritoryandthepopulationthatareadequateonetotheother，bothbecauseofthedifferencesinthequalityofland，initsfertility，inthenatureofitsproducts，andintheinfluenceofclimate，andbecauseofthedifferenttempersofthosewhoinhabitit;forsomeinafertilecountryconsumelittle，andothersonanungratefulsoilmuch。Thegreaterorlessfecundityofwomen，theconditionsthataremoreorlessfavourableineachcountrytothegrowthofpopulation，andtheinfluencethelegislatorcanhopetoexercisebyhisinstitutions，mustalsobetakenintoaccount。Thelegislatorthereforeshouldnotgobywhathesees，butbywhatheforesees;heshouldstopnotsomuchatthestateinwhichheactuallyfindsthepopulation，asatthattowhichitoughtnaturallytoattain。Lastly，therearecountlesscasesinwhichtheparticularlocalcircumstancesdemandorallowtheacquisitionofagreaterterritorythanseemsnecessary。Thus，expansionwillbegreatinamountainouscountry，wherethenaturalproducts，i。e。，woodsandpastures，needlesslabour，whereweknowfromexperiencethatwomenaremorefertilethanintheplains，andwhereagreatexpanseofslopeaffordsonlyasmallleveltractthatcanbecountedonforvegetation。Ontheotherhand，contractionispossibleonthecoast，eveninlandsofrocksandnearlybarrensands，becausetherefishingmakesuptoagreatextentforthelackofland-produce，becausetheinhabitantshavetocongregatetogethermoreinordertorepelpirates，andfurtherbecauseitiseasiertounburdenthecountryofitssuperfluousinhabitantsbymeansofcolonies。
Totheseconditionsoflaw-givingmustbeaddedoneotherwhich，thoughitcannottaketheplaceoftherest，rendersthemalluselesswhenitisabsent。Thisistheenjoymentofpeaceandplenty;forthemomentatwhichaStatesetsitshouseinorderis，likethemomentwhenabattalionisformingup，thatwhenitsbodyisleastcapableofofferingresistanceandeasiesttodestroy。Abetterresistancecouldbemadeatatimeofabsolutedisorganisationthanatamomentoffermentation，wheneachisoccupiedwithhisownpositionandnotwiththedanger。Ifwar，famine，orseditionarisesatthistimeofcrisis，theStatewillinevitablybeoverthrown。
Notthatmanygovernmentshavenotbeensetupduringsuchstorms;butinsuchcasesthesegovernmentsarethemselvestheState’sdestroyers。
Usurpersalwaysbringaboutorselecttroubloustimestogetpassed，undercoverofthepublicterror，destructivelaws，whichthepeoplewouldneveradoptincoldblood。Themomentchosenisoneofthesurestmeansofdistinguishingtheworkofthelegislatorfromthatofthetyrant。
Whatpeople，then，isafitsubjectforlegislation？Onewhich，alreadyboundbysomeunityoforigin，interest，orconvention，hasneveryetfelttherealyokeoflaw;onethathasneithercustomsnorsuperstitionsdeeplyingrained，onewhichstandsinnofearofbeingoverwhelmedbysuddeninvasion;
onewhich，withoutenteringintoitsneighbours’quarrels，canresisteachofthemsingle-handed，orgetthehelpofonetorepelanother;oneinwhicheverymembermaybeknownbyeveryother，andthereisnoneedtolayonanymanburdenstooheavyforamantobear;onewhichcandowithoutotherpeoples，andwithoutwhichallotherscando;15onewhichisneitherrichnorpoor，butself-sufficient;and，lastly，onewhichunitestheconsistencyofanancientpeoplewiththedocilityofanewone。Legislationismadedifficultlessbywhatitisnecessarytobuildupthanbywhathastobedestroyed;andwhatmakessuccesssorareistheimpossibilityoffindingnaturalsimplicitytogetherwithsocialrequirements。Alltheseconditionsareindeedrarelyfoundunited，andthereforefewStateshavegoodconstitutions。
ThereisstillinEuropeonecountrycapableofbeinggivenlaws？Corsica。
Thevalourandpersistencywithwhichthatbravepeoplehasregainedanddefendeditslibertywelldeservesthatsomewisemanshouldteachithowtopreservewhatithaswon。IhaveafeelingthatsomedaythatlittleislandwillastonishEurope。11。THEVARIOUSSYSTEMSOFLEGISLATIONIFweaskinwhatpreciselyconsiststhegreatestgoodofall，whichshouldbetheendofeverysystemoflegislation，weshallfinditreduceitselftotwomainobjects，libertyandequality？liberty，becauseallparticulardependencemeanssomuchforcetakenfromthebodyoftheStateandequality，becauselibertycannotexistwithoutit。
Ihavealreadydefinedcivilliberty;byequality，weshouldunderstand，notthatthedegreesofpowerandrichesaretobeabsolutelyidenticalforeverybody;butthatpowershallneverbegreatenoughforviolence，andshallalwaysbeexercisedbyvirtueofrankandlaw;andthat，inrespectofriches，nocitizenshalleverbewealthyenoughtobuyanother，andnonepoorenoughtobeforcedtosellhimself：16whichimplies，onthepartofthegreat，moderationingoodsandposition，and，onthesideofthecommonsort，moderationinavariceandcovetousness。
Suchequality，wearetold，isanunpracticalidealthatcannotactuallyexist。Butifitsabuseisinevitable，doesitfollowthatweshouldnotatleastmakeregulationsconcerningit？Itispreciselybecausetheforceofcircumstancestendscontinuallytodestroyequalitythattheforceoflegislationshouldalwaystendtoitsmaintenance。
Butthesegeneralobjectsofeverygoodlegislativesystemneedmodifyingineverycountryinaccordancewiththelocalsituationandthetemperoftheinhabitants;andthesecircumstancesshoulddetermine，ineachcase，theparticularsystemofinstitutionswhichisbest，notperhapsinitself，butfortheStateforwhichitisdestined。If，forinstance，thesoilisbarrenandunproductive，orthelandtoocrowdedforitsinhabitants，thepeopleshouldturntoindustryandthecrafts，andexchangewhattheyproduceforthecommoditiestheylack。If，ontheotherhand，apeopledwellsinrichplainsandfertileslopes，or，inagoodland，lacksinhabitants，itshouldgiveallitsattentiontoagriculture，whichcausesmentomultiply，andshoulddriveoutthecrafts，whichwouldonlyresultindepopulation，bygroupinginafewlocalitiesthefewinhabitantsthereare。17Ifanationdwellsonanextensiveandconvenientcoast-line，letitcovertheseawithshipsandfostercommerceandnavigation。Itwillhavealifethatwillbeshortandglorious。If，onitscoasts，theseawashesnothingbutalmostinaccessiblerocks，letitremainbarbarousandichthyophagous：
itwillhaveaquieter，perhapsabetter，andcertainlyahappierlife。
Inaword，besidestheprinciplesthatarecommontoall，everynationhasinitselfsomethingthatgivesthemaparticularapplication，andmakesitslegislationpeculiarlyitsown。Thus，amongtheJewslongagoandmorerecentlyamongtheArabs，thechiefobjectwasreligion，amongtheAtheniansletters，atCarthageandTyrecommerce，atRhodesshipping，atSpartawar，atRomevirtue。TheauthorofTheSpiritoftheLawshasshownwithmanyexamplesbywhatartthelegislatordirectstheconstitutiontowardseachoftheseobjects。WhatmakestheconstitutionofaStatereallysolidandlastingisthedueobservanceofwhatisproper，sothatthenaturalrelationsarealwaysinagreementwiththelawsoneverypoint，andlawonlyserves，sotospeak，toassure，accompanyandrectifythem。Butifthelegislatormistakeshisobjectandadoptsaprincipleotherthancircumstancesnaturallydirect;ifhisprinciplemakesforservitudewhiletheymakeforliberty，orifitmakesforriches，whiletheymakeforpopulousness，orifitmakesforpeace，whiletheymakeforconquest？thelawswillinsensiblylosetheirinfluence，theconstitutionwillalter，andtheStatewillhavenorestfromtroubletillitiseitherdestroyedorchanged，andnaturehasresumedherinvinciblesway。12。THEDIVISIONOFTHELAWSIFthewholeistobesetinorder，andthecommonwealthputintothebestpossibleshape，therearevariousrelationstobeconsidered。First，thereistheactionofthecompletebodyuponitself，therelationofthewholetothewhole，oftheSovereigntotheState;andthisrelation，asweshallsee，ismadeupoftherelationsoftheintermediateterms。
Thelawswhichregulatethisrelationbearthenameofpoliticallaws，andarealsocalledfundamentallaws，notwithoutreasoniftheyarewise。
For，ifthereis，ineachState，onlyonegoodsystem，thepeoplethatisinpossessionofitshouldholdfasttothis;butiftheestablishedorderisbad，whyshouldlawsthatpreventmenfrombeinggoodberegardedasfundamental？Besides，inanycase，apeopleisalwaysinapositiontochangeitslaws，howevergood;for，ifitchoosetodoitselfharm，whocanhavearighttostopit？
Thesecondrelationisthatofthemembersonetoanother，ortothebodyasawhole;andthisrelationshouldbeinthefirstrespectasunimportant，andinthesecondasimportant，aspossible。Eachcitizenwouldthenbeperfectlyindependentofalltherest，andatthesametimeverydependentonthecity;whichisbroughtaboutalwaysbythesamemeans，asthestrengthoftheStatecanalonesecurethelibertyofitsmembers。Fromthissecondrelationarisecivillaws。
Wemayconsideralsoathirdkindofrelationbetweentheindividualandthelaw，arelationofdisobediencetoitspenalty。Thisgivesrisetothesettingupofcriminallaws，which，atbottom，arelessaparticularclassoflawthanthesanctionbehindalltherest。
Alongwiththesethreekindsoflawgoesafourth，mostimportantofall，whichisnotgravenontabletsofmarbleorbrass，butontheheartsofthecitizens。ThisformstherealconstitutionoftheState，takesoneverydaynewpowers，whenotherlawsdecayordieout，restoresthemortakestheirplace，keepsapeopleinthewaysinwhichitwasmeanttogo，andinsensiblyreplacesauthoritybytheforceofhabit。Iamspeakingofmorality，ofcustom，aboveallofpublicopinion;apowerunknowntopoliticalthinkers，onwhichnonethelesssuccessineverythingelsedepends。
Withthisthegreatlegislatorconcernshimselfinsecret，thoughheseemstoconfinehimselftoparticularregulations;fortheseareonlythearcofthearch，whilemannersandmorals，slowertoarise，formintheenditsimmovablekeystone。
Amongthedifferentclassesoflaws，thepolitical，whichdeterminetheformsofthegovernment，arealonerelevanttomysubject。
6。Tobegeneral，awillneednotalwaysbeunanimous;buteveryvotemustbecounted：anyexclusionisabreachofgenerality。
7。"Everyinterest，"saystheMarquisd’Argenson，"hasdifferentprinciples。Theagreementoftwoparticularinterestsisformedbyoppositiontoathird。"Hemighthaveaddedthattheagreementofallinterestsisformedbyoppositiontothatofeach。
Iftherewerenodifferentinterests，thecommoninterestwouldbebarelyfelt，asitwouldencounternoobstacle;allwouldgoonofitsownaccord，andpoliticswouldceasetobeanart。
8。"Infact，"saysMachiavelli，"therearesomedivisionsthatareharmfultoaRepublicandsomethatareadvantageous。
Thosewhichstirupsectsandpartiesareharmful;thoseattendedbyneitherareadvantageous。Since，then，thefounderofaRepubliccannothelpenmitiesarising，heoughtatleasttopreventthemfromgrowingintosects"（HistoryofFlorence，Bookvii）。
9。Attentivereaders，donot，Ipray，beinahurrytochargemewithcontradictingmyself。Theterminologymadeitunavoidable，consideringthepovertyofthelanguage;butwaitandsee。
10。Iunderstandbythisword，notmerelyanaristocracyorademocracy，butgenerallyanygovernmentdirectedbythegeneralwill，whichisthelaw。Tobelegitimate，thegovernmentmustbe，notonewiththeSovereign，butitsminister。InsuchacaseevenamonarchyisaRepublic。Thiswillbemadeclearerinthefollowingbook。
11。Apeoplebecomesfamousonlywhenitslegislationbeginstodecline。WedonotknowforhowmanycenturiesthesystemofLycurgusmadetheSpartanshappybeforetherestofGreecetookanynoticeofit。
12。Montesquieu，TheGreatnessandDecadenceoftheRomans，ch。i。
13。ThosewhoknowCalvinonlyasatheologianmuchunder-estimatetheextentofhisgenius。Thecodificationofourwiseedicts，inwhichheplayedalargepart，doeshimnolesshonourthanhisInstitute。Whateverrevolutiontimemaybringinourreligion，solongasthespiritofpatriotismandlibertystilllivesamongus，thememoryofthisgreatmanwillbeforeverblessed。
14。"Intruth，"saysMachiavelli，"therehasneverbeen，inanycountry，anextraordinarylegislatorwhohasnothadrecoursetoGod;forotherwisehislawswouldnothavebeenaccepted：
thereare，infact，manyusefultruthsofwhichawisemanmayhaveknowledgewithouttheirhavinginthemselvessuchclearreasonsfortheirbeingsoastobeabletoconvinceothers"（DiscoursesonLivy，Bk。v，ch。
xi）。
15。Ifthereweretwoneighbouringpeoples，oneofwhichcouldnotdowithouttheother，itwouldbeveryhardontheformer，andverydangerousforthelatter。Everywisenation，insuchacase，wouldmakehastetofreetheotherfromdependence。TheRepublicofThiascala，enclosedbytheMexicanEmpire，preferreddoingwithoutsalttobuyingfromtheMexicans，orevengettingitfromthemasagift。TheThiascalanswerewiseenoughtoseethesnarehiddenundersuchliberality。
Theykepttheirfreedom，andthatlittleState，shutupinthatgreatEmpire，wasfinallytheinstrumentofitsruin。
16。IftheobjectistogivetheStateconsistency，bringthetwoextremesasneartoeachotheraspossible;
allowneitherrichmennorbeggars。Thesetwoestates，whicharenaturallyinseparable，areequallyfataltothecommongood;fromtheonecomethefriendsoftyranny，andfromtheothertyrants。Itisalwaysbetweenthemthatpubliclibertyisputuptoauction;theonebuys，andtheothersells。
17。"Anybranchofforeigncommerce，"
saysM。d’Argenson，"createsonthewholeonlyapparentadvantageforthekingdomingeneral;itmayenrichsomeindividuals，orevensometowns;
butthenationasawholegainsnothingbyit，andthepeopleisnobetteroff。"
Rousseau：SocialContract：BookIIIBOOKIIIBEFOREspeakingofthedifferentformsofgovernment，letustrytofixtheexactsenseoftheword，whichhasnotyetbeenveryclearlyexplained。1。GOVERNMENTINGENERALIWARNthereaderthatthischapterrequirescarefulreading，andthatIamunabletomakemyselfcleartothosewhorefusetobeattentive。Everyfreeactionisproducedbytheconcurrenceoftwocauses;onemoral，i。e。，thewillwhichdeterminestheact;theotherphysical，i。e。，thepowerwhichexecutesit。WhenIwalktowardsanobject，itisnecessaryfirstthatIshouldwilltogothere，and，inthesecondplace，thatmyfeetshouldcarryme。Ifaparalyticwillstorunandanactivemanwillsnotto，theywillbothstaywheretheyare。Thebodypolitichasthesamemotivepowers;heretooforceandwillaredistinguished，willunderthenameoflegislativepowerandforceunderthatofexecutivepower。Withouttheirconcurrence，nothingis，orshouldbe，done。
Wehaveseenthatthelegislativepowerbelongstothepeople，andcanbelongtoitalone。Itmay，ontheotherhand，readilybeseen，fromtheprincipleslaiddownabove，thattheexecutivepowercannotbelongtothegeneralityaslegislatureorSovereign，becauseitconsistswhollyofparticularactswhichfalloutsidethecompetencyofthelaw，andconsequentlyoftheSovereign，whoseactsmustalwaysbelaws。
Thepublicforcethereforeneedsanagentofitsowntobindittogetherandsetittoworkunderthedirectionofthegeneralwill，toserveasameansofcommunicationbetweentheStateandtheSovereign，andtodoforthecollectivepersonmoreorlesswhattheunionofsoulandbodydoesforman。Herewehavewhatis，intheState，thebasisofgovernment，oftenwronglyconfusedwiththeSovereign，whoseministeritis。
Whatthenisgovernment？AnintermediatebodysetupbetweenthesubjectsandtheSovereign，tosecuretheirmutualcorrespondence，chargedwiththeexecutionofthelawsandthemaintenanceofliberty，bothcivilandpolitical。
Themembersofthisbodyarecalledmagistratesorkings，thatistosaygovernors，andthewholebodybearsthenameprince。18Thusthosewhoholdthattheact，bywhichapeopleputsitselfunderaprince，isnotacontract，arecertainlyright。Itissimplyandsolelyacommission，anemployment，inwhichtherulers，mereofficialsoftheSovereign，exerciseintheirownnamethepowerofwhichitmakesthemdepositaries。Thispoweritcanlimit，modifyorrecoveratpleasure;forthealienationofsucharightisincompatiblewiththenatureofthesocialbody，andcontrarytotheendofassociation。
Icallthengovernment，orsupremeadministration，thelegitimateexerciseoftheexecutivepower，andprinceormagistratethemanorthebodyentrustedwiththatadministration。
Ingovernmentresidetheintermediateforceswhoserelationsmakeupthatofthewholetothewhole，oroftheSovereigntotheState。Thislastrelationmayberepresentedasthatbetweentheextremetermsofacontinuousproportion，whichhasgovernmentasitsmeanproportional。ThegovernmentgetsfromtheSovereigntheordersitgivesthepeople，and，fortheStatetobeproperlybalanced，theremust，wheneverythingisreckonedin，beequalitybetweentheproductorpowerofthegovernmenttakeninitself，andtheproductorpowerofthecitizens，whoareontheonehandsovereignandontheothersubject。
Furthermore，noneofthesethreetermscanbealteredwithouttheequalitybeinginstantlydestroyed。IftheSovereigndesirestogovern，orthemagistratetogivelaws，orifthesubjectsrefusetoobey，disordertakestheplaceofregularity，forceandwillnolongeracttogether，andtheStateisdissolvedandfallsintodespotismoranarchy。Lastly，asthereisonlyonemeanproportionalbetweeneachrelation，thereisalsoonlyonegoodgovernmentpossibleforaState。But，ascountlesseventsmaychangetherelationsofapeople，notonlymaydifferentgovernmentsbegoodfordifferentpeoples，butalsoforthesamepeopleatdifferenttimes。
Inattemptingtogivesomeideaofthevariousrelationsthatmayholdbetweenthesetwoextremeterms，Ishalltakeasanexamplethenumberofapeople，whichisthemosteasilyexpressible。
SupposetheStateiscomposedoftenthousandcitizens。TheSovereigncanonlybeconsideredcollectivelyandasabody;buteachmember，asbeingasubject，isregardedasanindividual：thustheSovereignistothesubjectastenthousandtoone，i。e。，eachmemberoftheStatehasashisshareonlyaten-thousandthpartofthesovereignauthority，althoughheiswhollyunderitscontrol。Ifthepeoplenumbersahundredthousand，theconditionofthesubjectundergoesnochange，andeachequallyisunderthewholeauthorityofthelaws，whilehisvote，beingreducedtoahundred-thousandthpart，hastentimeslessinfluenceindrawingthemup。Thesubjectthereforeremainingalwaysaunit，therelationbetweenhimandtheSovereignincreaseswiththenumberofthecitizens。Fromthisitfollowsthat，thelargertheState，thelesstheliberty。
WhenIsaytherelationincreases，Imeanthatitgrowsmoreunequal。
Thusthegreateritisinthegeometricalsense，thelessrelationthereisintheordinarysenseoftheword。Intheformersense，therelation，consideredaccordingtoquantity，isexpressedbythequotient;inthelatter，consideredaccordingtoidentity，itisreckonedbysimilarity。
Now，thelessrelationtheparticularwillshavetothegeneralwill，thatis，moralsandmannerstolaws，themoreshouldtherepressiveforcebeincreased。Thegovernment，then，tobegood，shouldbeproportionatelystrongerasthepeopleismorenumerous。
Ontheotherhand，asthegrowthoftheStategivesthedepositariesofthepublicauthoritymoretemptationsandchancesofabusingtheirpower，thegreatertheforcewithwhichthegovernmentoughttobeendowedforkeepingthepeopleinhand，thegreatertooshouldbetheforceatthedisposaloftheSovereignforkeepingthegovernmentinhand。Iamspeaking，notofabsoluteforce，butoftherelativeforceofthedifferentpartsoftheState。
ItfollowsfromthisdoublerelationthatthecontinuousproportionbetweentheSovereign，theprinceandthepeople，isbynomeansanarbitraryidea，butanecessaryconsequenceofthenatureofthebodypolitic。Itfollowsfurtherthat，oneoftheextremeterms，viz。，thepeople，assubject，beingfixedandrepresentedbyunity，whenevertheduplicateratioincreasesordiminishes，thesimpleratiodoesthesame，andischangedaccordingly。
Fromthisweseethatthereisnotasingleuniqueandabsoluteformofgovernment，butasmanygovernmentsdifferinginnatureasthereareStatesdifferinginsize。
If，ridiculingthissystem，anyoneweretosaythat，inordertofindthemeanproportionalandgiveformtothebodyofthegovernment，itisonlynecessary，accordingtome，tofindthesquarerootofthenumberofthepeople，IshouldanswerthatIamheretakingthisnumberonlyasaninstance;thattherelationsofwhichIamspeakingarenotmeasuredbythenumberofmenalone，butgenerallybytheamountofaction，whichisacombinationofamultitudeofcauses;andthat，further，if，tosavewords，Iborrowforamomentthetermsofgeometry，Iamnonethelesswellawarethatmoralquantitiesdonotallowofgeometricalaccuracy。
Thegovernmentisonasmallscalewhatthebodypoliticwhichincludesitisonagreatone。Itisamoralpersonendowedwithcertainfaculties，activeliketheSovereignandpassiveliketheState，andcapableofbeingresolvedintoothersimilarrelations。Thisaccordinglygivesrisetoanewproportion，withinwhichthereisyetanother，accordingtothearrangementofthemagistracies，tillanindivisiblemiddletermisreached，i。e。，asinglerulerorsuprememagistrate，whomayberepresented，inthemidstofthisprogression，astheunitybetweenthefractionalandtheordinalseries。
Withoutencumberingourselveswiththismultiplicationofterms，letusrestcontentwithregardinggovernmentasanewbodywithintheState，distinctfromthepeopleandtheSovereign，andintermediatebetweenthem。
Thereisbetweenthesetwobodiesthisessentialdifference，thattheStateexistsbyitself，andthegovernmentonlythroughtheSovereign。
Thusthedominantwilloftheprinceis，orshouldbe，nothingbutthegeneralwillorthelaw;hisforceisonlythepublicforceconcentratedinhishands，and，assoonashetriestobaseanyabsoluteandindependentactonhisownauthority，thetiethatbindsthewholetogetherbeginstobeloosened。IffinallytheprinceshouldcometohaveaparticularwillmoreactivethanthewilloftheSovereign，andshouldemploythepublicforceinhishandsinobediencetothisparticularwill，therewouldbe，sotospeak，twoSovereigns，onerightfulandtheotheractual，thesocialunionwouldevaporateinstantly，andthebodypoliticwouldbedissolved。
However，inorderthatthegovernmentmayhaveatrueexistenceandareallifedistinguishingitfromthebodyoftheState，andinorderthatallitsmembersmaybeabletoactinconcertandfulfiltheendforwhichitwassetup，itmusthaveaparticularpersonality，asensibilitycommontoitsmembers，andaforceandwillofitsownmakingforitspreservation。
Thisparticularexistenceimpliesassemblies，councils，poweranddeliberationanddecision，rights，titles，andprivilegesbelongingexclusivelytotheprinceandmakingtheofficeofmagistratemorehonourableinproportionasitismoretroublesome。Thedifficultieslieinthemannerofsoorderingthissubordinatewholewithinthewhole，thatitinnowayaltersthegeneralconstitutionbyaffirmationofitsown，andalwaysdistinguishestheparticularforceitpossesses，whichisdestinedtoaidinitspreservation，fromthepublicforce，whichisdestinedtothepreservationoftheState;and，inaword，isalwaysreadytosacrificethegovernmenttothepeople，andnevertosacrificethepeopletothegovernment。
Furthermore，althoughtheartificialbodyofthegovernmentistheworkofanotherartificialbody，andhas，wemaysay，onlyaborrowedandsubordinatelife，thisdoesnotpreventitfrombeingabletoactwithmoreorlessvigourorpromptitude，orfrombeing，sotospeak，inmoreorlessrobusthealth。Finally，withoutdepartingdirectlyfromtheendforwhichitwasinstituted，itmaydeviatemoreorlessfromit，accordingtothemannerofitsconstitution。
FromallthesedifferencesarisethevariousrelationswhichthegovernmentoughttobeartothebodyoftheState，accordingtotheaccidentalandparticularrelationsbywhichtheStateitselfismodified，foroftenthegovernmentthatisbestinitselfwillbecomethemostpernicious，iftherelationsinwhichitstandshavealteredaccordingtothedefectsofthebodypolitictowhichitbelongs。2。THECONSTITUENTPRINCIPLEINTHEVARIOUSFORMSOFGOVERNMENTTOsetforththegeneralcauseoftheabovedifferences，wemustheredistinguishbetweengovernmentanditsprinciple，aswedidbeforebetweentheStateandtheSovereign。
Thebodyofthemagistratemaybecomposedofagreateroralessnumberofmembers。WesaidthattherelationoftheSovereigntothesubjectswasgreaterinproportionasthepeoplewasmorenumerous，and，byaclearanalogy，wemaysaythesameoftherelationofthegovernmenttothemagistrates。
Butthetotalforceofthegovernment，beingalwaysthatoftheState，isinvariable;sothat，themoreofthisforceitexpendsonitsownmembers，thelessithaslefttoemployonthewholepeople。
Themorenumerousthemagistrates，therefore，theweakerthegovernment。
Thisprinciplebeingfundamental，wemustdoourbesttomakeitclear。
Inthepersonofthemagistratewecandistinguishthreeessentiallydifferentwills：first，theprivatewilloftheindividual，tendingonlytohispersonaladvantage;secondly，thecommonwillofthemagistrates，whichisrelativesolelytotheadvantageoftheprince，andmaybecalledcorporatewill，beinggeneralinrelationtothegovernment，andparticularinrelationtotheState，ofwhichthegovernmentformspart;and，inthethirdplace，thewillofthepeopleorthesovereignwill，whichisgeneralbothinrelationtotheStateregardedasthewhole，andtothegovernmentregardedasapartofthewhole。
Inaperfectactoflegislation，theindividualorparticularwillshouldbeatzero;thecorporatewillbelongingtothegovernmentshouldoccupyaverysubordinateposition;and，consequently，thegeneralorsovereignwillshouldalwayspredominateandshouldbethesoleguideofalltherest。
Accordingtothenaturalorder，ontheotherhand，thesedifferentwillsbecomemoreactiveinproportionastheyareconcentrated。Thus，thegeneralwillisalwaystheweakest，thecorporatewillsecond，andtheindividualwillstrongestofall：sothat，inthegovernment，eachmemberisfirstofallhimself，thenamagistrate，andthenacitizen？inanorderexactlythereverseofwhatthesocialsystemrequires。
Thisgranted，ifthewholegovernmentisinthehandsofoneman，theparticularandthecorporatewillarewhollyunited，andconsequentlythelatterisatitshighestpossibledegreeofintensity。But，astheusetowhichtheforceisputdependsonthedegreereachedbythewill，andastheabsoluteforceofthegovernmentisinvariable，itfollowsthatthemostactivegovernmentisthatofoneman。
Suppose，ontheotherhand，weunitethegovernmentwiththelegislativeauthority，andmaketheSovereignprincealso，andallthecitizenssomanymagistrates：thenthecorporatewill，beingconfoundedwiththegeneralwill，canpossessnogreateractivitythanthatwill，andmustleavetheparticularwillasstrongasitcanpossiblybe。Thus，thegovernment，havingalwaysthesameabsoluteforce，willbeatthelowestpointofitsrelativeforceoractivity。
Theserelationsareincontestable，andthereareotherconsiderationswhichstillfurtherconfirmthem。Wecansee，forinstance，thateachmagistrateismoreactiveinthebodytowhichhebelongsthaneachcitizeninthattowhichhebelongs，andthatconsequentlytheparticularwillhasmuchmoreinfluenceontheactsofthegovernmentthanonthoseoftheSovereign;
foreachmagistrateisalmostalwayschargedwithsomegovernmentalfunction，whileeachcitizen，takensingly，exercisesnofunctionofSovereignty。
Furthermore，thebiggertheStategrows，themoreitsrealforceincreases，thoughnotindirectproportiontoitsgrowth;but，theStateremainingthesame，thenumberofmagistratesmayincreasetoanyextent，withoutthegovernmentgaininganygreaterrealforce;foritsforceisthatoftheState，thedimensionofwhichremainsequal。Thustherelativeforceoractivityofthegovernmentdecreases，whileitsabsoluteorrealforcecannotincrease。
Moreover，itisacertaintythatpromptitudeinexecutiondiminishesasmorepeopleareputinchargeofit：whereprudenceismadetoomuchof，notenoughismadeoffortune;opportunityisletslip，anddeliberationresultsinthelossofitsobject。
Ihavejustprovedthatthegovernmentgrowsremissinproportionasthenumberofthemagistratesincreases;andIpreviouslyprovedthat，themorenumerousthepeople，thegreatershouldbetherepressiveforce。
FromthisitfollowsthattherelationofthemagistratestothegovernmentshouldvaryinverselytotherelationofthesubjectstotheSovereign;
thatistosay，thelargertheState，themoreshouldthegovernmentbetightened，sothatthenumberoftherulersdiminishinproportiontotheincreaseofthatofthepeople。
ItshouldbeaddedthatIamherespeakingoftherelativestrengthofthegovernment，andnotofitsrectitude：for，ontheotherhand，themorenumerousthemagistracy，thenearerthecorporatewillcomestothegeneralwill;while，underasinglemagistrate，thecorporatewillis，asIsaid，merelyaparticularwill。Thus，whatmaybegainedononesideislostontheother，andtheartofthelegislatoristoknowhowtofixthepointatwhichtheforceandthewillofthegovernment，whicharealwaysininverseproportion，meetintherelationthatismosttotheadvantageoftheState。3。THEDIVISIONOFGOVERNMENTSWEsawinthelastchapterwhatcausesthevariouskindsorformsofgovernmenttobedistinguishedaccordingtothenumberofthememberscomposingthem：itremainsinthistodiscoverhowthedivisionismade。
Inthefirstplace，theSovereignmaycommitthechargeofthegovernmenttothewholepeopleortothemajorityofthepeople，sothatmorecitizensaremagistratesthanaremereprivateindividuals。Thisformofgovernmentiscalleddemocracy。
Oritmayrestrictthegovernmenttoasmallnumber，sothattherearemoreprivatecitizensthanmagistrates;andthisisnamedaristocracy。
Lastly，itmayconcentratethewholegovernmentinthehandsofasinglemagistratefromwhomallothersholdtheirpower。Thisthirdformisthemostusual，andiscalledmonarchy，orroyalgovernment。
Itshouldberemarkedthatalltheseforms，oratleastthefirsttwo，admitofdegree，andevenofverywidedifferences;fordemocracymayincludethewholepeople，ormayberestrictedtohalf。Aristocracy，initsturn，mayberestrictedindefinitelyfromhalfthepeopledowntothesmallestpossiblenumber。Evenroyaltyissusceptibleofameasureofdistribution。
Spartaalwayshadtwokings，asitsconstitutionprovided;andtheRomanEmpiresawasmanyaseightemperorsatonce，withoutitbeingpossibletosaythattheEmpirewassplitup。Thusthereisapointatwhicheachformofgovernmentpassesintothenext，anditbecomesclearthat，underthreecomprehensivedenominations，governmentisreallysusceptibleofasmanydiverseformsastheStatehascitizens。
Thereareevenmore：for，asthegovernmentmayalso，incertainaspects，besubdividedintootherparts，oneadministeredinonefashionandoneinanother，thecombinationofthethreeformsmayresultinamultitudeofmixedforms，eachofwhichadmitsofmultiplicationbyallthesimpleforms。
Therehasbeenatalltimesmuchdisputeconcerningthebestformofgovernment，withoutconsiderationofthefactthateachisinsomecasesthebest，andinotherstheworst。
If，inthedifferentStates，thenumberofsuprememagistratesshouldbeininverseratiotothenumberofcitizens，itfollowsthat，generally，democraticgovernmentsuitssmallStates，aristocraticgovernmentthoseofmiddlesize，andmonarchygreatones。Thisruleisimmediatelydeduciblefromtheprinciplelaiddown。Butitisimpossibletocounttheinnumerablecircumstanceswhichmayfurnishexceptions。4。DEMOCRACYHEwhomakesthelawknowsbetterthananyoneelsehowitshouldbeexecutedandinterpreted。Itseemsthenimpossibletohaveabetterconstitutionthanthatinwhichtheexecutiveandlegislativepowersareunited;butthisveryfactrendersthegovernmentincertainrespectsinadequate，becausethingswhichshouldbedistinguishedareconfounded，andtheprinceandtheSovereign，beingthesameperson，form，sotospeak，nomorethanagovernmentwithoutgovernment。
Itisnotgoodforhimwhomakesthelawstoexecutethem，orforthebodyofthepeopletoturnitsattentionawayfromageneralstandpointanddevoteittoparticularobjects。Nothingismoredangerousthantheinfluenceofprivateinterestsinpublicaffairs，andtheabuseofthelawsbythegovernmentisalessevilthanthecorruptionofthelegislator，whichistheinevitablesequeltoaparticularstandpoint。Insuchacase，theStatebeingalteredinsubstance，allreformationbecomesimpossible，Apeoplethatwouldnevermisusegovernmentalpowerswouldnevermisuseindependence;apeoplethatwouldalwaysgovernwellwouldnotneedtobegoverned。
Ifwetaketheterminthestrictsense，thereneverhasbeenarealdemocracy，andthereneverwillbe。Itisagainstthenaturalorderforthemanytogovernandthefewtobegoverned。Itisunimaginablethatthepeopleshouldremaincontinuallyassembledtodevotetheirtimetopublicaffairs，anditisclearthattheycannotsetupcommissionsforthatpurposewithouttheformofadministrationbeingchanged。
Infact，Icanconfidentlylaydownasaprinciplethat，whenthefunctionsofgovernmentaresharedbyseveraltribunals，thelessnumeroussoonerorlateracquirethegreatestauthority，ifonlybecausetheyareinapositiontoexpediteaffairs，andpowerthusnaturallycomesintotheirhands。
Besides，howmanyconditionsthataredifficulttounitedoessuchagovernmentpresuppose！First，averysmallState，wherethepeoplecanreadilybegottogetherandwhereeachcitizencanwitheaseknowalltherest;secondly，greatsimplicityofmanners，topreventbusinessfrommultiplyingandraisingthornyproblems;next，alargemeasureofequalityinrankandfortune，withoutwhichequalityofrightsandauthoritycannotlongsubsist;lastly，littleornoluxury？forluxuryeithercomesofrichesormakesthemnecessary;itcorruptsatoncerichandpoor，therichbypossessionandthepoorbycovetousness;itsellsthecountrytosoftnessandvanity，andtakesawayfromtheStateallitscitizens，tomakethemslavesonetoanother，andoneandalltopublicopinion。
ThisiswhyafamouswriterhasmadevirtuethefundamentalprincipleofRepublics;E1foralltheseconditionscouldnotexistwithoutvirtue。But，forwantofthenecessarydistinctions，thatgreatthinkerwasofteninexact，andsometimesobscure，anddidnotseethat，thesovereignauthoritybeingeverywherethesame，thesameprincipleshouldbefoundineverywell-constitutedState，inagreaterorlessdegree，itistrue，accordingtotheformofthegovernment。
Itmaybeaddedthatthereisnogovernmentsosubjecttocivilwarsandintestineagitationsasdemocraticorpopulargovernment，becausethereisnonewhichhassostrongandcontinualatendencytochangetoanotherform，orwhichdemandsmorevigilanceandcourageforitsmaintenanceasitis。Undersuchaconstitutionaboveall，thecitizenshouldarmhimselfwithstrengthandconstancy，andsay，everydayofhislife，whatavirtuousCountPalatine19saidintheDietofPoland：Malopericulosamlibertatemquamquietumservitium。20
Werethereapeopleofgods，theirgovernmentwouldbedemocratic。Soperfectagovernmentisnotformen。5。ARISTOCRACYWEhaveheretwoquitedistinctmoralpersons，thegovernmentandtheSovereign，andinconsequencetwogeneralwills，onegeneralinrelationtoallthecitizens，theotheronlyforthemembersoftheadministration。Thus，althoughthegovernmentmayregulateitsinternalpolicyasitpleases，itcanneverspeaktothepeoplesaveinthenameoftheSovereign，thatis，ofthepeopleitself，afactwhichmustnotbeforgotten。
Thefirstsocietiesgovernedthemselvesaristocratically。Theheadsoffamiliestookcounseltogetheronpublicaffairs。Theyoungbowedwithoutquestiontotheauthorityofexperience。Hencesuchnamesaspriests，elders，senate，andgerontes。ThesavagesofNorthAmericagovernthemselvesinthiswayevennow，andtheirgovernmentisadmirable。
But，inproportionasartificialinequalityproducedbyinstitutionsbecamepredominantovernaturalinequality，richesorpower21wereputbeforeage，andaristocracybecameelective。Finally，thetransmissionofthefather’spoweralongwithhisgoodstohischildren，bycreatingpatricianfamilies，madegovernmenthereditary，andtherecametobesenatorsoftwenty。
Therearethenthreesortsofaristocracy？natural，electiveandhereditary。
Thefirstisonlyforsimplepeoples;thethirdistheworstofallgovernments;
thesecondisthebest，andisaristocracyproperlysocalled。
Besidestheadvantagethatliesinthedistinctionbetweenthetwopowers，itpresentsthatofitsmembersbeingchosen;for，inpopulargovernment，allthecitizensarebornmagistrates;butheremagistracyisconfinedtoafew，whobecomesuchonlybyelection。22Bythismeansuprightness，understanding，experienceandallotherclaimstopre-eminenceandpublicesteembecomesomanyfurtherguaranteesofwisegovernment。
Moreover，assembliesaremoreeasilyheld，affairsbetterdiscussedandcarriedoutwithmoreorderanddiligence，andthecreditoftheStateisbettersustainedabroadbyvenerablesenatorsthanbyamultitudethatisunknownordespised。
Inaword，itisthebestandmostnaturalarrangementthatthewisestshouldgovernthemany，whenitisassuredthattheywillgovernforitsprofit，andnotfortheirown。Thereisnoneedtomultiplyinstruments，orgettwentythousandmentodowhatahundredpickedmencandoevenbetter。Butitmustnotbeforgottenthatcorporateinterestherebeginstodirectthepublicpowerlessundertheregulationofthegeneralwill，andthatafurtherinevitablepropensitytakesawayfromthelawspartoftheexecutivepower。
Ifwearetospeakofwhatisindividuallydesirable，neithershouldtheStatebesosmall，norapeoplesosimpleandupright，thattheexecutionofthelawsfollowsimmediatelyfromthepublicwill，asitdoesinagooddemocracy。NorshouldthenationbesogreatthattherulershavetoscatterinordertogovernitandareabletoplaytheSovereigneachinhisowndepartment，and，beginningbymakingthemselvesindependent，endbybecomingmasters。
Butifaristocracydoesnotdemandallthevirtuesneededbypopulargovernment，itdemandsotherswhicharepeculiartoitself;forinstance，moderationonthesideoftherichandcontentmentonthatofthepoor;
foritseemsthatthorough-goingequalitywouldbeoutofplace，asitwasnotfoundevenatSparta。
Furthermore，ifthisformofgovernmentcarrieswithitacertaininequalityoffortune，thisisjustifiableinorderthatasaruletheadministrationofpublicaffairsmaybeentrustedtothosewhoaremostabletogivethemtheirwholetime，butnot，asAristotlemaintains，inorderthattherichmayalwaysbeputfirst。Onthecontrary，itisofimportancethatanoppositechoiceshouldoccasionallyteachthepeoplethatthedesertsofmenofferclaimstopre-eminencemoreimportantthanthoseofriches。6。MONARCHYSofar，wehaveconsideredtheprinceasamoralandcollectiveperson，unifiedbytheforceofthelaws，andthedepositaryintheStateoftheexecutivepower。Wehavenowtoconsiderthispowerwhenitisgatheredtogetherintothehandsofanaturalperson，arealman，whoalonehastherighttodisposeofitinaccordancewiththelaws。Suchapersoniscalledamonarchorking。
Incontrastwithotherformsofadministration，inwhichacollectivebeingstandsforanindividual，inthisformanindividualstandsforacollectivebeing;sothatthemoralunitythatconstitutestheprinceisatthesametimeaphysicalunity，andallthequalities，whichintheothercaseareonlywithdifficultybroughttogetherbythelaw，arefoundnaturallyunited。
Thusthewillofthepeople，thewilloftheprince，thepublicforceoftheState，andtheparticularforceofthegovernment，allanswertoasinglemotivepower;allthespringsofthemachineareinthesamehands，thewholemovestowardsthesameend;therearenoconflictingmovementstocanceloneanother，andnokindofconstitutioncanbeimaginedinwhichalessamountofeffortproducesamoreconsiderableamountofaction。
Archimedes，seatedquietlyonthebankandeasilydrawingagreatvesselafloat，standstomymindforaskilfulmonarch，governingvaststatesfromhisstudy，andmovingeverythingwhileheseemshimselfunmoved。
Butifnogovernmentismorevigorousthanthis，thereisalsononeinwhichtheparticularwillholdsmoreswayandrulestherestmoreeasily。
Everythingmovestowardsthesameendindeed，butthisendisbynomeansthatofthepublichappiness，andeventheforceoftheadministrationconstantlyshowsitselfprejudicialtotheState。
Kingsdesiretobeabsolute，andmenarealwayscryingouttothemfromafarthatthebestmeansofbeingsoistogetthemselveslovedbytheirpeople。Thispreceptisallverywell，andeveninsomerespectsverytrue。
Unfortunately，itwillalwaysbederidedatcourt。Thepowerwhichcomesofapeople’sloveisnodoubtthegreatest;butitisprecariousandconditional，andprinceswillneverrestcontentwithit。Thebestkingsdesiretobeinapositiontobewicked，iftheyplease，withoutforfeitingtheirmastery：
politicalsermonisersmaytellthemtotheirhearts’contentthat，thepeople’sstrengthbeingtheirown，theirfirstinterestisthatthepeopleshouldbeprosperous，numerousandformidable;theyarewellawarethatthisisuntrue。Theirfirstpersonalinterestisthatthepeopleshouldbeweak，wretched，andunabletoresistthem。Iadmitthat，providedthesubjectsremainedalwaysinsubmission，theprince’sinterestwouldindeedbethatitshouldbepowerful，inorderthatitspower，beinghisown，mightmakehimformidabletohisneighbours;but，thisinterestbeingmerelysecondaryandsubordinate，andstrengthbeingincompatiblewithsubmission，princesnaturallygivethepreferencealwaystotheprinciplethatismoretotheirimmediateadvantage。ThisiswhatSamuelputstronglybeforetheHebrews，andwhatMachiavellihasclearlyshown。Heprofessedtoteachkings;butitwasthepeoplehereallytaught。HisPrinceisthebookofRepublicans。23
Wefound，ongeneralgrounds，thatmonarchyissuitableonlyforgreatStates，andthisisconfirmedwhenweexamineitinitself。Themorenumerousthepublicadministration，thesmallerbecomestherelationbetweentheprinceandthesubjects，andtheneareritcomestoequality，sothatindemocracytheratioisunity，orabsoluteequality。Again，asthegovernmentisrestrictedinnumberstheratioincreasesandreachesitsmaximumwhenthegovernmentisinthehandsofasingleperson。Thereisthentoogreatadistancebetweenprinceandpeople，andtheStatelacksabondofunion。Toformsuchabond，theremustbeintermediateorders，andprinces，personagesandnobilitytocomposethem。ButnosuchthingssuitasmallState，towhichallclassdifferencesmeanruin。
If，however，itishardforagreatStatetobewellgoverned，itismuchharderforittobesobyasingleman;andeveryoneknowswhathappenswhenkingssubstituteothersforthemselves。
Anessentialandinevitabledefect，whichwillalwaysrankmonarchicalbelowtherepublicangovernment，isthatinarepublicthepublicvoicehardlyeverraisestothehighestpositionsmenwhoarenotenlightenedandcapable，andsuchastofillthemwithhonour;whileinmonarchiesthosewhorisetothetoparemostoftenmerelypettyblunderers，pettyswindlers，andpettyintriguers，whosepettytalentscausethemtogetintothehighestpositionsatCourt，but，assoonastheyhavegotthere，serveonlytomaketheirineptitudecleartothepublic。Thepeopleisfarlessoftenmistakeninitschoicethantheprince;andamanofrealworthamongtheking’sministersisalmostasrareasafoolattheheadofarepublicangovernment。Thus，when，bysomefortunatechance，oneoftheseborngovernorstakesthehelmofStateinsomemonarchythathasbeennearlyoverwhelmedbyswarmsof"gentlemanly"administrators，thereisnothingbutamazementattheresourceshediscovers，andhiscomingmarksanerainhiscountry’shistory。
ForamonarchicalStatetohaveachanceofbeingwellgoverned，itspopulationandextentmustbeproportionatetotheabilitiesofitsgovernor。
Itiseasiertoconquerthantorule。Withalongenoughlever，theworldcouldbemovedwithasinglefinger;tosustainitneedstheshouldersofHercules。HoweversmallaStatemaybe，theprinceishardlyeverbigenoughforit。When，ontheotherhand，ithappensthattheStateistoosmallforitsruler，intheserarecasestooitisillgoverned，becausetheruler，constantlypursuinghisgreatdesigns，forgetstheinterestsofthepeople，andmakesitnolesswretchedbymisusingthetalentshehas，thanaruleroflesscapacitywouldmakeitforwantofthosehehadnot。Akingdomshould，sotospeak，expandorcontractwitheachreign，accordingtotheprince’scapabilities;but，theabilitiesofasenatebeingmoreconstantinquantity，theStatecanthenhavepermanentfrontierswithouttheadministrationsuffering。
Thedisadvantagethatismostfeltinmonarchicalgovernmentisthewantofthecontinuoussuccessionwhich，inboththeotherforms，providesanunbrokenbondofunion。Whenonekingdies，anotherisneeded;electionsleavedangerousintervalsandarefullofstorms;andunlessthecitizensaredisinterestedanduprighttoadegreewhichveryseldomgoeswiththiskindofgovernment，intrigueandcorruptionabound。HetowhomtheStatehassolditselfcanhardlyhelpsellingitinhisturnandrepayinghimself，attheexpenseoftheweak，themoneythepowerfulhavewrungfromhim。
Undersuchanadministration，venalitysoonerorlaterspreadsthrougheverypart，andpeacesoenjoyedunderakingisworsethanthedisordersofaninterregnum。
Whathasbeendonetopreventtheseevils？Crownshavebeenmadehereditaryincertainfamilies，andanorderofsuccessionhasbeensetup，topreventdisputesfromarisingonthedeathofkings。Thatistosay，thedisadvantagesofregencyhavebeenputinplaceofthoseofelection，apparenttranquillityhasbeenpreferredtowiseadministration，andmenhavechosenrathertoriskhavingchildren，monstrosities，orimbecilesasrulerstohavingdisputesoverthechoiceofgoodkings。Ithasnotbeentakenintoaccountthat，insoexposingourselvestotherisksthispossibilityentails，wearesettingalmostallthechancesagainstus。TherewassoundsenseinwhattheyoungerDionysiussaidtohisfather，whoreproachedhimfordoingsomeshamefuldeedbyasking，"DidIsetyoutheexample？""No，"answeredhisson，"butyourfatherwasnotking。"
Everythingconspirestotakeawayfromamanwhoissetinauthorityoverothersthesenseofjusticeandreason。Muchtrouble，wearetold，istakentoteachyoungprincestheartofreigning;buttheireducationseemstodothemnogood。Itwouldbebettertobeginbyteachingthemtheartofobeying。Thegreatestkingswhosepraiseshistorytellswerenotbroughtuptoreign：reigningisascienceweareneversofarfrompossessingaswhenwehavelearnttoomuchofit，andoneweacquirebetterbyobeyingthanbycommanding。"Namutilissimusidemacbrevissimusbonarummalarumquererumdelectuscogitarequidautnoluerissubalioprincipe，autvolueris。"24
Oneresultofthislackofcoherenceistheinconstancyofroyalgovernment，which，regulatednowononeschemeandnowonanother，accordingtothecharacterofthereigningprinceorthosewhoreignforhim，cannotforlonghaveafixedobjectoraconsistentpolicy？andthisvariability，notfoundintheotherformsofgovernment，wheretheprinceisalwaysthesame，causestheStatetobealwaysshiftingfromprincipletoprincipleandfromprojecttoproject。Thuswemaysaythatgenerally，ifacourtismoresubtleinintrigue，thereismorewisdominasenate，andRepublicsadvancetowardstheirendsbymoreconsistentandbetterconsideredpolicies;
whileeveryrevolutioninaroyalministrycreatesarevolutionintheState;fortheprinciplecommontoallministersandnearlyallkingsistodoineveryrespectthereverseofwhatwasdonebytheirpredecessors。
Thisincoherencefurtherclearsupasophismthatisveryfamiliartoroyalistpoliticalwriters;notonlyiscivilgovernmentlikenedtodomesticgovernment，andtheprincetothefatherofafamily？thiserrorhasalreadybeenrefuted？buttheprinceisalsofreelycreditedwithallthevirtuesheoughttopossess，andissupposedtobealwayswhatheshouldbe。Thissuppositiononcemade，royalgovernmentisclearlypreferabletoallothers，becauseitisincontestablythestrongest，and，tobethebestalso，wantsonlyacorporatewillmoreinconformitywiththegeneralwill。
Butif，accordingtoPlato，25the"kingbynature"issuchararity，howoftenwillnatureandfortuneconspiretogivehimacrown？And，ifroyaleducationnecessarilycorruptsthosewhoreceiveit，whatistobehopedfromaseriesofmenbroughtuptoreign？Itis，then，wantonself-deceptiontoconfuseroyalgovernmentwithgovernmentbyagoodking。Toseesuchgovernmentasitisinitself，wemustconsideritasitisunderprinceswhoareincompetentorwicked：
foreithertheywillcometothethronewickedorincompetent，orthethronewillmakethemso。