INTRODUCTIONTOTHESCIENCEOFRIGHT。
　　GENERALDEFINITIONS，ANDDIVISIONS。
　　A。WhattheScienceofRightis。
　　TheScienceofRighthasforitsobjecttheprinciplesofallthelawswhichitispossibletopromulgatebyexternallegislation。Wherethereissuchalegislation，itbecomes，inactualapplicationtoit，asystemofpositiverightandlaw;andhewhoisversedintheknowledgeofthissystemiscalledajuristorjurisconsult（jurisconsultus）。Apracticaljurisconsult（jurisperitus），oraprofessionallawyer，isonewhoisskilledintheknowledgeofpositiveexternallaws，andwhocanapplythemtocasesthatmayoccurinexperience。Suchpracticalknowledgeofpositiveright，andlaw，mayberegardedasbelongingtojurisprudence（jurisprudentia）intheoriginalsenseoftheterm。Butthetheoreticalknowledgeofrightandlawinprinciple，asdistinguishedfrompositivelawsandempiricalcases，belongstothepurescienceofright（jurisscientia）。
　　Thescienceofrightthusdesignatesthephilosophicalandsystematicknowledgeoftheprinciplesofnaturalright。Anditisfromthissciencethattheimmutableprinciplesofallpositivelegislationmustbederivedbypracticaljuristsandlawgivers。
　　B。WhatisRight？
　　Thisquestionmaybesaidtobeaboutasembarrassingtothejuristasthewell—knownquestion，"Whatistruth？"istothelogician。Itisallthemoreso，if，onreflection，hestrivestoavoidtautologyinhisreplyandrecognisethefactthatareferencetowhatholdstruemerelyofthelawsofsomeonecountryataparticulartimeisnotasolutionofthegeneralproblemthusproposed。Itisquiteeasytostatewhatmayberightinparticularcases（quidsitjuris），asbeingwhatthelawsofacertainplaceandofacertaintimesayormayhavesaid;butitismuchmoredifficulttodeterminewhetherwhattheyhaveenactedisrightinitself，andtolaydownauniversalcriterionbywhichrightandwrongingeneral，andwhatisjustandunjust，mayberecognised。Allthismayremainentirelyhiddenevenfromthepracticaljuristuntilheabandonhisempiricalprinciplesforatimeandsearchinthepurereasonforthesourcesofsuchjudgements，inordertolayarealfoundationforactualpositivelegislation。Inthissearch，hisempiricallawsmay，indeed，furnishhimwithexcellentguidance;butamerelyempiricalsystemthatisvoidofrationalprinciplesis，likethewoodenheadinthefableofPhaedrus，fineenoughinappearance，butunfortunatelyitwantsbrain。
　　1。Theconceptionofright—asreferringtoacorrespondingobligationwhichisthemoralaspectofit—inthefirstplace，hasregardonlytotheexternalandpracticalrelationofonepersontoanother，insofarastheycanhaveinfluenceuponeachother，immediatelyormediately，bytheiractionsasfacts。2。Inthesecondplace，theconceptionofrightdoesnotindicatetherelationoftheactionofanindividualtothewishorthemeredesireofanother，asinactsofbenevolenceorofunkindness，butonlytherelationofhisfreeactiontothefreedomofactionoftheother。
　　3。And，inthethirdplace，inthisreciprocalrelationofvoluntaryactions，theconceptionofrightdoesnottakeintoconsiderationthematterofthematteroftheactofwillinsofarastheendwhichanyonemayhaveinviewinwillingitisconcerned。Inotherwords，itisnotaskedinaquestionofrightwhetheranyoneonbuyinggoodsforhisownbusinessrealizesaprofitbythetransactionornot;
　　butonlytheformofthetransactionistakenintoaccount，inconsideringtherelationofthemutualactsofwill。Actsofwillorvoluntarychoicearethusregardedonlyinsofarastheyarefree，andastowhethertheactionofonecanharmonizewiththefreedomofanother，accordingtoauniversallaw。
　　Right，therefore，comprehendsthewholeoftheconditionsunderwhichthevoluntaryactionsofanyonepersoncanbeharmonizedinrealitywiththevoluntaryactionsofeveryotherperson，accordingtoauniversallawoffreedom。
　　C。UniversalPrincipleofRight。
　　"Everyactionisrightwhichinitself，orinthemaximonwhichitproceeds，issuchthatitcancoexistalongwiththefreedomofthewillofeachandallinaction，accordingtoauniversallaw。"
　　If，then，myactionormyconditiongenerallycancoexistwiththefreedomofeveryother，accordingtoauniversallaw，anyonedoesmeawrongwhohindersmeintheperformanceofthisaction，orinthemaintenanceofthiscondition。Forsuchahindranceorobstructioncannotcoexistwithfreedomaccordingtouniversallaws。
　　Itfollowsalsothatitcannotbedemandedasamatterofright，thatthisuniversalprincipleofallmaximsshallitselfbeadoptedasmymaxim，thatis，thatIshallmakeitthemaximofmyactions。Foranyonemaybefree，althoughhisfreedomisentirelyindifferenttome，orevenifIwishedinmyhearttoinfringeit，solongasIdonotactuallyviolatethatfreedombymyexternalaction。Ethics，however，asdistinguishedfromjurisprudence，imposesuponmetheobligationtomakethefulfillmentofrightamaximofmyconduct。
　　Theuniversallawofrightmaythenbeexpressedthus："Actexternallyinsuchamannerthatthefreeexerciseofthywillmaybeabletocoexistwiththefreedomofallothers，accordingtoauniversallaw。"Thisisundoubtedlyalawwhichimposesobligationuponme;butitdoesnotatallimplyandstilllesscommandthatI
　　ought，merelyonaccountofthisobligation，tolimitmyfreedomtotheseveryconditions。Reasoninthisconnectionsaysonlythatitisrestrictedthusfarbyitsidea，andmaybelikewisethuslimitedinfactbyothers;anditlaysthisdownasapostulatewhichisnotcapableoffurtherproof。Astheobjectinviewisnottoteachvirtue，buttoexplainwhatrightis，thusfarthelawofright，asthuslaiddown，maynotandshouldnotberepresentedasamotive—principleofaction。
　　D。RightisConjoinedwiththeTitleorAuthoritytoCompel。
　　Theresistancewhichisopposedtoanyhindranceofaneffectisinrealityafurtheranceofthiseffectandisinaccordancewithitsaccomplishment。Now，everythingthatiswrongisahindranceoffreedom，accordingtouniversallaws;andcompulsionorconstraintofanykindisahindranceorresistancemadetofreedom。
　　Consequently，ifacertainexerciseoffreedomisitselfahindranceofthefreedomthatisaccordingtouniversallaws，itiswrong;andthecompulsionofconstraintwhichisopposedtoitisright，asbeingahinderingofahindranceoffreedom，andasbeinginaccordwiththefreedomwhichexistsinaccordancewithuniversallaws。Hence，accordingtothelogicalprincipleofcontradiction，allrightisaccompaniedwithanimpliedtitleorwarranttobringcompulsiontobearonanyonewhomayviolateitinfact。
　　E。StrictRightmaybealsoRepresentedasthePossibilityofaUniversalReciprocalCompulsioninharmonywiththeFreedomofAllaccordingtoUniversalLaws。
　　Thispropositionmeanstherightisnottoberegardedascomposedoftwodifferentelements—obligationaccordingtoalaw，andatitleonthepartofonewhohasboundanotherbyhisownfreechoicetocompelhimtoperform。Butitimportsthattheconceptionofrightmaybeviewedasconsistingimmediatelyinthepossibilityofauniversalreciprocalcompulsion，inharmonywiththefreedomofall。
　　Asrightingeneralhasforitsobjectonlywhatisexternalinactions，strictright，asthatwithwhichnothingethicalisintermingled，requiresnoothermotivesofactionthanthosethataremerelyexternal;foritisthenpurerightandisunmixedwithanyprescriptionsofvirtue。Astrictright，then，intheexactsenseoftheterm，isthatwhichalonecanbecalledwhollyexternal。Nowsuchrightisfounded，nodoubt，upontheconsciousnessoftheobligationofeveryindividualaccordingtothelaw;butifitistobepureassuch，itneithermaynorshouldrefertothisconsciousnessasamotivebywhichtodeterminethefreeactofthewill。Forthispurpose，however，itfoundsupontheprincipleofthepossibilityofanexternalcompulsion，suchasmaycoexistwiththefreedomofeveryoneaccordingtouniversallaws。Accordingly，then，whereitissaidthatacreditorhasarighttodemandfromadebtorthepaymentofhisdebt，thisdoesnotmeanmerelythathecanbringhimtofeelinhismindthatreasonobligeshimtodothis;butitmeansthathecanapplyanexternalcompulsiontoforceanysuchonesotopay，andthatthiscompulsionisquiteconsistentwiththefreedomofall，includingthepartiesinquestion，accordingtoauniversallaw。Rightandthetitletocompel，thusindicatethesamething。
　　Thelawofright，asthusenunciated，isrepresentedasareciprocalcompulsionnecessarilyinaccordancewiththefreedomofeveryone，undertheprincipleofauniversalfreedom。Itisthus，asitwere，arepresentativeconstructionoftheconceptionofright，byexhibitingitinapureintuitiveperceptionapriori，aftertheanalogyofthepossibilityofthefreemotionsofbodiesunderthephysicallawoftheequalityofactionandreaction。Now，asinpuremathematics，wecannotdeducethepropertiesofitsobjectsimmediatelyfromamereabstractconception，butcanonlydiscoverthembyfigurativeconstructionorrepresentationofitsconceptions;soitisinlikemannerwiththeprincipleofright。Itisnotsomuchthemereformalconceptionofright，butratherthatofauniversalandequalreciprocalcompulsionasharmonizingwithit，andreducedundergenerallaws，thatmakesrepresentationofthatconceptionpossible。Butjustasthoseconceptionspresentedindynamicsarefoundeduponamerelyformalrepresentationofpuremathematicsaspresentedingeometry，reasonhastakencarealsotoprovidetheunderstandingasfaraspossiblewithintuitivepresentationsaprioriinbehoofofaconstructionoftheconceptionofright。Therightingeometricallines（rectum）isopposed，asthestraight，tothatwhichiscurvedandtothatwhichisoblique。Inthefirstopposition，thereisinvolvedaninnerqualityofthelinesofsuchanaturethatthereisonlyonestraightorrightlinepossiblebetweentwogivenpoints。Inthesecondcase，again，thepositionsoftwointersectingormeetinglinesareofsuchanaturethattherecanlikewisebeonlyonelinecalledtheperpendicular，whichisnotmoreinclinedtotheonesidethantheother，anditdividesspaceoneithersideintotwoequalparts。Afterthemannerofthisanalogy，thescienceofrightaimsatdeterminingwhateveryoneshallhaveashisownwithmathematicalexactness;butthisisnottobeexpectedintheethicalscienceofvirtue，asitcannotbutallowacertainlatitudeforexceptions。But，withoutpassingintothesphereofethics，therearetwocases—knownastheequivocalrightofequityandnecessity—whichclaimajuridicaldecision，yetforwhichnoonecanbefoundtogivesuchadecision，andwhich，asregardstheirrelationtorights，belong，asitwere，tothe"Intermundia"
　　ofEpicurus。Thesewemustattheoutsettakeapartfromthespecialexpositionofthescienceofright，towhichwearenowabouttoadvance;andwemayconsiderthemnowbywayofsupplementtotheseintroductoryexplanations，inorderthattheiruncertainconditionsmaynotexertadisturbinginfluenceonthefixedprinciplesoftheproperdoctrineofright。
　　F。SupplementaryRemarksonEquivocalRight。
　　（JusAequivocum）。
　　Witheveryright，inthestrictacceptation（jusstrictum），thereisconjoinedarighttocompel。Butitispossibletothinkofotherrightsofawiderkind（juslatum）inwhichthetitletocompelcannotbedeterminedbyanylaw。Nowtherearetworealorsupposedrightsofthiskind—equityandtherightofnecessity。Thefirstallegesarightthatiswithoutcompulsion;thesecondadoptsacompulsionthatiswithoutright。Thisequivocalness，however，canbeeasilyshowntorestonthepeculiarfactthattherearecasesofdoubtfulright，forthedecisionofwhichnojudgecanbeappointed。
　　I。Equity。
　　Equity（aequitas），regardedobjectively，doesnotproperlyconstituteaclaimuponthemoraldutyofbenevolenceorbeneficenceonthepartofothers;butwhoeverinsistsuponanythingonthegroundofequity，foundsuponhisrighttothesame。Inthiscase，however，theconditionsareawantingthatarerequisiteforthefunctionofajudgeinorderthatbemightdeterminewhatorwhatkindofsatisfactioncanbedonetothisclaim。Whenoneofthepartnersofamercantilecompany，formedundertheconditionofequalprofits，has，however，donemorethantheothermembers，andinconsequencehasalsolostmore，itisinaccordancewithequitythatheshoulddemandfromthecompanymorethanmerelyanequalshareofadvantagewiththerest。But，inrelationtostrictright—ifwethinkofajudgeconsideringhiscase—hecanfurnishnodefinitedatatoestablishhowmuchmorebelongstohimbythecontract;andincaseofanactionatlaw，suchademandwouldberejected。Adomesticservant，again，whomightbepaidhiswagesduetotheendofhisyearofserviceinacoinagethatbecamedepreciatedwithinthatperiod，sothatitwouldnotbeofthesamevaluetohimasitwaswhenheenteredonhisengagement，cannotclaimbyrighttobekeptfromlossonaccountoftheunequalvalueofthemoneyifhereceivesthedueamountofit。Hecanonlymakeanappealonthegroundofequity，—
　　adumbgoddesswhocannotclaimabearingofright，—becausetherewasnothingbearingonthispointinthecontractofservice，andajudgecannotgiveadecreeonthebasisofvagueorindefiniteconditions。
　　Henceitfollows，thatacourtofequity，forthedecisionofdisputedquestionsofright，wouldinvolveacontradiction。Itisonlywherehisownproperrightsareconcerned，andinmattersinwhichhecandecide，thatajudgemayoroughttogiveahearingtoequity。Thus，iftheCrownissupplicatedtogiveanindemnitytocertainpersonsforlossorinjurysustainedinitsservice，itmayundertaketheburdenofdoingso，although，accordingtostrictright，theclaimmightberejectedonthegroundofthepretextthatthepartiesinquestionundertooktheperformanceoftheserviceoccasioningtheloss，attheirownrisk。
　　Thedictumofequitymaybeputthus："Thestrictestrightisthegreatestwrong"（summumjussummainjuria）。Butthisevilcannotbeobviatedbytheformsofright，althoughitrelatestoamatterofright;forthegrievancethatitgivesrisetocanonlybeputbeforea"courtofconscience"（forumpoli），whereaseveryquestionofrightmustbetakenbeforeacivilcourt（forumsoli）。
　　II。TheRightofNecessity。
　　Theso—calledrightofnecessity（jusnecessitatis）isthesupposedrightortitle，incaseofthedangeroflosingmyownlife，totakeawaythelifeofanotherwhohas，infact，donemenoharm。Itisevidentthat，viewedasadoctrineofright，thismustinvolveacontradiction，Forthisisnotthecaseofawrongfulaggressormakinganunjustassaultuponmylife，andwhomIanticipatebydeprivinghimofhisown（jusinculpataetutelae）;norconsequentlyisitaquestionmerelyoftherecommendationofmoderationwhichbelongstoethicsasthedoctrineofvirtue，andnottojurisprudenceasthedoctrineofright。Itisaquestionoftheallowablenessofusingviolenceagainstonewhohasusednoneagainstme。
　　Itisclearthattheassertionofsucharightisnottobeunderstoodobjectivelyasbeinginaccordancewithwhatalawwouldprescribe，butmerelysubjectively，asproceedingontheassumptionofhowasentencewouldbepronouncedbyacourtinthecase。Therecan，infact，benocriminallawassigningthepenaltyofdeathtoamanwho，whenshipwreckedandstrugglinginextremedangerforhislife，andinordertosaveit，maythrustanotherfromaplankonwhichhehadsavedhimself。Forthepunishmentthreatenedbythelawcouldnotpossiblyhavegreaterpowerthanthefearofthelossoflifeinthecaseinquestion。Suchapenallawwouldthusfailaltogethertoexerciseitsintendedeffect;forthethreatofanevilwhichisstilluncertain—suchasdeathbyajudicialsentence—
　　couldnotovercomethefearofanevilwhichiscertain，asdrowningisinsuchcircumstances。Anactofviolentself—preservation，then，oughtnottobeconsideredasaltogetherbeyondcondemnation（inculpabile）;itisonlytobeadjudgedasexemptfrompunishment（impunibile）。Yetthissubjectiveconditionofimpunity，byastrangeconfusionofideas，hasbeenregardedbyjuristsasequivalenttoobjectivelawfulness。
　　Thedictumoftherightofnecessityisputintheseterms：
　　"Necessityhasnolaw"（Necessitasnonhabetlegem）。Andyettherecannotbeanecessitythatcouldmakewhatiswronglawful。
　　Itisapparent，then，thatin。judgementsrelatingbothto"equity"and"therightofnecessity，"theequivocationsinvolvedarisefromaninterchangeoftheobjectiveandsubjectivegroundsthatenterintotheapplicationoftheprinciplesofright，whenviewedrespectivelybyreasonorbyajudicialtribunal。Whatonemayhavegoodgroundsforrecognisingasright，initself，maynotfindconfirmationinacourtofjustice;andwhathemustconsidertobewrong，initself，mayobtainrecognitioninsuchacourt。Andthereasonofthisisthattheconceptionofrightisnottakeninthetwocasesinoneandthesamesense。
　　DIVISION
　　DIVISIONOFTHESCIENCEOFRIGHT。
　　A。GeneralDivisionoftheDutiesofRight。
　　（JuridicalDuties）。
　　InthisdivisionwemayveryconvenientlyfollowUlpian，ifhisthreeformulaearetakeninageneralsense，whichmaynothavebeenquiteclearlyinhismind，butwhichtheyarecapableofbeingdevelopedintoorofreceiving。Theyarethefollowing：
　　1。Honestevive。"Liverightly。"juridicalrectitude，orhonour（honestasjuridica），consistsinmaintainingone’sownworthasamaninrelationtoothers。Thisdutymayberenderedbytheproposition："Donotmakethyselfameremeansfortheuseofothers，butbetothemlikewiseanend。"Thisdutywillbeexplainedinthenextformulaasanobligationarisingoutoftherightofhumanityinourownperson（lexjusti）。
　　2。Neminemlaede。"Dowrongtonoone。"Thisformulamayberenderedsoastomean："Donowrongtoanyone，evenifthoushouldstbeunderthenecessity，inobservingthisduty，toceasefromallconnectionwithothersandtoavoidallsociety"（lexjuridica）。
　　3。Suumcuiquetribue。"Assigntoeveryonewhatishisown。"Thismayberendered，"Enter，ifwrongcannotbeavoided，intoasocietywithothersinwhicheveryonemayhavesecuredtohimwhatishisown。"Ifthisformulaweretobesimplytranslated，"Giveeveryonehisown，"itwouldexpressanabsurdity，forwecannotgiveanyonewhathealreadyhas。Ifitistohaveadefinitemeaning，itmustthereforerunthus："Enterintoastateinwhicheveryonecanhavewhatishisownsecuredagainsttheactionofeveryother"（lexjustitiae）。
　　Thesethreeclassicalformulae，atthesametime，representprincipleswhichsuggestadivisionofthesystemofjuridicaldutiesintointernalduties，externalduties，andthoseconnectingdutieswhichcontainthelatterasdeducedfromtheprincipleoftheformerbysubsumption。
　　B。UniversalDivisionofRights。
　　I。NaturalRightandPositiveRight。Thesystemofrights，viewedasascientificsystemofdoctrines，isdividedintonaturalrightandpositiveright。Naturalrightrestsuponpurerationalprinciplesapriori;positiveorstatutoryrightiswhatproceedsfromthewillofalegislator。
　　II。InnateRightandAcquiredRight。Thesystemofrightsmayagainberegardedinreferencetotheimpliedpowersofdealingmorallywithothersasboundbyobligations，thatis，asfurnishingalegaltitleofactioninrelationtothem。Thusviewed，thesystemisdividedintoinnaterightandacquiredright。Innaterightisthatrightwhichbelongstoeveryonebynature，independentofalljuridicalactsofexperience。Acquiredrightisthatrightwhichisfoundeduponsuchjuridicalacts。
　　Innaterightmayalsobecalledthe"internalmineandthine"
　　（meumveltuuminternum）forexternalrightmustalwaysbeacquired。
　　ThereisonlyoneInnateRight，theBirthrightofFreedom。
　　Freedomisindependenceofthecompulsorywillofanother;andinsofarasitcancoexistwiththefreedomofallaccordingtoauniversallaw，itistheonesoleoriginal，inbornrightbelongingtoeverymaninvirtueofhishumanity。Thereis，indeed，aninnateequalitybelongingtoeverymanwhichconsistsinhisrighttobeindependentofbeingboundbyotherstoanythingmorethanthattowhichhemayalsoreciprocallybindthem。Itis，consequently，theinbornqualityofeverymaninvirtueofwhichheoughttobehisownmasterbyright（suijuris）。Thereis，also，thenaturalqualityofjustnessattributabletoamanasnaturallyofunimpeachableright（justi），becausebehasdonenowrongtoanyonepriortohisownjuridicalactions。And，further，thereisalsotheinnaterightofcommonactiononthepartofeveryman，sothathemaydotowardsotherswhatdoesnotinfringetheirrightsortakeawayanythingthatistheirsunlesstheyarewillingtoappropriateit;suchmerelytocommunicatethought，tonarrateanything，ortopromisesomethingwhethertrulyandhonestly，oruntrulyanddishonestly（veriloquimautfalsiloquim），foritrestsentirelyupontheseotherswhethertheywillbelieveortrustinitornot。*Butalltheserightsortitlesarealreadyincludedintheprincipleofinnatefreedom，andarenotreallydistinguishedfromit，evenasdividingmembersunderahigherspeciesofright。
　　*Itiscustomarytodesignateeveryuntruththatisspokenintentionallyassuch，althoughitmaybeinafrivolousmanneralie，orfalsehood（mendacium），becauseitmaydoharm，atleastinsofarasanyonewhorepeatsitingoodfaithmaybemadealaughing—stockoftoothersonaccountofhiseasycredulity。Butinthejuridicalsense，onlythatuntruthiscalledaliewhichimmediatelyinfringestherightofanother，suchasafalseallegationofacontracthavingbeenconcluded，whentheallegationisputforwardinordertodeprivesomeoneofwhatishis（falsiloquimdolosum）。Thisdistinctionofconceptionssocloselyalliedisnotwithoutfoundation;becauseontheoccasionofasimplestatementofone’sthoughts，itisalwaysfreeforanothertotakethemashemay;andyettheresultingrepute，thatsuchaoneisamanwhosewordcannotbetrusted，comessoclosetotheopprobriumofdirectlycallinghimaliar，thattheboundary—lineseparatingwhat，insuchacase，belongstojurisprudence，andwhatisspecialtoethics，canhardlybeotherwisedrawn。
　　Thereasonwhysuchadivisionintoseparaterightshasbeenintroducedintothesystemofnaturalright，viewedasincludingallthatisinnate，wasnotwithoutapurpose。Itsobjectwastoenableprooftobemorereadilyputforwardincaseofanycontroversyarisingaboutanacquiredright，andquestionsemergingeitherwithreferencetoafactthatmightbeindoubt，or，ifthatwereestablished，inreferencetoarightunderdispute。Forthepartyrepudiatinganobligation，andonwhomtheburdenofproof（onusprobandi）mightbeincumbent，couldthusmethodicallyrefertohisinnaterightoffreedomasspecifiedundervariousrelationsindetail，andcouldthereforefounduponthemequallyasdifferenttitlesofright。
　　Intherelationofinnateright，andconsequentlyoftheinternalmineandthine，thereisthereforenotrights，butonlyoneright。
　　And，accordingly，thishighestdivisionofrightsintoinnateandacquired，whichevidentlyconsistsoftwomembersextremelyunequalintheircontentsisproperlyplacedintheintroduction;andthesubdivisionsofthescienceofrightmaybereferredindetailtotheexternalmineandthine。
　　C。MethodicalDivisionoftheScienceofRight。
　　Thehighestdivisionofthesystemofnaturalrightshouldnotbe—
　　asitisfrequentlyput—into"naturalright"and"socialright，"
　　butintonaturalrightandcivilright。Thefirstconstitutesprivateright;thesecond，publicright。Foritisnotthe"socialstate"butthe"civilstate"thatisopposedtothe"stateofnature";
　　forinthe"stateofnature"theremaywellbesocietyofsomekind，butthereisno"civil"society，asaninstitutionsecuringthemineandthinebypubliclaws。Itisthusthatright，viewedunderreferencetothestateofnature，isspeciallycalledprivateright。
　　Thewholeoftheprinciplesofrightwillthereforefalltobeexpoundedunderthetwosubdivisionsofprivaterightandpublicright。
　　CH1
　　FIRSTPART。PRIVATERIGHT。
　　TheSystemofthoseLawsWhichRequireNoExternalPromulgation。
　　CHAPTERI。OftheModeofHavingAnythingExternalasOne’sOwn。
　　1。TheMeaningof"Mine"inRight（MeumJuris）。
　　Anythingis"Mine"byright，orisrightfullymine，whenIamsoconnectedwithit，thatifanyotherpersonshouldmakeuseofitwithoutmyconsent，hewoulddomealesionorinjury。Thesubjectiveconditionoftheuseofanythingispossessionofit。
　　Anexternalthing，howeverassuchcouldonlybemine，ifImayassumeittobepossiblethatIcanbewrongedbytheusewhichanothermightmakeofitwhenitisnotactuallyinmypossession。
　　Henceitwouldbeacontradictiontohaveanythingexternalasone’sown，werenottheconceptionofpossessioncapableoftwodifferentmeanings，assensiblepossessionthatisperceivablebythesenses，andrationalpossessionthatisperceivableonlybytheintellect。
　　Bytheformeristobeunderstoodaphysicalpossession，andbythelatter，apurelyjuridicalpossessionofthesameobject。
　　Thedescriptionofanobjectas"externaltome"maysignifyeitherthatitismerely"differentanddistinctfrommeasasubject，"orthatitisalso"athingplacedoutsideofme，andtobefoundelsewhereinspaceortime。"Takeninthefirstsense，thetermpossessionsignifiesrationalpossession;and，inthesecondsense，itmustmeanempiricalpossession。Arationalorintelligiblepossession，ifsuchbepossible，ispossessionviewedapartfromphysicalholdingordetention（detentio）。
　　2。JuridicalPostulateofthePracticalReason。
　　Itispossibletohaveanyexternalobjectofmywillasmine。Inotherwords，amaximtothiseffect—wereittobecomelaw—thatanyobjectonwhichthewillcanbeexertedmustremainobjectivelyinitselfwithoutanowner，asresnullius，iscontrarytotheprincipleofright。
　　Foranobjectofanyactofmywill，issomethingthatitwouldbephysicallywithinmypowertouse。Now，supposetherewerethingsthatbyrightshouldabsolutelynotbeinourpower，or，inotherwords，thatitwouldbewrongorinconsistentwiththefreedomofall，accordingtouniversallaw，tomakeuseofthem。Onthissupposition，freedomwouldsofarbedeprivingitselfoftheuseofitsvoluntaryactivity，inthusputtinguseableobjectsoutofallpossibilityofuse。Inpracticalrelations，thiswouldbetoannihilatethem，bymakingthemresnullius，notwithstandingthefactactactsofwillinrelationtosuchthingswouldformallyharmonize，intheactualuseofthem，withtheexternalfreedomofallaccordingtouniversallaws。Nowthepurepracticalreasonlaysdownonlyformallawsasprinciplestoregulatetheexerciseofthewill;
　　andthereforeabstractsfromthematteroftheactofwill，asregardstheotherqualitiesoftheobject，whichisconsideredonlyinsofarasitisanobjectoftheactivityofthewill。Hencethepracticalreasoncannotcontain，inreferencetosuchanobject，anabsoluteprohibitionofitsuse，becausethiswouldinvolveacontradictionofexternalfreedomwithitself。Anobjectofmyfreewill，however，isonewhichIhavethephysicalcapabilityofmakingsomeuseofatwill，sinceitsusestandsinmypower（inpotentia）。
　　Thisistobedistinguishedfromhavingtheobjectbroughtundermydisposal（inpostestatemmeamreductum），whichsupposesnotacapabilitymerely，butalsoaparticularactofthefree—will。Butinordertoconsidersomethingmerelyasanobjectofmywillassuch，itissufficienttobeconsciousthatIhaveitinmypower。Itisthereforeanassumptionaprioriofthepracticalreasontoregardandtreateveryobjectwithintherangeofmyfreeexerciseofwillasobjectivelyapossiblemineorthine。
　　Thispostulatemaybecalled"apermissivelaw"ofthepracticalreason，asgivingusaspecialtitlewhichwecouldnotevolveoutofthemereconceptionsofrightgenerally。Andthistitleconstitutestherighttoimposeuponallothersanobligation，nototherwiselaiduponthem，toabstainfromtheuseofcertainobjectsofourfreechoice，becausewehavealreadytakenthemintoourpossession。Reasonwillsthatthisshallberecognisedasavalidprinciple，anditdoessoaspracticalreason;anditisenabledbymeansofthispostulateaprioritoenlargeitsrangeofactivityinpractice。
　　3。PossessionandOwnership。
　　Anyonewhowouldasserttherighttoathingashismustbeinpossessionofitasanobject。Werehenotitsactualpossessororowner，hecouldnotbewrongedorinjuredbytheusewhichanothermightmakeofitwithouthisconsent。For，shouldanythingexternaltohim，andinnowayconnectedwithhimbyright，affectthisobject，itcouldnotaffecthimselfasasubject，nordohimanywrong，unlesshestoodinarelationofownershiptoit。
　　4。ExpositionoftheConceptionofthe。
　　ExternalMineandThine。
　　Therecanonlybethreeexternalobjectsofmywillintheactivityofchoice：
　　（1）Acorporealthingexternaltome;
　　（2）Thefree—willofanotherintheperformanceofaparticularact（praestatio）;
　　（3）Thestateofanotherinrelationtomyself。
　　Thesecorrespondtothecategoriesofsubstance，causality，andreciprocity;andtheyformthepracticalrelationsbetweenmeandexternalobjects，accordingtothelawsoffreedom。
　　A。Icanonlycallacorporealthingoranobjectinspace"mine，"
　　when，evenalthoughnotinphysicalpossessionofit，IamabletoassertthatIaminpossessionofitinanotherrealnonphysicalsense。Thus，IamnotentitledtocallanappleminemerelybecauseIholditinmyhandorpossessitphysically;butonlywhenIamentitledtosay，"Ipossessit，althoughIhavelaiditoutofmyhand，andwhereveritmaylie。"Inlikemanner，Iamnotentitledtosayoftheground，onwhichImayhavelaidmyselfdown，thatthereforeitismine;butonlywhenIcanrightlyassertthatitstillremainsinmypossession，althoughImayhaveleftthespot。Foranyonewho，intheformerappearancesofempiricalpossession，mightwrenchtheappleoutofmyhand，ordragmeawayfrommyresting—place，would，indeed，injuremeinrespectoftheinner"mine"
　　offreedom，butnotinrespectoftheexternal"mine，"unlessI
　　couldassertthatIwasinthepossessionoftheobject，evenwhennotactuallyholdingitphysically。AndifIcouldnotdothis，neithercouldIcalltheappleorthespotmine。
　　B。Icannotcalltheperformanceofsomethingbytheactionofthewillofanother"mine，"ifIcanonlysay"ithascomeintomypossessionatthesametimewithapromise"（pactumreinitum）;butonlyifIamabletoassert"Iaminpossessionofthewilloftheother，soastodeterminehimtotheperformanceofaparticularact，althoughthetimefortheperformanceofithasnotyetcome。"Inthelattercase，thepromisebelongstothenatureofthingsactuallyheldaspossessed，andasanactiveobligationIcanreckonitmine;andthisholdsgoodnotonlyifIhavethethingpromised—asinthefirstcase—alreadyinmypossession，butevenalthoughIdonotyetpossessitinfact。Hence，Imustbeabletoregardmyselfinthoughtasindependentofthatempiricalformofpossessionthatislimitedbytheconditionoftimeandasbeing，nevertheless，inpossessionoftheobject。
　　C。Icannotcallawife，achild，adomestic，or，generally，anyotherperson"mine"merelybecauseIcommandthematpresentasbelongingtomyhousehold，orbecauseIhavethemundercontrol，andinmypowerandpossession。ButIcancallthemmine，if，althoughtheymayhavewithdrawnthemselvesfrommycontrolandIdonotthereforepossessthemempirically，Icanstillsay"Ipossessthembymymerewill，providedtheyexistanywhereinspaceortime;and，consequently，mypossessionofthemispurelyjuridical。"Theybelong，infact，tomypossessions，onlywhenandsofarasIcanassertthisasamatterofright。
　　5。DefinitionoftheConceptionoftheExternalMineandThine。
　　Definitionsarenominalorreal。Anominaldefinitionissufficientmerelytodistinguishtheobjectdefinedfromallotherobjects，anditspringsoutofacompleteanddefiniteexpositionofitsconception。Arealdefinitionfurthersufficesforadeductionoftheconceptiondefined，soastofurnishaknowledgeoftherealityoftheobject。Thenominaldefinitionoftheexternal"mine"wouldthusbe："Theexternalmineisanythingoutsideofmyself，suchthatanyhindranceofmyuseofitatwillwouldbedoingmeaninjuryorwrongasaninfringementofthatfreedomofminewhichmaycoexistwiththefreedomofallothersaccordingtoauniversallaw。"Therealdefinitionofthisconceptionmaybeputthus："Theexternalmineisanythingoutsideofmyself，suchthatanypreventionofmyuseofitwouldbeawrong，althoughImaynotbeinpossessionofitsoastobeactuallyholdingitasanobject。"Imustbeinsomekindofpossessionofanexternalobject，iftheobjectistoberegardedasmine;for，otherwise，anyoneinterferingwiththisobjectwouldnot，indoingso，affectme;nor，consequently，wouldhetherebydomeanywrong。Hence，accordingtoSS4，arationalpossession（possessionoumenon）mustbeassumedaspossible，ifthereistoberightlyanexternalmineandthine。Empiricalpossessionisthusonlyphenomenalpossessionorholding（detention）oftheobjectinthesphereofsensibleappearance（possessiophenomenon），althoughtheobjectwhichIpossessisnotregardedinthispracticalrelationasitselfaphenomenon—accordingtotheexpositionoftheTranscendentalAnalyticintheCritiqueofPureReason—butasathinginitself。ForintheCritiqueofPureReasontheinterestofreasonturnsuponthetheoreticalknowledgeofthenatureofthingsandhowfarreasoncangoinsuchknowledge。Butherereasonhastodealwiththepracticaldeterminationoftheactionofthewillaccordingtolawsoffreedom，whethertheobjectisperceivablethroughthesensesormerelythinkablebythepureunderstanding。Andright，asunderconsideration，isapurepracticalconceptionofthereasoninrelationtotheexerciseofthewillunderlawsoffreedom。
　　And，hence，itisnotquitecorrecttospeakof"possessing"arighttothisorthatobject，butitshouldratherbesaidthatanobjectispossessedinapurelyjuridicalway;forarightisitselftherationalpossessionofanobject，andto"possessapossession，"wouldbeanexpressionwithoutmeaning。
　　6。DeductionoftheConceptionofaPurelyJuridicalPossessionofanExternalObject（PossessioNoumenon）。
　　Thequestion，"Howisanexternalmineandthinepossible？"resolvesitselfintothisotherquestion："Howisamerelyjuridicalorrationalpossessionpossible？"Andthissecondquestionresolvesitselfagainintoathird："Howisasyntheticpropositioninrightpossibleapriori？"
　　Allpropositionsofright—asjuridicalpropositions—arepropositionsapriori，fortheyarepracticallawsofreason（dictaminarationis）。Butthejuridicalpropositionapriorirespectingempiricalpossessionisanalytical;foritsaysnothingmorethanwhatfollowsbytheprincipleofcontradiction，fromtheconceptionofsuchpossession;namely，thatifIamtheholderofathinginthewayofbeingphysicallyconnectedwithit，anyoneinterferingwithitwithoutmyconsent—as，forinstance，inwrenchinganappleoutofmyhand—affectsanddetractsfrommyfreedomasthatwhichisinternallymine;andconsequentlythemaximofhisactionisindirectcontradictiontotheaxiomofright。Thepropositionexpressingtheprincipleofanempiricalrightfulpossessiondoesnotthereforegobeyondtherightofapersoninreferencetohimself。
　　Ontheotherhand，thepropositionexpressingthepossibilityofthepossessionofathingexternaltome，afterabstractionofalltheconditionsofempiricalpossessioninspaceandtime—consequentlypresentingtheassumptionofthepossibilityofapossessionoumenon—goesbeyondtheselimitingconditions;andbecausethispropositionassertsapossessionevenwithoutphysicalholding，asnecessarytotheconceptionoftheexternalmineandthine，itissynthetical。Andthusitbecomesaproblemforreasontoshowhowsuchaproposition，extendingitsrangebeyondtheconceptionofempiricalpossession，ispossibleapriori。
　　Inthismanner，forinstance，theactoftakingpossessionofaparticularportionofthesoilisamodeexercisingtheprivatefree—willwithoutbeinganactofusurpation。Thepossessorfoundsupontheinnaterightofcommonpossessionofthesurfaceoftheearth，andupontheuniversalwillcorrespondingaprioritoit，whichallowsaprivatepossessionofthesoil;becausewhataremerethingswouldbeotherwisemadeinthemselvesandbyalawintounappropriableobjects。Thusafirstappropriatoracquiresoriginallybyprimarypossessionaparticularportionoftheground;
　　andbyright（jure）heresistseveryotherpersonwhowouldhinderhimintheprivateuseofit，although，whilethe"stateofnature"
　　continues，thiscannotbedonebyjuridicalmeans（dejure），becauseapubliclawdoesnotyetexist。
　　Andalthoughapieceofgroundshouldberegardedasfree，ordeclaredtobesuch，soastobeforthepublicuseofallwithoutdistinction，yetitcannotbesaidthatitisthusfreebynatureandoriginallyso，priortoanyjuridicalact。Fortherewouldbearealrelationalreadyincorporatedinsuchapieceofgroundbytheveryfactthatthepossessionofitwasdeniedtoanyparticularindividual;andasthispublicfreedomofthegroundwouldbeaprohibitionofittoeveryparticularindividual，thispresupposesacommonpossessionofitwhichcannottakeeffectwithoutacontract。A
　　pieceofground，however，whichcanonlybecomepubliclyfreebycontract，mustactuallybeinthepossessionofallthoseassociatedtogether，whomutuallyinterdictorsuspendeachother，fromanyparticularorprivateuseofit。
　　Thisoriginalcommunityofthesoilandofthethingsuponit（communiofundioriginaria），isanideawhichhasobjectiveandpracticaljuridicalrealityandisentirelydifferentfromtheideaofaprimitivecommunityofthings，whichisafiction。Forthelatterwouldhavehadtobefoundedasaformofsociety，andmusthavetakenitsrisefromacontractbywhichallrenouncedtherightofprivatepossession，sothatbyunitingthepropertyownedbyeachintoawhole，itwasthustransformedintoacommonpossession。Buthadsuchaneventtakenplace，historymusthavepresentedsomeevidenceofit。Toregardsuchaprocedureastheoriginalmodeoftakingpossession，andtoholdthattheparticularpossessionsofeveryindividualmayandoughttobegroundeduponit，isevidentlyacontradiction。
　　Possession（possessio）istobedistinguishedfromhabitationasmereresidence（sedes）;andtheactoftakingpossessionofthesoilintheintentionofacquiringitonceforall，isalsotobedistinguishedfromsettlementordomicile（incolatus），whichisacontinuousprivatepossessionofaplacethatisdependentonthepresenceoftheindividualuponit。Wehavenotheretodealwiththequestionofdomiciliarysettlement，asthatisasecondaryjuridicalactwhichmayfollowuponpossession，ormaynotoccuratall;forassuchitcouldnotinvolveanoriginalpossession，butonlyasecondarypossessionderivedfromtheconsentofothers。
　　Simplephysicalpossession，orholdingofthesoil，involvesalreadycertainrelationsofrighttothething，althoughitiscertainlynotsufficienttoenablemetoregarditasmine。Relativetoothers，sofarastheyknow，itappearsasafirstpossessioninharmonywiththelawofexternalfreedom;and，atthesametime，itisembracedintheuniversaloriginalpossessionwhichcontainsapriorithefundamentalprincipleofthepossibilityofaprivatepossession。Hencetodisturbthefirstoccupierorholderofaportionofthesoilinhisuseofitisalesionorwrongdonetohim。Thefirsttakingofpossessionhasthereforeatitleofright（tituluspossessionis）initsfavour，whichissimplytheprincipleoftheoriginalcommonpossession;andthesayingthat"Itiswellforthosewhoareinpossession"（beatipossidentes），whenoneisnotboundtoauthenticatehispossession，isaprincipleofnaturalrightthatestablishesthejuridicalactoftakingpossession，asagroundofacquisitionuponwhicheveryfirstpossessormayfound。
　　IthasbeenshownintheCritiqueofPureReasonthatintheoreticalprinciplesapriori，anintuitionalperceptionapriorimustbesuppliedinconnectionwithanygivenconception;and，consequently，wereitaquestionofapurelytheoreticalprinciple，somethingwouldhavetobeaddedtotheconceptionofthepossessionofanobjecttomakeitreal。Butinrespectofthepracticalprincipleunderconsideration，theprocedureisjusttheconverseofthetheoreticalprocess;sothatalltheconditionsofperceptionwhichformthefoundationofempiricalpossessionmustbeabstractedortakenawayinordertoextendtherangeofthejuridicalconceptionbeyondtheempiricalsphere，andinordertobeabletoapplythepostulate，thateveryexternalobjectofthefreeactivityofmywill，sofarasIhaveitinmypower，althoughnotinthepossessionofit，maybereckonedasjuridicallymine。
　　Thepossibilityofsuchapossession，withconsequentdeductionoftheconceptionofanonempiricalpossession，isfoundeduponthejuridicalpostulateofthepracticalreason，that"Itisajuridicaldutysotoacttowardsothersthatwhatisexternalanduseablemaycomeintothepossessionorbecomethepropertyofsomeone。"Andthispostulateisconjoinedwiththeexpositionoftheconceptionthatwhatisexternallyone’sownisfoundeduponapossession，thatisnotphysical。Thepossibilityofsuchapossession，thusconceived，cannot，however，beprovedorcomprehendedinitself，becauseitisarationalconceptionforwhichnoempiricalperceptioncanbefurnished;butitfollowsasanimmediateconsequencefromthepostulatethathasbeenenunciated。For，ifitisnecessarytoactaccordingtothatjuridicalprinciple，therationalorintelligibleconditionofapurelyjuridicalpossessionmustalsobepossible。Itneedastonishnoone，then，thatthetheoreticalaspectoftheprinciplesoftheexternalmineandthineislostfromviewintherationalsphereofpureintelligenceandpresentsnoextensionofknowledge;fortheconceptionoffreedomuponwhichtheyrestdoesnotadmitofanytheoreticaldeductionofitspossibility，anditcanonlybeinferredfromthepracticallawofreason，calledthecategoricalimperative，viewedasafact。
　　7。ApplicationofthePrincipleofthePossibilityofanExternalMineandThinetoObjectsofExperience。
　　Theconceptionofapurelyjuridicalpossessionisnotanempiricalconceptiondependentonconditionsofspaceandtime，andyetithaspracticalreality。Assuchitmustbeapplicabletoobjectsofexperience，theknowledgeofwhichisindependentoftheconditionsofspaceandtime。Therationalprocessbywhichtheconceptionofrightisbroughtintorelationtosuchobjectssoastoconstituteapossibleexternalmineandthine，isasfollows。Theconceptionofright，beingcontainedmerelyinreason，cannotbeimmediatelyappliedtoobjectsofexperience，soastogivetheconceptionofanempiricalpossession，butmustbeapplieddirectlytothemediatingconception，intheunderstanding，ofpossessioningeneral;sothat，insteadofphysicalholding（detentio）asanempiricalrepresentationofpossession，theformalconceptionorthoughtofhaving，abstractedfromallconditionsofspaceandtime，isconceivedbythemind，andonlyasimplyingthatanobjectisinmypowerandatmydisposal（inpotestatemeapositumesse）。Inthisrelation，thetermexternaldoesnotsignifyexistenceinanotherplacethanwhereI
　　am，normyresolutionandacceptanceatanothertimethanthemomentinwhichIhavetheofferofathing：itsignifiesonlyanobjectdifferentfromorotherthanmyself。Nowthepracticalreasonbyitslawofrightwills，thatIshallthinkthemineandthineinapplicationtoobjects，notaccordingtosensibleconditions，butapartfromtheseandfromthepossessiontheyindicate;becausetheyrefertodeterminationsoftheactivityofthewillthatareinaccordancewiththelawsoffreedom。Foritisonlyaconceptionoftheunderstandingthatcanbebroughtundertherationalconceptionofright。ImaythereforesaythatIpossessafield，althoughitisinquiteadifferentplacefromthatonwhichIactuallyfindmyself。Forthequestionhereisnotconcerninganintellectualrelationtotheobject，butIhavethethingpracticallyinmypowerandatmydisposal，whichisaconceptionofpossessionrealizedbytheunderstandingandindependentofrelationsofspace;anditismine，becausemywill，indeterminingitselftoanyparticularuseofit，isnotinconflictwiththelawofexternalfreedom。Nowitisjustinabstractionfromphysicalpossessionoftheobjectofmyfree—willinthesphereofsense，thatthepracticalreasonwillsthatarationalpossessionofitshallbethought，accordingtointellectualconceptionswhicharenotempirical，butcontainaprioritheconditionsofrationalpossession。Henceitisinthisfact，thatwefoundthegroundofthevalidityofsucharationalconceptionofpossessionpossessionoumenon）asaprincipleofauniversallyvalidlegislation。Forsuchalegislationisimpliedandcontainedintheexpression，"Thisexternalobjectismine，"becauseanobligationistherebyimposeduponallothersinrespectofit，whowouldotherwisenothavebeenobligedtoabstainfromtheuseofthisobject。
　　Themode，then，ofhavingsomethingexternaltomyselfasmine，consistsinaspeciallyjuridicalconnectionofthewillofthesubjectwiththatobject，independentlyoftheempiricalrelationstoitinspaceandintime，andinaccordancewiththeconceptionofarationalpossession。AparticularspotontheearthisnotexternallyminebecauseIoccupyitwithmybody;forthequestionherediscussedrefersonlytomyexternalfreedom，andconsequentlyitaffectsonlythepossessionofmyself，whichisnotathingexternaltome，andthereforeonlyinvolvesaninternalright。ButifI
　　continuetobeinpossessionofthespot，althoughIhavetakenmyselfawayfromitandgonetoanotherplace，onlyunderthatconditionismyexternalrightconcernedinconnectionwithit。Andtomakethecontinuouspossessionofthisspotbymypersonaconditionofhavingitasmine，musteitherbetoassertthatitisnotpossibleatalltohaveanythingexternalasone’sown，whichiscontrarytothepostulateinSS2，ortorequire，inorderthatthisexternalpossessionmaybepossible，thatIshallbeintwoplacesatthesametime。ButthisamountstosayingthatImustbeinaplaceandalsonotinit，whichiscontradictoryandabsurd。
　　ThispositionmaybeappliedtothecaseinwhichIhaveacceptedapromise;formyhavingandpossessioninrespectofwhathasbeenpromisedbecomeestablishedonthegroundofexternalright。Thisrightisnottobeannulledbythefactthatthepromiserhavingsaidatonetime，"Thisthingshallbeyours，"againatasubsequenttimesays，"Mywillnowisthatthethingshallnotbeyours。"Insuchrelationsofrationalright，theconditionsholdjustthesameasifthepromiserhad，withoutanyintervaloftimebetweenthem，madethetwodeclarationsofhiswill，"Thisshallbeyours，"andalso"Thisshallnotbeyours";whichmanifestlycontradictsitself。
　　Thesamethingholds，inlikemanner，oftheconceptionofthejuridicalpossessionofapersonasbelongingtotheHavingofasubject，whetheritbeawife，achild，oraservant。Therelationsofrightinvolvedinahousehold，andthereciprocalpossessionofallitsmembers，arenotannulledbythecapabilityofseparatingfromeachotherinspace;becauseitisbyjuridicalrelationsthattheyareconnected，andtheexternalmineandthine，asintheformercases，restsentirelyupontheassumptionofthepossibilityofapurelyrationalpossession，withouttheaccompanimentofphysicaldetentionorholdingoftheobject。
　　Reasonisforcedtoacritiqueofitsjuridicallypracticalfunctioninspecialreferencetotheconceptionoftheexternalmineandthine，bytheantinomyofthepropositionsenunciatedregardingthepossibilityofsuchaformofpossession。Forthesegiverisetoaninevitabledialectic，inwhichathesisandanantithesissetupequalclaimstothevalidityoftwoconflictingconditions。Reasonisthuscompelled，initspracticalfunctioninrelationtoright—asitwasinitstheoreticalfunction—tomakeadistinctionbetweenpossessionasaphenomenalappearancepresentedtothesenses，andthatpossessionwhichisrationalandthinkableonlybytheunderstanding。
　　Thesis。—Thethesis，inthiscase，is："Itispossibletohavesomethingexternalasmine，althoughIamnotinpossessionofit。"
　　Antithesis。—Theantithesisis："Itisnotpossibletohaveanythingexternalasmine，ifIamnotinpossessionofit。"
　　Solution。—Thesolutionis："BothPropositionsaretrue";theformerwhenImeanempiricalpossession（possessiophaenomenon），thelatterwhenIunderstandbythesameterm，apurelyrationalpossession（possessionoumenon）。
　　Butthepossibilityofarationalpossession，andconsequentlyofanexternalmineandthine，cannotbecomprehendedbydirectinsight，butmustbededucedfromthepracticalreason。Andinthisrelationitisspeciallynoteworthythatthepracticalreasonwithoutintuitionalperceptions，andevenwithoutrequiringsuchanelementapriori，canextenditsrangebythemereeliminationofempiricalconditions，asjustifiedbythelawoffreedom，andcanthusestablishsyntheticalpropositionsapriori。Theproofofthisinthepracticalconnection，aswillbeshownafterwards，canbeadducedinananalyticalmanner。
　　8。ToHaveAnythingExternalasOne’sOwnisonlyPossibleinaJuridicalorCivilStateofSocietyundertheRegulationofaPublicLegislativePower。
　　If，bywordordeed，Ideclaremywillthatsomeexternalthingshallbemine，Imakeadeclarationthateveryotherpersonisobligedtoabstainfromtheuseofthisobjectofmyexerciseofwill;andthisimposesanobligationwhichnoonewouldbeunder，withoutsuchajuridicalactonmypart。ButtheassumptionofthisactatthesametimeinvolvestheadmissionthatIamobligedreciprocallytoobserveasimilarabstentiontowardseveryotherinrespectofwhatisexternallytheirs;fortheobligationinquestionarisesfromauniversalruleregulatingtheexternaljuridicalrelations。HenceIamnotobligedtoletalonewhatanotherpersondeclarestobeexternallyhis，unlesseveryotherpersonlikewisesecuresmebyaguaranteethathewillactinrelationtowhatismine，uponthesameprinciple。Thisguaranteeofreciprocalandmutualabstentionfromwhatbelongstoothersdoesnotrequireaspecialjuridicalactforitsestablishment，butisalreadyinvolvedintheconceptionofanexternalobligationofright，onaccountoftheuniversalityandconsequentlythereciprocityoftheobligatorinessarisingfromauniversalRule。Nowasinglewill，inrelationtoanexternalandconsequentlycontingentpossession，cannotserveasacompulsorylawforall，becausethatwouldbetodoviolencetothefreedomwhichisinaccordancewithuniversallaws。Thereforeitisonlyawillthatbindseveryone，andassuchacommon，collective，andauthoritativewill，thatcanfurnishaguaranteeofsecuritytoall。Butthestateofmenunderauniversal，external，andpubliclegislation，conjoinedwithauthorityandpower，iscalledthecivilstate。Therecanthereforebeanexternalmineandthineonlyinthecivilstateofsociety。
　　Consequence。—Itfollows，asacorollary，that，ifitisjuridicallypossibletohaveanexternalobjectasone’sown，theindividualsubjectofpossessionmustbeallowedtocompelorconstraineverypersonwithwhomadisputeastothemineorthineofsuchapossessionmayarise，toenteralongwithhimselfintotherelationsofacivilconstitution。
　　9。ThereMay，However，BeanExternalMineandThineFoundasaFactintheStateofNature，butitisonlyProvisory。
　　Naturalrightinthestateofacivilconstitutionmeanstheformsofrightwhichmaybededucedfromprinciplesaprioriastheconditionsofsuchaconstitution。Itisthereforenottobeinfringedbythestatutorylawsofsuchaconstitution;andaccordinglythejuridicalprincipleremainsinforce，that，"Whoeverproceedsuponamaximbywhichitbecomesimpossibleformetohaveanobjectoftheexerciseofmywillasmine，doesmealesionorinjury。"Foracivilconstitutionisonlythejuridicalconditionunderwhicheveryonehaswhatishisownmerelysecuredtohim，asdistinguishedfromitsbeingspeciallyassignedanddeterminedtohim。Allguarantee，therefore，assumesthateveryonetowhomathingissecuredisalreadyinpossessionofitashisown。Hence，priortothecivilconstitution—orapartfromit—anexternalmineandthinemustbeassumedaspossible，andalongwithitarighttocompeleveryonewithwhomwecouldcomeintoanykindofintercoursetoenterwithusintoaconstitutioninwhichwhatismineorthinecanbesecured。
　　Theremaythusbeapossessioninexpectationorinpreparationforsuchastateofsecurity，ascanonlybeestablishedonthelawofthecommonwill;andasitisthereforeinaccordancewiththepossibilityofsuchastate，itconstitutesaprovisoryortemporaryjuridicalpossession;whereasthatpossessionwhichisfoundinrealityinthecivilstateofsocietywillbeaperemptoryorguaranteedpossession。Priortoenteringintothisstate，forwhichheisnaturallyprepared，theindividualrightfullyresiststhosewhowillnotadaptthemselvestoit，andwhowoulddisturbhiminhisprovisorypossession;because，ifthewillofallexcepthimselfwereimposinguponhimanobligationtowithdrawfromacertainpossession，itwouldstillbeonlyaone—sidedorunilateralwill，andconsequentlyitwouldhavejustaslittlelegaltitle—whichcanbeproperlybasedonlyontheuniversalizedwill—tocontestaclaimofrightashewouldhavetoassertit。Yetbehastheadvantageonhisside，ofbeinginaccordwiththeconditionsrequisitetotheintroductionandinstitutionofacivilformofsociety。Inaword，themodeinwhichanythingexternalmaybeheldasone’sowninthestateofnature，isjustphysicalpossessionwithapresumptionofrightthusfarinitsfavour，thatbyunionofthewillsofallinapubliclegislationitwillbemadejuridical;andinthisexpectationitholdscomparatively，asakindofpotentialjuridicalpossession。
　　Thisprerogativeofright，asarisingfromthefactofempiricalpossession，isinaccordancewiththeformula："Itiswellforthosewhoareinpossession"（Beatipossidentes）。Itdoesnotconsistinthefactthat，becausethepossessorhasthepresumptionofbeingarightfulman，itisunnecessaryforhimtobringforwardproofthathepossessesacertainthingrightfully，forthispositionappliesonlytoacaseofdisputedright。Butitisbecauseitaccordswiththepostulateofthepracticalreason，thateveryoneisinvestedwiththefacultyofhavingashisownanyexternalobjectuponwhichhehasexertedhiswill;and，consequently，allactualpossessionisastatewhoserightfulnessisestablisheduponthatpostulatebyananterioractofwill。Andsuchanact，iftherebenopriorpossessionofthesameobjectbyanotheropposedtoit，does，therefore，provisionallyjustifyandentitleme，accordingtothelawofexternalfreedom，torestrainanyonewhorefusestoenterwithmeintoastateofpubliclegalfreedomfromallpretensiontotheuseofsuchanobject。Forsuchaprocedureisrequisite，inconformitywiththepostulateofreason，inordertosubjecttomyproperuseathingwhichwouldotherwisebepracticallyannihilated，asregardsallproperuseofit。