CH2
FIRSTPART。PRIVATERIGHT。
TheSystemofthoseLawsWhichRequireNoExternalPromulgation。
CHAPTERII。TheModeofAcquiringAnythingExternal。
10。TheGeneralPrincipleofExternalAcquisition。
IacquireathingwhenIact（efficio）sothatitbecomesmine。Anexternalthingisoriginallyminewhenitismineevenwithouttheinterventionofajuridicalact。Anacquisitionisoriginalandprimarywhenitisnotderivedfromwhatanotherhadalreadymadehisown。
Thereisnothingexternalthatisassuchoriginallymine;butanythingexternalmaybeoriginallyacquiredwhenitisanobjectthatnootherpersonhasyetmadehis。Astateinwhichthemineandthineareincommoncannotbeconceivedashavingbeenatanytimeoriginal。Suchastateofthingswouldhavetobeacquiredbyanexternaljuridicalact，althoughtheremaybeanoriginalandcommonpossessionofanexternalobject。Evenifwethinkhypotheticallyofastateinwhichthemineandthinewouldbeoriginallyincommonasacommuniomeiettuioriginaria，itwouldstillhavetobedistinguishedfromaprimevalcommunion（communioprimaeva）withthingsincommon，sometimessupposedtobefoundedinthefirstperiodoftherelationsofrightamongmen，andwhichcouldnotberegardedasbaseduponprinciplesliketheformer，butonlyuponhistory。
Evenunderthatconditionthehistoriccommunio，asasupposedprimevalcommunity，wouldalwayshavetobeviewedasacquiredandderivative（communioderivativa）。
Theprincipleofexternalacquisition，then，maybeexpressedthus："WhateverIbringundermypoweraccordingtothelawofexternalfreedom，ofwhichasanobjectofmyfreeactivityofwillIhavethecapabilityofmakinguseaccordingtothepostulateofthepracticalreason，andwhichIwilltobecomemineinconformitywiththeideaofapossibleunitedcommonwill，ismine。"
Thepracticalelements（momentaattendenda）constitutiveoftheprocessoforiginalacquisitionare：
1。Prehensionorseizureofanobjectwhichbelongstonoone;
for，ifitbelongedalreadytosomeone，theactwouldconflictwiththefreedomofothers，thatis，accordingtouniversallaws。Thisisthetakingpossessionofanobjectofmyfreeactivityofwillinspaceandtime;thepossession，therefore，intowhichIthusputmyselfissensibleorphysicalpossession（possessiophenomenon）;
2。Declarationofthepossessionofthisobjectbyformaldesignationandtheactofmyfreewillininterdictingeveryotherpersonfromusingitashis;
3。Appropriation，astheact，inidea，ofanexternallylegislativecommonwill，bywhichallandeachareobligedtorespectandactinconformitywithmyactofwill。
Thevalidityofthelastelementintheprocessofacquisition，asthatonwhichtheconclusionthat"theexternalobjectismine"rests，iswhatmakesthepossessionvalidasapurelyrationalandjuridicalpossession（possessionoumenon）。Itisfoundeduponthefactthat，asalltheseactsarejuridical，theyconsequentlyproceedfromthepracticalreason，andtherefore，inthequestionastowhatisright，abstractionmaybemadeoftheempiricalconditionsinvolved，andtheconclusion，"theexternalobjectismine，"thusbecomesacorrectinferencefromtheexternalfactofsensiblepossessiontotheinternalrightofrationalpossession。
Theoriginalprimaryacquisitionofanexternalobjectoftheactionofthewill，iscalledoccupancy。Itcanonlytakeplaceinreferencetosubstancesorcorporealthings。Nowwhenthisoccupationofanexternalobjectdoestakeplace，theactpresupposes，asaconditionofsuchempiricalpossession，itspriorityintimebeforetheactofanyotherwhomayalsobewillingtoenteruponoccupationofit。Hencethelegalmaxim："quipriortempore，potiorjure。"Suchoccupationasoriginalorprimaryis，further，theeffectonlyofasingleorunilateralwill;forwereabilateralortwofoldwillrequisiteforit，itwouldbederivedfromacontractoftwoormorepersonswitheachother，andconsequentlyitwouldbebaseduponwhatanotherorothershadalreadymadetheirown。Itisnoteasytoseehowsuchanactoffree—willasthiswouldbecouldreallyformafoundationforeveryonehavinghisown。However，thefirstacquisitionofathingisonthataccountnotquiteexactlythesameastheoriginalacquisitionofit。Fortheacquisitionofapublicjuridicalstatebyunionofthewillsofallinauniversallegislationwouldbesuchanoriginalacquisition，seeingthatnootherofthekindcouldprecedeit，andyetitwouldbederivedfromtheparticularwillsofalltheindividuals，andconsequentlybecomeall—sidedoromnilateral;foraproperlyprimaryacquisitioncanonlyproceedfromanindividualorunilateralorunilateralwill。
DIVISIONOFTHESUBJECTOFTHEACQUISITIONOFTHEEXTERNAL
MINEANDTHINE。
I。Inrespectofthematterofobjectofacquisition，Iacquireeitheracorporealthing（substance），ortheperformanceofsomethingbyanother（causality），orthisotherasapersoninrespectofhisstate，sofarasIhavearighttodisposeofthesame（inarelationofreciprocitywithhim）。
II。Inrespectoftheformormodeofacquisition，itiseitherarealright（jusreale），orapersonalright（juspersonale），orareal—personalright（jusrealiterpersonale），tothepossessionalthoughnottotheuse，ofanotherpersonasifhewereathing。
III。Inrespectofthegroundofrightorthetitle（titulus）ofacquisition—which，properly，isnotaparticularmemberofthedivisionofrights，butratheraconstituentelementofthemodeofexercisingthem—anythingexternalisacquiredbyacertainfreeexerciseofwillthatiseitherunilateral，astheactofasinglewill（facto），orbilateral，astheactoftwowills（pacto），oromnilateral，astheactofallthewillsofacommunitytogether（lege）。
SECTIONI。PrinciplesofRealRight。
11。WhatisaRealRight？
Theusualdefinitionofrealright，or"rightinathing"（jusreale，jusinre），isthat"itisarightasagainsteverypossessorofit。"Thisisacorrectnominaldefinition。Butwhatisitthatentitlesmetoclaimanexternalobjectfromanyonewhomayappearasitspossessor，andtocompelhim，pervindicationem，toputmeagain，inplaceofhimself，intopossessionofit？Isthisexternaljuridicalrelationofmywillakindofimmediaterelationtoanexternalthing？Ifso，whoevermightthinkofhisrightasreferringnotimmediatelytopersonsbuttothingswouldhavetorepresentit，althoughonlyinanobscureway，somewhatthus。Arightononesidehasalwaysadutycorrespondingtoitontheother，sothatanexternalthing，althoughawayfromthehandsofitsfirstpossessor，continuestobestillconnectedwithhimbyacontinuingobligation;
andthusitrefusestofallundertheclaimofanyotherpossessor，becauseitisalreadyboundtoanother。Inthiswaymyright，viewedasakindofgoodgeniusaccompanyingathingandpreservingitfromallexternalattack，wouldreferanalienpossessoralwaystome！Itis，however，absurdtothinkofanobligationofpersonstowardsthings，andconversely;althoughitmaybeallowedinanyparticularcasetorepresentthejuridicalrelationbyasensibleimageofthiskind，andtoexpressitinthisway。
Therealdefinitionwouldrunthus："Rightinathingisarighttotheprivateuseofathing，ofwhichIaminpossession—originalorderivative—incommonwithallothers。"ForthisistheoneconditionunderwhichitisalonepossiblethatIcanexcludeeveryotherspossessorfromtheprivateuseofthething（juscontraquemlibethujusreipossessorem）。For，exceptbypresupposingsuchacommoncollectivepossession，itcannotbeconceivedhow，whenIamnotinactualpossessionofathing，Icouldbeinjuredorwrongedbyotherswhoareinpossessionofitanduseit。ByanindividualactofmyownwillIcannotobligeanyotherpersontoabstainfromtheuseofathinginrespectofwhichhewouldotherwisebeundernoobligation;and，accordingly，suchanobligationcanonlyarisefromthecollectivewillofallunitedinarelationofcommonpossession。Otherwise，Iwouldhavetothinkofarightinathing，asifthethinghasanobligationtowardsme，andasiftherightasagainsteverypossessorofithadtobederivedfromthisobligationinthething，whichisanabsurdwayofrepresentingthesubject。
Further，bythetermrealright（jusreale）ismeantnotonlytherightinathing（jusinre），butalsotheconstitutiveprincipleofallthelawswhichrelatetotherealmineandthine。Itis，however，evidentthatamanentirelyaloneupontheearthcouldproperlyneitherhavenoracquireanyexternalthingashisown;
because，betweenhimasapersonandallexternalthingsasmaterialobjects，therecouldbenorelationsofobligation。Thereistherefore，literally，nodirectrightinathing，butonlythatrightistobeproperlycalled"real"whichbelongstoanyoneasconstitutedagainstaperson，whoisincommonpossessionofthingswithallothersinthecivilstateofsociety。
12。TheFirstAcquisitionofaThingcanonlybethatoftheSoil。
BythesoilisunderstoodallhabitableLand。Inrelationtoeverythingthatismoveableuponit，itistoberegardedasasubstance，andthemodeoftheexistenceofthemoveablesisviewedasaninherenceinit。Andjustas，inthetheoreticalacceptance，accidentscannotexistapartfromtheirsubstances，so，inthepracticalrelation，moveablesuponthesoilcannotberegardedasbelongingtoanyoneunlessheissupposedtohavebeenpreviouslyinjuridicalpossessionofthesoil，sothatitisthusconsideredtobehis。
For，letitbesupposedthatthesoilbelongstonoone。ThenI
wouldbeentitledtoremoveeverymoveablethingfounduponitfromitsplace，eventototallossofit，inordertooccupythatplace，withoutinfringingtherebyonthefreedomofanyother;therebeing，bythehypothesis，nopossessorofitatall。Buteverythingthatcanbedestroyed，suchasatree，ahouse，andsuchlike—asregardsitsmatteratleast—ismoveable;andifwecallathingwhichcannotbemovedwithoutdestructionofitsformanimmoveable，themineandthineinitisnotunderstoodasapplyingtoitssubstance，buttothatwhichisadherenttoitandwhichdoesnotessentiallyconstitutethethingitself。
13。EveryPartoftheSoilmaybeOriginallyAcquired;andthePrincipleofthePossibilityofsuchAcquisitionistheOriginalCommunityoftheSoilGenerally。
Thefirstclauseofthispropositionisfoundeduponthepostulateofthepracticalreason（SS2）;thesecondisestablishedbythefollowingproof。
Allmenareoriginallyandbeforeanyjuridicalactofwillinrightfulpossessionofthesoil;thatis，theyhavearighttobewherevernatureorchancehasplacedthemwithouttheirwill。
Possession（possessio），whichistobedistinguishedfromresidentialsettlement（sedes）asavoluntary，acquired，andpermanentpossession，becomescommonpossession，onaccountoftheconnectionwitheachotherofalltheplacesonthesurfaceoftheearthasaglobe。For，hadthesurfaceoftheearthbeenaninfiniteplain，mencouldhavebeensodisperseduponitthattheymightnothavecomeintoanynecessarycommunionwitheachother，andastateofsocialcommunitywouldnothavebeenanecessaryconsequenceoftheirexistenceupontheearth。Nowthatpossessionpropertoallmenupontheearth，whichispriortoalltheirparticularjuridicalacts，constitutesanoriginalpossessionincommon（communiopossessionisoriginaria）。Theconceptionofsuchanoriginal，commonpossessionofthingsisnotderivedfromexperience，norisitdependentonconditionsoftime，asisthecasewiththeimaginaryandindemonstrablefictionofaprimaevalcommunityofpossessioninactualhistory。Henceitisapracticalconceptionofreason，involvinginitselftheonlyprincipleaccordingtowhichmenmayusetheplacetheyhappentooccupyonthesurfaceoftheearth，inaccordancewithlawsofright。
14。TheJuridicalActofthisOriginalAcquisitionisOccupancy。
Theactoftakingpossession（apprehensio），beingatitsbeginningthephysicalappropriationofacorporealthinginspace（possessionisphysicae），canaccordwiththelawoftheexternalfreedomofall，undernootherconditionthanthatofitspriorityinrespectoftime。
Inthisrelationitmusthavethecharacteristicofafirstactinthewayoftakingpossession，asafreeexerciseofwill。Theactivityofwill，however，asdeterminingthatthething—inthiscaseadefiniteseparateplaceonthesurfaceoftheearth—shallbemine，beinganactofappropriation，cannotbeotherwiseinthecaseoforiginalacquisitionthanindividualorunilateral（voluntasunilateraliss。propria）。Now，occupancyistheacquisitionofanexternalobjectbyanindividualactofwill。Theoriginalacquisitionofsuchanobjectasalimitedportionofthesoilcanthereforeonlybeaccomplishedbyanactofoccupation。
Thepossibilityofthismodeofacquisitioncannotbeintuitivelyapprehendedbypurereasoninanyway，norestablishedbyitsprinciples，butisanimmediateconsequencefromthepostulateofthepracticalreason。Thewillaspracticalreason，however，cannotjustifyexternalacquisitionotherwisethanonlyinsofarasitisitselfincludedinanabsolutelyauthoritativewill，withwhichitisunitedbyimplication;or，inotherwords，onlyinsofarasitiscontainedwithinaunionofthewillsofallwhocomeintopracticalrelationwitheachother。Foranindividual，unilateralwill—andthesameappliestoadualorotherparticularwill—
cannotimposeonallanobligationwhichiscontingentinitself。Thisrequiresanomnilateraloruniversalwill，whichisnotcontingent，butapriori，andwhichisthereforenecessarilyunitedandlegislative。Onlyinaccordancewithsuchaprinciplecantherebeagreementoftheactivefree—willofeachindividualwiththefreedomofall，andconsequentlyrightsingeneral，oreventhepossibilityofanexternalmineandthine。
15。ItisOnlywithinaCivilConstitutionthatAnythingcanbeAcquiredPeremptorily，whereasintheStateofNatureAcquisitioncanonlybeProvisory。
Acivilconstitutionisobjectivelynecessaryasaduty，althoughsubjectivelyitsrealityiscontingent。Hence，thereisconnectedwithitarealnaturallawofright，towhichallexternalacquisitionissubjected。
Theempiricaltitleofacquisitionhasbeenshowntobeconstitutedbythetakingphysicalpossession（apprehensiophysica）asfoundeduponanoriginalcommunityofrightinalltothesoil。Andbecauseapossessioninthephenomenalsphereofsensecanonlybesubordinatedtothatpossessionwhichisinaccordancewithrationalconceptionsofright，theremustcorrespondtothisphysicalactofpossessionarationalmodeoftakingpossessionbyeliminationofalltheempiricalconditionsinspaceandtime。Thisrationalformofpossessionestablishesthepropositionthat"whateverIbringundermypowerinaccordancewithlawsofexternalfreedom，andwillthatitshallbemine，becomesmine。"
Therationaltitleofacquisitioncanthereforeonlylieoriginallyintheideaofthewillofallunitedimplicitly，ornecessarilytobeunited，whichisheretacitlyassumedasanindispensablecondition（conditiosinequanon）。Forbyasinglewilltherecannotbeimposeduponothersanobligationbywhichtheywouldnothavebeenotherwisebound。Butthefactformedbywillsactuallyanduniversallyunitedinalegislationconstitutesthecivilstateofsociety。Hence，itisonlyinconformitywiththeideaofacivilstateofsociety，orinreferencetoitanditsrealization，thatanythingexternalcanbeacquired。Beforesuchastateisrealized，andinanticipationofit，acquisition，whichwouldotherwisebederived，isconsequentlyonlyprovisory。Theacquisitionwhichisperemptoryfindsplaceonlyinthecivilstate。
Nevertheless，suchprovisoryacquisitionisrealacquisition。For，accordingtothepostulateofthejuridicallypracticalreason，thepossibilityofacquisitioninwhateverstatemenmayhappentobelivingbesideoneanother，andthereforeinthestateofnatureaswell，isaprincipleofprivateright。Andinaccordancewiththisprinciple，everyoneisjustifiedorentitledtoexercisethatcompulsionbywhichitalonebecomespossibletopassoutofthestateofnatureandtoenterintothatstateofcivilsocietywhichalonecanmakeallacquisitionperemptory。
Itisaquestionastohowfartherightoftakingpossessionofthesoilextends。Theansweris，Sofarasthecapabilityofhavingitunderone’spowerextends;thatis，justasfarashewhowillstoappropriateitcandefendit，asifthesoilweretosay："Ifyoucannotprotectme，neithercanyoucommandme。"Inthiswaythecontroversyaboutwhatconstitutesafreeorclosedseamustbedecided。Thus，withintherangeofacannon—shotnoonehasarighttointrudeonthecoastofacountrythatalreadybelongstoacertainstate，inordertofishorgatheramberontheshore，orsuchlike。
Further，thequestionisput，"Iscultivationofthesoil，bybuilding，agriculture，drainage，etc。，necessaryinordertoitsacquisition？"No。For，astheseprocessesasformsofspecificationareonlyaccidents，theydonotconstituteobjectsofimmediatepossessionandcanonlybelongtothesubjectinsofarasthesubstanceofthemhasbeenalreadyrecognizedashis。Whenitisaquestionofthefirstacquisitionofathing，thecultivationormodificationofitbylabourformsnothingmorethananexternalsignofthefactthatithasbeentakenintopossession，andthiscanbeindicatedbymanyothersignsthatcostlesstrouble。Again：
"Mayanyonebehinderedintheactoftakingpossession，sothatneitheronenorotheroftwocompetitorsshallacquiretherightofpriority，andthesoilinconsequencemayremainforalltimefreeasbelongingtonoone？"Notatall。Suchahindrancecannotbeallowedtotakeplace，becausethesecondofthetwo，inordertobeenabledtodothis，wouldhimselfhavetobeuponsomeneighbouringsoil，wherehealso，inthismanner，couldbehinderedfrombeing，andsuchabsolutehinderingwouldinvolveacontradiction。Itwould，however，bequiteconsistentwiththerightofoccupation，inthecaseofacertaininterveningpieceofthesoil，toletitlieunusedasaneutralgroundfortheseparationoftwoneighbouringstates;butundersuchacondition，thatgroundwouldactuallybelongtothembothincommon，andwouldnotbewithoutanowner（resnullius），justbecauseitwouldbeusedbybothinordertoformaseparationbetweenthem。Again："Mayonehaveathingashis，onasoilofwhichnoonehasappropriatedanypartashisown？"Yes。InMongolia，forexample，anyonemayletliewhateverbaggagehehas，orbringbackthehorsethathasrunawayfromhimintohispossessionashisown，becausethewholesoilbelongstothepeoplegenerally，andtheuseofitaccordinglybelongstoeveryindividual。Butthatanyonecanhaveamoveablethingonthesoilofanotherashisownisonlypossiblebycontract。Finally，thereisthequestion："Mayoneoftwoneighbouringnationsortribesresistanotherwhenattemptingtoimposeuponthemacertainmodeofusingaparticularsoil;as，forinstance，atribeofhuntersmakingsuchanattemptinrelationtoapastoralpeople，orthelattertoagriculturistsandsuchlike？"
Certainly。Forthemodeinwhichsuchpeoplesortribesmaysettlethemselvesuponthesurfaceoftheearth，providedtheykeepwithintheirownboundaries，isamatterofmerepleasureandchoiceontheirownpart（resmeraefacultatis）。
Asafurtherquestion，itmaybeaskedwhether，whenneithernaturenorchance，butmerelyourownwill，bringsusintotheneighbourhoodofapeoplethatgivesnopromiseofaprospectofenteringintocivilunionwithus，wearetobeconsideredentitledinanycasetoproceedwithforceintheintentionoffoundingsuchaunion，andbringingintoajuridicalstatesuchmenasthesavageAmericanIndians，theHottentots，andtheNewHollanders;or—andthecaseisnotmuchbetter—whetherwemayestablishcoloniesbydeceptivepurchase，andsobecomeownersoftheirsoil，and，ingeneral，withoutregardtotheirfirstpossession，makeuseatwillofoursuperiorityinrelationtothem？Further，mayitnotbeheldthatNatureherself，asabhorringavacuum，seemstodemandsuchaprocedure，andthatlargeregionsinothercontinents，thatarenowmagnificentlypeopled，wouldotherwisehaveremainedunpossessedbycivilizedinhabitantsandmighthaveforeverremainedthus，sothattheendofcreationwouldhavesofarbeenfrustrated？Itisalmostunnecessarytoanswer;foritiseasytoseethroughallthisflimsyveilofinjustice，whichjustamountstotheJesuitismofmakingagoodendjustifyanymeans。Thismodeofacquiringthesoilis，therefore，toberepudiated。
Theindefinitenessofexternalacquirableobjectsinrespectoftheirquantity，aswellastheirquality，makestheproblemofthesoleprimaryexternalacquisitionofthemoneofthemostdifficulttosolve。Theremust，however，besomeonefirstacquisitionofanexternalobject;foreveryAcquisitioncannotbederivative。Hence，theproblemisnottobegivenupasinsolubleorinitselfasimpossible。Ifitissolvedbyreferencetotheoriginalcontract，unlessthiscontractisextendedsoastoincludethewholehumanrace，acquisitionunderitwouldstillremainbutprovisional。
16。ExpositionoftheConceptionofaPrimaryAcquisitionoftheSoil。
Allmenareoriginallyinacommoncollectivepossessionofthesoilofthewholeearth（communiofundioriginaria），andtheyhavenaturallyeachawilltouseit（lexjusti）。Butonaccountoftheoppositionofthefreewillofonetothatoftheotherinthesphereofaction，whichisinevitablebynature，alluseofthesoilwouldbepreventeddidnoteverywillcontainatthesametimealawfortheregulationoftherelationofallwillsinaction，accordingtowhichaparticularpossessioncanbedeterminedtoeveryoneuponthecommonsoil。Thisisthejuridicallaw（lexjuridica）。Butthedistributivelawofthemineandthine，asapplicabletoeachindividualonthesoil，accordingtotheaxiomofexternalfreedom，cannotproceedotherwisethanfromaprimarilyunitedwillapriori—
whichdoesnotpresupposeanyjuridicalactasrequisiteforthisunion。ThisLawcanonlytakeforminthecivilstate（lexjustitiaedistributivae）;asitisinthisstatealonethattheunitedcommonwilldetermineswhatisright，whatisrightful，andwhatistheconstitutionofRight。Inreferencetothisstate，however—andpriortoitsestablishmentandinviewofit—itisprovisorilyadutyforeveryonetoproceedaccordingtothelawofexternalacquisition;
andaccordinglyitisajuridicalprocedureonthepartofthewilltolayeveryoneunderobligationtorecognisetheactofpossessingandappropriating，althoughitbeonlyunilaterally。Henceaprovisoryacquisitionofthesoil，withallitsjuridicalconsequences，ispossibleinthestateofnature。
Suchanacquisition，however，requiresandalsoobtainsthefavourofapermissivelaw（lexpermissiva），inrespectofthedeterminationofthelimitsofjuridicallypossiblepossession。Foritprecedesthejuridicalstate，andasmerelyintroductorytoitisnotyetperemptory;andthisfavourdoesnotextendfartherthanthedateoftheconsentoftheotherco—operatorsintheestablishmentofthecivilstate。Butiftheyareopposedtoenteringintothecivilstate，aslongasthisoppositionlastsitcarriesalltheeffectofaguaranteedjuridicalacquisitionwithit，becausetheadvancefromthestateofnaturetothecivilstateisfoundeduponaduty。
17。DeductionoftheConceptionoftheOriginalPrimaryAcquisition。
Wehavefoundthetitleofacquisitioninauniversaloriginalcommunityofthesoil，undertheconditionsofanexternalacquisitioninspace;andthemodeofacquisitioniscontainedintheempiricalfactoftakingpossession（apprehensio），conjoinedwiththewilltohaveanexternalobjectasone’sown。Itisfurthernecessarytounfold，fromtheprinciplesofthepurejuridicallypracticalreasoninvolvedintheconception，thejuridicalacquisitionproperofanobject—thatis，theexternalmineandthinethatfollowsfromthetwopreviousconditions，asrationalpossession（possessionoumenon）。
Thejuridicalconceptionoftheexternalmineandthine，sofarasitinvolvesthecategoryofsubstance，cannotby"thatwhichisexternaltome"meanmerely"inaplaceotherthanthatinwhichI
am";foritisarationalconception。Asundertheconceptionsofthereasononlyintellectualconceptionscanbeembraced，theexpressioninquestioncanonlysignify"somethingthatisdifferentanddistinctfromme"accordingtotheideaofanon—empiricalpossessionthrough，asitwere，acontinuousactivityintakingpossessionofanexternalobject;anditinvolvesonlythenotionofhavingsomethinginmypower，whichindicatestheconnectionofanobjectwithmyself，asasubjectiveconditionofthepossibilityofmakinguseofit。Thisformsapurelyintellectualconceptionoftheunderstanding。Nowwecanleaveoutorabstractfromthesensibleconditionsofpossession，asrelationsofapersontoobjectswhichhavenoobligation。Thisprocessofeliminationjustgivestherationalrelationofapersontopersons;anditissuchthathecanbindthemallbyanobligationinreferencetotheuseofthingsthroughhisactofwill，sofarasitisconformabletotheaxiomoffreedom，thepostulateofright，andtheuniversallegislationofthecommonwill，conceivedasunitedapriori。Thisisthereforetherationalintelligiblepossessionofthingsasbypureright，althoughtheyareobjectsofsense。
Itisevidentthatthefirstmodification，limitation，ortransformationgenerally，ofaportionofthesoilcannotofitselffurnishatitletoitsacquisition，sincepossessionofanaccidentdoesnotformagroundforlegalpossessionofthesubstance。
Rather，conversely，theinferenceastothemineandthinemustbedrawnfromownershipofthesubstanceaccordingtotherule：
Accessariumsequitursuumprincipale。Henceonewhohasspentlabouronapieceofgroundthatwasnotalreadyhisown，haslosthiseffortandworktotheformerowner。Thispositionissoevidentofitselfthattheoldopiniontotheoppositeeffect，thatisstillspreadfarandwide，canhardlybeascribedtoanyotherthantheprevailingillusionwhichunconsciouslyleadstothepersonificationofthings;and，then，asiftheycouldbeboundunderanobligationbythelabourbestoweduponthemtobeattheserviceofthepersonwhodoesthelabour，toregardthemashisbyimmediateright。Otherwiseitisprobablethatthenaturalquestion—alreadydiscussed—wouldnothavebeenpassedoverwithsolightatread，namely："Howisarightinathingpossible？"For，rightasagainsteverypossiblepossessorofathingmeansonlytheclaimofaparticularwilltotheuseofanobjectsofarasitmaybeincludedintheall—comprehendinguniversalwill，andcanbethoughtasinharmonywithitslaw。
Asregardsbodiessituateduponapieceofgroundwhichisalreadymine，iftheyotherwisebelongtonootherperson，theybelongtomewithoutmyrequiringanyparticularjuridicalactforthepurposeofthisacquisition;theyareminenotfacto，butlege。Fortheymayberegardedasaccidentsinheringinthesubstanceofthesoil，andtheyarethusminejurereimeae。Tothiscategoryalsobelongseverythingwhichissoconnectedwithanythingofminethatitcannotbeseparatedfromwhatisminewithoutalteringitsubstantially。Examplesofthisaregildingonanobject，mixtureofamaterialbelongingtomewithotherthings，alluvialdeposit，orevenalterationoftheadjoiningbedofastreamorriverinmyfavoursoastoproduceanincreaseofmyland，etc。Bythesameprinciples，thequestionmustalsobedecidedastowhethertheacquirablesoilmayextendfartherthantheexistingland，soaseventoincludepartofthebedofthesea，withtherighttofishonmyownshores，togatheramberandsuchlike。SofarasIhavethemechanicalcapabilityfrommyownsite，astheplaceIoccupy，tosecuremysoilfromtheattackofothers—and，therefore，asfarascannoncancarryfromtheshore—allisincludedinmypossession，andtheseaisthusfarclosed（mareclausum）。Butasthereisnositeforoccupationuponthewideseaitself，possiblepossessioncannotbeextendedsofar，andtheopenseaisfree（mareliberum）。Butinthecaseofmen，orthingsthatbelongtothem，becomingstrandedontheshore，sincethefactisnotvoluntary，itcannotberegardedbytheowneroftheshoreasgivinghimarightofacquisition。Forshipwreckisnotanactofwill，norisitsresultalesiontohim;andthingswhichmayhavecomethusuponhissoil，asstillbelongingtosomeone，arenottobetreatedasbeingwithoutanownerorresnullius。
Ontheotherhand，ariver，sofaraspossessionofthebankreaches，maybeoriginallyacquired，likeanyotherpieceofground，undertheaboverestrictions，byonewhoisinpossessionofbothitsbanks。
PROPERTY。
Anexternalobject，whichinrespectofitssubstancecanbeclaimedbysomeoneashisown，iscalledtheproperty（dominium）ofthatpersontowhomalltherightsinitasathingbelong—liketheaccidentsinheringinasubstance—andwhich，therefore，heastheproprietor（dominus）candisposeofatwill（jusdisponendideresua）。Butfromthisitfollowsatoncethatsuchanobjectcanonlybeacorporealthingtowardswhichthereisnodirectpersonalobligation。Henceamanmaybehisownmaster（suijuris）butnottheproprietorofhimself（suidominus），soastobeabletodisposeofhimselfatwill，tosaynothingofthepossibilityofsucharelationtoothermen;becauseheisresponsibletohumanityinhisownperson。Thispoint，however，asbelongingtotherightofhumanityassuch，ratherthantothatofindividualmen，wouldnotbediscussedatitsproperplacehere，butisonlymentionedincidentallyforthebetterelucidationofwhathasjustbeensaid。Itmaybefurtherobservedthattheremaybetwofullproprietorsofoneandthesamething，withouttherebeingamineandthineincommon，butonlyinsofarastheyarecommonpossessorsofwhatbelongsonlytooneofthemashisown。Insuchacasethewholepossession，withouttheuseofthething，belongstooneonlyoftheco—proprietors（condomini）;whiletotheothersbelongsalltheuseofthethingalongwithitspossession。Theformerasthedirectproprietor（dominusdirectus），therefore，restrictsthelatterastheproprietorinuse（dominusutilis）totheconditionofacertaincontinuousperformance，withreferencetothethingitself，withoutlimitinghimintheuseofit。
SECTIONII。PrinciplesofPersonalRight。
18。NatureandAcquisitionofPersonalRight。
Thepossessionoftheactivefree—willofanotherperson，asthepowertodetermineitbymywilltoacertainaction，accordingtolawsoffreedom，isaformofrightrelatingtotheexternalmineandthine，asaffectedbythecausalityofanother。Itispossibletohaveseveralsuchrightsinreferencetothesamepersonortodifferentpersons。Theprincipleofthesystemoflaws，accordingtowhichIcanbeinsuchpossession，isthatofpersonalright，andthereisonlyonesuchprinciple。
Theacquisitionofapersonalrightcanneverbeprimaryorarbitrary;forsuchamodeofacquiringitwouldnotbeinaccordancewiththeprincipleoftheharmonyofthefreedomofmywillwiththefreedomofeveryother，anditwouldthereforebewrong。
Norcansucharightbeacquiredbymeansofanyunjustactofanother（factoinjustialterius），asbeingitselfcontrarytoright;forifsuchawrongasitimplieswereperpetratedonme，andIcoulddemandsatisfactionfromtheother，inaccordancewithright，yetinsuchacaseIwouldonlybeentitledtomaintainundiminishedwhatwasmine，andnottoacquireanythingmorethanwhatIformerlyhad。
Acquisitionbymeansoftheactionofanother，towhichI
determinehiswillaccordingtolawsofright，isthereforealwaysderivedfromwhatthatotherhasashisown。Thisderivation，asajuridicalact，cannotbeeffectedbyamerenegativerelinquishmentorrenunciationofwhatishis（perderelictionemautrenunciationem）;
becausesuchanegativeactwouldonlyamounttoacessationofhisright，andnottotheacquirementofarightonthepartofanother。
Itisthereforeonlybypositivetransference（translatio），orconveyance，thatapersonalrightcanbeacquired;andthisisonlypossiblebymeansofacommonwill，throughwhichobjectscomeintothepowerofoneorother，sothatasonerenouncesaparticularthingwhichheholdsunderthecommonright，thesameobjectwhenacceptedbyanother，inconsequenceofapositiveactofwill，becomeshis。
Suchtransferenceofthepropertyofonetoanotheristermeditsalienation。Theactoftheunitedwillsoftwopersons，bywhichwhatbelongedtoonepassestotheother，constitutescontract。
19。AcquisitionbyContract。
Ineverycontracttherearefourjuridicalactsofwillinvolved;
twoofthembeingpreparatoryacts，andtwoofthemconstitutiveacts。
Thetwopreparatoryacts，asformsoftreatinginthetransaction，areoffer（oblatio）andapproval（approbatio）;thetwoconstitutiveacts，astheformsofconcludingthetransaction，arepromise（promissum）andacceptance（acceptatio）。Foranoffercannotconstituteapromisebeforeitcanbejudgedthatthethingoffered（oblatum）issomethingthatisagreeabletothepartytowhomitisoffered，andthismuchisshownbythefirsttwodeclarations;butbythemalonethereisnothingasyetacquired。
Further，itisneitherbytheparticularwillofthepromisernorthatoftheacceptorthatthepropertyoftheformerpassesovertothelatter。Thisiseffectedonlybythecombinedorunitedwillsofboth，andconsequentlysofaronlyasthewillofbothisdeclaredatthesametimeorsimultaneously。Now，suchsimultaneousnessisimpossiblebyempiricalactsofdeclaration，whichcanonlyfolloweachotherintimeandareneveractuallysimultaneous。ForifI
havepromised，andanotherpersonisnowmerelywillingtoaccept，duringtheintervalbeforeactualacceptance，howevershortitmaybe，Imayretractmyoffer，becauseIamthusfarstillfree;and，ontheotherside，theacceptor，forthesamereason，maylikewiseholdhimselfnottobebound，uptillthemomentofacceptance，byhiscounter—declarationfollowinguponthepromise。Theexternalformalitiesorsolemnities（solemnia）ontheconclusionofacontract—
suchasshakinghandsorbreakingastraw（stipula）laidholdofbytwopersons—andallthevariousmodesofconfirmingthedeclarationsoneitherside，proveinfacttheembarrassmentofthecontractingpartiesastohowandinwhatwaytheymayrepresentdeclarations，whicharealwayssuccessive，asexistingsimultaneouslyatthesamemoment;andtheseformsfailtodothis。
Theyare，bytheirverynature，actsnecessarilyfollowingeachotherintime，sothatwhentheoneactis，theothereitherisnotyetorisnolonger。
Itisonlythephilosophicaltranscendentaldeductionoftheconceptionofacquisitionbycontractthatcanremoveallthesedifficulties。Inajuridicalexternalrelation，mytakingpossessionofthefree—willofanother，asthecausethatdeterminedittoacertainact，isconceivedatfirstempiricallybymeansofthedeclarationandcounter—declarationofthefree—willofeachofusintime，asthesensibleconditionsoftakingpossession;andthetwojuridicalactsmustnecessarilyberegardedasfollowingoneanotherintime。Butbecausethisrelation，viewedasjuridical，ispurelyrationalinitself，thewillasalaw—givingfacultyofreasonrepresentsthispossessionasintelligibleorrational（possessionoumenon），inaccordancewithconceptionsoffreedomandunderabstractionofthoseempiricalconditions。Andnow，thetwoactsofpromiseandacceptancearenotregardedasfollowingoneanotherintime，but，inthemannerofapactumreinitum，asproceedingfromacommonwill，whichisexpressedbytheterm"atthesametime，"or"simultaneous，"andtheobjectpromised（promissum）isrepresented，undereliminationofempiricalconditions，asacquiredaccordingtothelawofthepurepracticalreason。
ThatthisisthetrueandonlypossibledeductionoftheideaofacquisitionbycontractissufficientlyattestedbythelaboriousyetalwaysfutilestrivingofwritersonjurisprudencesuchasMosesMendelssohninhisJerusalem—toadduceaproofofitsrationalpossibility。Thequestionisputthus："WhyoughtItokeepmyPromise？"ForitisassumedasunderstoodbyallthatIoughttodoso。Itis，however，absolutelyimpossibletogiveanyfurtherproofofthecategoricalimperativeimplied;justasitisimpossibleforthegeometriciantoprovebyrationalsyllogismsthatinordertoconstructatriangleImusttakethreelines—sofarananalyticalproposition—ofwhichthreelinesanytwotogethermustbegreaterthanthethird—asyntheticalproposition，andliketheformerapriori。Itisapostulateofthepurereasonthatweoughttoabstractfromallthesensibleconditionsofspaceandtimeinreferencetotheconceptionofright;andthetheoryofthepossibilityofsuchabstractionfromtheseconditions，withouttakingawaytherealityofthepossession，justconstitutesthetranscendentaldeductionoftheconceptionofacquisitionbycontract。Itisquiteakintowhatwaspresentedunderthelasttitle，asthetheoryofacquisitionbyoccupationoftheexternalobject。
20。WhatisAcquiredbyContract。
Butwhatisthat，designatedasexternal，whichIacquirebycontract？Asitisonlythecausalityoftheactivewillofanother，inrespectoftheperformanceofsomethingpromisedtome，Idonotimmediatelyacquiretherebyanexternalthing，butanactofthewillinquestion，wherebyathingisbroughtundermypowersothatImakeitmine。Bythecontract，therefore，Iacquirethepromiseofanother，asdistinguishedfromthethingpromised;andyetsomethingistherebyaddedtomyhavingandpossession。Ihavebecomethericherinpossession（locupletior）bytheacquisitionofanactiveobligationthatIcanbringtobearuponthefreedomandcapabilityofanother。
Thismyright，however，isonlyapersonalright，validonlytotheeffectofactinguponaparticularphysicalpersonandspeciallyuponthecausalityofhiswill，sothatheshallperformsomethingforme。Itisnotarealrightuponthatmoralperson，whichisidentifiedwiththeideaoftheunitedwillofallviewedapriori，andthroughwhichaloneIcanacquirearightvalidagainsteverypossessorofthething。For，itisinthisthatallrightinathingconsists。
Thetransferortransmissionofwhatisminetoanotherbycontract，takesplaceaccordingtothelawofcontinuity（lexcontinui）。
Possessionoftheobjectisnotinterruptedforamomentduringthisact;for，otherwise，Iwouldacquireanobjectinthisstateasathingthathadnopossessor，anditwouldthusbeacquiredoriginally，whichiscontrarytotheideaofacontract。Thiscontinuity，however，impliesthatitisnottheparticularwillofeitherthepromiserortheacceptor，buttheirunitedwillincommon，thattransferswhatisminetoanother。Andhenceitisnotaccomplishedinsuchamannerthatthepromiserfirstrelinquishes（derelinquit）hispossessionforthebenefitofanother，orrenounceshisright（renunciat），andthereupontheotheratthesametimeentersuponit;orconversely。Thetransfer（translatio）isthereforeanactinwhichtheobjectbelongsforamomentatthesametimetoboth，justasintheparabolicpathofaprojectiletheobjectonreachingitshighestpointmayberegardedforamomentasatthesametimebothrisingandfalling，andasthuspassinginfactfromtheascendingtothefallingmotion。
21。AcceptanceandDelivery。
Athingisnotacquiredinacaseofcontractbytheacceptance（acceptatio）ofthepromise，butonlybythedelivery（traditio）oftheobjectpromised。Forallpromiseisrelativetoperformance;andifwhatwaspromisedisathing，theperformancecannotbeexecutedotherwisethanbyanactwherebytheacceptorisputbythepromiserintopossessionofthething;andthisisdelivery。Beforethedeliveryandthereceptionofthething，theperformanceoftheactrequiredhasnotyettakenplace;thethinghasnotyetpassedfromtheonepersontotheotherand，consequently，hasnotbeenacquiredbythatother。Hencetherightarisingfromacontractisonlyapersonalright;anditonlybecomesarealrightbydelivery。
Acontractuponwhichdeliveryimmediatelyfollows（pactumreinitum）excludesanyintervaloftimebetweenitsconclusionanditsexecution;andassuchitrequiresnofurtherparticularactinthefuturebywhichonepersonmaytransfertoanotherwhatishis。Butifthereisatime—definiteorindefinite—agreeduponbetweenthemforthedelivery，thequestionthenariseswhetherthethinghasalreadybeforethattimebecometheacceptor’sbythecontract，sothathisrightisarightinthething;orwhetherafurtherspecialcontractregardingthedeliveryalonemustbeenteredupon，sothattherightthatisacquiredbymereacceptanceisonlyapersonalright，andthusitdoesnotbecomearightinthethinguntildelivery？Thattherelationmustbedeterminedaccordingtothelatteralternativewillbeclearfromwhatfollows。
SupposeIconcludeacontractaboutathingthatIwishtoacquire—suchasahorse—andthatItakeitimmediatelyintomystable，orotherwiseintomypossession;thenitismine（vipactireiniti），andmyrightisarightinthething。ButifIleaveitinthehandsofthesellerwithoutarrangingwithhimspeciallyinwhosephysicalpossessionorholding（detentio）thisthingshallbebeforemytakingpossessionofit（apprehensio），andconsequently，beforetheactualchangeofpossession，thehorseisnotyetmine;andtherightwhichIacquireisonlyarightagainstaparticularperson—
namely，thesellerofthehorse—tobeputintopossessionoftheobject（poscenditraditionem）asthesubjectiveconditionofanyuseofitatmywill。Myrightisthusonlyapersonalrighttodemandfromthesellertheperformanceofhispromise（praestatio）toputmeintopossessionofthething。Now，ifthecontractdoesnotcontaintheconditionofdeliveryatthesametime—asapactumreinitum—andconsequentlyanintervaloftimeintervenesbetweentheconclusionofthecontractandthetakingpossessionoftheobjectofacquisition，Icannotobtainpossessionofitduringthisintervalotherwisethanbyexercisingtheparticularjuridicalactivitycalledapossessoryact（actumpossessorium），whichconstitutesaspecialcontract。Thisactconsistsinmysaying，"Iwillsendtofetchthehorse，"towhichthesellerhastoagree。Foritisnotself—evidentoruniversallyreasonablethatanyonewilltakeathingdestinedfortheuseofanotherintohischargeathisownrisk。
Onthecontrary，aspecialcontractisnecessaryforthisarrangement，accordingtowhichthealienatorofathingcontinuestobeitsownerduringacertaindefinitetime，andmustbeartheriskofwhatevermayhappentoit;whiletheacquirercanonlyberegardedbythesellerastheownerwhenhehasdelayedtoenterintopossessionbeyondthedateatwhichheagreedtotakedelivery。
Priortothepossessoryact，therefore，allthatisacquiredbythecontractisonlyapersonalright;andtheacceptorcanacquireanexternalthingonlybydelivery。
SECTIONIII。PrinciplesofPersonalRightthatisRealinKind。（JusRealiterPersonale）。
22。NatureofPersonalRightofaRealKind。
Personalrightofarealkindistherighttothepossessionofanexternalobjectasathing，andtotheuseofitasaperson。Themineandthineembracedunderthisrightrelatespeciallytothefamilyandhousehold;andtherelationsinvolvedarethoseoffreebeingsinreciprocalrealinteractionwitheachother。Throughtheirrelationsandinfluenceaspersonsupononeanother，inaccordancewiththeprincipleofexternalfreedomasthecauseofit，theyformasocietycomposedasawholeofmembersstandingincommunitywitheachotheraspersons;andthisconstitutesthehousehold。Themodeinwhichthissocialstatusisacquiredbyindividuals，andthefunctionswhichprevailwithinit，proceedneitherbyarbitraryindividualaction（facto），norbymerecontract（pacto），butbylaw（lege）。Andthislawasbeingnotonlyaright，butalsoasconstitutingpossessioninreferencetoaperson，isarightrisingaboveallmererealandpersonalright。Itmust，infact，formtherightofhumanityinourownperson;and，assuch，ithasasitsconsequenceanaturalpermissivelaw，bythefavourofwhichsuchacquisitionbecomespossibletous。
23。Whatisacquiredinthehousehold。
Theacquisitionthatisfoundeduponthislawis，asregardsitsobjects，threefold。Themanacquiresawife;thehusbandandwifeacquirechildren，constitutingafamily;andthefamilyacquiredomestics。Alltheseobjects，whileacquirable，areinalienable;andtherightofpossessionintheseobjectsisthemoststrictlypersonalofallrights。
TheRightsoftheFamilyasaDomesticSocietyTitleI。ConjugalRight。（HusbandandWife）
24。TheNaturalBasisofMarriage。
Thedomesticrelationsarefoundedonmarriage，andmarriageisfoundeduponthenaturalreciprocityorintercommunity（commercium）ofthesexes。*Thisnaturalunionofthesexesproceedsaccordingtothemereanimalnature（vagalibido，venusvulgivaga，fornicatio），oraccordingtothelaw。Thelatterismarriage（matrimonium），whichistheunionoftwopersonsofdifferentsexforlife—longreciprocalpossessionoftheirsexualfaculties。Theendofproducingandeducatingchildrenmayberegardedasalwaystheendofnatureinimplantingmutualdesireandinclinationinthesexes;
butitisnotnecessaryfortherightfulnessofmarriagethatthosewhomarryshouldsetthisbeforethemselvesastheendoftheirunion，otherwisethemarriagewouldbedissolvedofitselfwhentheproductionofchildrenceased。
*Commerciumsexualeestususmembrorumetfacultatumsexualiumalterius。This"usus"iseithernatural，bywhichhumanbeingsmayreproducetheirownkind，orunnatural，which，again，referseithertoapersonofthesamesexortoananimalofanotherspeciesthanman。Thesetransgressionsofalllaw，ascriminacarniscontranaturam，areeven"nottobenamed";and，aswrongsagainstallhumanityintheperson，theycannotbesaved，byanylimitationorexceptionwhatever，fromentirereprobation。
Andevenassumingthatenjoymentinthereciprocaluseofthesexualendowmentsisanendofmarriage，yetthecontractofmarriageisnotonthataccountamatterofarbitrarywill，butisacontractnecessaryinitsnaturebythelawofhumanity。Inotherwords，ifamanandawomanhavethewilltoenteronreciprocalenjoymentinaccordancewiththeirsexualnature，theymustnecessarilymarryeachother;andthisnecessityisinaccordancewiththejuridicallawsofpurereason。
25。TheRationalRightofMarriage。
For，thisnaturalcommercium—asaususmembrorumsexualiumalterius—isanenjoymentforwhichtheonepersonisgivenuptotheother。Inthisrelationthehumanindividualmakeshimselfares，whichiscontrarytotherightofhumanityinhisownperson。
This，however，isonlypossibleundertheonecondition，thatastheonepersonisacquiredbytheotherasares，thatsamepersonalsoequallyacquirestheotherreciprocally，andthusregainsandreestablishestherationalpersonality。Theacquisitionofapartofthehumanorganismbeing，onaccountofitsunity，atthesametimetheacquisitionofthewholeperson，itfollowsthatthesurrenderandacceptationof，orby，onesexinrelationtotheother，isnotonlypermissibleundertheconditionofmarriage，butisfurtheronlyreallypossibleunderthatcondition。Butthepersonalrightthusacquiredis，atthesametime，realinkind;andthischaracteristicofitisestablishedbythefactthatifoneofthemarriedpersonsrunawayorenterintothepossessionofanother，theotherisentitled，atanytime，andincontestably，tobringsuchaonebacktotheformerrelation，asifthatpersonwereathing。
26。MonogamyandEqualityinMarriage。
Forthesamereasons，therelationofthemarriedpersonstoeachotherisarelationofequalityasregardsthemutualpossessionoftheirpersons，aswellasoftheirgoods。Consequentlymarriageisonlytrulyrealizedinmonogamy;forintherelationofpolygamythepersonwhoisgivenawayontheoneside，gainsonlyapartoftheonetowhomthatpersonisgivenup，andthereforebecomesamereres。Butinrespectoftheirgoods，theyhaveseverallytherighttorenouncetheuseofanypartofthem，althoughonlybyaspecialcontract。
Fromtheprinciplethusstated，italsofollowsthatconcubinageisaslittlecapableofbeingbroughtunderacontractofrightasthehiringofapersononanyoneoccasion，inthewayofapactumfornicationis。For，asregardssuchacontractasthislatterrelationwouldimply，itmustbeadmittedbyallthatanyonewhomightenterintoitcouldnotbelegallyheldtothefulfillmentoftheirpromiseiftheywishedtoresilefromit。Andasregardstheformer，acontractofconcubinagewouldalsofallasapactumturpe;becauseasacontractofthehire（locatio，conductio），ofapartfortheuseofanother，onaccountoftheinseparableunityofthemembersofaperson，anyoneenteringintosuchacontractwouldbeactuallysurrenderingasarestothearbitrarywillofanother。Henceanypartymayannulacontractlikethisifenteredintowithanyother，atanytimeandatpleasure;andthatotherwouldhavenoground，inthecircumstances，tocomplainofalesionofhisright。Thesameholdslikewiseofamorganaticor"left—hand"marriage，contractedinordertoturntheinequalityinthesocialstatusofthetwopartiestoadvantageinthewayofestablishingthesocialsupremacyoftheoneovertheother;for，infact，sucharelationisnotreallydifferentfromconcubinage，accordingtotheprinciplesofnaturalright，andthereforedoesnotconstitutearealmarriage。Hencethequestionmayberaisedastowhetheritisnotcontrarytotheequalityofmarriedpersonswhenthelawsaysinanywayofthehusbandinrelationtothewife，"heshallbethymaster，"sothatheisrepresentedastheonewhocommands，andsheistheonewhoobeys。This，however，cannotberegardedascontrarytothenaturalequalityofahumanpair，ifsuchlegalsupremacyisbasedonlyuponthenaturalsuperiorityofthefacultiesofthehusbandcomparedwiththewife，intheeffectuationofthecommoninterestofthehousehold，andiftherighttocommandisbasedmerelyuponthisfact。
Forthisrightmaythusbededucedfromtheverydutyofunityandequalityinrelationtotheendinvolved。
27。FulfillmentoftheContractofMarriage。
Thecontractofmarriageiscompletedonlybyconjugalcohabitation。
Acontractoftwopersonsofdifferentsex，withthesecretunderstandingeithertoabstainfromconjugalcohabitationorwiththeconsciousnessoneithersideofincapacityforit，isasimulatedcontract;itdoesnotconstituteamarriage，anditmaybedissolvedbyeitherofthepartiesatwill。Butiftheincapacityonlyarisesaftermarriage，therightofthecontractisnotannulledordiminishedbyacontingencythatcannotbelegallyblamed。
Theacquisitionofaspouse，eitherasahusbandorasawife，isthereforenotconstitutedfacto—thatis，bycohabitation—withoutaprecedingcontract;norevenpacto—byamerecontractofmarriage，withoutsubsequentcohabitation;butonlylege，thatis，asajuridicalconsequenceoftheobligationthatisformedbytwopersonsenteringintoasexualunionsolelyonthebasisofareciprocalpossessionofeachother，whichpossessionatthesametimeisonlyeffectedinrealitybythereciprocalususfacultatumsexualiumalterius。
TitleII。ParentalRight。（ParentandChild）。
28。TheRelationofParentandChild。
Fromthedutyofmantowardshimself—thatis，towardsthehumanityinhisownpersontherethusarisesapersonalrightonthepartofthemembersoftheoppositesexes，aspersons，toacquireoneanotherreallyandreciprocallybymarriage。Inlikemanner，fromthefactofprocreationintheunionthusconstituted，therefollowsthedutyofpreservingandrearingchildrenastheproductsofthisunion。Accordingly，children，aspersons，have，atthesametime，anoriginalcongenitalright—distinguishedfrommerehereditaryright—toberearedbythecareoftheirparentstilltheyarecapableofmaintainingthemselves;andthisprovisionbecomesimmediatelytheirsbylaw，withoutanyparticularjuridicalactbeingrequiredtodetermineit。
Forwhatisthusproducedisaperson，anditisimpossibletothinkofabeingendowedwithpersonalfreedomasproducedmerelybyaphysicalprocess。Andhence，inthepracticalrelation，itisquiteacorrectandevenanecessaryideatoregardtheactofgenerationasaprocessbywhichapersonisbroughtwithouthisconsentintotheworldandplacedinitbytheresponsiblefreewillofothers。Thisact，therefore，attachesanobligationtotheparentstomaketheirchildren—asfarastheirpowergoes—contentedwiththeconditionthusacquired。Henceparentscannotregardtheirchildas，inamanner，athingoftheirownmaking;forabeingendowedwithfreedomcannotbesoregarded。Nor，consequently，havetheyarighttodestroyitasifitweretheirownproperty，oreventoleaveittochance;becausetheyhavebroughtabeingintotheworldwhobecomesinfactacitizenoftheworld，andtheyhaveplacedthatbeinginastatewhichtheycannotbelefttotreatwithindifference，evenaccordingtothenaturalconceptionsofright。
WecannotevenconceivehowitispossiblethatGodcancreatefreebeings;foritappearsasifalltheirfutureactions，beingpredeterminedbythatfirstact，wouldbecontainedinthechainofnaturalnecessity，andthat，therefore，theycouldnotbefree。Butasmenwearefreeinfact，asisprovedbythecategoricalimperativeinthemoralandpracticalrelationasanauthoritativedecisionofreason;yetreasoncannotmakethepossibilityofsucharelationofcausetoeffectconceivablefromthetheoreticalpointofview，becausetheyarebothsuprasensible。Allthatcanbedemandedofreasonundertheseconditionswouldmerelybetoprovethatthereisnocontradictioninvolvedintheconceptionofacreationoffreebeings;andthismaybedonebyshowingthatcontradictiononlyariseswhen，alongwiththecategoryofcausality，theconditionoftimeistransferredtotherelationofsuprasensiblethings。Thiscondition，asimplyingthatthecauseofaneffectmustprecedetheeffectasitsreason，isinevitableinthinkingtherelationofobjectsofsensetooneanother;andifthisconceptionofcausalityweretohaveobjectiverealitygiventoitinthetheoreticalbearing，itwouldalsohavetobereferredtothesuprasensiblesphere。Butthecontradictionvanisheswhenthepurecategory，apartfromanysensibleconditions，isappliedfromthemoralandpracticalpointofview，andconsequentlyasinanon—sensiblerelationtotheconceptionofcreation。
Thephilosophicaljuristwillnotregardthisinvestigation，whenthuscarriedbackeventotheultimateprinciplesofthetranscendentalphilosophy，asanunnecessarysubtletyinametaphysicofmorals，oraslosingitselfinaimlessobscurity，whenhetakesintoconsiderationthedifficultyofdoingjusticeinthisinquirytotheultimaterelationsoftheprinciplesofright。
29。TheRightsoftheParent。