Fromthedutythusindicated，therefurthernecessarilyarisestherightoftheparentstothemanagementandtrainingofthechild，solongasitisitselfincapableofmakingproperuseofitsbodyasanorganism，andofitsmindasanunderstanding。Thisinvolvesitsnourishmentandthecareofitseducation。Thisincludes，ingeneral，thefunctionofforminganddevelopingitpractically，thatitmaybeableinthefuturetomaintainandadvanceitself，andalsoitsmoralcultureanddevelopment，theguiltofneglectingitfallingupontheparents。Allthistrainingistobecontinuedtillthechildreachestheperiodofemancipation（emancipatio），astheageofpracticableself—support。Theparentsthenvirtuallyrenouncetheparentalrighttocommand，aswellasallclaimtorepaymentfortheirpreviouscareandtrouble;forwhichcareandtrouble，aftertheprocessofeducationiscomplete，theycanonlyappealtothechildren，bywayofanyclaim，onthegroundoftheobligationofgratitudeasadutyofvirtue。
　　Fromthefactofpersonalityinthechildren，itfurtherfollowsthattheycanneverberegardedasthepropertyoftheparents，butonlyasbelongingtothembywayofbeingintheirpossession，likeotherthingsthatareheldapartfromthepossessionofallothersandthatcanbebroughtbackevenagainstthewillofthesubjects。
　　Hencetherightoftheparentsisnotapurelyrealright，anditisnotalienable（juspersonalissimum）。Butneitherisitamerelypersonalright;itisapersonalrightofarealkind，thatis，apersonalrightthatisconstitutedandexercisedafterthemannerofarealright。
　　Itisthereforeevidentthatthetitleofapersonalrightofarealkindmustnecessarilybeadded，inthescienceofright，tothetitlesofrealrightandpersonalright，thedivisionofrightsintothesetwobeingnotcomplete。For，iftherightoftheparentstothechildrenweretreatedasifitweremerelyarealrighttoapartofwhatbelongstotheirhouse，theycouldnotfoundonlyuponthedutyofthechildrentoreturntotheminclaimingthemwhentheyrunaway，buttheywouldbethenentitledtoseizethemandimpoundthemlikethingsorrunawaycattle。
　　TITLEIII。HouseholdRight。（MasterandServant）
　　30。RelationandRightoftheMasterofaHousehold。
　　Thechildrenofthehouse，who，alongwiththeparents，constituteafamily，attainmajority，andbecomemastersofthemselves（majorennes，suijuris），evenwithoutacontractofreleasefromtheirpreviousstateofdependence，bytheiractuallyattainingtothecapabilityofself—maintenance。Thisattainmentarises，ontheonehand，asastateofnaturalmajority，withtheadvanceofyearsinthegeneralcourseofnature;and，ontheotherhand，ittakesform，asastateinaccordancewiththeirownnaturalcondition。Theythusacquiretherightofbeingtheirownmasters，withouttheinterpositionofanyspecialjuridicalact，andthereforemerelybylaw（lege）;andtheyowetheirparentsnothingbywayoflegaldebtfortheireducation，justastheparents，ontheirside，arenowreleasedfromtheirobligationstothechildreninthesameway。Parentsandchildrenthusgainorregaintheirnaturalfreedom;andthedomesticsociety，whichwasnecessaryaccordingtothelawofright，isthusnaturallydissolved。
　　Bothparties，however，mayresolvetocontinuethehousehold，butunderanothermodeofobligation。Itmayassumetheformofarelationbetweenthebeadofthehouse，asitsmaster，andtheothermembersasdomesticservants，maleorfemale;andtheconnectionbetweentheminthisnewregulateddomesticeconomy（societasherilis）maybedeterminedbycontract。Themasterofthehouse，actuallyorvirtually，entersintocontractwiththechildren，nowbecomemajorandmastersofthemselves;or，iftherebenochildreninthefamily，withotherfreepersonsconstitutingthemembershipofthehousehold;andthusthereisestablisheddomesticrelationshipnotfoundedonsocialequality，butsuchthatonecommandsasmaster，andanotherobeysasservant（imperantisetsubjectidomestici）。
　　Thedomesticsorservantsmaythenberegardedbythemasterofthehouseholdasthusfarhis。Asregardstheformormodeofhispossessionofthem，theybelongtohimasifbyarealright;forifanyofthemrunaway，heisentitledtobringthemagainunderhispowerbyaunilateralactofhiswill。Butasregardsthematterofhisright，ortheuseheisentitledtomakeofsuchpersonsashisdomestics，heisnotentitledtoconducthimselftowardsthemasifhewastheirproprietororowner（dominusservi）;becausetheyareonlysubjectedtohispowerbycontract，andbyacontractundercertaindefiniterestrictions。Foracontractbywhichtheonepartyrenouncedhiswholefreedomfortheadvantageoftheother，ceasingtherebytobeapersonandconsequentlyhavingnodutyeventoobserveacontract，isselfcontradictory，andisthereforeofitselfnullandvoid。Thequestionastotherightofpropertyinrelationtoonewhohaslosthislegalpersonalitybyacrimedoesnotconcernushere。
　　Thiscontract，then，ofthemasterofahouseholdwithhisdomestics，cannotbeofsuchanaturethattheuseofthemcouldeverrightlybecomeanabuseofthem;andthejudgementastowhatconstitutesuseorabuseinsuchcircumstancestheisnotleftmerelytothemaster，butisalsocompetenttotheservants，whooughtnevertobeheldinbondageorbodilyservitudeasslavesorserfs。
　　Suchacontractcannot，therefore，beconcludedforlife，butinallcasesonlyforadefiniteperiod，withinwhichonepartymayintimatetotheotheraterminationoftheirconnection。Children，however，includingeventhechildrenofonewhohasbecomeenslavedowingtoacrime，arealwaysfree。Foreverymanisbornfree，becausehehasatbirthasyetbrokennolaw;andeventhecostofhiseducationtillhismaturitycannotbereckonedasadebtwhichheisboundtopay。Evenaslave，ifitwereinhispower，wouldbeboundtoeducatehischildrenwithoutbeingentitledtocountandreckonwiththemforthecost;andinviewofhisownincapacityfordischargingthisfunction，thepossessorofaslave，therefore，entersupontheobligationwhichhehasrenderedtheslavehimselfunabletofulfil。
　　Here，again，asunderthefirsttwotitles，itisclearthatthereisapersonalrightofarealkind，intherelationofthemasterofahousetohisdomestics。Forhecanlegallydemandthemasbelongingtowhatisexternallyhis，fromanyotherpossessorofthem;andheisentitledtofetchthembacktohishouse，evenbeforethereasonsthatmayhaveledthemtorunaway，andtheirparticularrightinthecircumstances，havebeenjuridicallyinvestigated。
　　SYSTEMATICDIVISIONOFALLTHERIGHTSCAPABLEOF
　　BEINGACQUIREDBYCONTRACT。
　　31。DivisionofContractsJuridicalConceptionsofMoneyandaBook。
　　Itisreasonabletodemandthatametaphysicalscienceofrightshallcompletelyanddefinitelydeterminethemembersofalogicaldivisionofitsconceptionsapriori，andthusestablishtheminagenuinesystem。Allempiricaldivision，ontheotherhand，ismerelyfragmentarypartition，anditleavesusinuncertaintyastowhethertheremaynotbemoremembersstillrequiredtocompletethewholesphereofthedividedconception。Adivisionthatismadeaccordingtoaprincipleapriorimaybecalled，incontrasttoallempiricalpartitions，adogmaticdivision。
　　Everycontract，regardedinitselfobjectively，consistsoftwojuridicalacts：thepromiseanditsacceptance。Acquisitionbythelatter，unlessitbeapactumreinitumwhichrequiresdelivery，isnotapart，butthejuridicallynecessaryconsequenceofthecontract。
　　Consideredagainsubjectively，orastowhethertheacquisition，whichoughttohappenasanecessaryconsequenceaccordingtoreason，willalsofollow，infact，asaphysicalconsequence，itisevidentthatIhavenosecurityorguaranteethatthiswillhappenbythemereacceptanceofapromise。Thereis，therefore，somethingexternallyrequiredconnectedwiththemodeofthecontract，inreferencetothecertaintyofacquisitionbyit;andthiscanonlybesomeelementcompletinganddeterminingthemeansnecessarytotheattainmentofacquisitionasrealizingthepurposeofthecontract。
　　Andinhisconnectionandbehoof，threepersonsarerequiredtointervene—thepromiser，theacceptor，andthecautionerorsurety。
　　Theimportanceofthecautionerisevident;butbyhisinterventionandhisspecialcontractwiththepromiser，theacceptorgainsnothinginrespectoftheobjectbutthemeansofcompulsionthatenablehimtoobtainwhatishisown。
　　Accordingtotheserationalprinciplesoflogicaldivision，thereareproperlyonlythreepureandsimplemodesofcontract。Thereare，however，innumerablemixedandempiricalmodes，addingstatutoryandconventionalformstotheprinciplesofmineandthinethatareinaccordancewithrationallaws。Buttheylieoutsideofthecircleofthemetaphysicalscienceofright，whoserationalmodesofcontractcanalonebeindicatedhere。
　　Allcontractsarefoundeduponapurposeofacquisition，andareeither：
　　A。Gratuitouscontracts，withunilateralacquisition;orB。Onerouscontracts，withreciprocalacquisition;orC。Cautionarycontracts，withnoacquisition，butonlyguaranteeofwhathasbeenalreadyacquired。Thesecontractsmaybegratuitousontheoneside，andyet，atthesametime，onerousontheother。
　　A。Thegratuitouscontracts（pactagratuita）are：
　　1。Depositation（depositum），involvingthepreservationofsomevaluabledepositedintrust;
　　2。Commodate（commodatum）aloanoftheuseofathing;
　　3。Donation（donatio），afreegift。
　　B。Theonerouscontractsarecontractseitherofpermutationorofhiring。
　　I。Contractsofpermutationorreciprocalexchange（permutatiolatesicdicta）：
　　1。Barter，orstrictlyrealexchange（permutatiostrictesicdicta）。Goodsexchangedforgoods。
　　2。Purchaseandsale（emptiovenditio）。Goodsexchangedformoney。
　　3。Loan（mutuum）。Loanofafungibleunderconditionofitsbeingreturnedinkind：cornforcorn，ormoneyformoney。
　　II。Contractsoflettingandhiring（locatioconductio）：
　　1。Lettingofathingonhiretoanotherpersonwhoistomakeuseofit（locatiorei）。Ifthethingcanonlyberestoredinspecie，itmaybethesubjectofanonerouscontractcombiningtheconsiderationofinterestwithit（pactumusurarium）。
　　2。Lettingofworkonhire（locatiooperae）。Consenttotheuseofmypowersbyanotherforacertainprice（merces）。Theworkerunderthiscontractisahiredservant（mercenarius）。
　　3。Mandate（mandatum）。Thecontractofmandateisanengagementtoperformorexecuteacertainbusinessinplaceandinnameofanotherperson。Iftheactionismerelydoneintheplaceofanother，butnot，atthesametime，inhisname，itisperformancewithoutcommission（gestionegotii）;butifitisrightfullyperformedinnameoftheother，itconstitutesmandate，whichasacontractofprocurationisanonerouscontract（mandatumonerosum）。
　　C。Thecautionarycontracts（cautiones）are：
　　1。Pledge（pignus）。Cautionbyamoveabledepositedassecurity。
　　2。Suretyship（fidejussio）。Cautionforthefulfillmentofthepromiseofanother。
　　3。Personalsecurity（praestatioobsidis）。
　　Guaranteeofpersonalperformance。
　　Thislistofallmodesinwhichthepropertyofonepersonmaybetransferredorconveyedtoanotherincludesconceptionsofcertainobjectsorinstrumentsrequiredforsuchtransference（translatio）。
　　Theseappeartobeentirelyempirical，anditmaythereforeseemquestionablewhethertheyareentitledtoaplaceinametaphysicalscienceofright。For，insuchascience，thedivisionsmustbemadeaccordingtoprinciplesapriori;andhencethematterofthejuridicalrelation，whichmaybeconventional，oughttobeleftoutofaccount，andonlyitsformshouldbetakenintoconsideration。
　　Suchconceptionsmaybeillustratedbytakingtheinstanceofmoney，incontradistinctionfromallotherexchangeablethingsaswaresandmerchandise;orbythecaseofabook。Andconsideringtheseasillustrativeexamplesinthisconnection，itwillbeshownthattheconceptionofmoneyasthegreatestandmostuseableofallthemeansofhumanintercommunicationthroughthings，inthewayofpurchaseandsaleincommerce，aswellasthatofbooksasthegreatestmeansofcarryingontheinterchangeofthought，resolvethemselvesintorelationsthatarepurelyintellectualandrational。
　　Andhenceitwillbemadeevidentthatsuchconceptionsdonotreallydetractfromthepurityofthegivenschemeofpurerationalcontracts，byempiricaladmixture。
　　IllustrationofRelationsofContractbytheConceptionsofMoneyandaBookI。WhatisMoney？
　　Moneyisathingwhichcanonlybemadeuseof，bybeingalienatedorexchanged。Thisisagoodnominaldefinition，asgivenbyAchenwall;anditissufficienttodistinguishobjectsofthewillofthiskindfromallotherobjects。Butitgivesusnoinformationregardingtherationalpossibilityofsuchathingasmoneyis。Yetweseethusmuchbythedefinition：（1）thatthealienationinthismodeofhumanintercommunicationandexchangeisnotviewedasagift，butisintendedasamodeofreciprocalacquisitionbyanonerouscontract;and（2）thatitisregardedasameremeansofcarryingoncommerce，universallyadoptedbythepeople，buthavingnovalueassuchofitself，incontrasttootherthingsasmercantilegoodsorwareswhichhaveaparticularvalueinrelationtospecialwantsexistingamongthepeople。Itthereforerepresentsallexchangeablethings。
　　Abushelofcornhasthegreatestdirectvalueasameansofsatisfyinghumanwants。Cattlemaybefedbyit;andtheseagainaresubservienttoournourishmentandlocomotion，andtheyevenlabourinourstead。Thus，bymeansofcorn，menaremultipliedandsupported，whonotonlyactagaininreproducingsuchnaturalproducts，butalsobyotherartificialproductstheycancometothereliefofallourproperwants。Thusaremenenabledtobuilddwellings，toprepareclothing，andtosupplyalltheingeniouscomfortsandenjoymentswhichmakeuptheproductsofindustry。Ontheotherhand，thevalueofmoneyisonlyindirect。Itcannotbeitselfenjoyed，norbeuseddirectlyforenjoyment;itis，however，ameanstowardsthis，andofalloutwardthingsitisofthehighestutility。
　　Wemayfoundarealdefinitionofmoneyprovisionallyupontheseconsiderations。Itmaythusbedefinedastheuniversalmeansofcarryingontheindustryofmeninexchangingintercommunicationswitheachother。Hencenationalwealth，insofarasitcanbeacquiredbymeansofmoney，isproperlyonlythesumoftheindustryorappliedlabourwithwhichmenpayeachother，andwhichisrepresentedbythemoneyincirculationamongthepeople。
　　Thethingwhichistobecalledmoneymust，therefore，havecostasmuchindustrytoproduceit，oreventoputitintothehandsofothers，asmaybeequivalenttotheindustryorlabourrequiredfortheacquisitionofthegoodsorwaresormerchandise，asnaturalorartificialproducts，forwhichitisexchanged。Forifitwereeasiertoprocurethematerialwhichiscalledmoneythanthegoodsthatarerequired，therewouldbemoremoneyinthemarketthangoodstobesold;andbecausethesellerwouldthenhavetoexpendmorelabouruponhisgoodsthanthebuyerontheequivalent，themoneycomingintohimmorerapidly，thelabourappliedtothepreparationofgoodsandindustrygenerally，withtheindustrialproductivitywhichisthesourceofthepublicwealth，wouldatthesametimedwindleandbecutdown。Hencebanknotesandassignationsarenottoberegardedasmoney，althoughtheymaytakeitsplacebywayofrepresentingitforatime;becauseitcostsalmostnolabourtopreparethem，andtheirvalueisbasedmerelyupontheopinionprevailingastothefurthercontinuanceofthepreviouspossibilityofchangingthemintoreadymoney。Butonitsbeinginanywayfoundoutthatthereisnotreadymoneyinsufficientquantityforeasyandsafeconversionofsuchnotesorassignations，theopiniongivesway，andafallintheirvaluebecomesinevitable。ThustheindustriallabourofthosewhoworkthegoldandsilverminesinPeruandMexico—
　　especiallyonaccountofthefrequentfailuresintheapplicationoffruitlesseffortstodiscovernewveinsofthesepreciousmetals—isprobablyevengreaterthanwhatisexpendedinthemanufactureofgoodsinEurope。Hencesuchmininglabour，asunrewardedinthecircumstances，wouldbeabandonedofitself，andthecountriesmentionedwouldinconsequencesoonsinkintopoverty，didnottheindustryofEurope，stimulatedinturnbytheseverymetals，proportionallyexpandatthesametimesoasconstantlytokeepupthezealoftheminersintheirworkbythearticlesofluxurytherebyofferedtothem。Itisthusthattheconcurrenceofindustrywithindustry，andoflabourwithlabour，isalwaysmaintained。
　　Buthowisitpossiblethatwhatatthebeginningconstitutedonlygoodsorwares，atlengthbecamemoney？Thishashappenedwhereverasovereignasgreatandpowerfulconsumerofaparticularsubstance，whichheatfirstusedmerelyfortheadornmentanddecorationofhisservantsandcourt，hasenforcedthetributeofhissubjectsinthiskindofmaterial。Thusitmayhavebeengold，orsilver，orcopper，oraspeciesofbeautifulshellscalledcowries，orevenasortofmatcalledmakutes，asinCongo;oringotsofiron，asinSenegal;orNegroslaves，asontheGuineaCoast。Whentherulerofthecountrydemandedsuchthingsasimposts，thosewhoselabourhadtobeputinmotiontoprocurethemwerealsopaidbymeansofthem，accordingtocertainregulationsofcommercethenestablished，asinamarketorexchange。Asitappearstome，itisonlythusthataparticularspeciesofgoodscametobemadealegalmeansofcarryingontheindustriallabourofthesubjectsintheircommercewitheachother，andtherebyformingthemediumofthenationalwealth。Andthusitpracticallybecamemoney。
　　Therationalconceptionofmoney，underwhichtheempiricalconceptionisembraced，isthereforethatofathingwhich，inthecourseofthepublicpermutationorexchangeofpossessions（permutatiopublica），determinesthepriceofalltheotherthingsthatformproductsorgoods—underwhichtermeventhesciencesareincluded，insofarastheyarenottaughtgratistoothers。Thequantityofitamongapeopleconstitutestheirwealth（opulentia）。
　　Forprice（pretium）isthepublicjudgementaboutthevalueofathing，inrelationtotheproportionateabundanceofwhatformstheuniversalrepresentativemeansincirculationforcarryingonthereciprocalinterchangeoftheproductsofindustryorlabour。*Thepreciousmetals，whentheyarenotmerelyweighedbutalsostampedorprovidedwithasignindicatinghowmuchtheyareworth，formlegalmoney，andarecalledcoin。
　　*Hencewherecommerceisextensiveneithergoldnorcopperisspeciallyusedasmoney，butonlyasconstitutingwares;becausethereistoolittleofthefirstandtoomuchofthesecondforthemtobeeasilybroughtintocirculation，soasatoncetohavetheformerinsuchsmallpiecesasarenecessaryinpaymentforparticulargoodsandnottohavethelatteringreatquantityincaseofthesmallestacquisitions。Hencesilver—moreorlessalloyedwithcopper—istakenasthepropermaterialofmoneyandthemeasureofthecalculationofallpricesinthegreatcommercialintercommunicationsoftheworld;andtheothermetals—andstillmorenon—metalicsubstances—
　　canonlytakeitsplaceinthecaseofapeopleoflimitedcommerce。
　　AccordingtoAdamSmith："Moneyhasbecome，inallcivilizednations，theuniversalinstrumentofcommerce，bytheinterventionofwhichgoodsofallkindsareboughtandsoldorexchangedforoneanother。"Thisdefinitionexpandstheempiricalconceptionofmoneytotherationalideaofit，bytakingregardonlytotheimpliedformofthereciprocalperformancesintheonerouscontracts，andthusabstractingfromtheirmatter。Itisthusconformabletotheconceptionofrightinthepermutationandexchangeofthemineandthinegenerally（commutatiolatesicdicta）。Thedefinition，therefore，accordswiththerepresentationintheabovesynopsisofadogmaticdivisionofcontractsapriori，andconsequentlywiththemetaphysicalprincipleofrightingeneral。
　　II。WhatisaBook？
　　Abookisawritingwhichcontainsadiscourseaddressedbysomeonetothepublic，throughvisiblesignsofspeech。Itisamatterofindifferencetothepresentconsiderationswhetheritiswrittenbyapenorimprintedbytypes，andonfewormanypages。Hewhospeakstothepublicinhisownnameistheauthor。Hewhoaddressesthewritingtothepublicinthenameoftheauthoristhepublisher。Whenapublisherdoesthiswiththepermissionorauthorityoftheauthor，theactisinaccordancewithright，andheistherightfulpublisher;butifthisisdonewithoutsuchpermissionorauthority，theactiscontrarytoright，andthepublisherisacounterfeiterorunlawfulpublisher。Thewholeofasetofcopiesoftheoriginaldocumentiscalledanedition。
　　TheUnauthorizedPublishingofBooksisContrarytothePrinciplesofRight，andisRightlyProhibited。
　　Awritingisnotanimmediatedirectpresentationofaconception，asisthecase，forinstance，withanengravingthatexhibitsaportrait，orabustorcastbyasculptor。Itisadiscourseaddressedinaparticularformtothepublic;andtheauthormaybesaidtospeakpubliclybymeansofhispublisher。Thepublisher，again，speaksbytheaidoftheprinterashisworkman（operarius），yetnotinhisownname，forotherwisehewouldbetheauthor，butinthenameoftheauthor;andheisonlyentitledtodosoinvirtueofamandategivenhimtothateffectbytheauthor。Nowtheunauthorizedprinterandpublisherspeaksbyanassumedauthorityinhispublication;inthenameindeedoftheauthor，butwithoutamandatetothateffect（geritsemandatariumabsquemandato）。Consequentlysuchanunauthorizedpublicationisawrongcommittedupontheauthorizedandonlylawfulpublisher，asitamountstoapilferingoftheprofitswhichthelatterwasentitledandabletodrawfromtheuseofhisproperright（furtumusus）。Unauthorizedprintingandpublicationofbooksis，therefore，forbidden—asanactofcounterfeitandpiracy—
　　onthegroundofright。
　　Thereseems，however，tobeanimpressionthatthereisasortofcommonrighttoprintandpublishbooks;buttheslightestreflectionmustconvinceanyonethatthiswouldbeagreatinjustice。
　　Thereasonofitisfoundsimplyinthefactthatabook，regardedfromonepointofview，isanexternalproductofmechanicalart（opusmechanicum），thatcanbeimitatedbyanyonewhomaybeinrightfulpossessionofacopy;anditisthereforehisbyarealright。
　　But，fromanotherpointofview，abookisnotmerelyanexternalthing，butisadiscourseofthepublishertothepublic，andheisonlyentitledtodothispubliclyunderthemandateoftheauthor（praestatiooperae）;andthisconstitutesapersonalright。Theerrorunderlyingtheimpressionreferredto，therefore，arisesfromaninterchangeandconfusionofthesetwokindsofrightinrelationtobooks。
　　ConfusionofPersonalRightandRealRight。
　　Theconfusionofpersonalrightwithrealrightmaybelikewiseshownbyreferencetoadifferenceofviewinconnectionwithanothercontract，fallingundertheheadofcontractsofhiring（BII。
　　I），namely，thecontractoflease（jusincolatus）。Thequestionisraisedastowhetheraproprietorwhenhehassoldahouseorapieceofgroundheldonlease，beforetheexpiryoftheperiodoflease，wasboundtoaddtheconditionofthecontinuanceoftheleasetothecontractofpurchase;orwhetheritshouldbeheldthat"purchasebreakshire，"ofcourseunderreservationofaperiodofwarningdeterminedbythenatureofthesubjectinuse。Intheformerview，ahouseorfarmwouldberegardedashavingaburdenlyinguponit，constitutingarealrightacquiredinitbythelessee;
　　andthismightwellenoughbecarriedoutbyaclausemerelyindorsingoringrossingthecontractofleaseinthedeedofsale。Butasitwouldnolongerthenbeasimplelease;anothercontractwouldproperlyberequiredtobeconjoined，amatterwhichfewlessorswouldbedisposedtogrant。Theproposition，then，that"Purchasebreakshire"holdsinprinciple;forthefullrightinathingasapropertyoverbearsallpersonalright，whichisinconsistentwithit。Butthereremainsarightofactiontothelessee，onthegroundofapersonalrightforindemnificationonaccountofanylossarisingfrombreakingofthecontract。
　　EPISODICALSECTION。TheIdealAcquisitionofExternalObjectsoftheWill。
　　32。TheNatureandModesofIdealAcquisition。
　　Icallthatmodeofacquisitionidealwhichinvolvesnocausalityintime，andwhichisfoundeduponamereideaofpurereason。Itisneverthelessactual，andnotmerelyimaginaryacquisition：anditisnotcalledrealonlybecausetheactofacquisitionisnotempirical。Thischaracteroftheactarisesfromthepeculiaritythatthepersonacquiringacquiresfromanotherwhoeitherisnotyet，andwhocanonlyberegardedasapossiblebeing，orwhoisjustceasingtobe，orwhonolongeris。Hencesuchamodeofattainingtopossessionistoberegardedasamerepracticalideaofreason。
　　Therearethreemodesofidealacquisition：
　　I。Acquisitionbyusucapion;
　　II。Acquisitionbyinheritanceorsuccession;
　　III。Acquisitionbyundyingmerit（meritumimmortale），ortheclaimbyrighttoagoodnameatdeath。
　　Thesethreemodesofacquisitioncan，asamatteroffact，onlyhaveeffectinapublicjuridicalstateofexistence，buttheyarenotfoundedmerelyuponthecivilconstitutionoruponarbitrarystatutes;
　　theyarealreadycontainedaprioriintheconceptionofthestateofnature，andarethusnecessarilyconceivablepriortotheirempiricalmanifestation。Thelawsregardingtheminthecivilconstitutionoughttoberegulatedbythatrationalconception。
　　33。I。AcquisitionbyUsucapion。
　　（AcquisitioperUsucapionem）。
　　Imayacquirethepropertyofanothermerelybylongpossessionanduseofit（usucapio）。Suchpropertyisnotacquired，becauseImaylegitimatelypresumethathisconsentisgiventothiseffect（perconsensumpraesumptum）;norbecauseIcanassumethat，ashedoesnotopposemyacquisitionofit，hehasrelinquishedorabandoneditashis（remderelictam）。ButIacquireitthusbecause，eveniftherewereanyoneactuallyraisingaclaimtothispropertyasitstrueowner，Imayexcludehimonthegroundofmylongpossessionofit，ignorehispreviousexistence，andproceedasifheexistedduringthetimeofmypossessionasamereabstraction，althoughImayhavebeensubsequentlyapprizedofhisrealityaswellasofhisclaim。
　　Thismodeofacquisitionisnotquitecorrectlydesignatedacquisitionbyprescription（perpraescriptionem）;fortheexclusionofallotherclaimantsistoberegardedasonlytheconsequenceoftheusucapion;andtheprocessofacquisitionmusthavegonebeforetherightofexclusion。Therationalpossibilityofsuchamodeofacquisitionhasnowtobeproved。
　　Anyonewhodoesnotexerciseacontinuouspossessoryactivity（actuspossessorius）inrelationtoathingashisisregardedwithgoodrightasonewhodoesnotatallexistasitspossessor。Forhecannotcomplainoflesionsolongashedoesnotqualifyhimselfwithatitleasitspossessor。Andevenifheshouldafterwardslayclaimtothethingwhenanotherhasalreadytakenpossessionofit，heonlysayshewasonceonatimeownerofit，butnotthatheissostill，orthathispossessionhascontinuedwithoutinterruptionasajuridicalfact。Itcan，therefore，onlybeajuridicalprocessofpossession，thathasbeenmaintainedwithoutinterruptionandisproveablebydocumentaryfact，thatanyonecansecureforhimselfwhatishisownafterceasingforalongtimetomakeuseofit。
　　For，supposethattheneglecttoexercisethispossessoryactivityhadnottheeffectofenablinganothertofounduponhishithertolawful，undisputedandbonafidepossession，andirrefragablerighttocontinueinitspossessionsothathemayregardthethingthatisthusinhispossessionasacquiredbyhim。Thennoacquisitionwouldeverbecomeperemptoryandsecured，butallacquisitionwouldonlybeprovisoryandtemporary。Thisisevidentonthegroundthattherearenohistoricalrecordsavailabletocarrytheinvestigationofatitlebacktothefirstpossessorandhisactofacquisition。Thepresumptionuponwhichacquisitionbyusucapionisfoundedis，therefore，notmerelyitsconformitytorightasallowedandjust，butalsothepresumptionofitsbeingright（praesumtiojurisetdejure），anditsbeingassumedtobeinaccordancewithcompulsorylaws（suppositiolegalis）。Anyonewhohasneglectedtoembodyhispossessoryactinadocumentarytitlehaslosthisclaimtotherightofbeingpossessorforthetime;andthelengthoftheperiodofhisneglectingtodoso—whichneednotnecessarilybeparticularlydefined—canbereferredtoonlyasestablishingthecertaintyofthisneglect。Anditwouldcontradictthepostulateofthejuridicallypracticalreasontomaintainthatonehithertounknownasapossessor，andwhosepossessoryactivityhasatleastbeeninterrupted，whetherbyorwithoutfaultofhisown，couldalwaysatanytimere—acquireaproperty;forthiswouldbetomakeallownershipuncertain（dominiarerumincertafacere）。
　　Butifheisamemberofthecommonwealthorcivilunion，thestatemaymaintainhispossessionforhimvicariously，althoughitmaybeinterruptedasprivatepossession;andinthatcasetheactualpossessorwillnotbeabletoproveatitleofacquisitionevenfromafirstoccupation，nortofounduponatitleofusucapion。But，inthestateofnature，usucapionisuniversallyarightfulgroundofholding，notproperlyasajuridicalmodeofrequiringathing，butasagroundformaintainingoneselfinpossessionofitwheretherearenojuridicalacts。Areleasefromjuridicalclaimsiscommonlyalsocalledacquisition。Theprescriptivetitleoftheolderpossessor，therefore，belongstothesphereofnaturalright（estjurisnaturae）。
　　34。II。AcquisitionbyInheritance。
　　（Acquisitiohaereditatis）。
　　Inheritanceisconstitutedbythetransfer（translatio）ofthepropertyorgoodsofonewhoisdyingtoasurvivor，throughtheconsentofthewillofboth。Theacquisitionoftheheirwhotakestheestate（haeredisinstituti）andtherelinquishmentofthetestatorwholeavesit，beingtheactsthatconstitutetheexchangeofthemineandthine，takeplaceinthesamemomentoftime—inarticulomortis—
　　andjustwhenthetestatorceasestobe。Thereisthereforenospecialactoftransfer（translatio）intheempiricalsense;forthatwouldinvolvetwosuccessiveacts，bywhichtheonewouldfirstdivesthimselfofhispossession，andtheotherwouldthereuponenterintoit。Inheritanceasconstitutedbyasimultaneousdoubleactis，therefore，anidealmodeofacquisition。Inheritanceisinconceivableinthestateofnaturewithoutatestamentarydisposition（dispositioultimaevoluntatis）;andthequestionarisesastowhetherthismodeofacquisitionistoberegardedasacontractofsuccession，oraunilateralactinstitutinganheirbyawill（testamentum）。Thedeterminationofthisquestiondependsonthefurtherquestion，whetherandhow，intheverysamemomentinwhichoneindividualceasestobe，therecanbeatransitionofhispropertytoanotherperson。Hencetheproblem，astohowamodeofacquisitionbyinheritanceispossible，mustbeinvestigatedindependentlyofthevariouspossibleformsinwhichitispracticallycarriedout，andwhichcanhaveplaceonlyinacommonwealth。
　　"Itispossibletoacquirebybeinginstitutedorappointedheirinatestamentarydisposition。"ForthetestatorCaiuspromisesanddeclaresinhislastwilltoTitius，whoknowsnothingofthispromise，totransfertohimhisestateincaseofdeath，butthuscontinuingaslongashelivessoleownerofit。Nowbyamereunilateralactofwill，nothingcaninfactbetransmittedtoanotherperson，asinadditiontothepromiseoftheonepartythereisrequiredacceptance（acceptatio）onthepartoftheother，andasimultaneousbilateralactofwill（voluntassimultanea）which，however，ishereawanting。SolongasCaiuslives，Titiuscannotexpresslyacceptinordertoenteronacquisition，becauseCaiushasonlypromisedincaseofdeath;otherwisethepropertywouldbeforamomentatleastincommonpossession，whichisnotthewillofthetestator。However，Titiusacquirestacitlyaspecialrighttotheinheritanceasarealright。Thisisconstitutedbythesoleandexclusiverighttoaccepttheestate（jusinrejacente），whichisthereforecalledatthatpointoftimeahaereditasjacens。Nowaseveryman—becausehemustalwaysgainandneverlosebyit—
　　necessarily，althoughtacitly，acceptssucharight，andasTitiusafterthedeathofCaiusisinthisposition，hemayacquirethesuccessionasheirbyacceptanceofthepromise。Andtheestateisnotinthemeantimeentirelywithoutanowner（resnullius），butisonlyinabeyanceorvacant（vacua）;becausehehasexclusivelytherightofchoiceastowhetherhewillactuallymaketheestatebequeathedtohimhisownornot。
　　Hencetestamentsarevalidaccordingtomerenaturalright（suntjurisnaturae）。Thisassertionhowever，istobeunderstoodinthesensethattheyarecapableandworthyofbeingintroducedandsanctionedinthecivilstate，wheneveritisinstituted。Foritisonlythecommonwillinthecivilstatethatmaintainsthepossessionoftheinheritanceorsuccession，whileithangsbetweenacceptanceorrejectionandspeciallybelongstonoparticularindividual。
　　35。III。TheContinuingRightofaGoodNameafterDeath。（BonafamaDefuncti）。
　　Itwouldbeabsurdtothinkthatadeadpersoncouldpossessanythingafterhisdeath，whenhenolongerexistsintheeyeofthelaw，ifthematterinquestionwereamerething。Butagoodnameisacongenitalandexternal，althoughmerelyideal，possession，whichattachesinseparablytotheindividualasaperson。Nowwecanandmustabstractherefromallconsiderationastowhetherthepersonsceasetobeafterdeathorstillcontinueassuchtoexist;because，inconsideringtheirjuridicalrelationtoothers，weregardpersonsmerelyaccordingtotheirhumanityandasrationalbeings（homonoumenon）。Henceanyattempttobringthereputationorgoodnameofapersonintoevilandfalsereputeafterdeath，isalwaysquestionable，evenalthoughawell—foundedchargemaybeallowed—fortothatextentthebrocard"Demortuisnilnisibene"*iswrong。Yettospreadchargesagainstonewhoisabsentandcannotdefendhimself，showsatleastawantofmagnanimity。
　　*[Letnothingbesaidofthedeadbutwhatisfavourable。]
　　Byablamelesslifeandadeaththatworthilyendsit，nothingendsit，itisadmittedthatamanmayacquirea（negatively）goodreputationconstitutingsomethingthatishisown，evenwhenhenolongerexistsintheworldofsenseasavisibleperson（homophaenomenon）。Itisfurtherheldthathissurvivorsandsuccessors—
　　whetherrelativesorstrangers—areentitledtodefendhisgoodnameasamatterofright，onthegroundthatunprovedaccusationssubjectthemalltothedangerofsimilartreatmentafterdeath。Nowthatamanwhendeadcanyetacquiresucharightisapeculiarand，nevertheless，anundeniablemanifestationinfact，oftheapriorilaw—givingreasonthusextendingitslawofcommandorprohibitionbeyondthelimitsofthepresentlife。Ifsomeonethenspreadsachargeregardingadeadpersonthatwouldhavedishonouredhimwhenliving，orevenmadehimdespicable，anyonewhocanadduceaproofthatthisaccusationisintentionallyfalseanduntruemaypubliclydeclarehimwhothusbringsthedeadpersonintoillreputetobeacalumniator，andaffixdishonourtohiminturn。Thiswouldnotbeallowableunlessitwerelegitimatetoassumethatthedeadpersonwasinjuredbytheaccusation，althoughheisdead，andthatacertainjustsatisfactionwasdonetohimbyanapology，althoughhenolongersensiblyexists。Atitletoactthepartthevindicatorofthedeadpersondoesnotrequiretobeestablished;foreveryonenecessarilyclaimsthisofhimself，notmerelyasadutyofvirtueregardedethically，butasarightbelongingtohiminvirtueofhishumanity。Nordoesthevindicatorrequiretoshowanyspecialpersonaldamage，accruingtohimasafriendorrelative，fromastainonthecharacterofthedeceased，tojustifyhiminproceedingtocensureit。
　　Thatsuchaformofidealacquisition，andevenarightinanindividualafterdeathagainstsurvivors，isthusactuallyfounded，cannot，therefore，bedisputed，althoughthepossibilityofsucharightisnotcapableoflogicaldeduction。
　　Thereisnogroundfordrawingvisionaryinferencesfromwhathasjustbeenstated，tothepresentimentofafuturelifeandinvisiblerelationstodepartedsouls。Fortheconsiderationsconnectedwiththisrightturnonnothingmorethanthepurelymoralandjuridicalrelationwhichsubsistsamongmen，eveninthepresentlife，asrationalbeings。Abstractionis，however，madefromallthatbelongsphysicallytotheirexistenceinspaceandtime;thatis，menareconsideredlogicallyapartfromthesephysicalconcomitantsoftheirnature，notastotheirstatewhenactuallydeprivedofthem，butonlyinsofarasbeingspiritstheyareinaconditionthatmightrealizetheinjurydonethembycalumniators。Anyonewhomayfalselysaysomethingagainstmeahundredyearshenceinjuresmeevennow。Forinthepurejuridicalrelation，whichisentirelyrationalandsurprasensible，abstractionismadefromthephysicalconditionsoftime，andthecalumniatorisasculpableasifhehadcommittedtheoffenceinmylifetime;onlythiswillnotbetriedbyacriminalprocess，buthewillonlybepunishedwiththatlossofhonourhewouldhavecausedtoanother，andthisisinflicteduponhimbypublicopinionaccordingtothelextalionis。Evenaplagiarismfromadeadauthor，althoughitdoesnottarnishthehonourofthedeceased，butonlydepriveshimofapartofhisproperty，isyetproperlyregardedasalesionofhishumanright。
　　CH3
　　FIRSTPART。PRIVATERIGHT。
　　TheSystemofthoseLawsWhichRequireNoExternalPromulgation。
　　CHAPTERIII。AcquisitionConditionedbytheSentenceofaPublicJudicatory。
　　36。HowandWhatAcquisitionisSubjectivelyConditionedbythePrincipleofaPublicCourt。
　　Naturalright，understoodsimplyasthatrightwhichisnotstatutory，andwhichisknowablepurelyapriori，byeveryman’sreason，willincludedistributivejusticeaswellascommutativejustice。Itismanifestthatthelatter，asconstitutingthejusticethatisvalidbetweenpersonsintheirreciprocalrelationsofintercoursewithoneanother，mustbelongtonaturalright。Butthisholdsalsoofdistributivejustice，insofarasitcanbeknownapriori;anddecisionsorsentencesregardingitmustberegulatedbythelawofnaturalright。
　　ThemoralpersonwhopresidesinthesphereofjusticeandadministersitiscalledtheCourtofjustice，and，asengagedintheprocessofofficialduty，thejudicatory;thesentencedeliveredinacase，isthejudgement（judicium）。Allthisistobehereviewedapriori，accordingtotherationalconditionsofright，withouttakingintoconsiderationhowsuchaconstitutionistobeactuallyestablishedororganized，forwhichparticularstatutes，andconsequentlyempiricalprinciples，arerequisite。
　　Thequestion，then，inthisconnection，isnotmerely"Whatisrightinitself？"inthesenseinwhicheverymanmustdetermineitbythejudgementofreason;but"Whatisrightasappliedtothiscase？"thatis，"Whatisrightandjustasviewedbyacourt？"Therationalandthejudicialpointsofviewarethereforetobedistinguished;andtherearefourcasesinwhichthetwoformsofjudgementhaveadifferentandoppositeissue。Andyettheymayco—existwitheachother，becausetheyaredeliveredfromtwodifferent，yetrespectivelytrue，pointsofview：theonefromregardtoprivateright，theotherfromtheideaofpublicright。Theyare：I。Thecontractofdonation（pactumdonationis）;II。Thecontractofloan（commodatum）;
　　III。Theactionofrealrevindication（vindicatio）;andIV。
　　Guaranteebyoath（juramentum）。
　　Itisacommonerroronthepartofthejuristtofallhereintothefallacyofbeggingthequestionbyatacitassumption（vitiumsubreptionis）。Thisisdonebyassumingasobjectiveandabsolutethejuridicalprinciplewhichapubliccourtofjusticeisentitledandevenboundtoadoptinitsownbehoof，andonlyfromthesubjectivepurposeofqualifyingitselftodecideandjudgeuponalltherightspertainingtoindividuals。Itisthereforeofnosmallimportancetomakethisspecificdifferenceintelligible，andtodrawattentiontoit。
　　37。I。TheContractofDonation。
　　（PactumDonationis）。
　　Thecontractofdonationsignifiesthegratuitousalienation（gratis）ofathingorrightthatismine。Itinvolvesarelationbetweenmeasthedonor（donans），andanotherpersonasthedonatory（donatarius），inaccordancewiththeprincipleofprivateright，bywhichwhatismineistransferredtothelatter，onhisacceptanceofit，asagift（donum）。However，itisnottobepresumedthatI
　　havevoluntarilyboundmyselftherebysoastobecompelledtokeepmypromise，andthatIhavethusgivenawaymyfreedomgratuitously，and，asitwere，tothatextentthrownmyselfaway。Nemosuumjactarepraesumitur。Butthisiswhatwouldhappen，undersuchcircumstances，accordingtotheprincipleofrightinthecivilstate;
　　forinthisspherethedonatorycancompelme，undercertainconditions，toperformmypromise。If，then，thecasecomesbeforeacourt，accordingtotheconditionsofpublicright，itmusteitherbepresumedthatthedonorhasconsentedtosuchcompulsion，orthecourtwouldgivenoregard，inthesentence，totheconsiderationastowhetherheintendedtoreservetherighttoresilefromhispromiseornot;butwouldonlyrefertowhatiscertain，namely，theconditionofthepromiseandtheacceptanceofthedonatory。Althoughthepromiser，therefore，thought—asmayeasilybesupposed—thathecouldnotbeboundbyhispromiseinanycase，ifhe"rued"itbeforeitwasactuallycarriedout，yetthecourtassumesthatheoughtexpresslytohavereservedthisconditionifsuchwashismind;andifhedidnotmakesuchanexpressreservation，itwillbeheldthathecanbecompelledtoimplementhispromise。Andthisprincipleisassumedbythecourt，becausetheadministrationofjusticewouldotherwisebeendlesslyimpeded，orevenmadeentirelyimpossible。
　　38。II。TheContractofLoan。（Commodatum）。
　　Inthecontractofcommodate—loan（commodatum）Igivesomeonethegratuitoususeofsomethingthatismine。Ifitisathingthatisgivenonloan，thecontractingpartiesagreethattheborrowerwillrestoretheverysamethingtothepowerofthelender，Butthereceiveroftheloan（commodatarius）cannot，atthesametime，assumethattheownerofthethinglent（commodans）willtakeuponhimselfallrisk（casus）ofanypossiblelossofit，orofitsusefulquality，thatmayarisefromhavinggivenitintothepossessionofthereceiver。Foritisnottobeunderstoodofitselfthattheowner，besidestheuseofthething，whichhehasgrantedtothereceiver，andthedetrimentthatisinseparablefromsuchuse，alsogivesaguaranteeorwarrandiceagainstalldamagethatmayarisefromsuchuse。Onthecontrary，aspecialaccessorycontractwouldhavetobeenteredintoforthispurpose。Theonlyquestion，then，thatcanberaisedisthis："Isitincumbentonthelenderortheborrowertoaddexpresslytheconditionofundertakingtheriskthatmayaccruetothethinglent;or，ifthisisnotdone，whichofthepartiesistobepresumedtohaveconsentedandagreedtoguaranteethepropertyofthelender，uptorestorationoftheverysamethingoritsequivalent？"Certainlynotthelender;becauseitcannotbepresumedthathehasgratuitouslyagreedtogivemorethanthemereuseofthething，sothathecannotbesupposedtohavealsoundertakentheriskoflossofhisproperty。Butthismaybeassumedonthesideoftheborrower;becausehetherebyundertakesandperformsnothingmorethanwhatisimpliedinthecontract。
　　Forexample，Ienterahouse，whenovertakenbyashowerofrain，andasktheloanofacloak。Butthroughaccidentalcontactwithcolouringmatter，itbecomesentirelyspoiledwhileinmypossession;oronenteringanotherhouse，Ilayitasideanditisstolen。Undersuchcircumstances，everybodywouldthinkitabsurdformetoassertthatIhadnofurtherconcernwiththecloakbuttoreturnitasitwas，or，inthelattercase，onlytomentionthefactofthetheft;andthat，inanycase，anythingmorerequiredwouldbebutanactofcourtesyinexpressingsympathywiththeowneronaccountofhisloss，seeinghecanclaimnothingonthegroundofright。Itwouldbeotherwise，however，if，onaskingtheuseofanarticle，Idischargedmyselfbeforehandfromallresponsibility，incaseofitscomingtogriefwhileinmyhands，onthegroundofmybeingpoorandunabletocompensateanyincidentalloss。Noonecouldfindsuchaconditionsuperfluousorludicrous，unlesstheborrowerwere，infact，knowntobeawell—to—doandwell—disposedman;becauseinsuchacaseitwouldalmostbeaninsultnottoactonthepresumptionofgenerouscompensationforanylosssustained。
　　Nowbytheverynatureofthiscontract，thepossibledamage（casus）
　　whichthethinglentmayundergocannotbeexactlydeterminedinanyagreement。Commodateisthereforeanuncertaincontract（pactumincertum），becausetheconsentcanonlybesofarpresumed。Thejudgement，inanycase，decidinguponwhomtheincidenceofanylossmustfall，cannotthereforebedeterminedfromtheconditionsofthecontractinitself，butonlybytheprincipleofthecourtbeforewhichitcomes，andwhichcanonlyconsiderwhatiscertaininthecontract;andtheonlythingcertainisalwaysthefactastothepossessionofthethingasproperty。Hencethejudgementpassedinthestateofnaturewillbedifferentfromthatgivenbyacourtofjusticeinthecivilstate。Thejudgementfromthestandpointofnaturalrightwillbedeterminedbyregardtotheinnerrationalqualityofthething，andwillrunthus："Lossarisingfromdamageaccruingtoathinglentfallsupontheborrower"（casumsentitcommodatarius）;whereasthesentenceofacourtofjusticeinthecivilstatewillrunthus："Thelossfallsuponthelender"（casumsentitdominus）。Thelatterjudgementturnsoutdifferentlyfromtheformerasthesentenceofthemeresoundreason，becauseapublicjudgecannotfounduponpresumptionsastowhateitherpartymayhavethought;andthustheonewhohasnotobtainedreleasefromalllossinthething，byaspecialaccessorycontract，mustbeartheloss。Hencethedifferencebetweenthejudgementasthecourtmustdeliveritandtheforminwhicheachindividualisentitledtoholditforhimself，byhisprivatereason，isamatterofimportance，andisnottobeoverlookedintheconsiderationofjuridicaljudgements。
　　39。III。TheRevindicationofwhathasbeenLost。
　　（Vindicatio）。
　　Itisclearfromwhathasbeenalreadysaidthatathingofminewhichcontinuestoexistremainsmine，althoughImaynotbeincontinuousoccupationofit;andthatitdoesnotceasetobeminewithoutajuridicalactofderelictionoralienation。Further，itisevidentthatarightinthisthing（jusreale）belongsinconsequencetome（juspersonale），againsteveryholderofit，andnotmerelyagainstsomeparticularperson。Butthequestionnowarisesastowhetherthisrightmustberegardedbyeveryotherpersonasacontinuousrightofpropertyperse，ifIhavenotinanywayrenouncedit，althoughthethingisinthepossessionofanother。
　　Athingmaybelost（resamissa）andthuscomeintootherhandsinanhonourablebonafidewayasasupposed"find";oritmaycometomebyformaltransferonthepartofonewhoisinpossessionofit，andwhoprofessestobeitsowner，althoughheisnotso。Takingthelattercase，thequestionariseswhether，sinceIcannotacquireathingfromonewhoisnotitsowner（anondomino），Iamexcludedbythefactfromallrightinthethingitself，andhavemerelyapersonalrightagainstawrongfulpossessor？Thisismanifestlyso，iftheacquisitionisjudgedpurelyaccordingtoitsinnerjustifyinggroundsandviewedaccordingtothestateofnature，andnotaccordingtotheconvenienceofacourtofjustice。
　　Foreverythingalienablemustbecapableofbeingacquiredbyanyone。Therightfulnessofacquisition，however，restsentirelyupontheforminaccordancewithwhichwhatisinpossessionofanother，istransferredtomeandacceptedbyme。Inotherwords，rightfulacquisitiondependsupontheformalityofthejuridicalactofcommutationorinterchangebetweenthepossessorofthethingandtheacquirerofit，withoutitsbeingrequiredtoaskhowtheformercamebyit;becausethiswoulditselfbeaninjury，onthegroundthat：Quilibetpraesumiturbonus。Nowsupposeitturnedoutthatthesaidpossessorwasnottherealowner，Icannotadmitthattherealownerisentitledtoholdmedirectlyresponsible，orsoentitledwithregardtoanyonewhomightbeholdingthething。ForIhavemyselftakennothingawayfromhim，when，forexample，Iboughthishorseaccordingtothelaw（tituloemptivenditi）whenitwasofferedforsaleinthepublicmarket。Thetitleofacquisitionisthereforeunimpeachableonmyside;andasbuyerIamnotbound，norevenhaveI
　　theright，toinvestigatethetitleoftheseller;forthisprocessofinvestigationwouldhavetogooninanascendingseriesadinfinitum。
　　HenceonsuchgroundsIoughttoberegarded，invirtueofaregularandformalpurchase，asnotmerelytheputative，buttherealownerofthehorse。
　　Butagainstthisposition，thereimmediatelystartupthefollowingjuridicalprinciples。Anyacquisitionderivedfromonewhoisnottheownerofthethinginquestionisnullandvoid。Icannotderivefromanotheranythingmorethanwhathehimselfrightfullyhas;
　　andalthoughasregardstheformoftheacquisitionthemodusacquirendi—ImayproceedinaccordancewithalltheconditionsofrightwhenIdealinastolenhorseexposedforsaleinthemarket，yetarealtitlewarrantingtheacquisitionwasawanting;forthehorsewasnotreallythepropertyofthesellerinquestion。HoweverI
　　maybeabonafidepossessorofathingundersuchconditions，Iamstillonlyaputativeowner，andtherealownerhastherightofvindicationagainstme（remsuamvindicandi）。
　　Now，itmaybeagainasked，whatisrightandjustinitselfregardingtheacquisitionofexternalthingsamongmenintheirintercoursewithoneanother—viewedinthestateofnatureaccordingtotheprinciplesofcommutativejustice？Anditmustbeadmittedinthisconnectionthatwhoeverhasapurposeofacquiringanythingmustregarditasabsolutelynecessarytoinvestigatewhetherthethingwhichhewishestoacquiredoesnotalreadybelongtoanotherperson。Foralthoughhemaycarefullyobservetheformalconditionsrequiredforappropriatingwhatmaybelongtothepropertyofanother，asinbuyingahorseaccordingtotheusualtermsinamarket，yethecan，atthemost，acquireonlyapersonalrightinrelationtoathing（jusadrem）solongasitisstillunknowntohimwhetheranotherthanthesellermaynotbetherealowner。Hence，ifsomeotherpersonweretocomeforwardandprovebydocumentaryevidenceapriorrightofpropertyinthething，nothingwouldremainfortheputativenewownerbuttheadvantagewhichhehasdrawnasabonafidepossessorofituptothatmoment。Nowitisfrequentlyimpossibletodiscovertheabsolutelyfirstoriginalownerofathingintheseriesofputativeowners，whoderivetheirrightfromoneanother。Hencenomereexchangeofexternalthings，howeverwellitmayagreewiththeformalconditionsofcommutativejustice，caneverguaranteeanabsolutelycertainacquisition。
　　Here，however，thejuridicallylaw—givingreasoncomesinagainwiththeprincipleofdistributivejustice;anditadoptsasacriterionoftherightfulnessofpossession，notwhatisinitselfinreferencetotheprivatewillofeachindividualinthestateofnature，butonlytheconsiderationofhowitwouldbeadjudgedbyacourtofjusticeinacivilstate，constitutedbytheunitedwillofall。Inthisconnection，fulfillmentoftheformalconditionsofacquisition，thatinthemselvesonlyestablishapersonalright，ispostulatedassufficient;andtheystandasanequivalentforthematerialconditionswhichproperlyestablishthederivationofpropertyfromapriorputativeowner，totheextentofmakingwhatisinitselfonlyapersonalright，validbeforeacourt，asarealright。ThusthehorsewhichIboughtwhenexposedforsaleinthepublicmarket，underconditionsregulatedbythemunicipallaw，becomesmypropertyifalltheconditionsofpurchaseandsalehavebeenexactlyobservedinthetransaction;butalwaysunderthereservationthattherealownercontinuestohavetherightofaclaimagainsttheseller，onthegroundofhispriorunalienatedpossession。