Myotherwisepersonalrightisthustransmutedintoarealright，accordingtowhichImaytakeandvindicatetheobjectasminewhereverImayfindit，withoutbeingresponsibleforthewayinwhichtheSellerhadcomeintopossessionofit。
Itisthereforeonlyinbehoofoftherequirementsofjuridicaldecisioninacourt（infavoremjustitaedistributivae）thattherightinrespectofathingisregarded，notaspersonal，whichitisinitself，butasreal，becauseitcanthusbemosteasilyandcertainlyadjudged;anditisthusacceptedanddealtwithaccordingtoapureprincipleapriori。Uponthisprinciple，variousstatutorylawscometobefoundedwhichspeciallyaimatlayingdowntheconditionsunderwhichaloneamodeofacquisitionshallbelegitimate，sothatthejudgemaybeabletoassigneveryonehisownaseasilyandcertainlyaspossible。Thus，inthebrocard，"Purchasebreakshire，"whatbythenatureofthesubjectisarealright—namelythehire—istakentoholdasamerelypersonalright;
and，conversely，asinthecasereferredtoabove，whatisinitselfmerelyapersonalrightisheldtobevalidasarealright。Andthisisdoneonlywhenthequestionarisesastotheprinciplesbywhichacourtofjusticeinthecivilstateistobeguided，inordertoproceedwithallpossiblesafetyindeliveringjudgementontherightsofindividuals。
40。IV。AcquisitionofSecuritybytheTakingofanOath。
（CautioJuratoria）。
Onlyonegroundcanbeassignedonwhichitcouldbeheldthatmenareboundinthejuridicalrelationtobelieveandtoconfessthattherearegods，orthatthereisaGod。Itisthattheymaybeabletoswearanoath;andthatthusbythefearofanall—seeingSupremePower，whoserevengetheymustsolemnlyinvokeuponthemselvesincasetheirutteranceshouldbefalse，theymaybeconstrainedtobetruthfulinstatementandfaithfulinpromising。Itisnotmoralitybutmerelyblindsuperstitionthatisreckoneduponinthisprocess;
foritisevidentitimpliesthatnocertaintyistobeexpectedfromameresolemndeclarationinmattersofrightbeforeacourt，althoughthedutyoftruthfulnessmusthavealwaysappearedself—evidenttoall，inamatterwhichconcernstheholiestthatcanbeamongmen—namely，therightofman。Hencerecoursehasbeenhadtoamotivefoundedonmeremythsandfablesasimaginaryguarantees。
ThusamongtheRejangs，aheathenpeopleinSumatra，itisthecustom—
accordingtothetestimonyofMarsden—toswearbythebonesoftheirdeadrelatives，althoughtheyhavenobeliefinalifeafterdeath。InlikemannerthenegroesofGuineaswearbytheirfetish，abird’sfeather，whichtheyimprecateunderthebeliefthatitwillbreaktheirneck。Andsoinothercases。Thebeliefunderlyingtheseoathsisthataninvisiblepower—whetherithasunderstandingornot—
byitsverynaturepossessesmagicalpowerthatcanbeputintoactionbysuchinvocations。Suchabelief—whichiscommonlycalledreligion，butwhichoughttobecalledsuperstition—is，however，indispensablefortheadministrationofjustice;because，withoutreferringtoit，acourtofjusticewouldnothaveadequatemeanstoascertainfactsotherwisekeptsecret，andtodeterminerights。A
lawmakinganoathobligatoryisthereforeonlygiveninbehoofofthejudicialauthority。
Butthenthequestionarisesastowhattheobligationcouldbefoundeduponthatwouldbindanyoneinacourtofjusticetoaccepttheoathofanotherpersonasarightandvalidproofofthetruthofhisstatementswhicharetoputanendtoalldispute。Inotherwords，whatobligesmejuridicallytobelievethatanotherpersonwhentakinganoathhasanyreligionatall，sothatIshouldsubordinateorentrustmyrighttohisoath？And，onlikegrounds，conversely，canIbeboundatalltotakeanoath？Itisevidentthatboththesequestionspointtowhatisinitselfmorallywrong。
Butinrelationtoacourtofjustice—andgenerallyinthecivilstate—ifitbeassumedtherearenoothermeansofgettingtothetruthincertaincasesthanbyanoath，itmustbeadopted。Inregardtoreligion，underthesuppositionthateveryonehasit，itmaybeutilizedasanecessarymeans（incausunecessitatis），inbehoofofthelegitimateprocedureofacourtofjustice。Thecourtusesthisformofspiritualcompulsion（torturaspiritualis）asanavailablemeans，inconformitywiththesuperstitiouspropensityofmankind，fortheascertainmentofwhatisconcealed;andthereforeholdsitselfjustifiedinsodoing。Thelegislativepower，however，isfundamentallywronginassigningthisauthoritytothejudicialpower，becauseeveninthecivilstateanycompulsionwithregardtothetakingofoathsiscontrarytotheinalienablefreedomofman。
Officialoaths，whichareusuallypromissory，beingtakenonenteringuponanoffice，totheeffectthattheindividualhassincereintentiontoadministerhisfunctionsdutifully，mightwellbechangedintoassertoryoaths，tobetakenattheendofayearormoreofactualadministration，theofficialswearingtothefaithfulnessofhisdischargeofdutyduringthattime。Thiswouldbringtheconsciencemoreintoactionthanthepromissoryoath，whichalwaysgivesroomfortheinternalpretextthat，withthebestintention，thedifficultiesthataroseduringtheadministrationoftheofficialfunctionwerenotforeseen。And，further，violationsofduty，undertheprospectoftheirbeingsummedupbyfuturecensors，wouldgiverisetomoreanxietyastocensurethanwhentheyaremerelyrepresented，oneaftertheother，andforgotten。
Asregardsanoathtakenconcerningamatterofbelief（decredulitate），itisevidentthatnosuchoathcanbedemandedbyacourt。1。For，first，itcontainsinitselfacontradiction。Suchbelief，asintermediatebetweenopinionandknowledge，isathingonwhichonemightventuretolayawagerbutnottoswearanoath。2。
And，second，thejudgewhoimposesanoathofbelief，inordertoascertainanythingpertinenttohisownpurposeoreventothecommongood，commitsagreatoffenceagainsttheconscientiousnessofthepartytakingsuchanoath。Thishedoesinregardbothtothelevityofmind，whichhetherebyhelpstoengender，andtothestingsofconsciencewhichamanmustfeelwhoto—dayregardsasubjectfromacertainpointofview，butwhowillveryprobablyto—morrowfinditquiteimprobablefromanotherpointofview。Anyone，therefore，whoiscompelledtotakesuchanoath，issubjectedtoaninjury。
TransitionfromtheMineandThineintheStateofNaturetotheMineandThineintheJuridicalStateGenerally。
41。PublicJusticeasRelatedtotheNaturalandtheCivilState。
Thejuridicalstateisthatrelationofmentooneanotherwhichcontainstheconditionsunderwhichitisalonepossibleforeveryonetoobtaintherightthatishisdue。Theformalprincipleofthepossibilityofactuallyparticipatinginsuchright，viewedinaccordancewiththeideaofauniversallylegislativewill，ispublicjustice。Publicjusticemaybeconsideredinrelationeithertothepossibility，oractuality，ornecessityofthepossessionofobjects—regardedasthematteroftheactivityofthewill—accordingtolaws。Itmaythusbedividedintoprotectivejustice（justitiatestatrix），commutativejustice（justitiacommutativa），anddistributivejustice（justitiadistributiva），inthefirstmodeofjustice，thelawdeclaresmerelywhatrelationisinternallyrightinrespectofform（lexjusti）;inthesecond，itdeclareswhatislikewiseexternallyinaccordwithalawinrespectoftheobject，andwhatpossessionisrightful（lexjuridica）;andinthethird，itdeclareswhatisright，andwhatisjust，andtowhatextent，bythejudgementofacourtinanyparticularcasecomingunderthegivenlaw。Inthislatterrelation，thepubliccourtiscalledthejusticeofthecountry;andthequestionwhetherthereactuallyisorisnotsuchanadministrationofpublicjusticemayberegardedasthemostimportantofalljuridicalinterests。
Thenon—juridicalstateisthatconditionofsocietyinwhichthereisnodistributivejustice。Itiscommonlycalledthenaturalstate（statusnaturalis），orthestateofnature。Itisnotthesocialstate，asAchenwallputsit，forthismaybeinitselfanartificialstate（statusartificialis），thatistobecontradistinguishedfromthe"natural"state。Theoppositeofthestateofnatureisthecivilstate（statuscivilis）astheconditionofasocietystandingunderadistributivejustice。Inthestateofnature，theremayevenbejuridicalformsofsocietysuchasmarriage，parentalauthority，thehousehold，andsuchlike。Fornoneofthese，however，doesanylawapriorilayitdownasanincumbentobligation："Thoushaltenterintothisstate。"Butitmaybesaidofthejuridicalstatethat："Allmenwhomayeveninvoluntarilycomeintorelationsofrightwithoneanotheroughttoenterintothisstate。"
Thenaturalornon—juridicalsocialstatemaybeviewedasthesphereofprivateright，andthecivilstatemaybespeciallyregardedasthesphereofpublicright。Thelatterstatecontainsnomoreandnootherdutiesofmentowardseachotherthanwhatmaybeconceivedinconnectionwiththeformerstate;thematterofprivaterightis，inshort，theverysameinboth。Thelawsofthecivilstate，therefore，onlyturnuponthejuridicalformofthecoexistenceofmenunderacommonconstitution;and，inthisrespect，theselawsmustnecessarilyberegardedandconceivedaspubliclaws。
Thecivilunion（uniocivilis）cannot，inthestrictsense，beproperlycalledasociety;forthereisnosocialityincommonbetweentheruler（imperans）andthesubject（subditus）underacivilconstitution。Theyarenotco—ordinatedasassociatesinasocietywitheachother，buttheoneissubordinatedtotheother。Thosewhomaybeco—ordinatedwithoneanothermustconsiderthemselvesasmutuallyequal，insofarastheystandundercommonlaws。Thecivilunionmaythereforeberegardednotsomuchasbeing，butratherasmakingasociety。
42。ThePostulateofPublicRight。
Fromtheconditionsofprivaterightinthenaturalstate，therearisesthepostulateofpublicright。Itmaybethusexpressed："Intherelationofunavoidablecoexistencewithothers，thoushaltpassfromthestateofnatureintoajuridicalunionconstitutedundertheconditionofadistributivejustice。"Theprincipleofthispostulatemaybeunfoldedanalyticallyfromtheconceptionofrightintheexternalrelation，contradistinguishedfrommeremightasviolence。
Nooneisunderobligationtoabstainfrominterferingwiththepossessionofothers，unlesstheygivehimareciprocalguaranteefortheobservanceofasimilarabstentionfrominterferencewithhispossession。Nordoesherequiretowaitforproofbyexperienceoftheneedofthisguarantee，inviewoftheantagonisticdispositionofothers。Heisthereforeundernoobligationtowaittillheacquirespracticalprudenceathisowncost;forhecanperceiveinhimselfevidenceofthenaturalinclinationofmentoplaythemasteroverothers，andtodisregardtheclaimsoftherightofothers，whentheyfeelthemselvestheirsuperiorsbymightorfraud。Andthusitisnotnecessarytowaitforthemelancholyexperienceofactualhostility;theindividualisfromthefirstentitledtoexercisearightfulcompulsiontowardsthosewhoalreadythreatenhimbytheirverynature。Quilibetpraesumiturmalus，donecsecuritatemdederitoppositi。
Solongastheintentiontoliveandcontinueinthisstateofexternallylawlessfreedomprevails，menmaybesaidtodonowrongorinjusticeatalltooneanother，evenwhentheywagewaragainsteachother。Forwhatseemscompetentasgoodfortheoneisequallyvalidfortheother，asifitweresobymutualagreement。Utipartesdejuresuodisponunt，itajusest。Butgenerallytheymustbeconsideredasbeinginthehigheststateofwrong，asbeingandwillingtobeinaconditionwhichisnotjuridical，andinwhich，therefore，noonecanbesecuredagainstviolence，inthepossessionofhisown。
Thedistinctionbetweenwhatisonlyformallyandwhatisalsomateriallywrong，andunjust，findsfrequentapplicationinthescienceofright。Anenemywho，onoccupyingabesiegedfortress，insteadofhonourablyfulfillingtheconditionsofacapitulation，maltreatsthegarrisononmarchingout，orotherwiseviolatestheagreement，cannotcomplainofinjuryorwrongifonanotheroccasionthesametreatmentisinflicteduponthemselves。But，infact，allsuchactionsfundamentallyinvolvethecommissionofwrongandinjustice，inthehighestdegree;becausetheytakeallvalidityawayfromtheconceptionofright，andgiveupeverything，asitwerebylawitself，tosavageviolence，andthusoverthrowtherightsofmengenerally。
SECONDPART。PUBLICRIGHT。
THESYSTEMOFTHOSELAWSWHICHREQUIREPUBLICPROMULGATION。
THEPRINCIPLESOFRIGHTINCIVILSOCIETY。
43。DefinitionandDivisionofPublicRight。
Publicrightembracesthewholeofthelawsthatrequiretobeuniversallypromulgatedinordertoproducejuridicalstateofsociety。Itisthereforeasystemofthoselawsthatarerequisiteforapeopleasamultitudeofmenforminganation，orforanumberofnations，intheirrelationstoeachother。Menandnations，onaccountoftheirmutualinfluenceononeanother，requireajuridicalconstitutionunitingthemunderonewill，inorderthattheymayparticipateinwhatisright。Thisrelationoftheindividualsofanationtoeachotherconstitutesthecivilunioninthesocialstate;and，viewedasawholeinrelationtoitsconstituentmembers，itformsthepoliticalstate（civitas）。
1。Thestate，asconstitutedbythecommoninterestofalltoliveinajuridicalunion，iscalled，inviewofitsform，thecommonwealthortherepublicinthewidersenseoftheterm（respublicalatiussicdicta）。Theprinciplesofrightinthisspherethusconstitutethefirstdepartmentofpublicrightastherightofthestate（juscivitatis）ornationalright。2。Thestate，again，viewedinrelationtootherpeoples，iscalledapower（potentia），whencearisestheideaofpotentates。Viewedinrelationtothesupposedhereditaryunityofthepeoplecomposingit，thestateconstitutesanation（gens）。Underthegeneralconceptionofpublicright，inadditiontotherightoftheindividualstate，therethusarisesanotherdepartmentofright，constitutingtherightofnations（jusgentium）orinternationalright。3。Further，asthesurfaceoftheearthisnotunlimitedinextent，butiscircumscribedintoaunity，nationalrightandinternationalrightnecessarilyculminateintheideaofauniversalrightofmankind，whichmaybecalledCosmopoliticalRight（juscosmopoliticum）。Andnational，international，andcosmopoliticalrightaresointerconnected，that，ifanyoneofthesethreepossibleformsofthejuridicalrelationfailstoembodytheessentialprinciplesthatoughttoregulateexternalfreedombylaw，thestructureoflegislationrearedbytheotherswillalsobeundermined，andthewholesystemwouldatlastfalltopieces。
I。RightoftheStateandConstitutionalLaw。
（JusCivitatis）。
44。OriginOftheCivilUnionandPublicRight。
Itisnotfromanyexperiencepriortotheappearanceofanexternalauthoritativelegislationthatwelearnofthemaximofnaturalviolenceamongmenandtheireviltendencytoengageinwarwitheachother。Norisitassumedherethatitismerelysomeparticularhistoricalconditionorfact，thatmakespubliclegislativeconstraintnecessary;forhoweverwell—disposedorfavourabletorightmenmaybeconsideredtobeofthemselves，therationalideaofastateofsocietynotyetregulatedbyright，mustbetakenasourstarting—point。Thisideaimpliesthatbeforealegalstateofsocietycanbepubliclyestablished，individualmen，nations，andstates，canneverbesafeagainstviolencefromeachother;andthisisevidentfromtheconsiderationthateveryoneofhisownwillnaturallydoeswhatseemsgoodandrightinhisowneyes，entirelyindependentoftheopinionofothers。Hence，unlesstheinstitutionofrightistoberenounced，thefirstthingincumbentonmenistoaccepttheprinciplethatitisnecessarytoleavethestateofnature，inwhicheveryonefollowshisowninclinations，andtoformaunionofallthosewhocannotavoidcomingintoreciprocalcommunication，andthussubjectthemselvesincommontotheexternalrestraintofpubliccompulsorylaws。Menthusenterintoacivilunion，inwhicheveryonehasitdeterminedbylawwhatshallberecognizedashis;andthisissecuredtohimbyacompetentexternalpowerdistinctfromhisownindividuality。Suchistheprimaryobligation，onthepartofallmen，toenterintotherelationsofacivilstateofsociety。
Thenaturalconditionofmankindneednot，onthisground，berepresentedasastateofabsoluteinjustice，asiftherecouldhavebeennootherrelationoriginallyamongmenbutwhatwasmerelydeterminedbyforce。Butthisnaturalconditionmustberegarded，ifiteverexisted，asastateofsocietythatwasvoidofregulationbyright（statusjustitiaevacuus），sothatifamatterofrightcametobeindispute（juscontroversum），nocompetentjudgewasfoundtogiveanauthorizedlegaldecisionuponit。Itisthereforereasonablethatanyoneshouldconstrainanotherbyforce，topassfromsuchanonjuridicalstateoflifeandenterwithinthejurisdictionofacivilstateofsociety。For，althoughonthebasisoftheideasofrightheldbyindividualsassuch，externalthingsmaybeacquiredbyoccupancyorcontract，yetsuchacquisitionisonlyprovisorysolongasithasnotyetobtainedthesanctionofapubliclaw。Tillthissanctionisreached，theconditionofpossessionisnotdeterminedbyanypublicdistributivejustice，norisitsecuredbyanypowerexercisingpublicright。
Ifmenwerenotdisposedtorecognizeanyacquisitionatallasrightful—eveninaprovisionalway—priortoenteringintothecivilstate，thisstateofsocietywoulditselfbeimpossible。Forthelawsregardingthemineandthineinthestateofnature，containformallytheverysamethingastheyprescribeinthecivilstate，whenitisviewedmerelyaccordingtorationalconceptions：onlythatintheformsofthecivilstatetheconditionsarelaiddownunderwhichtheformalprescriptionsofthestateofnatureattainrealizationconformabletodistributivejustice。Werethere，then，notevenprovisionally，anexternalmeumandtuuminthestateofnature，neitherwouldtherebeanyjuridicaldutiesinrelationtothem;and，consequently，therewouldbenoobligationtopassoutofthatstateintoanother。
45。TheFormoftheStateanditsThreePowers。
Astate（civitas）istheunionofanumberofmenunderjuridicallaws。Theselaws，assuch，aretoberegardedasnecessaryapriori—
thatis，asfollowingofthemselvesfromtheconceptionsofexternalrightgenerally—andnotasmerelyestablishedbystatute。Theformofthestateisthusinvolvedintheideaofthestate，viewedasitoughttobeaccordingtopureprinciplesofright;andthisidealformfurnishesthenormalcriterionofeveryrealunionthatconstitutesacommonwealth。
Everystatecontainsinitselfthreepowers，theuniversalunitedwillofthepeoplebeingthuspersonifiedinapoliticaltriad。
Thesearethelegislativepower，theexecutivepower，andthejudiciarypower。1。Thelegislativepowerofthesovereigntyinthestateisembodiedinthepersonofthelawgiver;2。theexecutivepowerisembodiedinthepersonoftherulerwhoadministerstheLaw;and3。thejudiciarypower，embodiedinthepersonofthejudge，isthefunctionofassigningeveryonewhatishisown，accordingtothelaw（potestaslegislatoria，rectoria，etjudiciaria）。
Thesethreepowersmaybecomparedtothethreepropositionsinapracticalsyllogism：themajorasthesumptionlayingdowntheuniversallawofawill，theminorpresentingthecommandapplicabletoanactionaccordingtothelawastheprincipleofthesubsumption，andtheconclusioncontainingthesentence，orjudgementofright，intheparticularcaseunderconsideration。
46。TheLegislativePowerandtheMembersoftheState。
Thelegislativepower，viewedinitsrationalprinciple，canonlybelongtotheunitedwillofthepeople。For，asallrightoughttoproceedfromthispower，itisnecessarythatitslawsshouldbeunabletodowrongtoanyonewhatever。Now，ifanyoneindividualdeterminesanythinginthestateincontradistinctiontoanother，itisalwayspossiblethathemayperpetrateawrongonthatother;butthisisneverpossiblewhenalldetermineanddecreewhatistobeLawtothemselves。Volentinonfitinjuria。Henceitisonlytheunitedandconsentingwillofallthepeople—insofaraseachofthemdeterminesthesamethingaboutall，andalldeterminethesamethingabouteach—thatoughttohavethepowerofenactinglawinthestate。
Themembersofacivilsocietythusunitedforthepurposeoflegislation，andtherebyconstitutingastate，arecalleditscitizens;andtherearethreejuridicalattributesthatinseparablybelongtothembyright。Theseare：1。constitutionalfreedom，astherightofeverycitizentohavetoobeynootherlawthanthattowhichhehasgivenhisconsentorapproval;2。civilequality，astherightofthecitizentorecognisenooneasasuperioramongthepeopleinrelationtohimself，exceptinsofarassuchaoneisassubjecttohismoralpowertoimposeobligations，asthatotherhaspowertoimposeobligationsuponhim;and3。politicalindependence，asthelighttoowehisexistenceandcontinuanceinsocietynottothearbitrarywillofanother，buttohisownrightsandpowersasamemberofthecommonwealth，and，consequently，thepossessionofacivilpersonality，whichcannotberepresentedbyanyotherthanhimself。
Thecapabilityofvotingbypossessionofthesuffrageproperlyconstitutesthepoliticalqualificationofacitizenasamemberofthestate。Butthis，again，presupposestheindependenceorself—sufficiencyoftheindividualcitizenamongthepeople，asonewhoisnotamereincidentalpartofthecommonwealth，butamemberofitactingofhisownwillincommunitywithothers。Thelastofthethreequalitiesinvolvednecessarilyconstitutesthedistinctionbetweenactiveandpassivecitizenship;althoughthelatterconceptionappearstostandincontradictiontothedefinitionofacitizenassuch。Thefollowingexamplesmayservetoremovethisdifficulty。
Theapprenticeofamerchantortradesman，aservantwhoisnotintheemployofthestate，aminor（naturalitervelciviliter），allwomen，and，generally，everyonewhoiscompelledtomaintainhimselfnotaccordingtohisownindustry，butasitisarrangedbyothers（thestateexcepted），arewithoutcivilpersonality，andtheirexistenceisonly，asitwere，incidentallyincludedinthestate。ThewoodcutterwhomIemployonmyestate;thesmithinIndiawhocarrieshishammer，anvil，andbellowsintothehouseswhereheisengagedtoworkiniron，asdistinguishedfromtheEuropeancarpenterorsmith，whocanoffertheindependentproductsofhislabouraswaresforpublicsale;
theresidenttutorasdistinguishedfromtheschoolmaster;theploughmanasdistinguishedfromthefarmerandsuchlike，illustratethedistinctioninquestion。Inallthesecases，theformermembersofthecontrastaredistinguishedfromthelatterbybeingmeresubsidiariesofthecommonwealthandnotactiveindependentmembersofit，becausetheyareofnecessitycommandedandprotectedbyothers，andconsequentlypossessnopoliticalself—sufficiencyinthemselves。Suchdependenceonthewillofothersandtheconsequentinequalityare，however，notinconsistentwiththefreedomandequalityoftheindividualsasmenhelpingtoconstitutethepeople。
Muchratherisitthecasethatitisonlyundersuchconditionsthatapeoplecanbecomeastateandenterintoacivilconstitution。Butallarenotequallyqualifiedtoexercisetherightofsuffrageundertheconstitution，andtobefullcitizensofthestate，andnotmerepassivesubjectsunderitsprotection。For，althoughtheyareentitledtodemandtobetreatedbyalltheothercitizensaccordingtolawsofnaturalfreedomandequality，aspassivepartsofthestate，itdoesnotfollowthattheyoughtthemselvestohavetherighttodealwiththestateasactivemembersofit，toreorganizeit，ortotakeactionbywayofintroducingcertainlaws。
Alltheyhavearightintheircircumstancestoclaimmaybenomorethanthatwhateverbethemodeinwhichthepositivelawsareenacted，theselawsmustnotbecontrarytothenaturallawsthatdemandthefreedomofallthepeopleandtheequalitythatisconformablethereto;anditmustthereforebemadepossibleforthemtoraisethemselvesfromthispassiveconditioninthestatetotheconditionofactivecitizenship。
47。DignitiesintheStateandtheOriginalContract。
Allthesethreepowersinthestatearedignities;and，asnecessarilyarisingoutoftheideaofthestateandessentialgenerallytothefoundationofitsconstitution，theyaretoberegardedaspoliticaldignities。Theyimplytherelationbetweenauniversalsovereignasheadofthestate—whichaccordingtothelawsoffreedomcanbenoneotherthanthepeopleitselfunitedintoanation—andthemassoftheindividualsofthenationassubjects。Theformermemberoftherelationistherulingpower，whosefunctionistogovern（imperans）;thelatteristheruledconstituentsofthestate，whosefunctionistoobey（subditi）。
Theactbywhichapeopleisrepresentedasconstitutingitselfintoastate，istermedtheoriginalcontract。Thisisproperlyonlyanoutwardmodeofrepresentingtheideabywhichtherightfulnessoftheprocessoforganizingtheconstitutionmaybemadeconceivable。
Accordingtothisrepresentation，allandeachofthepeoplegiveuptheirexternalfreedominordertoreceiveitimmediatelyagainasmembersofacommonwealth。Thecommonwealthisthepeopleviewedasunitedaltogetherintoastate。Andthusitisnottobesaidthattheindividualinthestatehassacrificedapartofhisinbornexternalfreedomforaparticularpurpose;buthehasabandonedhiswildlawlessfreedomwholly，inordertofindallhisproperfreedomagainentireandundiminished，butintheformofaregulatedorderofdependence，thatis，inacivilstateregulatedbylawsofright。Thisrelationofdependencethusarisesoutofhisownregulativelawgivingwill。
48。MutualRelationsandCharacteristicsoftheThreePowers。
Thethreepowersinthestate，asregardstheirrelationstoeachother，are，therefore：（1）coordinatewithoneanotherassomanymoralpersons，andtheoneisthusthecomplementoftheotherinthewayofcompletingtheconstitutionofthestate;（2）theyarelikewisesubordinatetooneanother，sothattheonecannotatthesametimeusurpthefunctionoftheotherbywhosesideitmoves，eachhavingitsownprincipleandmaintainingitsauthorityinaparticularperson，butundertheconditionofthewillofasuperior;andfurther，（3）bytheunionofboththeserelations，theyassigndistributivelytoeverysubjectinthestatehisownrights。
Consideredastotheirrespectivedignity，thethreepowersmaybethusdescribed。Thewillofthesovereignlegislator，inrespectofwhatconstitutestheexternalmineandthine，istoberegardedasirreprehensible;theexecutivefunctionofthesupremeruleristoberegardedasirresistible;andthejudicialsentenceofthesupremejudgeistoberegardedasirreversible，beingbeyondappeal。
49。DistinctFunctionsoftheThreePowers。
AutonomyoftheState1。Theexecutivepowerbelongstothegovernororregentofthestate，whetheritassumestheformofamoralorindividualperson，asthekingorprince（rex，princeps）。Thisexecutiveauthority，asthesupremeagentofthestate，appointsthemagistrates，andprescribestherulestothepeople，inaccordancewithwhichindividualsmayacquireanythingormaintainwhatistheirownconformablytothelaw，eachcasebeingbroughtunderitsapplication。Regardedasamoralperson，thisexecutiveauthorityconstitutesthegovernment。Theordersissuedbythegovernmenttothepeopleandthemagistrates，aswellastothehigherministerialadministratorsofthestate（gubernatio），arerescriptsordecrees，andnotlaws;fortheyterminateinthedecisionofparticularcases，andaregivenforthasunchangeable。Agovernmentactingasanexecutive，andatthesametimelayingdownthelawasthelegislativepower，wouldbeadespoticgovernment，andwouldhavetobecontradistinguishedfromapatrioticgovernment。Apatrioticgovernment，again，istobedistinguishedfromapaternalgovernment（regimenpaternale）whichisthemostdespoticgovernmentofall，thecitizensbeingdealtwithbyitasmerechildren。Apatrioticgovernment，however，isoneinwhichthestate，whiledealingwiththesubjectsasiftheyweremembersofafamily，stilltreatsthemlikewiseascitizens，andaccordingtolawsthatrecognizetheirindependence，eachindividualpossessinghimselfandnotbeingdependentontheabsolutewillofanotherbesidehimorabovehim。
2。Thelegislativeauthorityoughtnotatthesametimetobetheexecutiveorgovernor;forthegovernor，asadministrator，shouldstandundertheauthorityofthelaw，andisboundbyitunderthesupremecontrolofthelegislator。Thelegislativeauthoritymaythereforedeprivethegovernorofhispower，deposehim，orreformhisadministration，butnotpunishhim。ThisistheproperandonlymeaningofthecommonsayinginEngland，"TheKing—asthesupremeexecutivepower—candonowrong。"Foranysuchapplicationofpunishmentwouldnecessarilybeanactofthatveryexecutivepowertowhichthesupremerighttocompelaccordingtolawpertains，andwhichwoulditselfbethussubjectedtocoercion;whichisself—contradictory。
3。Further，neitherthelegislativepowernortheexecutivepoweroughttoexercisethejudicialfunction，butonlyappointjudgesasmagistrates。Itisthepeoplewhooughttojudgethemselves，throughthoseofthecitizenswhoareelectedbyfreechoiceastheirrepresentativesforthispurpose，andevenspeciallyforeveryprocessorcause。Forthejudicialsentenceisaspecialactofpublicdistributivejusticeperformedbyajudgeorcourtasaconstitutionaladministratorofthelaw，toasubjectasoneofthepeople。Suchanactisnotinvestedinherentlywiththepowertodetermineandassigntoanyonewhatishis。Everyindividualamongthepeoplebeingmerelypassiveinthisrelationtothesupremepower，eithertheexecutiveorthelegislativeauthoritymightdohimwrongintheirdeterminationsincasesofdisputeregardingthepropertyofindividuals。Itwouldnotbethepeoplethemselveswhothusdetermined，orwhopronouncedthejudgementsof"guilty"or"notguilty"regardingtheirfellow—citizens。Foritistothedeterminationofthisissueinacausethatthecourthastoapplythelaw;anditisbymeansoftheexecutiveauthority，thatthejudgeholdspowertoassigntoeveryonehisown。Henceitisonlythepeoplethatproperlycanjudgeinacause—althoughindirectlyrepresentativeselectedanddeputedbythemselves，asinajury。Itwouldevenbebeneaththedignityofthesovereignheadofthestatetoplaythejudge;forthiswouldbetoputhimselfintoapositioninwhichitwouldbepossibletodowrong，andthustosubjecthimselftothedemandforanappealtoastillhigherpower（aregemaleinformatoadregemmeliusinformandum）。
Itisbytheco—operationofthesethreepowers—thelegislative，theexecutive，andthejudicial—thatthestaterealizesitsautonomy。
Thisautonomyconsistsinitsorganizing，forming，andmaintainingitselfinaccordancewiththelawsoffreedom。Intheirunionthewelfareofthestateisrealized。Salusreipublicaesupremalex。*Bythisisnottobeunderstoodmerelytheindividualwell—beingandhappinessofthecitizensofthestate;for—asRousseauasserts—thisendmayperhapsbemoreagreeablyandmoredesirablyattainedinthestateofnature，orevenunderadespoticgovernment。Butthewelfareofthestate，asitsownhighestgood，signifiesthatconditioninwhichthegreatestharmonyisattainedbetweenitsconstitutionandtheprinciplesofright—aconditionofthestatewhichreasonbyacategoricalimperativemakesitobligatoryuponustostriveafter。
*["Thehealthofthestateisthehighestlaw。"]
ConstitutionalandJuridicalConsequencesarisingfromtheNatureoftheCivilUnion。
A。RightoftheSupremePower;Treason;Dethronement;
Revolution;Reform。
Theoriginofthesupremepowerispracticallyinscrutablebythepeoplewhoareplacedunderitsauthority。Inotherwords，thesubjectneednotreasontoocuriouslyinregardtoitsorigininthepracticalrelation，asiftherightoftheobedienceduetoitweretobedoubted（juscontroversum）。Forasthepeople，inordertobeabletoabjudicatewithatitleofrightregardingthesupremepowerinthestate，mustberegardedasalreadyunitedunderonecommonlegislativewill，itcannotjudgeotherwisethanasthepresentsupremeheadofthestate（summusimperans）wills。Thequestionhasbeenraisedastowhetheranactualcontractofsubjection（pactumsubjectioniscivilis）originallyprecededthecivilgovernmentasafact;orwhetherthepowerarosefirst，andthelawonlyfollowedafterwards，ormayhavefollowedinthisorder。Butsuchquestions，asregardsthepeoplealreadyactuallylivingunderthecivillaw，areeitherentirelyaimless，orevenfraughtwithsubtledangertothestate。
For，shouldthesubject，afterhavingdugdowntotheultimateoriginofthestate，riseinoppositiontothepresentrulingauthority，hewouldexposehimselfasacitizen，accordingtothelawandwithfullright，tobepunished，destroyed，oroutlawed。Alawwhichissoholyandinviolablethatitispracticallyacrimeeventocastdoubtuponit，ortosuspenditsoperationforamoment，isrepresentedofitselfasnecessarilyderivedfromsomesupreme，unblameablelawgiver。Andthisisthemeaningofthemaxim，"AllauthorityisfromGod"，whichpropositiondoesnotexpressthehistoricalfoundationofthecivilconstitution，butanidealprincipleofthepracticalreason。Itmaybeotherwiserenderedthus："Itisadutytoobeythelawoftheexistinglegislativepower，beitsoriginwhatitmay。"
Henceitfollows，thatthesupremepowerinthestatehasonlyrights，andno（compulsory）dutiestowardsthesubject。Further，iftherulerorregent，astheorganofthesupremepower，proceedsinviolationofthelaws，asinimposingtaxes，recruitingsoldiers，andsoon，contrarytothelawofequalityinthedistributionofthepoliticalburdens，thesubjectmayopposecomplaintsandobjections（gravamina）tothisinjustice，butnotactiveresistance。
TherecannotevenbeanArticlecontainedinthepoliticalconstitutionthatwouldmakeitpossibleforapowerinthestate，incaseofthetransgressionoftheconstitutionallawsbythesupremeauthority，toresistoreventorestrictitinsodoing。For，whoeverwouldrestrictthesupremepowerofthestatemusthavemore，oratleastequal，powerascomparedwiththepowerthatissorestricted;andifcompetenttocommandthesubjectstoresist，suchaonewouldalsohavetobeabletoprotectthem，andifheistobeconsideredcapableofjudgingwhatisrightineverycase，hemayalsopubliclyorderresistance。Butsuchaone，andnottheactualauthority，wouldthenbethesupremepower;whichiscontradictory。
Thesupremesovereignpower，then，inproceedingbyaministerwhoisatthesametimetherulerofthestate，consequentlybecomesdespotic;andtheexpedientofgivingthepeopletoimagine—whentheyhaveproperlyonlylegislativeinfluence—thattheyactbytheirdeputiesbywayoflimitingthesovereignauthority，cannotsomaskanddisguisetheactualdespotismofsuchagovernmentthatitwillnotappearinthemeasuresandmeansadoptedbytheministertocarryouthisfunction。Thepeople，whilerepresentedbytheirdeputiesinparliament，undersuchconditions，mayhaveinthesewarrantorsoftheirfreedomandrights，personswhoarekeenlyinterestedontheirownaccountandtheirfamilies，andwholooktosuchaministerforthebenefitofhisinfluenceinthearmy，navy，andpublicoffices。Andhence，insteadofofferingresistancetotheunduepretensionsofthegovernment—whosepublicdeclarationsoughttocarryaprioraccordonthepartofthepeople，which，however，cannotbeallowedinpeace，theyareratheralwaysreadytoplayintothehandsofthegovernment。Hencetheso—calledlimitedpoliticalconstitution，asaconstitutionoftheinternalrightsofthestate，isanunreality;andinsteadofbeingconsistentwithright，itisonlyaprincipleofexpediency。Anditsaimisnotsomuchtothrowallpossibleobstaclesinthewayofapowerfulviolatorofpopularrightsbyhisarbitraryinfluenceuponthegovernment，asrathertocloakitoverundertheillusionofarightofoppositionconcededtothepeople。
Resistanceonthepartofthepeopletothesupremelegislativepowerofthestateisinnocaselegitimate;foritisonlybysubmissiontotheuniversallegislativewill，thataconditionoflawandorderispossible。Hencethereisnorightofsedition，andstilllessofrebellion，belongingtothepeople。Andleastofall，whenthesupremepowerisembodiedinanindividualmonarch，isthereanyjustification，underthepretextofhisabuseofpower，forseizinghispersonortakingawayhislife（monarchomachismussubspecietyrannicidii）。Theslightestattemptofthiskindishightreason（proditioeminens）;andatraitorofthissortwhoaimsattheoverthrowofhiscountrymaybepunished，asapoliticalparricide，evenwithdeath。Itisthedutyofthepeopletobearanyabuseofthesupremepower，eventhenthoughitshouldbeconsideredtobeunbearable。Andthereasonisthatanyresistanceofthehighestlegislativeauthoritycanneverbutbecontrarytothelaw，andmustevenberegardedastendingtodestroythewholelegalconstitution。
Inordertobeentitledtooffersuchresistance，apubliclawwouldberequiredtopermitit。Butthesupremelegislationwouldbysuchalawceasetobesupreme，andthepeopleassubjectswouldbemadesovereignoverthattowhichtheyaresubject;whichisacontradiction。Andthecontradictionbecomesmoreapparentwhenthequestionisput："Whoistobethejudgeinacontroversybetweenthepeopleandthesovereign？"Forthepeopleandthesovereignaretobeconstitutionallyorjuridicallyregardedastwodifferentmoralpersons;butthequestionshowsthatthepeoplewouldthenhavetobethejudgeintheirowncause。
Thedethronementofamonarchmaybealsoconceivedasavoluntaryabdicationofthecrown，andaresignationofhispowerintothehandsofthepeople;oritmightbeadeliberatesurrenderofthesewithoutanyassaultontheroyalperson，inorderthatthemonarchmayberelegatedintoprivatelife。But，howeverithappen，forciblecompulsionofit，onthepartofthepeople，cannotbejustifiedunderthepretextofarightofnecessity（casusnecessitatis）;andleastofallcantheslightestrightbeshownforpunishingthesovereignonthegroundofpreviousmaladministration。Forallthathasbeenalreadydoneinthequalityofasovereignmustberegardedasdoneoutwardlybyright;and，consideredasthesourceofthelaws，thesovereignhimselfcandonowrong。Ofalltheabominationsintheoverthrowofastatebyrevolution，eventhemurderorassassinationofthemonarchisnottheworst。Forthatmaybedonebythepeopleoutoffear，lest，ifheisallowedtolive，hemayagainacquirepowerandinflictpunishmentuponthem;andsoitmaybedone，notasanactofpunitivejustice，butmerelyfromregardtoself—preservation。Itistheformalexecutionofamonarchthathorrifiesasoulfilledwithideasofhumanright;andthisfeelingoccursagainandagainasofasthemindrealizesthescenesthatterminatedthefateofCharlesIorLouisXVI。Nowhowisthisfeelingtobeexplained？Itisnotamereaestheticfeeling，arisingfromtheworkingoftheimagination，norfromsympathy，producedbyfancyingourselvesintheplaceofthesufferer。Onthecontrary，itisamoralfeelingarisingfromtheentiresubversionofallournotionsofright。Regicide，inshort，isregardedasacrimewhichalwaysremainssuchandcanneverbeexpiated（crimenimmortale，inexpiabile）;anditappearstoresemblethatsinwhichthetheologiansdeclarecanneitherbeforgiveninthisworldnorinthenext。Theexplanationofthisphenomenoninthehumanmindappearstobefurnishedbythefollowingreflectionsuponit;andtheyevenshedsomelightupontheprinciplesofpoliticalright。
Everytransgressionofalawonlycanandmustbeexplainedasarisingfromamaximofthetransgressormakingsuchwrong—doinghisruleofaction;forwereitnotcommittedbyhimasafreebeing，itcouldnotbeimputedtohim。Butitisabsolutelyimpossibletoexplainhowanyrationalindividualformssuchamaximagainsttheclearprohibitionofthelaw—givingreason;foritisonlyeventswhichhappenaccordingtothemechanicallawsofnaturethatarecapableofexplanation。Nowatransgressororcriminalmaycommithiswrong—doingeitheraccordingtothemaximofarulesupposedtobevalidobjectivelyanduniversally，oronlyasanexceptionfromtherulebydispensingwithitsobligationfortheoccasion。Inthelattercase，heonlydivergesfromthelaw，althoughintentionally。Hemay，atthesametime，abhorhisowntransgression，andwithoutformallyrenouncinghisobediencetothelawonlywishtoavoidit。Intheformercase，however，herejectstheauthorityofthelawitself，thevalidityofwhich，however，hecannotrepudiatebeforehisownreason，evenwhilehemakesithisruletoactagainstit。Hismaximis，therefore，notmerelydefectiveasbeingnegativelycontrarytothelaw，butitisevenpositivelyillegal，asbeingdiametricallycontraryandinhostileoppositiontoit。Sofaraswecanseeintoandunderstandtherelation，itwouldappearasifitwereimpossibleformentocommitwrongsandcrimesofawhollyuselessformofwickedness，andyettheideaofsuchextremeperversitycannotbeoverlookedinasystemofmoralphilosophy。
Thereisthusafeelingofhorroratthethoughtoftheformalexecutionofamonarchbyhispeople。Andthereasonitisthat，whereasanactofassassinationmustbeconsideredasonlyanexceptionfromtherulewhichhasbeenconstitutedamaxim，suchanexecutionmustberegardedasacompleteperversionoftheprinciplesthatshouldregulatetherelationbetweenasovereignandhispeople。Foritmakesthepeople，whoowetheirconstitutionalexistencetothelegislationthatissuedfromthesovereign，tobetheruleroverhim。Hencemereviolenceisthuselevatedwithboldbrow，andasitwerebyprinciple，abovetheholiestright;and，appearinglikeanabysstoswallowupeverythingwithoutrecall，itseemslikesuicidecommittedbythestateuponitselfandacrimethatiscapableofnoatonement。Thereisthereforereasontoassumethattheconsentthatisaccordedtosuchexecutionsisnotreallybaseduponasupposedprincipleofright，butonlyspringsfromfearofthevengeancethatwouldbetakenuponthepeoplewerethesamepowertoreviveagaininthestate。Andhenceitmaybeheldthattheformalitiesaccompanyingthemhaveonlybeenputforwardinordertogivethesedeedsalookofpunishmentfromtheaccompanimentofajudicialprocess，suchascouldnotgoalongwithameremurderorassassination。Butsuchacloakingofthedeedentirelyfailsofitspurpose，becausethispretensiononthepartofthepeopleisevenworsethanmurderitself，asitimpliesaprinciplewhichwouldnecessarilymaketherestorationofastate，whenonceoverthrown，animpossibility。
Analterationofthestilldefectiveconstitutionofthestatemaysometimesbequitenecessary。Butallsuchchangesoughtonlytoproceedfromthesovereignpowerinthewayofreform，andarenottobebroughtaboutbythepeopleinthewayofrevolution;andwhentheytakeplace，theyshouldonlyeffecttheexecutive，andnotthelegislative，power。Apoliticalconstitutionwhichissomodifiedthatthepeoplebytheirrepresentativesinparliamentcanlegallyresisttheexecutivepower，anditsrepresentativeminister，iscalledalimitedconstitution。Yetevenundersuchaconstitutionthereisnorightofactiveresistance，asbyanarbitrarycombinationofthepeopletocoercethegovernmentintoacertainactiveprocedure;forthiswouldbetoassumetoperformanactoftheexecutiveitself。Allthatcanrightlybeallowed，isonlyanegativeresistance，amountingtoanactofrefusalonthepartofthepeopletoconcedeallthedemandswhichtheexecutivemaydeemitnecessarytomakeinbehoofofthepoliticaladministration。Andifthisrightwereneverexercised，itwouldbeasuresignthatthepeoplewerecorrupted，theirrepresentativesvenal，thesupremeheadofthegovernmentdespotic，andhisministerspracticallybetrayersofthepeople。
Further，whenonthesuccessofarevolutionanewconstitutionhasbeenfounded，theunlawfulnessofitsbeginningandofitsinstitutioncannotreleasethesubjectsfromtheobligationofadaptingthemselves，asgoodcitizens，totheneworderofthings;andtheyarenotentitledtorefusehonourablytoobeytheauthoritythathasthusattainedthepowerinthestate。Adethronedmonarch，whohassurvivedsucharevolution，isnottobecalledtoaccountonthegroundofhisformeradministration;andstilllessmayhebepunishedforit，whenwithdrawingintotheprivatelifeofacitizenheprefershisownquietandthepeaceofthestatetotheuncertaintyofexile，withtheintentionofmaintaininghisclaimsforrestorationatallhazards，andpushingtheseeitherbysecretcounter—revolutionorbytheassistanceofotherpowers。However，ifhepreferstofollowthelattercourse，hisrightsremain，becausetherebellionthatdrovehimfromhispositionwasinherentlyunjust。
Butthequestionthenemergesastowhetherotherpowershavetherighttoformthemselvesintoanallianceinbehalfofsuchadethronedmonarchmerelyinordernottoleavethecrimecommittedbythepeopleunavenged，ortodoawaywithitasascandaltoallthestates;andwhethertheyarethereforejustifiedandcalledupontorestorebyforcetoanotherstateaformerlyexistingconstitutionthathasbeenremovedbyarevolution。Thediscussionofthisquestion，however，doesnotbelongtothisdepartmentofpublicright，buttothefollowingsection，concerningtherightofnations。
B。LandRights。SecularandChurchLands，RightsofTaxation;
Finance;Police;Inspection。
Isthesovereign，viewedasembodyingthelegislativepower，toberegardedasthesupremeproprietorofthesoil，oronlyasthehighestrulerofthepeoplebythelaws？Asthesoilisthesupremeconditionunderwhichitisalonepossibletohaveexternalthingsasone’sown，itspossiblepossessionanduseconstitutethefirstacquirablebasisofexternalright。Henceitisthatallsuchrightsmustbederivedfromthesovereignasoverlordandparamountsuperiorofthesoil，or，asitmaybebetterput，asthesupremeproprietoroftheland（dominusterritorii）。Thepeople，asformingthemassofthesubjects，belongtothesovereignasapeople;notinthesenseofhisbeingtheirproprietorinthewayofrealright，butastheirsupremecommanderorchiefinthewayofpersonalright。Thissupremeproprietorship，however，isonlyanideaofthecivilconstitution，objectifiedtorepresent，inaccordancewithjuridicalconceptions，thenecessaryunionoftheprivatepropertyofallthepeopleunderapublicuniversalpossessor。Therelationissorepresentedinorderthatitmayformabasisforthedeterminationofparticularrightsinproperty。Itdoesnotproceed，therefore，upontheprincipleofmereaggregation，whichadvancesempiricallyfromthepartstothewhole，butfromthenecessaryformalprincipleofadivisionofthesoilaccordingtoconceptionsofright。
Inaccordancewiththisprinciple，thesupremeuniversalproprietorcannothaveanyprivatepropertyinanypartofthesoil;forotherwisehewouldmakehimselfaprivateperson。Privatepropertyinthesoilbelongsonlytothepeople，takendistributivelyandnotcollectively;fromwhichcondition，however，anomadicpeoplemustbeexceptedashavingnoprivatepropertyatallinthesoil。Thesupremeproprietoraccordinglyoughtnottoholdprivateestates，eitherforprivateuseorforthesupportofthecourt。For，asitwoulddependuponhisownpleasurehowfartheseshouldextend，thestatewouldbeindangerofseeingallpropertyinthelandtakenintothehandsofthegovernment，andallthesubjectstreatedasbondsmenofthesoil（glebaeadscripti）。Aspossessorsonlyofwhatwastheprivatepropertyofanother，theymightthusbedeprivedofallfreedomandregardedasserfsorslaves。Ofthesupremeproprietoroftheland，itmaybesaidthathepossessesnothingashisown，excepthimself;forifhepossessedthingsinthestatealongsideofothers，disputeandlitigationwouldbepossiblewiththeseothersregardingthosethings，andtherewouldbenoindependentjudgetosettlethecause。Butitmayalsobesaidthathepossesseseverything;forhehasthesupremerightofsovereigntyoverthewholepeople，towhomallexternalthingsseverally（divisim）belong;andassuchheassignsdistributivelytoeveryonewhatistobehis。
Hencetherecannotbeanycorporationinthestate，noranyclassororder，thatasproprietorscantransmitthelandforasoleexclusiveusetothefollowinggenerationsforalltime（adinfinitum），accordingtocertainfixedstatutes。Thestatemayannulandabrogateallsuchstatutesatanytime，onlyundertheconditionofindemnifyingsurvivorsfortheirinterests。Theorderofknights，constitutingthenobilityregardedasamererankorclassofspeciallytitledindividuals，aswellastheorderoftheclergy，calledthechurch，arebothsubjecttothisrelation。Theycanneverbeentitledbyanyhereditaryprivilegeswithwhichtheymaybefavoured，toacquireanabsolutepropertyinthesoiltransmissibletotheirsuccessors。Theycanonlyacquiretheuseofsuchpropertyforthetimebeing。Ifpublicopinionhasceased，onaccountofotherarrangements，toimpelthestatetoprotectitselffromnegligenceinthenationaldefencebyappealtothemilitaryhonouroftheknightlyorder，theestatesgrantedonthatconditionmayberecalled。
And，inlikemanner，thechurchlandsorspiritualitiesmaybereclaimedbythestatewithoutscruple，ifpublicopinionhasceasedtoimpelthemembersofthestatetomaintainmassesforthesoulsofthedead，prayersfortheliving，andamultitudeofclergy，asmeanstoprotectthemselvesfrometernalfire。Butinbothcases，theconditionofindemnifyingexistinginterestsmustbeobserved。
Thosewhointhisconnectionfallunderthemovementofreformarenotentitledtocomplainthattheirpropertyistakenfromthem;forthefoundationoftheirpreviouspossessionlayonlyintheopinionofthepeople，anditcanbevalidonlysolongasthisopinionlasts。Assoonasthispublicopinioninfavourofsuchinstitutionsdiesout，orisevenextinguishedinthejudgementofthosewhohavethegreatestclaimbytheiracknowledgedmerittoleadandrepresentit，theputativeproprietorshipinquestionmustcease，asifbyapublicappealmaderegardingittothestate（aregemaleinformatoadregemmeliusinformandum）。
Onthisprimarilyacquiredsupremeproprietorshipinthelandreststherightofthesovereign，asuniversalproprietorofthecountry，toassesstheprivateproprietorsofthesoil，andtodemandtaxes，excise，anddues，ortheperformanceofservicetothestatesuchasmayberequiredinwar。Butthisistobedonesothatitisactuallythepeoplethatassessthemselves，thisbeingtheonlymodeofproceedingaccordingtolawsofright。Thismaybeeffectedthroughthemediumofthebodyofdeputieswhorepresentthepeople。Itisalsopermissible，incircumstancesinwhichthestateisinimminentdanger，toproceedbyaforcedloan，asarightvestedinthesovereign，althoughthismaybeadivergencefromtheexistinglaw。
Uponthisprincipleisalsofoundedtherightofadministeringthenationaleconomy，includingthefinanceandthepolice。Thepolicehasspeciallytocareforthepublicsafety，convenience，anddecency。
Asregardsthelastofthese—thefeelingornegativetasteforpublicpropriety—itisimportantthatitbenotdeadenedbysuchinfluencesasbegging，disorderlynoises，offensivesmells，publicprostitution（Venusvulgivaga），orotheroffencesagainstthemoralsense，asitgreatlyfacilitatesthegovernmentinthetaskofregulatingthelifeofthepeoplebylaw。
Forthepreservationofthestatetherefurtherbelongstoitarightofinspection（jusinspectionis），whichentitlesthepublicauthoritytoseethatnosecretsociety，politicalorreligious，existsamongthepeoplethatcanexertaprejudicialinfluenceuponthepublicweal。Accordingly，whenitisrequiredbythepolice，nosuchsecretsocietymayrefusetolayopenitsconstitution。Butthevisitationandsearchofprivatehousesbythepolicecanonlybejustifiedinacaseofnecessity;andineveryparticularinstance，itmustbeauthorizedbyahigherauthority。
C。ReliefofthePoor。FoundlingHospitals。TheChurch。
Thesovereign，asundertakerofthedutyofthepeople，hastherighttotaxthemforpurposesessentiallyconnectedwiththeirownpreservation。Suchare，inparticular，thereliefofthepoor，foundlingasylums，andecclesiasticalestablishments，otherwisedesignatedcharitableorpiousfoundations。
1。Thepeoplehaveinfactunitedthemselvesbytheircommonwillintoasociety，whichhastobeperpetuallymaintained;andforthispurposetheyhavesubjectedthemselvestotheinternalpowerofthestate，inordertopreservethemembersofthissocietyevenwhentheyarenotabletosupportthemselves。Bythefundamentalprincipleofthestate，thegovernmentisjustifiedandentitledtocompelthosewhoareable，tofurnishthemeansnecessarytopreservethosewhoarenotthemselvescapableofprovidingforthemostnecessarywantsofnature。Fortheexistenceofpersonswithpropertyinthestateimpliestheirsubmissionunderitforprotectionandtheprovisionbythestateofwhatisnecessaryfortheirexistence;andaccordinglythestatefoundsarightuponanobligationontheirparttocontributeoftheirmeansforthepreservationoftheirfellowcitizens。Thismaybecarriedoutbytaxingthepropertyorthecommercialindustryofthecitizens，orbyestablishingfundsanddrawinginterestfromthem，notforthewantsofthestateassuch，whichisrich，butforthoseofthepeople。Andthisisnottobedonemerelybyvoluntarycontributions，butbycompulsoryexactionsasstate—burdens，forwearehereconsideringonlytherightofthestateinrelationtothepeople。Amongthevoluntarymodesofraisingsuchcontributions，lotteriesoughtnottobeallowed，becausetheyincreasethenumberofthosewhoarepoor，andinvolvedangertothepublicproperty。Itmaybeaskedwhetherthereliefofthepooroughttobeadministeredoutofcurrentcontributions，sothateveryageshouldmaintainitsownpoor;orwhetherthiswerebetterdonebymeansofpermanentfundsandcharitableinstitutions，suchaswidows’homes，hospitals，etc。？Andiftheformermethodisthebetter，itmayalsobeconsideredwhetherthemeansnecessaryaretoberaisedbyalegalassessmentratherthanbybegging，whichisgenerallynighakintorobbing。Theformermethodmustinrealityberegardedastheonlyonethatisconformabletotherightofthestate，whichcannotwithdrawitsconnectionfromanyonewhohastolive。Foralegalcurrentprovisiondoesnotmaketheprofessionofpovertyameansofgainfortheindolent，asistobefearedisthecasewithpiousfoundationswhentheygrowwiththenumberofthepoor;norcanitbechargedwithbeinganunjustorunrighteousburdenimposedbythegovernmentonthepeople。
2。Thestatehasalsoarighttoimposeuponthepeoplethedutyofpreservingchildrenexposedfromwantorshame，andwhowouldotherwiseperish;foritcannotknowinglyallowthisincreaseofitspowertobedestroyed，howeverunwelcomeinsomerespectsitmaybe。
Butitisadifficultquestiontodeterminehowthismaymostjustlybecarriedout。Itmightbeconsideredwhetheritwouldnotberighttoexactcontributionsforthispurposefromtheunmarriedpersonsofbothsexeswhoarepossessedofmeans，asbeinginpartresponsiblefortheevil;andfurther，whethertheendinviewwouldbebestcarriedoutbyfoundlinghospitals，orinwhatotherwayconsistentwithright。Butthisisaproblemofwhichnosolutionhasyetbeenofferedthatdoesnotinsomemeasureoffendagainstrightormorality。
3。Thechurchishereregardedasanecclesiasticalestablishmentmerely，andassuchitmustbecarefullydistinguishedfromreligion，whichasaninternalmodeoffeelinglieswhollybeyondthesphereoftheactionofthecivilpower。Viewedasaninstitutionforpublicworshipfoundedforthepeople—towhoseopinionorconvictionitowesitsorigin—thechurchestablishmentrespondstoarealwantinthestate。ThisistheneedfeltbythepeopletoregardthemselvesasalsosubjectsofaSupremeInvisiblePowertowhichtheymustpayhomage，andwhichmayofbebroughtintoaveryundesirablecollisionwiththecivilpower。Thestatehasthereforearightinthisrelation;butitisnottoberegardedastherightofconstitutionallegislationinthechurch，soastoorganizeitasmayseemmostadvantageousforitself，ortoprescribeandcommanditsfaithandritualformsofworship（ritus）;
forallthismustbeleftentirelytotheteachersandrulerswhichthechurchhaschosenforitself。Thefunctionofthestateinthisconnection，onlyincludesthenegativerightofregulatingtheinfluenceofthesepublicteachersuponthevisiblepoliticalcommonwealth，thatitmaynotbeprejudicialtothepublicpeaceandtranquility。Consequentlythestatehastotakemeasures，onoccasionofanyinternalconflictinthechurch，oronoccasionofanycollisionoftheseveralchurcheswitheachother，thatcivilconcordisnotendangered;andthisrightfallswithintheprovinceofthepolice。Itisbeneaththedignityofthesupremepowertointerposeindeterminingwhatparticularfaiththechurchshallprofess，ortodecreethatacertainfaithshallbeunalterablyheld，andthatthechurchmaynotreformitself。Forindoingso，thesupremepowerwouldbemixingitselfupinascholasticwrangle，onafootingofequalitywithitssubjects;themonarchwouldbemakinghimselfapriest;andthechurchmenmightevenreproachthesupremepowerwithunderstandingnothingaboutmattersoffaith。
Especiallywouldthisholdinrespectofanyprohibitionofinternalreforminthechurch;forwhatthepeopleasawholecannotdetermineuponforthemselvescannotbedeterminedforthepeoplebythelegislator。Butnopeoplecaneverrationallydeterminethattheywillneveradvancefartherintheirinsightintomattersoffaith，orresolvethattheywillneverreformtheinstitutionsofthechurch;becausethiswouldbeopposedtothehumanityintheirownpersonsandtotheirhighestrights。Andthereforethesupremepowercannotofitselfresolveanddecreeinthesemattersforthepeople。