Moreover，toestablishaview，youshouldlookandseeifthegenusispredicatedinthecategoryofessenceofthosethingsofwhichithasbeenrenderedasthegenus，supposingthespeciesrenderedtobenotonesinglespeciesbutseveraldifferentones：
　　forthenclearlyitwillbethegenus。If，ontheother，thespeciesrenderedbesingle，lookandseewhetherthegenusbepredicatedinthecategoryofessenceofotherspeciesaswell：forthen，again，theresultwillbethatitispredicatedofseveraldifferentspecies。
　　Sincesomepeoplethinkthatthedifferentia，too，isapredicateofthevariousspeciesinthecategoryofessence，youshoulddistinguishthegenusfromthedifferentiabyemployingtheaforesaidelementaryprinciples—（a）thatthegenushasawiderdenotationthanthedifferentia；（b）thatinrenderingtheessenceofathingitismorefittingtostatethegenusthanthedifferentia：foranyonewhosaysthat’man’isan’animal’showswhatmanisbetterthanhewhodescribeshimas’walking’；also（c）thatthedifferentiaalwayssignifiesaqualityofthegenus，whereasthegenusdoesnotdothisofthedifferentia：forhewhosays’walking’describesananimalofacertainquality，whereashewhosays’animal’describesananimalofacertainquality，whereashewhosays’animal’doesnotdescribeawalkingthingofacertainquality。
　　Thedifferentia，then，shouldbedistinguishedfromthegenusinthismanner。Nowseeingitisgenerallyheldthatifwhatismusical，inbeingmusical，possessesknowledgeinsomerespect，thenalso’music’isaparticularkindof’knowledge’；andalsothatifwhatwalksismovedinwalking，then’walking’isaparticularkindof’movement’；youshouldthereforeexamineintheaforesaidmanneranygenusinwhichyouwanttoestablishtheexistenceofsomething；
　　e。g。ifyouwishtoprovethat’knowledge’isaformof’conviction’，seewhethertheknowerinknowingisconvinced：forthenclearlyknowledgewouldbeaparticularkindofconviction。Youshouldproceedinthesamewayalsoinregardtotheothercasesofthiskind。
　　Moreover，seeingthatitisdifficulttodistinguishwhateveralwaysfollowsalongwithathing，andisnotconvertiblewithit，fromitsgenus，ifAfollowsBuniversally，whereasBdoesnotfollowA
　　universally—ase。g。’rest’alwaysfollowsa’calm’and’divisibility’follows’number’，butnotconversely（forthedivisibleisnotalwaysanumber，norrestacalm）—youmayyourselfassumeinyourtreatmentofthemthattheonewhichalwaysfollowsisthegenus，whenevertheotherisnotconvertiblewithit：if，ontheotherhand，someoneelseputsforwardtheproposition，donotacceptituniversally。Anobjectiontoitisthat’not—being’alwaysfollowswhatis’comingtobe’（forwhatiscomingtobeisnot）andisnotconvertiblewithit（forwhatisnotisnotalwayscomingtobe），andthatstill’not—being’isnotthegenusof’comingtobe’：for’not—being’hasnotanyspeciesatall。Questions，then，inregardtoGenusshouldbeinvestigatedinthewaysdescribed。
　　BookV
　　1
　　THEquestionwhethertheattributestatedisorisnotaproperty，shouldbeexaminedbythefollowingmethods：
　　Any’property’renderedisalwayseitheressentialandpermanentorrelativeandtemporary：e。g。itisan’essentialproperty’ofmantobe’bynatureacivilizedanimal’：a’relativeproperty’isonelikethatofthesoulinrelationtothebody，viz。thattheoneisfittedtocommand，andtheothertoobey：a’permanentproperty’isonelikethepropertywhichbelongstoGod，ofbeingan’immortallivingbeing’：a’temporaryproperty’isonelikethepropertywhichbelongstoanyparticularmanofwalkinginthegymnasium。
　　[Therenderingofaproperty’relatively’givesriseeithertotwoproblemsortofour。Forifheatthesametimerenderthispropertyofonethinganddenyitofanother，onlytwoproblemsarise，asinthecaseofastatementthatitisapropertyofaman，inrelationtoahorse，tobeabiped。Foronemighttrybothtoshowthatamanisnotabiped，andalsothatahorseisabiped：inbothwaysthepropertywouldbeupset。Ifontheotherhandherenderoneapieceoftwoattributestoeachoftwothings，anddenyitineachcaseoftheother，therewillthenbefourproblems；asinthecaseofastatementthatitisapropertyofamaninrelationtoahorsefortheformertobeabipedandthelatteraquadruped。Forthenitispossibletotrytoshowboththatamanisnotnaturallyabiped，andthatheisaquadruped，andalsothatthehorsebothisabiped，andisnotaquadruped。Ifyoushowanyoftheseatall，theintendedattributeisdemolished。]
　　An’essential’propertyisonewhichisrenderedofathingincomparisonwitheverythingelseanddistinguishesthesaidthingfromeverythingelse，asdoes’amortallivingbeingcapableofreceivingknowledge’inthecaseofman。A’relative’propertyisonewhichseparatesitssubjectoffnotfromeverythingelsebutonlyfromaparticulardefinitething，asdoesthepropertywhichvirtuepossesses，incomparisonwithknowledge，viz。thattheformerisnaturallyproducedinmorethanonefaculty，whereasthelatterisproducedinthatofreasonalone，andinthosewhohaveareasoningfaculty。A’permanent’propertyisonewhichistrueateverytime，andneverfails，likebeing’compoundedofsoulandbody’，inthecaseofalivingcreature。A’temporary’propertyisonewhichistrueatsomeparticulartime，anddoesnotofnecessityalwaysfollow；as，ofsomeparticularman，thathewalksinthemarket—place。
　　Torenderaproperty’relatively’tosomethingelsemeanstostatethedifferencebetweenthemasitisfoundeitheruniversallyandalways，orgenerallyandinmostcases：thusadifferencethatisfounduniversallyandalways，isonesuchasmanpossessesincomparisonwithahorse，viz。beingabiped：foramanisalwaysandineverycaseabiped，whereasahorseisneverabipedatanytime。
　　Ontheotherhand，adifferencethatisfoundgenerallyandinmostcases，isonesuchasthefacultyofreasonpossessesincomparisonwiththatofdesireandspirit，inthattheformercommands，whilethelatterobeys：forthereasoningfacultydoesnotalwayscommand，butsometimesalsoisundercommand，noristhatofdesireandspiritalwaysundercommand，butalsoonoccasionassumesthecommand，wheneverthesoulofamanisvicious。
　　Of’properties’themost’arguable’aretheessentialandpermanentandtherelative。Forarelativepropertygivesrise，aswesaidbefore，toseveralquestions：forofnecessitythequestionsarisingareeithertwoorfour，orthatargumentsinregardtotheseareseveral。Anessentialandapermanentpropertyyoucandiscussinrelationtomanythings，orcanobserveinrelationtomanyperiodsoftime：ifessential’，discussitincomparisonwithmanythings：forthepropertyoughttobelongtoitssubjectincomparisonwitheverysinglethingthatis，sothatifthesubjectbenotdistinguishedbyitincomparisonwitheverythingelse，thepropertycouldnothavebeenrenderedcorrectly。Soapermanentpropertyyoushouldobserveinrelationtomanyperiodsoftime；forifitdoesnotordidnot，orisnotgoingto，belong，itwillnotbeaproperty。Ontheotherhand，aboutatemporarypropertywedonotinquirefurtherthaninregardtothetimecalled’thepresent’；andsoargumentsinregardtoitarenotmany；whereasanarguable’questionisoneinregardtowhichitispossibleforargumentsbothnumerousandgoodtoarise。
　　Theso—called’relative’property，then，shouldbeexaminedbymeansofthecommonplaceargumentsrelatingtoAccident，toseewhetheritbelongstotheonethingandnottotheother：ontheotherhand，permanentandessentialpropertiesshouldbeconsideredbythefollowingmethods。
　　2
　　First，seewhetherthepropertyhasorhasnotbeenrenderedcorrectly。Ofarenderingbeingincorrectorcorrect，onetestistoseewhetherthetermsinwhichthepropertyisstatedarenotoraremoreintelligible—fordestructivepurposes，whethertheyarenotso，andforconstructivepurposes，whethertheyareso。Ofthetermsnotbeingmoreintelligible，onetestistoseewhetherthepropertywhichherendersisaltogethermoreunintelligiblethanthesubjectwhosepropertyhehasstated：for，ifso，thepropertywillnothavebeenstatedcorrectly。Fortheobjectofgettingapropertyconstitutedistobeintelligible：thetermsthereforeinwhichitisrenderedshouldbemoreintelligible：forinthatcaseitwillbepossibletoconceiveitmoreadequately，e。g。anyonewhohasstatedthatitisapropertyof’fire’to’bearaverycloseresemblancetothesoul’，usestheterm’soul’，whichislessintelligiblethan’fire’—forweknowbetterwhatfireisthanwhatsoulis—，andthereforea’verycloseresemblancetothesoul’couldnotbecorrectlystatedtobeapropertyoffire。AnothertestistoseewhethertheattributionofA（property）toB（subject）failstobemoreintelligible。Fornotonlyshouldthepropertybemoreintelligiblethanitssubject，butalsoitshouldbesomethingwhoseattributiontotheparticularsubjectisamoreintelligibleattribution。Forhewhodoesnotknowwhetheritisanattributeoftheparticularsubjectatall，willnotknoweitherwhetheritbelongstoitalone，sothatwhicheveroftheseresultshappens，itscharacterasapropertybecomesobscure。
　　Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyoffiretobe’theprimaryelementwhereinthesoulisnaturallyfound’，hasintroducedasubjectwhichislessintelligiblethan’fire’，viz。
　　whetherthesoulisfoundinit，andwhetheritisfoundthereprimarily；andthereforetobe’theprimaryelementinwhichthesoulisnaturallyfound’couldnotbecorrectlystatedtobeapropertyof’fire’。Ontheotherhand，forconstructivepurposes，seewhetherthetermsinwhichthepropertyisstatedaremoreintelligible，andiftheyaremoreintelligibleineachoftheaforesaidways。Forthenthepropertywillhavebeencorrectlystatedinthisrespect：forofconstructivearguments，showingthecorrectnessofarendering，somewillshowthecorrectnessmerelyinthisrespect，whileotherswillshowitwithoutqualification。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohassaidthatthe’possessionofsensation’isapropertyof’animal’hasbothusedmoreintelligibletermsandhasrenderedthepropertymoreintelligibleineachoftheaforesaidsenses；sothatto’possesssensation’wouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrenderedasapropertyof’animal’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetheranyofthetermsrenderedinthepropertyisusedinmorethanonesense，orwhetherthewholeexpressiontoosignifiesmorethanonething。Forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）seeingthatto’beingnaturalsentient’signifiesmorethanonething，viz。
　　（1）topossesssensation，（2）touseone’ssensation，beingnaturallysentient’couldnotbeacorrectstatementofapropertyof’animal’。Thereasonwhythetermyouuse，orthewholeexpressionsignifyingtheproperty，shouldnotbearmorethanonemeaningisthis，thatanexpressionbearingmorethanonemeaningmakestheobjectdescribedobscure，becausethemanwhoisabouttoattemptanargumentisindoubtwhichofthevarioussensestheexpressionbears：andthiswillnotdo，fortheobjectofrenderingthepropertyisthathemayunderstand。Moreover，inadditiontothis，itisinevitablethatthosewhorenderapropertyafterthisfashionshouldbesomehowrefutedwheneveranyoneaddresseshissyllogismtothatoneoftheterm’sseveralmeaningswhichdoesnotagree。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherbothallthetermsandalsotheexpressionasawholeavoidbearingmorethanonesense：forthenthepropertywillhavebeencorrectlystatedinthisrespect。Thus（e。g。）seeingthat’body’doesnotbearseveralmeanings，norquickesttomoveupwardsinspace’，noryetthewholeexpressionmadebyputtingthemtogether，itwouldbecorrectinthisrespecttosaythatitisapropertyoffiretobethe’bodyquickesttomoveupwardsinspace’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthetermofwhichherendersthepropertyisusedinmorethanonesense，andnodistinctionhasbeendrawnastowhichofthemitiswhosepropertyheisstating：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlyrendered。Thereasonswhythisissoarequiteclearfromwhathasbeensaidabove：forthesameresultsareboundtofollow。Thus（e。g。）
　　seeingthat’theknowledgeofthis’signifiesmanythingsforitmeans（1）thepossessionofknowledgebyit，（2）theuseofitsknowledgebyit，（3）theexistenceofknowledgeaboutit，（4）theuseofknowledgeaboutit—nopropertyofthe’knowledgeofthis’couldberenderedcorrectlyunlesshedrawadistinctionastowhichoftheseitiswhosepropertyheisrendering。Forconstructivepurposes，amanshouldseeifthetermofwhichheisrenderingthepropertyavoidsbearingmanysensesandisoneandsimple：forthenthepropertywillhavebeencorrectlystatedinthisrespect。Thus（e。g。）seeingthat’man’isusedinasinglesense，’naturallycivilizedanimal’
　　wouldbecorrectlystatedasapropertyofman。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherthesametermhasbeenrepeatedintheproperty。Forpeopleoftendothisundetectedinrendering’properties’also，justastheydointheir’definitions’aswell：butapropertytowhichthishashappenedwillnothavebeencorrectlystated：fortherepetitionofitconfusesthehearer；thusinevitablythemeaningbecomesobscure，andfurther，suchpeoplearethoughttobabble。Repetitionofthesametermislikelytohappenintwoways；oneis，whenamanrepeatedlyusesthesameword，aswouldhappenifanyoneweretorender，asapropertyoffire，’thebodywhichisthemostrarefiedofbodies’（forhehasrepeatedtheword’body’）；thesecondis，ifamanreplaceswordsbytheirdefinitions，aswouldhappenifanyoneweretorender，asapropertyofearth，’thesubstancewhichisbyitsnaturemosteasilyofallbodiesbornedownwardsinspace’，andwerethentosubstitute’substancesofsuchandsuchakind’fortheword’bodies’：for’body’
　　and’asubstanceofsuchandsuchakind’meanoneandthesamething。
　　Forhewillhaverepeatedtheword’substance’，andaccordinglyneitherofthepropertieswouldbecorrectlystated。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherheavoidseverrepeatingthesameterm；forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。Thus（e。g。）seeingthathewhohasstated’animalcapableofacquiringknowledge’asapropertyofmanhasavoidedrepeatingthesametermseveraltimes，thepropertywouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrenderedofman。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasrenderedinthepropertyanysuchtermasisauniversalattribute。Foronewhichdoesnotdistinguishitssubjectfromotherthingsisuseless，anditisthebusinessofthelanguageOf’properties’，asalsoofthelanguageofdefinitions，todistinguish。Inthecasecontemplated，therefore，thepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlyrendered。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofknowledgetobea’conceptionincontrovertiblebyargument，becauseofitsunity’，hasusedinthepropertyatermofthatkind，viz。’unity’，whichisauniversalattribute；andthereforethepropertyofknowledgecouldnothavebeencorrectlystated。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherhehasavoidedalltermsthatarecommontoeverythingandusedatermthatdistinguishesthesubjectfromsomething：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchashewhohassaidthatitisapropertyofa’livingcreature’to’haveasoul’hasusednotermthatiscommontoeverything，itwouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystatedtobeapropertyofa’livingcreature’to’haveasoul’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposesseewhetherherendersmorethanonepropertyofthesamething，withoutadefiniteprovisothatheisstatingmorethanone：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated。Forjustasinthecaseofdefinitionstoothereshouldbenofurtheradditionbesidetheexpressionwhichshowstheessence，sotoointhecaseofpropertiesnothingfurthershouldberenderedbesidetheexpressionthatconstitutesthepropertymentioned：forsuchanadditionismadetonopurpose。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohassaidthatitisapropertyoffiretobe’themostrarefiedandlightestbody’hasrenderedmorethanoneproperty（foreachtermisatruepredicateoffirealone）；andsoitcouldnotbeacorrectlystatedpropertyoffiretobe’themostrarefiedandlightestbody’。Ontheotherhand，forconstructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasavoidedrenderingmorethanonepropertyofthesamething，andhasrenderedoneonly：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohassaidthatitisapropertyofaliquidtobea’bodyadaptabletoeveryshape’hasrenderedasitspropertyasinglecharacterandnotseveral，andsothepropertyof’liquid’wouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。
　　3
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasemployedeithertheactualsubjectwhosepropertyheisrendering，oranyofitsspecies：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated。
　　Fortheobjectofrenderingthepropertyisthatpeoplemayunderstand：nowthesubjectitselfisjustasunintelligibleasitwastostartwith，whileanyoneofitsspeciesisposteriortoit，andsoisnomoreintelligible。Accordinglyitisimpossibletounderstandanythingfurtherbytheuseoftheseterms。Thus（e。g。）anyonewhohassaidthatitispropertyof’animal’tobe’thesubstancetowhich"man"belongsasaspecies’hasemployedoneofitsspecies，andthereforethepropertycouldnothavebeencorrectlystated。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherheavoidsintroducingeitherthesubjectitselforanyofitsspecies：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。
　　Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofalivingcreaturetobe’compoundedofsoulandbody’hasavoidedintroducingamongtheresteitherthesubjectitselforanyofitsspecies，andthereforeinthisrespectthepropertyofa’livingcreature’wouldhavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　Youshouldinquireinthesamewayalsointhecaseofothertermsthatdoordonotmakethesubjectmoreintelligible：thus，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasemployedanythingeitheroppositetothesubjector，ingeneral，anythingsimultaneousbynaturewithitorposteriortoit：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated。Foranoppositeissimultaneousbynaturewithitsopposite，andwhatissimultaneousbynatureorisposteriortoitdoesnotmakeitssubjectmoreintelligible。Thus（e。g。）anyonewhohassaidthatitisapropertyofgoodtobe’themostdirectoppositeofevil’，hasemployedtheoppositeofgood，andsothepropertyofgoodcouldnothavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherhehasavoidedemployinganythingeitheroppositeto，or，ingeneral，simultaneousbynaturewiththesubject，orposteriortoit：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofknowledgetobe’themostconvincingconception’hasavoidedemployinganythingeitheroppositeto，orsimultaneousbynaturewith，orposteriorto，thesubject；andsothepropertyofknowledgewouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasrenderedaspropertysomethingthatdoesnotalwaysfollowthesubjectbutsometimesceasestobeitsproperty：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlydescribed。Forthereisnonecessityeitherthatthenameofthesubjectmustalsobetrueofanythingtowhichwefindsuchanattributebelonging；noryetthatthenameofthesubjectwillbeuntrueofanythingtowhichsuchanattributeisfoundnottobelong。Moreover，inadditiontothis，evenafterhehasrenderedthepropertyitwillnotbeclearwhetheritbelongs，seeingthatitisthekindofattributethatmayfall：andsothepropertywillnotbeclear。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofanimal’sometimestomoveandsometimestostandstill’renderedthekindofpropertywhichsometimesisnotaproperty，andsothepropertycouldnothavebeencorrectlystated。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherhehasrenderedsomethingthatofnecessitymustalwaysbeaproperty：forthenthepropertywillhavebeeninthisrespectcorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofvirtuetobe’whatmakesitspossessorgood’hasrenderedaspropertysomethingthatalwaysfollows，andsothepropertyofvirtuewouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherinrenderingthepropertyofthepresenttimehehasomittedtomakeadefiniteprovisothatitisthepropertyofthepresenttimewhichheisrendering：forelsethepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated。Forinthefirstplace，anyunusualprocedurealwaysneedsadefiniteproviso：
　　anditistheusualprocedureforeverybodytorenderaspropertysomeattributethatalwaysfollows。Inthesecondplace，amanwhoomitstoprovidedefinitelywhetheritwasthepropertyofthepresenttimewhichheintendedtostate，isobscure：andoneshouldnotgiveanyoccasionforadversecriticism。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstateditasthepropertyofaparticularman’tobesittingwithaparticularman’，statesthepropertyofthepresenttime，andsohecannothaverenderedthepropertycorrectly，seeingthathehasdescribeditwithoutanydefiniteproviso。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhether，inrenderingthepropertyofthepresenttime，hehas，instatingit，madeadefiniteprovisothatitisthepropertyofthepresenttimethatheisstating：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohassaidthatitisthepropertyofaparticularman’tobewalkingnow’，hasmadethisdistinctioninhisstatement，andsothepropertywouldhavebeencorrectlystated。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasrenderedapropertyofthekindwhoseappropriatenessisnotobviousexceptbysensation：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated。Foreverysensibleattribute，onceitistakenbeyondthesphereofsensation，becomesuncertain。Foritisnotclearwhetheritstillbelongs，becauseitisevidencedonlybysensation。Thisprinciplewillbetrueinthecaseofanyattributesthatdonotalwaysandnecessarilyfollow。Thus（e。g。）anyonewhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofthesuntobe’thebrighteststarthatmovesovertheearth’，hasusedindescribingthepropertyanexpressionofthatkind，viz。’tomoveovertheearth’，whichisevidencedbysensation；andsothesun’spropertycouldnothavebeencorrectlyrendered：foritwillbeuncertain，wheneverthesunsets，whetheritcontinuestomoveovertheearth，becausesensationthenfailsus。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherhehasrenderedthepropertyofakindthatisnotobvioustosensation，or，ifitbesensible，mustclearlybelongofnecessity：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofasurfacetobe’theprimarythingthatiscoloured’，hasintroducedamongsttherestasensiblequality，’tobecoloured’，butstillaqualitysuchasmanifestlyalwaysbelongs，andsothepropertyof’surface’wouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasrenderedthedefinitionasaproperty：forthenthepropertywillnothavebeencorrectlystated：forthepropertyofathingoughtnottoshowitsessence。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohassaidthatitisthepropertyofmantobe’awalking，bipedanimal’hasrenderedapropertyofmansoastosignifyhisessence，andsothepropertyofmancouldnothavebeencorrectlyrendered。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherthepropertywhichhehasrenderedformsapredicateconvertiblewithitssubject，without，however，signifyingitsessence：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。Thus（e。g。）hewhohasstatedthatitisapropertyofmantobea’naturallycivilizedanimal’hasrenderedthepropertysoastobeconvertiblewithitssubject，without，however，showingitsessence，andsothepropertyofman’wouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seewhetherhehasrenderedthepropertywithouthavingplacedthesubjectwithinitsessence。Forofproperties，asalsoofdefinitions，thefirsttermtoberenderedshouldbethegenus，andthentherestofitshouldbeappendedimmediatelyafterwards，andshoulddistinguishitssubjectfromotherthings。Henceapropertywhichisnotstatedinthiswaycouldnothavebeencorrectlyrendered。Thus（e。g。）amanwhohassaidthatitisapropertyofalivingcreatureto’haveasoul’hasnotplaced’livingcreature’withinitsessence，andsothepropertyofalivingcreaturecouldnothavebeencorrectlystated。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetheramanfirstplaceswithinitsessencethesubjectwhosepropertyheisrendering，andthenappendstherest：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。Thus（e。g。）hewhohasstatedthatisapropertyofmantobean’animalcapableofreceivingknowledge’，hasrenderedthepropertyafterplacingthesubjectwithinitsessence，andsothepropertyof’man’wouldinthisrespecthavebeencorrectlyrendered。
　　4
　　Theinquiry，then，whetherthepropertyhasbeencorrectlyrenderedorno，shouldbemadebythesemeans。Thequestion，ontheotherhand，whetherwhatisstatedisorisnotapropertyatall，youshouldexaminefromthefollowingpointsofview。Forthecommonplaceargumentswhichestablishabsolutelythatthepropertyisaccuratelystatedwillbethesameasthosethatconstituteitapropertyatall：accordinglytheywillbedescribedinthecourseofthem。
　　Firstly，then，fordestructivepurposes，takealookateachsubjectofwhichhehasrenderedtheproperty，andsee（e。g。）ifitfailstobelongtoanyofthematall，ortobetrueoftheminthatparticularrespect，ortobeapropertyofeachoftheminrespectofthatcharacterofwhichhehasrenderedtheproperty：forthenwhatisstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus，forexample，inasmuchasitisnottrueofthegeometricianthathe’cannotbedeceivedbyanargument’（forageometricianisdeceivedwhenhisfigureismisdrawn），itcouldnotbeapropertyofthemanofsciencethatheisnotdeceivedbyanargument。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhetherthepropertyrenderedbetrueofeveryinstance，andtrueinthatparticularrespect：forthenwhatisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thus，forexample，inasmuchasthedescription’ananimalcapableofreceivingknowledge’istrueofeveryman，andtrueofhimquaman，itwouldbeapropertyofmantobe’ananimalcapableofreceivingknowledge’。
　　commonplacerulemeans—fordestructivepurposes，seeifthedescriptionfailstobetrueofthatofwhichthenameistrue；andifthenamefailstobetrueofthatofwhichthedescriptionistrue：
　　forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthedescriptiontooispredicatedofthatofwhichthenameispredicated，andifthenametooispredicatedofthatofwhichthedescriptionispredicated。]
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthedescriptionfailstoapplytothattowhichthenameapplies，andifthenamefailstoapplytothattowhichthedescriptionapplies：forthenwhatisstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasthedescription’alivingbeingthatpartakesofknowledge’istrueofGod，while’man’isnotpredicatedofGod，tobealivingbeingthatpartakesofknowledge’couldnotbeapropertyofman。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthenameaswellbepredicatedofthatofwhichthedescriptionispredicated，andifthedescriptionaswellbepredicatedofthatofwhichthenameispredicated。Forthenwhatisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）thepredicate’livingcreature’istrueofthatofwhich’havingasoul’istrue，and’havingasoul’istrueofthatofwhichthepredicate’livingcreature’istrue；andso’havingasoulwouldbeapropertyof’livingcreature’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifhehasrenderedasubjectasapropertyofthatwhichisdescribedas’inthesubject’：forthenwhathasbeenstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchashewhohasrendered’fire’asthepropertyof’thebodywiththemostrarefiedparticles’，hasrenderedthesubjectasthepropertyofitspredicate，’fire’couldnotbeapropertyof’thebodywiththemostrarefiedparticles’。Thereasonwhythesubjectwillnotbeapropertyofthatwhichisfoundinthesubjectisthis，thatthenthesamethingwillbethepropertyofanumberofthingsthatarespecificallydifferent。Forthesamethinghasquiteanumberofspecificallydifferentpredicatesthatbelongtoitalone，andthesubjectwillbeapropertyofallofthese，ifanyonestatesthepropertyinthisway。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifhehasrenderedwhatisfoundinthesubjectasapropertyofthesubject：forthenwhathasbeenstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty，ifitbepredicatedonlyofthethingsofwhichithasbeenstatedtobetheproperty。Thus（e。g。）hewhohassaidthatitisapropertyof’earth’tobe’specificallytheheaviestbody’hasrenderedofthesubjectasitspropertysomethingthatissaidofthethinginquestionalone，andissaidofitinthemannerinwhichapropertyispredicated，andsothepropertyofearthwouldhavebeenrightlystated。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifhehasrenderedthepropertyaspartakenof：forthenwhatisstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Foranattributeofwhichthesubjectpartakesisaconstituentpartofitsessence：andanattributeofthatkindwouldbeadifferentiaapplyingtosomeonespecies。E。g。inasmuchashewhohassaidthat’walkingontwofeet’ispropertyofmanhasrenderedthepropertyaspartakenof，’walkingontwofeet’couldnotbeapropertyof’man’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifhehasavoidedrenderingthepropertyaspartakenof，orasshowingtheessence，thoughthesubjectispredicatedconvertiblywithit：forthenwhatisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）hewhohasstatedthattobe’naturallysentient’isapropertyof’animal’hasrenderedthepropertyneitheraspartakenofnorasshowingtheessence，thoughthesubjectispredicatedconvertiblywithit；andsotobe’naturallysentient’wouldbeapropertyof’animal’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthepropertycannotpossiblybelongsimultaneously，butmustbelongeitherasposteriororaspriortotheattributedescribedinthename：forthenwhatisstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeapropertyeithernever，ornotalways。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitispossiblefortheattribute’walkingthroughthemarket—place’tobelongtoanobjectaspriorandasposteriortotheattribute’man’，’walkingthroughthemarket—place’couldnotbeapropertyof’man’eithernever，ornotalways。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifitalwaysandofnecessitybelongssimultaneously，withoutbeingeitheradefinitionoradifferentia：forthenwhatisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）theattribute’ananimalcapableofreceivingknowledge’alwaysandofnecessitybelongssimultaneouslywiththeattribute’man’，andisneitherdifferentianordefinitionofitssubject，andso’ananimalcapableofreceivingknowledge’wouldbeapropertyof’man’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthesamethingfailstobeapropertyofthingsthatarethesameasthesubject，sofarastheyarethesame：forthenwhatisstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus，forexample，inasmuchasitisnopropertyofa’properobjectofpursuit’to’appeargoodtocertainpersons’，itcouldnotbeapropertyofthe’desirable’eitherto’appeargoodtocertainpersons’：for’properobjectofpursuit’and’desirable’
　　meanthesame。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthesamethingbeapropertyofsomethingthatisthesameasthesubject，insofarasitisthesame。Forthenisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitiscalledapropertyofaman，insofarasheisaman，’tohaveatripartitesoul’，itwouldalsobeapropertyofamortal，insofarasheisamortal，tohaveatripartitesoul。ThiscommonplaceruleisusefulalsoindealingwithAccident：forthesameattributesoughteithertobelongornotbelongtothesamethings，insofarastheyarethesame。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthepropertyofthingsthatarethesameinkindasthesubjectfailstobealwaysthesameinkindastheallegedproperty：forthenneitherwillwhatisstatedtobethepropertyofthesubjectinquestion。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasamanandahorsearethesameinkind，anditisnotalwaysapropertyofahorsetostandbyitsowninitiative，itcouldnotbeapropertyofamantomovebyhisowninitiative；fortostandandtomovebyhisowninitiativearethesameinkind，becausetheybelongtoeachoftheminsofaraseachisan’animal’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifofthingsthatarethesameinkindasthesubjectthepropertythatisthesameastheallegedpropertyisalwaystrue：forthenwhatisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）sinceitisapropertyofmantobea’walkingbiped，’itwouldalsobeapropertyofabirdtobea’flyingbiped’：foreachoftheseisthesameinkind，insofarastheonepairhavethesamenessofspeciesthatfallunderthesamegenus，beingunderthegenus’animal’，whiletheotherpairhavethatofdifferentiaeofthegenus，viz。of’animal’。Thiscommonplaceruleisdeceptivewheneveroneofthepropertiesmentionedbelongstosomeonespeciesonlywhiletheotherbelongstomany，asdoes’walkingquadruped’。
　　Inasmuchas’same’and’different’aretermsusedinseveralsenses，itisajobtorendertoasophisticalquestionerapropertythatbelongstoonethingandthatonly。Foranattributethatbelongstosomethingqualifiedbyanaccidentwillalsobelongtotheaccidenttakenalongwiththesubjectwhichitqualifies；e。g。anattributethatbelongsto’man’willbelongalsoto’whiteman’，iftherebeawhiteman，andonethatbelongsto’whiteman’willbelongalsoto’man’。Onemight，then，bringcaptiouscriticismagainstthemajorityofproperties，byrepresentingthesubjectasbeingonethinginitself，andanotherthingwhencombinedwithitsaccident，saying，forexample，that’man’isonething，andwhiteman’
　　another，andmoreoverbyrepresentingasdifferentacertainstateandwhatiscalledafterthatstate。Foranattributethatbelongstothestatewillbelongalsotowhatiscalledafterthatstate，andonethatbelongstowhatiscalledafterastatewillbelongalsotothestate：e。g。inasmuchastheconditionofthescientistiscalledafterhisscience，itcouldnotbeapropertyof’science’thatitis’incontrovertiblebyargument’；forthenthescientistalsowillbeincontrovertiblebyargument。Forconstructivepurposes，however，youshouldsaythatthesubjectofanaccidentisnotabsolutelydifferentfromtheaccidenttakenalongwithitssubject；thoughitiscalled’another’thingbecausethemodeofbeingofthetwoisdifferent：foritisnotthesamethingforamantobeamanandforawhitemantobeawhiteman。Moreover，youshouldtakealookalongattheinflections，andsaythatthedescriptionofthemanofscienceiswrong：oneshouldsaynot’it’but’heisincontrovertiblebyargument’；whilethedescriptionofScienceiswrongtoo：oneshouldsaynot’it’but’sheisincontrovertiblebyargument’。Foragainstanobjectorwhosticksatnothingthedefenceshouldstickatnothing。
　　5
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeif，whileintendingtorenderanattributethatnaturallybelongs，hestatesitinhislanguageinsuchawayastoindicateonethatinvariablybelongs：forthenitwouldbegenerallyagreedthatwhathasbeenstatedtobeapropertyisupset。Thus（e。g。）themanwhohassaidthat’biped’isapropertyofmanintendstorendertheattributethatnaturallybelongs，buthisexpressionactuallyindicatesonethatinvariablybelongs：
　　accordingly，’biped’couldnotbeapropertyofman：fornoteverymanispossessedoftwofeet。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifheintendstorenderthepropertythatnaturallybelongs，andindicatesitinthatwayinhislanguage：forthenthepropertywillnotbeupsetinthisrespect。Thus（e。g。）hewhorendersasapropertyof’man’thephrase’ananimalcapableofreceivingknowledge’bothintends，andbyhislanguageindicates，thepropertythatbelongsbynature，andso’ananimalcapableofreceivingknowledge’wouldnotbeupsetorshowninthatrespectnottobeapropertyofman。
　　Moreover，asregardsallthethingsthatarecalledastheyareprimarilyaftersomethingelse，orprimarilyinthemselves，itisajobtorenderthepropertyofsuchthings。Forifyourenderapropertyasbelongingtothesubjectthatissocalledaftersomethingelse，thenitwillbetrueofitsprimarysubjectaswell；whereasifyoustateitofitsprimarysubject，thenitwillbepredicatedalsoofthethingthatissocalledafterthisother。Thus（e。g。）ifanyonerenders，coloured’asthepropertyof’surface’，’coloured’
　　willbetrueofbodyaswell；whereasifherenderitof’body’，itwillbepredicatedalsoof’surface’。Hencethenameaswellwillnotbetrueofthatofwhichthedescriptionistrue。
　　Inthecaseofsomepropertiesitmostlyhappensthatsomeerrorisincurredbecauseofafailuretodefinehowaswellastowhatthingsthepropertyisstatedtobelong。Foreveryonetriestorenderasthepropertyofathingsomethingthatbelongstoiteithernaturally，as’biped’belongsto’man’，oractually，as’havingfourfingers’belongstoaparticularman，orspecifically，as’consistingofmostrarefiedparticles’belongsto’fire’，orabsolutely，as’life’to’livingbeing’，oronethatbelongstoathingonlyascalledaftersomethingelse，as’wisdom’tothe’soul’，orontheotherhandprimarily，as’wisdom’tothe’rationalfaculty’，orbecausethethingisinacertainstate，as’incontrovertiblebyargument’belongstoa’scientist’（forsimplyandsolelybyreasonofhisbeinginacertainstatewillhebe’incontrovertiblebyargument’），orbecauseitisthestatepossessedbysomething，as’incontrovertiblebyargument’belongsto’science’，orbecauseitispartakenof，as’sensation’belongsto’animal’（forotherthingsaswellhavesensation，e。g。man，buttheyhaveitbecausetheyalreadypartakeof’animal’），orbecauseitpartakesofsomethingelse，as’life’belongstoaparticularkindof’livingbeing’。Accordinglyhemakesamistakeifhehasfailedtoaddtheword’naturally’，becausewhatbelongsnaturallymayfailtobelongtothethingtowhichitnaturallybelongs，as（e。g。）
　　itbelongstoamantohavetwofeet：sotooheerrsifhedoesnotmakeadefiniteprovisothatheisrenderingwhatactuallybelongs，becauseonedaythatattributewillnotbewhatitnowis，e。g。theman’spossessionoffourfingers。Soheerrsifhehasnotshownthathestatesathingtobesuchandsuchprimarily，orthathecallsitsoaftersomethingelse，becausethenitsnametoowillnotbetrueofthatofwhichthedescriptionistrue，asisthecasewith’coloured’，whetherrenderedasapropertyof’surface’orof’body’。Soheerrsifhehasnotsaidbeforehandthathehasrenderedapropertytoathingeitherbecausethatthingpossessesastate，orbecauseitisastatepossessedbysomething；becausethenitwillnotbeaproperty。For，supposingherendersthepropertytosomethingasbeingastatepossessed，itwillbelongtowhatpossessesthatstate；whilesupposingherendersittowhatpossessesthestate，itwillbelongtothestatepossessed，asdid’incontrovertiblebyargument’whenstatedasapropertyof’science’orofthe’scientist’。Soheerrsifhehasnotindicatedbeforehandthatthepropertybelongsbecausethethingpartakesof，orispartakenofby，something；becausethenthepropertywillbelongtocertainotherthingsaswell。Forifherendersitbecauseitssubjectispartakenof，itwillbelongtothethingswhichpartakeofit；whereasifherendersitbecauseitssubjectpartakesofsomethingelse，itwillbelongtothethingspartakenof，as（e。g。）ifheweretostate’life’tobeapropertyofa’particularkindoflivingbeing’，orjustof’livingbeing。Soheerrsifhehasnotexpresslydistinguishedthepropertythatbelongsspecifically，becausethenitwillbelongonlytooneofthethingsthatfallunderthetermofwhichhestatestheproperty：forthesuperlativebelongsonlytooneofthem，e。g。’lightest’asappliedto’fire’。Sometimes，too，amanmayevenaddtheword’specifically’，andstillmakeamistake。
　　Forthethingsinquestionshouldallbeofonespecies，whenevertheword’specifically’isadded：andinsomecasesthisdoesnotoccur，asitdoesnot，infact，inthecaseoffire。Forfireisnotallofonespecies；forlivecoalsandflameandlightareeachofthem’fire’，butareofdifferentspecies。Thereasonwhy，whenever’specifically’isadded，thereshouldnotbeanyspeciesotherthantheonementioned，isthis，thatiftherebe，thenthepropertyinquestionwillbelongtosomeoftheminagreaterandtoothersinalessdegree，ashappenswith’consistingofmostrarefiedparticles’
　　inthecaseoffire：for’light’consistsofmorerarefiedparticlesthanlivecoalsandflame。Andthisshouldnothappenunlessthenametoobepredicatedinagreaterdegreeofthatofwhichthedescriptionistruer；otherwisetherulethatwherethedescriptionistruerthenametooshouldbetruerisnotfulfilled。Moreover，inadditiontothis，thesameattributewillbethepropertybothofthetermwhichhasitabsolutelyandofthatelementthereinwhichhasitinthehighestdegree，asistheconditionoftheproperty’consistingofmostrarefiedparticles’inthecaseof’fire’：forthissameattributewillbethepropertyof’light’aswell：foritis’light’that’consistsofthemostrarefiedparticles’。If，then，anyoneelserendersapropertyinthiswayoneshouldattackit；
　　foroneself，oneshouldnotgiveoccasionforthisobjection，butshoulddefineinwhatmanneronestatesthepropertyattheactualtimeofmakingthestatement。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifhehasstatedathingasapropertyofitself：forthenwhathasbeenstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Forathingitselfalwaysshowsitsownessence，andwhatshowstheessenceisnotapropertybutadefinition。Thus（e。g。）hewhohassaidthat’becoming’isapropertyof’beautiful’hasrenderedthetermasapropertyofitself（for’beautiful’and’becoming’arethesame）；andso’becoming’couldnotbeapropertyof’beautiful’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifhehasavoidedrenderingathingasapropertyofitself，buthasyetstatedaconvertiblepredicate：
　　forthenwhatisstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。
　　Thushewhohasstated’animatesubstance’asapropertyof’living—creature’hasnotstated’living—creature’asapropertyofitself，buthasrenderedaconvertiblepredicate，sothat’animatesubstance’wouldbeapropertyof’living—creature’。
　　Next，inthecaseofthingsconsistingoflikeparts，youshouldlookandsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthepropertyofthewholebenottrueofthepart，orifthatofthepartbenotpredicatedofthewhole：forthenwhathasbeenstatedtobethepropertywillnotbeaproperty。Insomecasesithappensthatthisisso：forsometimesinrenderingapropertyinthecaseofthingsthatconsistoflikepartsamanmayhavehiseyeonthewhole，whilesometimeshemayaddresshimselftowhatispredicatedofthepart：andtheninneithercasewillithavebeenrightlyrendered。Takeaninstancereferringtothewhole：themanwhohassaidthatitisapropertyofthe’sea’
　　tobe’thelargestvolumeofsaltwater’，hasstatedthepropertyofsomethingthatconsistsoflikeparts，buthasrenderedanattributeofsuchakindasisnottrueofthepart（foraparticularseaisnot’thelargestvolumeofsaltwater’）；andsothelargestvolumeofsaltwater’couldnotbeapropertyofthe’sea’。Nowtakeonereferringtothepart：themanwhohasstatedthatitisapropertyof’air’tobe’breathable’hasstatedthepropertyofsomethingthatconsistsoflikeparts，buthehasstatedanattributesuchas，thoughtrueofsomeair，isstillnotpredicableofthewhole（forthewholeoftheairisnotbreathable）；andso’breathable’couldnotbeapropertyof’air’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seewhether，whileitistrueofeachofthethingswithsimilarparts，itisontheotherhandapropertyofthemtakenasacollectivewhole：
　　forthenwhathasbeenstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。
　　Thus（e。g。）whileitistrueofeartheverywherethatitnaturallyfallsdownwards，itisapropertyofthevariousparticularpiecesofearthtakenas’theEarth’，sothatitwouldbeapropertyof’earth’’naturallytofalldownwards’。
　　6
　　Next，lookfromthepointofviewoftherespectiveopposites，andfirst（a）fromthatofthecontraries，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthecontraryofthetermrenderedfailstobeapropertyofthecontrarysubject。Forthenneitherwillthecontraryofthefirstbeapropertyofthecontraryofthesecond。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasinjusticeiscontrarytojustice，andthelowesteviltothehighestgood，but’tobethehighestgood’isnotapropertyof’justice’，therefore’tobethelowestevil’couldnotbeapropertyof’injustice’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthecontraryisthepropertyofthecontrary：forthenalsothecontraryofthefirstwillbethepropertyofthecontraryofthesecond。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchaseviliscontrarytogood，andobjectionabletodesirable，and’desirable’isapropertyof’good’，’objectionable’wouldbeapropertyof’evil’。
　　Secondly（h）lookfromthepointofviewofrelativeoppositesandsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthecorrelativeofthetermrenderedfailstobeapropertyofthecorrelativeofthesubject：forthenneitherwillthecorrelativeofthefirstbeapropertyofthecorrelativeofthesecond。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’double’isrelativeto’half’，and’inexcess’to’exceeded’，while’inexcess’
　　isnotapropertyof’double’，exceeded’couldnotbeapropertyof’half’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthecorrelativeoftheallegedpropertyisapropertyofthesubject’scorrelative：forthenalsothecorrelativeofthefirstwillbeapropertyofthecorrelativeofthesecond：e。g。inasmuchas’double’
　　isrelativeto’half’，andtheproportion1：2isrelativetotheproportion2：1，whileitisapropertyof’double’tobe’intheproportionof2to1’，itwouldbeapropertyof’half’tobe’intheproportionof1to2’。
　　Thirdly（c）fordestructivepurposes，seeifanattributedescribedintermsofastate（X）failstobeapropertyofthegivenstate（Y）：forthenneitherwilltheattributedescribedintermsoftheprivation（ofX）beapropertyoftheprivation（ofY）。
　　Alsoif，ontheotherhand，anattributedescribedintermsoftheprivation（ofX）benotapropertyofthegivenprivation（ofY），neitherwilltheattributedescribedintermsofthestate（X）beapropertyofthestate（Y）。Thus，forexample，inasmuchasitisnotpredicatedasapropertyof’deafness’tobea’lackofsensation’，neithercoulditbeapropertyof’hearing’tobea’sensation’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifanattributedescribedintermsofastate（X）isapropertyofthegivenstate（Y）：forthenalsotheattributethatisdescribedintermsoftheprivation（ofX）willbeapropertyoftheprivation（ofY）。Also，ifanattributedescribedintermsofaprivation（ofX）beapropertyoftheprivation（ofY），thenalsotheattributethatisdescribedintermsofthestate（X）willbeapropertyofthestate（Y）。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’tosee’isapropertyof’sight’，inasmuchaswehavesight，’failuretosee’wouldbeapropertyof’blindness’，inasmuchaswehavenotgotthesightweshouldnaturallyhave。
　　Next，lookfromthepointofviewofpositiveandnegativeterms；
　　andfirst（a）fromthepointofviewofthepredicatestakenbythemselves。Thiscommon—placeruleisusefulonlyforadestructivepurpose。Thus（e。g。）seeifthepositivetermortheattributedescribedintermsofitisapropertyofthesubject：forthenthenegativetermortheattributedescribedintermsofitwillnotbeapropertyofthesubject。Alsoif，ontheotherhand，thenegativetermortheattributedescribedintermsofitisapropertyofthesubject，thenthepositivetermortheattributedescribedintermsofitwillnotbeapropertyofthesubject：e。g。inasmuchas’animate’
　　isapropertyof’livingcreature’，’inanimate’couldnotbeapropertyof’livingcreature’。
　　Secondly（b）lookfromthepointofviewofthepredicates，positiveornegative，andtheirrespectivesubjects；andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthepositivetermfallstobeapropertyofthepositivesubject：forthenneitherwillthenegativetermbeapropertyofthenegativesubject。Also，ifthenegativetermfailstobeapropertyofthenegativesubject，neitherwillthepositivetermbeapropertyofthepositivesubject。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’animal’isnotapropertyof’man’，neithercould’not—animal’beapropertyof’not—man’。Alsoif’not—animal’seemsnottobeapropertyof’not—man’，neitherwill’animal’beapropertyof’man’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthepositivetermisapropertyofthepositivesubject：forthenthenegativetermwillbeapropertyofthenegativesubjectaswell。Alsoifthenegativetermbeapropertyofthenegativesubject，thepositivewillbeapropertyofthepositiveaswell。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitisapropertyof’not—livingbeing’’nottolive’，itwouldbeapropertyof’livingbeing’’tolive’：alsoifitseemstobeapropertyof’livingbeing’’tolive’，itwillalsoseemtobeapropertyof’not—livingbeing’’nottolive’。
　　Thirdly（c）lookfromthepointofviewofthesubjectstakenbythemselves，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthepropertyrenderedisapropertyofthepositivesubject：forthenthesametermwillnotbeapropertyofthenegativesubjectaswell。Also，ifthetermrenderedbeapropertyofthenegativesubject，itwillnotbeapropertyofthepositive。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’animate’isapropertyof’livingcreature’，’animate’couldnotbeapropertyof’not—livingcreature’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，ifthetermrenderedfailstobeapropertyoftheaffirmativesubjectitwouldbeapropertyofthenegative。Thiscommonplaceruleis，however，deceptive：forapositivetermisnotapropertyofanegative，oranegativeofapositive。Forapositivetermdoesnotbelongatalltoanegative，whileanegativeterm，thoughitbelongstoapositive，doesnotbelongasaproperty。
　　Next，lookfromthepointofviewofthecoordinatemembersofadivision，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifnoneoftheco—ordinatemembers（parallelwiththepropertyrendered）beapropertyofanyoftheremainingsetofco—ordinatemembers（parallelwiththesubject）：forthenneitherwillthetermstatedbeapropertyofthatofwhichitisstatedtobeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’sensiblelivingbeing’isnotapropertyofanyoftheotherlivingbeings，’intelligiblelivingbeing’couldnotbeapropertyofGod。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifsomeoneorotheroftheremainingco—ordinatemembers（parallelwiththepropertyrendered）beapropertyofeachoftheseco—ordinatemembers（parallelwiththesubject）：forthentheremainingonetoowillbeapropertyofthatofwhichithasbeenstatednottobeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitisapropertyof’wisdom’tobeessentially’thenaturalvirtueoftherationalfaculty’，then，takingeachoftheothervirtuesaswellinthisway，itwouldbeapropertyof’temperance’tobeessentially’thenaturalvirtueofthefacultyofdesire’。
　　Next，lookfromthepointofviewoftheinflexions，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，iftheinflexionofthepropertyrenderedfailstobeapropertyoftheinflexionofthesubject：forthenneitherwilltheotherinflexionbeapropertyoftheotherinflexion。
　　Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’beautifully’isnotapropertyof’justly’，neithercould’beautiful’beapropertyof’just’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeiftheinflexionofthepropertyrenderedisapropertyoftheinflexionofthesubject：forthenalsotheotherinflexionwillbeapropertyoftheotherinflexion。
　　Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’walkingbiped’isapropertyofman，itwouldalsobeanyone’sproperty’asaman’tobedescribed’asawalkingbiped’。Notonlyinthecaseoftheactualtermmentionedshouldonelookattheinflexions，butalsointhecaseofitsopposites，justashasbeenlaiddowninthecaseoftheformercommonplacerulesaswell。’Thus，fordestructivepurposes，seeiftheinflexionoftheoppositeofthepropertyrenderedfailstobethepropertyoftheinflexionoftheoppositeofthesubject：forthenneitherwilltheinflexionoftheotheroppositebeapropertyoftheinflexionoftheotheropposite。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’well’isnotapropertyof’justly’，neithercould’badly’beapropertyof’unjustly’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeiftheinflexionoftheoppositeofthepropertyoriginallysuggestedisapropertyoftheinflexionoftheoppositeoftheoriginalsubject：forthenalsotheinflexionoftheotheroppositewillbeapropertyoftheinflexionoftheotheropposite。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’best’isapropertyof’thegood’，’worst’alsowillbeapropertyof’theevil’。
　　7
　　Next，lookfromthepointofviewofthingsthatareinalikerelation，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifwhatisinarelationlikethatofthepropertyrenderedfailstobeapropertyofwhatisinarelationlikethatofthesubject：forthenneitherwillwhatisinarelationlikethatofthefirstbeapropertyofwhatisinarelationlikethatofthesecond。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchastherelationofthebuildertowardstheproductionofahouseislikethatofthedoctortowardstheproductionofhealth，anditisnotapropertyofadoctortoproducehealth，itcouldnotbeapropertyofabuildertoproduceahouse。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifwhatisinarelationlikethatofthepropertyrenderedisapropertyofwhatisinarelationlikethatofthesubject：forthenalsowhatisinarelationlikethatofthefirstwillbeapropertyofwhatisinarelationlikethatofthesecond。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchastherelationofadoctortowardsthepossessionofabilitytoproducehealthislikethatofatrainertowardsthepossessionofabilitytoproducevigour，anditisapropertyofatrainertopossesstheabilitytoproducevigour，itwouldbeapropertyofadoctortopossesstheabilitytoproducehealth。
　　Nextlookfromthepointofviewofthingsthatareidenticallyrelated，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthepredicatethatisidenticallyrelatedtowardstwosubjectsfailstobeapropertyofthesubjectwhichisidenticallyrelatedtoitasthesubjectinquestion；
　　forthenneitherwillthepredicatethatisidenticallyrelatedtobothsubjectsbeapropertyofthesubjectwhichisidenticallyrelatedtoitasthefirst。If，ontheotherhand，thepredicatewhichisidenticallyrelatedtotwosubjectsisthepropertyofthesubjectwhichisidenticallyrelatedtoitasthesubjectinquestion，thenitwillnotbeapropertyofthatofwhichithasbeenstatedtobeaproperty。（e。g。）inasmuchasprudenceisidenticallyrelatedtoboththenobleandthebase，sinceitisknowledgeofeachofthem，anditisnotapropertyofprudencetobeknowledgeofthenoble，itcouldnotbeapropertyofprudencetobeknowledgeofthebase。