If，ontheotherhand，itisapropertyofprudencetobetheknowledgeofthenoble，itcouldnotbeapropertyofittobetheknowledgeofthebase。]Foritisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeapropertyofmorethanonesubject。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，thiscommonplaceruleisofnouse：forwhatis’identicallyrelated’isasinglepredicateinprocessofcomparisonwithmorethanonesubject。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifthepredicatequalifiedbytheverb’tobe’failstobeapropertyofthesubjectqualifiedbytheverb’tobe’：forthenneitherwillthedestructionoftheonebeapropertyoftheotherqualifiedbytheverb’tobedestroyed’，norwillthe’becoming’theonebeapropertyoftheotherqualifiedbytheverb’tobecome’。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitisnotapropertyof’man’tobeananimal，neithercoulditbeapropertyofbecomingamantobecomeananimal；norcouldthedestructionofananimalbeapropertyofthedestructionofaman。Inthesamewayoneshouldderiveargumentsalsofrom’becoming’to’being’and’beingdestroyed’，andfrom’beingdestroyed’to’being’andto’becoming’
　　exactlyastheyhavejustbeengivenfrom’being’to’becoming’and’beingdestroyed’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthesubjectsetdownasqualifiedbytheverb’tobe’hasthepredicatesetdownassoqualified，asitsproperty：forthenalsothesubjectqualifiedbythevery’tobecome’willhavethepredicatequalifiedby’tobecome’asitsproperty，andthesubjectqualifiedbytheverbtobedestroyed’willhaveasitspropertythepredicaterenderedwiththisqualification。Thus，forexample，inasmuchasitisapropertyofmantobeamortal，itwouldbeapropertyofbecomingamantobecomeamortal，andthedestructionofamortalwouldbeapropertyofthedestructionofaman。Inthesamewayoneshouldderiveargumentsalsofrom’becoming’and’beingdestroyed’bothto’being’andtotheconclusionsthatfollowfromthem，exactlyaswasdirectedalsoforthepurposeofdestruction。
　　Nexttakealookatthe’idea’ofthesubjectstated，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifthesuggestedpropertyfailstobelongtothe’idea’inquestion，orfailstobelongtoitinvirtueofthatcharacterwhichcausesittobearthedescriptionofwhichthepropertywasrendered：forthenwhathasbeenstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’beingmotionless’doesnotbelongto’man—himself’qua’man’，butqua’idea’，itcouldnotbeapropertyof’man’tobemotionless。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthepropertyinquestionbelongstotheidea，andbelongstoitinthatrespectinvirtueofwhichthereispredicatedofitthatcharacterofwhichthepredicateinquestionhasbeenstatednottobeaproperty：forthenwhathasbeenstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。
　　Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitbelongsto’living—creature—itself’tobecompoundedofsoulandbody，andfurtherthisbelongstoitqua’living—creature’，itwouldbeapropertyof’living—creature’tobecompoundedofsoulandbody。
　　8
　　Nextlookfromthepointofviewofgreaterandlessdegrees，andfirst（a）fordestructivepurposes，seeifwhatismore—Pfailstobeapropertyofwhatismore—S：forthenneitherwillwhatisless—Pbeapropertyofwhatisless—S，norleast—Pofleast—S，normost—Pofmost—S，norPsimplyofSsimply。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasbeingmorehighlycolouredisnotapropertyofwhatismoreabody，neithercouldbeinglesshighlycolouredbeapropertyofwhatislessabody，norbeingcolouredbeapropertyofbodyatall。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifwhatismore—Pisapropertyofwhatismore—S：forthenalsowhatisless—PwillbeapropertyofwhatislessS，andleast—Pofleast—S，andmost—Pofmost—S，andPsimplyofSsimply。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasahigherdegreeofsensationisapropertyofahigherdegreeoflife，alowerdegreeofsensationalsowouldbeapropertyofalowerdegreeoflife，andthehighestofthehighestandthelowestofthelowestdegree，andsensationsimplyoflifesimply。
　　Alsoyoushouldlookattheargumentfromasimplepredicationtothesamequalifiedtypesofpredication，andsee，fordestructivepurposes，ifPsimplyfailstobeapropertyofSsimply；forthenneitherwillmore—Pbeapropertyofmore—S，norless—Pofless—S，normost—Pofmost—S，norleast—Pofleast—S。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’virtuous’isnotapropertyof’man’，neithercould’morevirtuous’
　　beapropertyofwhatis’morehuman’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifPsimplyisapropertyofSsimply：forthenmorePalsowillbeapropertyofmore—S，andless—Pofless—S，andleast—Pofleast—S，andmost—Pofmost—S。Thus（e。g。）atendencytomoveupwardsbynatureisapropertyoffire，andsoalsoagreatertendencytomoveupwardsbynaturewouldbeapropertyofwhatismorefiery。Inthesamewaytoooneshouldlookatallthesemattersfromthepointofviewoftheothersaswell。
　　Secondly（b）fordestructivepurposes，seeifthemorelikelypropertyfailstobeapropertyofthemorelikelysubject：forthenneitherwillthelesslikelypropertybeapropertyofthelesslikelysubject。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’perceiving’ismorelikelytobeapropertyof’animal’than’knowing’of’man’，and’perceiving’isnotapropertyof’animal’，’knowing’couldnotbeapropertyof’man’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifthelesslikelypropertyisapropertyofthelesslikelysubject；forthentoothemorelikelypropertywillbeapropertyofthemorelikelysubject。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’tobenaturallycivilized’islesslikelytobeapropertyofmanthan’tolive’ofananimal，anditisapropertyofmantobenaturallycivilized，itwouldbeapropertyofanimaltolive。
　　Thirdly（c）fordestructivepurposes，seeifthepredicatefailstobeapropertyofthatofwhichitismorelikelytobeaproperty：forthenneitherwillitbeapropertyofthatofwhichitislesslikelytobeaproperty：whileifitisapropertyoftheformer，itwillnotbeapropertyofthelatter。Thus（e。g。）
　　inasmuchas’tobecoloured’ismorelikelytobeapropertyofa’surface’thanofa’body’，anditisnotapropertyofasurface，’tobecoloured’couldnotbeapropertyof’body’；whileifitisapropertyofa’surface’，itcouldnotbeapropertyofa’body’。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，thiscommonplaceruleisnotofanyuse：foritisimpossibleforthesamethingtobeapropertyofmorethanonething。
　　Fourthly（d）fordestructivepurposes，seeifwhatismorelikelytobeapropertyofagivensubjectfailstobeitsproperty：forthenneitherwillwhatislesslikelytobeapropertyofitbeitsproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’sensible’ismorelikelythan’divisible’tobeapropertyof’animal’，and’sensible’isnotapropertyofanimal，’divisible’couldnotbeapropertyofanimal。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifwhatislesslikelytobeapropertyofitisaproperty；forthenwhatismorelikelytobeapropertyofitwillbeapropertyaswell。Thus，forexample，inasmuchas’sensation’islesslikelytobeapropertyof’animal’thanlife’，and’sensation’isapropertyofanimal，’life’
　　wouldbeapropertyofanimal。
　　Next，lookfromthepointofviewoftheattributesthatbelonginalikemanner，andfirst（a）fordestructivepurposes，seeifwhatisasmuchapropertyfailstobeapropertyofthatofwhichitisasmuchaproperty：forthenneitherwillthatwhichisasmuchapropertyasitbeapropertyofthatofwhichitisasmuchaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’desiring’isasmuchapropertyofthefacultyofdesireasreasoning’isapropertyofthefacultyofreason，anddesiringisnotapropertyofthefacultyofdesire，reasoningcouldnotbeapropertyofthefacultyofreason。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifwhatisasmuchapropertyisapropertyofthatofwhichitisasmuchaproperty：
　　forthenalsowhatisasmuchapropertyasitwillbeapropertyofthatofwhichitisasmuchaproperty。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasitisasmuchapropertyof’thefacultyofreason’tobe’theprimaryseatofwisdom’asitisof’thefacultyofdesire’tobe’theprimaryseatoftemperance’，anditisapropertyofthefacultyofreasontobetheprimaryseatofwisdom，itwouldbeapropertyofthefacultyofdesiretobetheprimaryseatoftemperance。
　　Secondly（b）fordestructivepurposes，seeifwhatisasmuchapropertyofanythingfailstobeapropertyofit：forthenneitherwillwhatisasmuchapropertybeapropertyofit。Thus（e。g。）
　　inasmuchas’seeing’isasmuchapropertyofmanas’hearing’，and’seeing’isnotapropertyofman，’hearing’couldnotbeapropertyofman。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifwhatisasmuchapropertyofitisitsproperty：forthenwhatisasmuchapropertyofitastheformerwillbeitspropertyaswell。Thus（e。g。）
　　itisasmuchapropertyofthesoultobetheprimarypossessorofapartthatdesiresasofapartthatreasons，anditisapropertyofthesoultobetheprimarypossessorofapartthatdesires，andsoitbeapropertyofthesoultobetheprimarypossessorofapartthatreasons。
　　Thirdly（c）fordestructivepurposes，seeifitfailstobeapropertyofthatofwhichitisasmuchaproperty：forthenneitherwillitbeapropertyofthatofwhichitisasmuchapropertyasoftheformer，whileifitbeapropertyoftheformer，itwillnotbeapropertyoftheother。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchas’toburn’isasmuchapropertyof’flame’asof’livecoals’，and’toburn’isnotapropertyofflame，’toburn’couldnotbeapropertyoflivecoals：whileifitisapropertyofflame，itcouldnotbeapropertyoflivecoals。Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，thiscommonplaceruleisofnouse。
　　Therulebasedonthingsthatareinalikerelation’differsfromtherulebasedonattributesthatbelonginalikemanner，’becausetheformerpointissecuredbyanalogy，notfromreflectiononthebelongingofanyattribute，whilethelatterisjudgedbyacomparisonbasedonthefactthatanattributebelongs。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifinrenderingthepropertypotentially，hehasalsothroughthatpotentialityrenderedthepropertyrelativelytosomethingthatdoesnotexist，whenthepotentialityinquestioncannotbelongtowhatdoesnotexist：forthenwhatisstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Thus（e。g。）hewhohassaidthat’breathable’isapropertyof’air’has，ontheonehand，renderedthepropertypotentially（forthatis’breathable’whichissuchascanbebreathed），andontheotherhandhasalsorenderedthepropertyrelativelytowhatdoesnotexist：—forwhileairmayexist，eventhoughthereexistnoanimalsoconstitutedastobreathetheair，itisnotpossibletobreatheitifnoanimalexist：sothatitwillnot，either，beapropertyofairtobesuchascanbebreathedatatimewhenthereexistsnoanimalsuchastobreatheitandsoitfollowsthat’breathable’couldnotbeapropertyofair。
　　Forconstructivepurposes，seeifinrenderingthepropertypotentiallyherendersthepropertyeitherrelativelytosomethingthatexists，ortosomethingthatdoesnotexist，whenthepotentialityinquestioncanbelongtowhatdoesnotexist：forthenwhathasbeenstatednottobeapropertywillbeaproperty。Thuse。g。）hewhorendersitasapropertyof’being’tobe’capableofbeingacteduponorofacting’，inrenderingthepropertypotentially，hasrenderedthepropertyrelativelytosomethingthatexists：forwhen’being’exists，itwillalsobecapableofbeingacteduponorofactinginacertainway：sothattobe’capableofbeingacteduponorofacting’wouldbeapropertyof’being’。
　　Next，fordestructivepurposes，seeifhehasstatedthepropertyinthesuperlative：forthenwhathasbeenstatedtobeapropertywillnotbeaproperty。Forpeoplewhorenderthepropertyinthatwayfindthatoftheobjectofwhichthedescriptionistrue，thenameisnottrueaswell：forthoughtheobjectperishthedescriptionwillcontinueinbeingnonetheless；foritbelongsmostnearlytosomethingthatisinbeing。Anexamplewouldbesupposinganyoneweretorender’thelightestbody’asapropertyof’fire’：for，thoughfireperish，thereehrewillstillbesomeformofbodythatisthelightest，sothat’thelightestbody’couldnotbeapropertyoffire。
　　Forconstructivepurposes，ontheotherhand，seeifhehasavoidedrenderingthepropertyinthesuperlative：forthenthepropertywillinthisrespecthavebeenpropertyofmanhasnotrenderedthepropertycorrectlystated。Thus（e。g。）inasmuchasheinthesuperlative，thepropertywouldinwhostates’anaturallycivilizedanimal’asathisrespecthavebeencorrectlystated。
　　BookVI
　　1
　　THEdiscussionofDefinitionsfallsintofiveparts。Foryouhavetoshoweither（1）thatitisnottrueatalltoapplytheexpressionaswelltothattowhichthetermisapplied（forthedefinitionofManoughttobetrueofeveryman）；or（2）thatthoughtheobjecthasagenus，hehasfailedtoputtheobjectdefinedintothegenus，ortoputitintotheappropriategenus（fortheframerofadefinitionshouldfirstplacetheobjectinitsgenus，andthenappenditsdifferences：forofalltheelementsofthedefinitionthegenusisusuallysupposedtobetheprincipalmarkoftheessenceofwhatisdefined）：or（3）thattheexpressionisnotpeculiartotheobject（for，aswesaidaboveaswell，adefinitionoughttobepeculiar）：orelse（4）seeif，thoughhehasobservedalltheaforesaidcautions，hehasyetfailedtodefinetheobject，thatis，toexpressitsessence。（5）Itremains，apartfromtheforegoing，toseeifhehasdefinedit，butdefineditincorrectly。
　　Whether，then，theexpressionbenotalsotrueofthatofwhichthetermistrueyoushouldproceedtoexamineaccordingtothecommonplacerulesthatrelatetoAccident。Fortheretoothequestionisalways’Issoandsotrueoruntrue？’：forwheneverwearguethatanaccidentbelongs，wedeclareittobetrue，whilewheneverwearguethatitdoesnotbelong，wedeclareittobeuntrue。
　　If，again，hehasfailedtoplacetheobjectintheappropriategenus，oriftheexpressionbenotpeculiartotheobject，wemustgoontoexaminethecaseaccordingtothecommonplacerulesthatrelatetogenusandproperty。
　　Itremains，then，toprescribehowtoinvestigatewhethertheobjecthasbeeneithernotdefinedatall，orelsedefinedincorrectly。
　　First，then，wemustproceedtoexamineifithasbeendefinedincorrectly：forwithanythingitiseasiertodoitthantodoitcorrectly。Clearly，then，moremistakesaremadeinthelattertaskonaccountofitsgreaterdifficulty。Accordinglytheattackbecomeseasierinthelattercasethanintheformer。
　　Incorrectnessfallsintotwobranches：（1）first，theuseofobscurelanguage（forthelanguageofadefinitionoughttobetheveryclearestpossible，seeingthatthewholepurposeofrenderingitistomakesomethingknown）；（secondly，iftheexpressionusedbelongerthanisnecessary：foralladditionalmatterinadefinitionissuperfluous。Again，eachoftheaforesaidbranchesisdividedintoanumberofothers。
　　2
　　Onecommonplacerule，then，inregardtoobscurityis，Seeifthemeaningintendedbythedefinitioninvolvesanambiguitywithanyother，e。g。’Becomingisapassageintobeing’，or’Healthisthebalanceofhotandcoldelements’。Here’passage’and’balance’areambiguousterms：itisaccordinglynotclearwhichoftheseveralpossiblesensesofthetermheintendstoconvey。Likewisealso，ifthetermdefinedbeusedindifferentsensesandhehasspokenwithoutdistinguishingbetweenthem：forthenitisnotcleartowhichofthemthedefinitionrenderedapplies，andonecanthenbringacaptiousobjectiononthegroundthatthedefinitiondoesnotapplytoallthethingswhosedefinitionhehasrendered：andthiskindofthingisparticularlyeasyinthecasewherethedefinerdoesnotseetheambiguityofhisterms。Or，again，thequestionermayhimselfdistinguishthevarioussensesofthetermrenderedinthedefinition，andtheninstitutehisargumentagainsteach：foriftheexpressionusedbenotadequatetothesubjectinanyofitssenses，itisclearthathecannothavedefineditinanysensearight。
　　Anotherruleis，Seeifhehasusedametaphoricalexpression，as，forinstance，ifhehasdefinedknowledgeas’unsupplantable’，ortheearthasa’nurse’，ortemperanceasa’harmony’。Forametaphoricalexpressionisalwaysobscure。Itispossible，also，toarguesophisticallyagainsttheuserofametaphoricalexpressionasthoughhehaduseditinitsliteralsense：forthedefinitionstatedwillnotapplytothetermdefined，e。g。inthecaseoftemperance：forharmonyisalwaysfoundbetweennotes。Moreover，ifharmonybethegenusoftemperance，thenthesameobjectwilloccurintwogeneraofwhichneithercontainstheother：forharmonydoesnotcontainvirtue，norvirtueharmony。Again，seeifheusestermsthatareunfamiliar，aswhenPlatodescribestheeyeas’brow—shaded’，oracertainspideraspoison—fanged’，orthemarrowas’boneformed’。Foranunusualphraseisalwaysobscure。
　　Sometimesaphraseisusedneitherambiguously，noryetmetaphorically，noryetliterally，aswhenthelawissaidtobethe’measure’or’image’ofthethingsthatarebynaturejust。Suchphrasesareworsethanmetaphor；forthelatterdoesmakeitsmeaningtosomeextentclearbecauseofthelikenessinvolved；forthosewhousemetaphorsdosoalwaysinviewofsomelikeness：whereasthiskindofphrasemakesnothingclear；forthereisnolikenesstojustifythedescription’measure’or’image’，asappliedtothelaw，noristhelawordinarilysocalledinaliteralsense。Sothen，ifamansaysthatthelawisliterallya’measure’oran’image’，hespeaksfalsely：foranimageissomethingproducedbyimitation，andthisisnotfoundinthecaseofthelaw。If，ontheotherhand，hedoesnotmeanthetermliterally，itisclearthathehasusedanunclearexpression，andonethatisworsethananysortofmetaphoricalexpression。
　　Moreover，seeiffromtheexpressionusedthedefinitionofthecontrarybenotclear；fordefinitionsthathavebeencorrectlyrenderedalsoindicatetheircontrariesaswell。Or，again，seeif，whenitismerelystatedbyitself，itisnotevidentwhatitdefines：
　　justasintheworksoftheoldpainters，unlesstherewereaninscription，thefiguresusedtobeunrecognizable。
　　3
　　If，then，thedefinitionbenotclear，youshouldproceedtoexamineonlinessuchasthese。If，ontheotherhand，hehasphrasedthedefinitionredundantly，firstofalllookandseewhetherhehasusedanyattributethatbelongsuniversally，eithertorealobjectsingeneral，ortoallthatfallunderthesamegenusastheobjectdefined：forthementionofthisissuretoberedundant。Forthegenusoughttodividetheobjectfromthingsingeneral，andthedifferentiafromanyofthethingscontainedinthesamegenus。Nowanytermthatbelongstoeverythingseparatesoffthegivenobjectfromabsolutelynothing，whileanythatbelongstoallthethingsthatfallunderthesamegenusdoesnotseparateitofffromthethingscontainedinthesamegenus。Anyaddition，then，ofthatkindwillbepointless。
　　Orseeif，thoughtheadditionalmattermaybepeculiartothegiventerm，yetevenwhenitisstruckouttherestoftheexpressiontooispeculiarandmakescleartheessenceoftheterm。Thus，inthedefinitionofman，theaddition’capableofreceivingknowledge’issuperfluous；forstrikeitout，andstilltheexpressionispeculiarandmakesclearhisessence。Speakinggenerally，everythingissuperfluousuponwhoseremovaltheremainderstillmakesthetermthatisbeingdefinedclear。Such，forinstance，wouldalsobethedefinitionofthesoul，assumingittobestatedasa’self—movingnumber’；forthesoulisjust’theself—moving’，asPlatodefinedit。Orperhapstheexpressionused，thoughappropriate，yetdoesnotdeclaretheessence，iftheword’number’beeliminated。Whichofthetwoistherealstateofthecaseitisdifficulttodetermineclearly：therightwaytotreatthematterinallcasesistobeguidedbyconvenience。Thus（e。g。）itissaidthatthedefinitionofphlegmisthe’undigestedmoisturethatcomesfirstofffood’。Heretheadditionoftheword’undigested’issuperfluous，seeingthat’thefirst’isoneandnotmany，sothatevenwhenundigested’isleftoutthedefinitionwillstillbepeculiartothesubject：foritisimpossiblethatbothphlegmandalsosomethingelseshouldbothbethefirsttoarisefromthefood。Orperhapsthephlegmisnotabsolutelythefirstthingtocomeoffthefood，butonlythefirstoftheundigestedmatters，sothattheaddition’undigested’isrequired；
　　forstatedtheotherwaythedefinitionwouldnotbetrueunlessthephlegmcomesfirstofall。
　　Moreover，seeifanythingcontainedinthedefinitionfailstoapplytoeverythingthatfallsunderthesamespecies：forthissortofdefinitionisworsethanthosewhichincludeanattributebelongingtoallthingsuniversally。Forinthatcase，iftheremainderoftheexpressionbepeculiar，thewholetoowillbepeculiar：forabsolutelyalways，iftosomethingpeculiaranythingwhateverthatistruebeadded，thewholetoobecomespeculiar。Whereasifanypartoftheexpressiondonotapplytoeverythingthatfallsunderthesamespecies，itisimpossiblethattheexpressionasawholeshouldbepeculiar：foritwillnotbepredicatedconvertiblywiththeobject；
　　e。g。’awalkingbipedanimalsixfeethigh’：foranexpressionofthatkindisnotpredicatedconvertiblywiththeterm，becausetheattribute’sixfeethigh’doesnotbelongtoeverythingthatfallsunderthesamespecies。
　　Again，seeifhehassaidthesamethingmorethanonce，saying（e。g。）’desire’isa’conationforthepleasant’。For’desire’isalways’forthepleasant’，sothatwhatisthesameasdesirewillalsobe’forthepleasant’。Accordinglyourdefinitionofdesirebecomes’conation—for—the—pleasant’：fortheword’desire’istheexactequivalentofthewords’conationfor—the—pleasant’，sothatbothalikewillbe’forthepleasant’。Orperhapsthereisnoabsurdityinthis；forconsiderthisinstance：—Manisabiped’：
　　therefore，whatisthesameasmanisabiped：but’awalkingbipedanimal’isthesameasman，andthereforewalkingbipedanimalisabiped’。Butthisinvolvesnorealabsurdity。For’biped’isnotapredicateof’walkinganimal’：ifitwere，thenweshouldcertainlyhave’biped’predicatedtwiceofthesamething；butasamatteroffactthesubjectsaidtobeabipedis’awalkingbipedanimal’，sothattheword’biped’isonlyusedasapredicateonce。Likewisealsointhecaseof’desire’aswell：foritisnot’conation’thatissaidtobe’forthepleasant’，butratherthewholeidea，sothattheretoothepredicationisonlymadeonce。Absurdityresults，notwhenthesamewordisutteredtwice，butwhenthesamethingismorethanoncepredicatedofasubject；e。g。ifhesays，likeXenocrates，thatwisdomdefinesandcontemplatesreality：’fordefinitionisacertaintypeofcontemplation，sothatbyaddingthewords’andcontemplates’overagainhesaysthesamethingtwiceover。
　　Likewise，too，thosefailwhosaythat’cooling’is’theprivationofnaturalheat’。Forallprivationisaprivationofsomenaturalattribute，sothattheadditionoftheword’natural’issuperfluous：itwouldhavebeenenoughtosay’privationofheat’，fortheword’privation’showsofitselfthattheheatmeantisnaturalheat。
　　Again，seeifauniversalhavebeenmentionedandthenaparticularcaseofitbeaddedaswell，e。g。’Equityisaremissionofwhatisexpedientandjust’；forwhatisjustisabranchofwhatisexpedientandisthereforeincludedinthelatterterm：itsmentionisthereforeredundant，anadditionoftheparticularaftertheuniversalhasbeenalreadystated。Soalso，ifhedefines’medicine’as’knowledgeofwhatmakesforhealthinanimalsandmen’，or’thelaw’as’theimageofwhatisbynaturenobleandjust’；forwhatisjustisabranchofwhatisnoble，sothathesaysthesamethingmorethanonce。
　　4
　　Whether，then，amandefinesathingcorrectlyorincorrectlyyoushouldproceedtoexamineontheseandsimilarlines。Butwhetherhehasmentionedanddefineditsessenceorno，shouldbeexaminedasfollows：Firstofall，seeifhehasfailedtomakethedefinitionthroughtermsthatarepriorandmoreintelligible。Forthereasonwhythedefinitionisrenderedistomakeknownthetermstated，andwemakethingsknownbytakingnotanyrandomterms，butsuchasarepriorandmoreintelligible，asisdoneindemonstrations（forsoitiswithallteachingandlearning）；accordingly，itisclearthatamanwhodoesnotdefinethroughtermsofthiskindhasnotdefinedatall。Otherwise，therewillbemorethanonedefinitionofthesamething：forclearlyhewhodefinesthroughtermsthatarepriorandmoreintelligiblehasalsoframedadefinition，andabetterone，sothatbothwouldthenbedefinitionsofthesameobject。Thissortofview，however，doesnotgenerallyfindacceptance：forofeachrealobjecttheessenceissingle：if，then，therearetobeanumberofdefinitionsofthesamething，theessenceoftheobjectwillbethesameasitisrepresentedtobeineachofthedefinitions，andtheserepresentationsarenotthesame，inasmuchasthedefinitionsaredifferent。Clearly，then，anyonewhohasnotdefinedathingthroughtermsthatarepriorandmoreintelligiblehasnotdefineditatall。
　　Thestatementthatadefinitionhasnotbeenmadethroughmoreintelligibletermsmaybeunderstoodintwosenses，eithersupposingthatitstermsareabsolutelylessintelligible，orsupposingthattheyarelessintelligibletous：foreithersenseispossible。Thusabsolutelythepriorismoreintelligiblethantheposterior，apoint，forinstance，thanaline，alinethanaplane，andaplanethanasolid；justasalsoaunitismoreintelligiblethananumber；foritisthepriusandstarting—pointofallnumber。Likewise，also，aletterismoreintelligiblethanasyllable。Whereastousitsometimeshappensthattheconverseisthecase：forthesolidfallsunderperceptionmostofall—morethanaplane—andaplanemorethanaline，andalinemorethanapoint；formostpeoplelearnthingsliketheformerearlierthanthelatter；foranyordinaryintelligencecangraspthem，whereastheothersrequireanexactandexceptionalunderstanding。
　　Absolutely，then，itisbettertotrytomakewhatisposteriorknownthroughwhatisprior，inasmuchassuchawayofprocedureismorescientific。Ofcourse，indealingwithpersonswhocannotrecognizethingsthroughtermsofthatkind，itmayperhapsbenecessarytoframetheexpressionthroughtermsthatareintelligibletothem。Amongdefinitionsofthiskindarethoseofapoint，aline，andaplane，allofwhichexplainthepriorbytheposterior；fortheysaythatapointisthelimitofaline，alineofaplane，aplaneofasolid。Onemust，however，notfailtoobservethatthosewhodefineinthiswaycannotshowtheessentialnatureofthetermtheydefine，unlessitsohappensthatthesamethingismoreintelligiblebothtousandalsoabsolutely，sinceacorrectdefinitionmustdefineathingthroughitsgenusanditsdifferentiae，andthesebelongtotheorderofthingswhichareabsolutelymoreintelligiblethan，andpriorto，thespecies。Forannulthegenusanddifferentia，andthespeciestooisannulled，sothatthesearepriortothespecies。Theyarealsomoreintelligible；forifthespeciesbeknown，thegenusanddifferentiamustofnecessitybeknownaswell（foranyonewhoknowswhatamanisknowsalsowhat’animal’and’walking’are），whereasifthegenusorthedifferentiabeknownitdoesnotfollowofnecessitythatthespeciesisknownaswell：thusthespeciesislessintelligible。Moreover，thosewhosaythatsuchdefinitions，viz。thosewhichproceedfromwhatisintelligibletothis，that，ortheotherman，arereallyandtrulydefinitions，willhavetosaythatthereareseveraldefinitionsofoneandthesamething。For，asithappens，differentthingsaremoreintelligibletodifferentpeople，notthesamethingstoall；andsoadifferentdefinitionwouldhavetoberenderedtoeachseveralperson，ifthedefinitionistobeconstructedfromwhatismoreintelligibletoparticularindividuals。Moreover，tothesamepeopledifferentthingsaremoreintelligibleatdifferenttimes；firstofalltheobjectsofsense；then，astheybecomemoresharpwitted，theconverse；sothatthosewhoholdthatadefinitionoughttoberenderedthroughwhatismoreintelligibletoparticularindividualswouldnothavetorenderthesamedefinitionatalltimeseventothesameperson。Itisclear，then，thattherightwaytodefineisnotthroughtermsofthatkind，butthroughwhatisabsolutelymoreintelligible：foronlyinthiswaycouldthedefinitioncomealwaystobeoneandthesame。Perhaps，also，whatisabsolutelyintelligibleiswhatisintelligible，nottoall，buttothosewhoareinasoundstateofunderstanding，justaswhatisabsolutelyhealthyiswhatishealthytothoseinasoundstateofbody。Allsuchpointsasthisoughttobemadeveryprecise，andmadeuseofinthecourseofdiscussionasoccasionrequires。Thedemolitionofadefinitionwillmostsurelywinageneralapprovalifthedefinerhappenstohaveframedhisexpressionneitherfromwhatisabsolutelymoreintelligiblenoryetfromwhatissotous。
　　Oneform，then，ofthefailuretoworkthroughmoreintelligibletermsistheexhibitionofthepriorthroughtheposterior，asweremarkedbefore。’Anotherformoccursifwefindthatthedefinitionhasbeenrenderedofwhatisatrestanddefinitethroughwhatisindefiniteandinmotion：forwhatisstillanddefiniteispriortowhatisindefiniteandinmotion。
　　Ofthefailuretousetermsthatarepriortherearethreeforms：
　　（1）Thefirstiswhenanoppositehasbeendefinedthroughitsopposite，e。g。i。goodthroughevil：foroppositesarealwayssimultaneousbynature。Somepeoplethink，also，thatbothareobjectsofthesamescience，sothattheoneisnotevenmoreintelligiblethantheother。Onemust，however，observethatitisperhapsnotpossibletodefinesomethingsinanyotherway，e。g。thedoublewithoutthehalf，andallthetermsthatareessentiallyrelative：forinallsuchcasestheessentialbeingisthesameasacertainrelationtosomething，sothatitisimpossibletounderstandtheonetermwithouttheother，andaccordinglyinthedefinitionoftheonetheothertoomustbeembraced。Oneoughttolearnupallsuchpointsasthese，andusethemasoccasionmayseemtorequire。
　　（2）Anotheris—ifhehasusedthetermdefineditself。Thispassesunobservedwhentheactualnameoftheobjectisnotused，e。g。
　　supposinganyonehaddefinedthesunasastarthatappearsbyday’。Forinbringingin’day’hebringsinthesun。Todetecterrorsofthissort，exchangethewordforitsdefinition，e。g。thedefinitionof’day’asthe’passageofthesunovertheearth’。
　　Clearly，whoeverhassaid’thepassageofthesunovertheearth’
　　hassaid’thesun’，sothatinbringinginthe’day’hehasbroughtinthesun。
　　（3）Again，seeifhehasdefinedonecoordinatememberofadivisionbyanother，e。g。’anoddnumber’as’thatwhichisgreaterbyonethananevennumber’。Fortheco—ordinatemembersofadivisionthatarederivedfromthesamegenusaresimultaneousbynatureand’odd’and’even’aresuchterms：forbotharedifferentiaeofnumber。
　　Likewisealso，seeifhehasdefinedasuperiorthroughasubordinateterm，e。g。’An"evennumber"is"anumberdivisibleintohalves"’，or’"thegood"isa"stateofvirtue"’。For’half’isderivedfrom’two’，and’two’isanevennumber：virtuealsoisakindofgood，sothatthelattertermsaresubordinatetotheformer。
　　Moreover，inusingthesubordinatetermoneisboundtousetheotheraswell：forwhoeveremploystheterm’virtue’employstheterm’good’，seeingthatvirtueisacertainkindofgood：likewise，also，whoeveremploystheterm’half’employstheterm’even’，fortobe’dividedinhalf’meanstobedividedintotwo，andtwoiseven。
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　　Generallyspeaking，then，onecommonplacerulerelatestothefailuretoframetheexpressionbymeansoftermsthatarepriorandmoreintelligible：andofthisthesubdivisionsarethosespecifiedabove。Asecondis，seewhether，thoughtheobjectisinagenus，ithasnotbeenplacedinagenus。Thissortoferrorisalwaysfoundwheretheessenceoftheobjectdoesnotstandfirstintheexpression，e。g。thedefinitionof’body’as’thatwhichhasthreedimensions’，orthedefinitionof’man’，supposinganyonetogiveit，as’thatwhichknowshowtocount’：foritisnotstatedwhatitisthathasthreedimensions，orwhatitisthatknowshowtocount：
　　whereasthegenusismeanttoindicatejustthis，andissubmittedfirstofthetermsinthedefinition。
　　Moreover，seeif，whilethetermtobedefinedisusedinrelationtomanythings，hehasfailedtorenderitinrelationtoallofthem；
　　as（e。g。）ifhedefine’grammar’asthe’knowledgehowtowritefromdictation’：forheoughtalsotosaythatitisaknowledgehowtoreadaswell。Forinrenderingitas’knowledgeofwriting’hasnomoredefineditthanbyrenderingitas’knowledgeofreading’：
　　neitherinfacthassucceeded，butonlyhewhomentionsboththesethings，sinceitisimpossiblethatthereshouldbemorethanonedefinitionofthesamething。Itisonly，however，insomecasesthatwhathasbeensaidcorrespondstotheactualstateofthings：
　　insomeitdoesnot，e。g。allthosetermswhicharenotusedessentiallyinrelationtoboththings：asmedicineissaidtodealwiththeproductionofdiseaseandhealth；foritissaidessentiallytodothelatter，buttheformeronlybyaccident：foritisabsolutelyalientomedicinetoproducedisease。Here，then，themanwhorendersmedicineasrelativetobothofthesethingshasnotdefineditanybetterthanhewhomentionstheoneonly。Infacthehasdoneitperhapsworse，foranyoneelsebesidesthedoctoriscapableofproducingdisease。
　　Moreover，inacasewherethetermtobedefinedisusedinrelationtoseveralthings，seeifhehasrendereditasrelativetotheworseratherthantothebetter；foreveryformofknowledgeandpotentialityisgenerallythoughttoberelativetothebest。
　　Again，ifthethinginquestionbenotplacedinitsownpropergenus，onemustexamineitaccordingtotheelementaryrulesinregardtogenera，ashasbeensaidbefore。’
　　Moreover，seeifheuseslanguagewhichtransgressesthegeneraofthethingshedefines，defining，e。g。justiceasa’statethatproducesequality’or’distributeswhatisequal’：forbydefiningitsohepassesoutsidethesphereofvirtue，andsobyleavingoutthegenusofjusticehefailstoexpressitsessence：fortheessenceofathingmustineachcasebringinitsgenus。Itisthesamethingiftheobjectbenotputintoitsnearestgenus；forthemanwhoputsitintothenearestonehasstatedallthehighergenera，seeingthatallthehighergeneraarepredicatedofthelower。Either，then，itoughttobeputintoitsnearestgenus，orelsetothehighergenusallthedifferentiaeoughttobeappendedwherebythenearestgenusisdefined。Forthenhewouldnothaveleftoutanything：butwouldmerelyhavementionedthesubordinategenusbyanexpressioninsteadofbyname。Ontheotherhand，hewhomentionsmerelythehighergenusbyitself，doesnotstatethesubordinategenusaswell：insaying’plant’amandoesnotspecify’atree’。
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　　Again，inregardtothedifferentiae，wemustexamineinlikemannerwhetherthedifferentiae，too，thathehasstatedbethoseofthegenus。Forifamanhasnotdefinedtheobjectbythedifferentiaepeculiartoit，orhasmentionedsomethingsuchasisutterlyincapableofbeingadifferentiaofanything，e。g。’animal’or’substance’，clearlyhehasnotdefineditatall：fortheaforesaidtermsdonotdifferentiateanythingatall。Further，wemustseewhetherthedifferentiastatedpossessesanythingthatisco—ordinatewithitinadivision；for，ifnot，clearlytheonestatedcouldnotbeadifferentiaofthegenus。Foragenusisalwaysdividedbydifferentiaethatareco—ordinatemembersofadivision，as，forinstance，bytheterms’walking’，’flying’，’aquatic’，and’biped’。Orseeif，thoughthecontrasteddifferentiaexists，ityetisnottrueofthegenus，forthen，clearly，neitherofthemcouldbeadifferentiaofthegenus；fordifferentiaethatareco—ordinatesinadivisionwiththedifferentiaofathingarealltrueofthegenustowhichthethingbelongs。Likewise，also，seeif，thoughitbetrue，yettheadditionofittothegenusfailstomakeaspecies。Forthen，clearly，thiscouldnotbeaspecificdifferentiaofthegenus：foraspecificdifferentia，ifaddedtothegenus，alwaysmakesaspecies。
　　If，however，thisbenotruedifferentia，nomoreistheoneadduced，seeingthatitisaco—ordinatememberofadivisionwiththis。
　　Moreover，seeifhedividesthegenusbyanegation，asthosedowhodefinelineas’lengthwithoutbreadth’：forthismeanssimplythatithasnotanybreadth。Thegenuswillthenbefoundtopartakeofitsownspecies：for，sinceofeverythingeitheranaffirmationoritsnegationistrue，lengthmustalwayseitherlackbreadthorpossessit，sothat’length’aswell，i。e。thegenusof’line’，willbeeitherwithorwithoutbreadth。But’lengthwithoutbreadth’isthedefinitionofaspecies，asalsois’lengthwithbreadth’：for’withoutbreadth’and’withbreadth’aredifferentiae，andthegenusanddifferentiaconstitutethedefinitionofthespecies。Hencethegenuswouldadmitofthedefinitionofitsspecies。Likewise，also，itwilladmitofthedefinitionofthedifferentia，seeingthatoneortheotheroftheaforesaiddifferentiaeisofnecessitypredicatedofthegenus。Theusefulnessofthisprincipleisfoundinmeetingthosewhoasserttheexistenceof’Ideas’：forifabsolutelengthexist，howwillitbepredicableofthegenusthatithasbreadthorthatitlacksit？Foroneassertionortheotherwillhavetobetrueof’length’universally，ifitistobetrueofthegenusatall：
　　andthisiscontrarytothefact：forthereexistbothlengthswhichhave，andlengthswhichhavenot，breadth。Hencetheonlypeopleagainstwhomtherulecanbeemployedarethosewhoassertthatagenusisalwaysnumericallyone；andthisiswhatisdonebythosewhoasserttherealexistenceofthe’Ideas’；fortheyallegethatabsolutelengthandabsoluteanimalarethegenus。
　　Itmaybethatinsomecasesthedefinerisobligedtoemployanegationaswell，e。g。indefiningprivations。For’blind’meansathingwhichcannotseewhenitsnatureistosee。Thereisnodifferencebetweendividingthegenusbyanegation，anddividingitbysuchanaffirmationasisboundtohaveanegationasitsco—ordinateinadivision，e。g。supposinghehaddefinedsomethingas’lengthpossessedofbreadth’；forco—ordinateinthedivisionwiththatwhichispossessedofbreadthisthatwhichpossessesnobreadthandthatonly，sothatagainthegenusisdividedbyanegation。
　　Again，seeifherenderedthespeciesasadifferentia，asdothosewhodefine’contumely’as’insolenceaccompaniedbyjeering’；
　　forjeeringisakindofinsolence，i。e。itisaspeciesandnotadifferentia。
　　Moreover，seeifhehasstatedthegenusasthedifferentia，e。g。
　　’Virtueisagoodornoblestate：for’good’isthegenusof’virtue’。
　　Orpossibly’good’hereisnotthegenusbutthedifferentia，ontheprinciplethatthesamethingcannotbeintwogeneraofwhichneithercontainstheother：for’good’doesnotinclude’state’，norviceversa：fornoteverystateisgoodnoreverygooda’state’。Both，then，couldnotbegenera，andconsequently，if’state’isthegenusofvirtue，clearly’good’cannotbeitsgenus：itmustratherbethedifferentia’。Moreover，’astate’indicatestheessenceofvirtue，whereas’good’indicatesnottheessencebutaquality：andtoindicateaqualityisgenerallyheldtobethefunctionofthedifferentia。See，further，whetherthedifferentiarenderedindicatesanindividualratherthanaquality：forthegeneralviewisthatthedifferentiaalwaysexpressesaquality。
　　Lookandsee，further，whetherthedifferentiabelongsonlybyaccidenttotheobjectdefined。Forthedifferentiaisneveranaccidentalattribute，anymorethanthegenusis：forthedifferentiaofathingcannotbothbelongandnotbelongtoit。
　　Moreover，ifeitherthedifferentiaorthespecies，oranyofthethingswhichareunderthespecies，ispredicableofthegenus，thenhecouldnothavedefinedtheterm。Fornoneoftheaforesaidcanpossiblybepredicatedofthegenus，seeingthatthegenusisthetermwiththewidestrangeofall。Again，seeifthegenusbepredicatedofthedifferentia；forthegeneralviewisthatthegenusispredicated，notofthedifferentia，butoftheobjectsofwhichthedifferentiaispredicated。Animal（e。g。）ispredicatedof’man’or’ox’orotherwalkinganimals，notoftheactualdifferentiaitselfwhichwepredicateofthespecies。Forif’animal’istobepredicatedofeachofitsdifferentiae，then’animal’wouldbepredicatedofthespeciesseveraltimesover；forthedifferentiaearepredicatesofthespecies。Moreover，thedifferentiaewillbealleitherspeciesorindividuals，iftheyareanimals；foreveryanimaliseitheraspeciesoranindividual。
　　Likewiseyoumustinquirealsoifthespeciesoranyoftheobjectsthatcomeunderitispredicatedofthedifferentia：forthisisimpossible，seeingthatthedifferentiaisatermwithawiderrangethanthevariousspecies。Moreover，ifanyofthespeciesbepredicatedofit，theresultwillbethatthedifferentiaisaspecies：if，forinstance，’man’bepredicated，thedifferentiaisclearlythehumanrace。Again，seeifthedifferentiafailstobepriortothespecies：forthedifferentiaoughttobeposteriortothegenus，butpriortothespecies。
　　Lookandseealsoifthedifferentiamentionedbelongstoadifferentgenus，neithercontainedinnorcontainingthegenusinquestion。Forthegeneralviewisthatthesamedifferentiacannotbeusedoftwonon—subalterngenera。Elsetheresultwillbethatthesamespeciesaswellwillbeintwonon—subalterngenera：foreachofthedifferentiaeimportsitsowngenus，e。g。’walking’and’biped’importwiththemthegenus’animal’。If，then，eachofthegeneraaswellistrueofthatofwhichthedifferentiaistrue，itclearlyfollowsthatthespeciesmustbeintwonon—subalterngenera。Orperhapsitisnotimpossibleforthesamedifferentiatobeusedoftwonon—subalterngenera，andweoughttoaddthewords’excepttheybothbesubordinatemembersofthesamegenus’。Thus’walkinganimal’and’flyinganimal’arenon—subalterngenera，and’biped’isthedifferentiaofboth。Thewords’excepttheybothbesubordinatemembersofthesamegenus’oughtthereforetobeadded；
　　forboththesearesubordinateto’animal’。Fromthispossibility，thatthesamedifferentiamaybeusedoftwonon—subalterngenera，itisclearalsothatthereisnonecessityforthedifferentiatocarrywithitthewholeofthegenustowhichitbelongs，butonlytheoneortheotherofitslimbstogetherwiththegenerathatarehigherthanthis，as’biped’carrieswithiteither’flying’or’walkinganimal’。
　　See，too，ifhehasrendered’existencein’somethingasthedifferentiaofathing’sessence：forthegeneralviewisthatlocalitycannotdifferentiatebetweenoneessenceandanother。
　　Hence，too，peoplecondemnthosewhodivideanimalsbymeansoftheterms’walking’and’aquatic’，onthegroundthat’walking’and’aquatic’indicatemerelocality。Orpossiblyinthiscasethecensureisundeserved；for’aquatic’doesnotmean’in’anything；nordoesitdenotealocality，butacertainquality：forevenifthethingbeonthedryland，stillitisaquatic：andlikewisealand—animal，eventhoughitbeinthewater，willstillbeaandnotanaquatic—animal。Butallthesame，ifeverthedifferentiadoesdenoteexistenceinsomething，clearlyhewillhavemadeabadmistake。
　　Again，seeifhehasrenderedanaffectionasthedifferentia：foreveryaffection，ifintensified，subvertstheessenceofthething，whilethedifferentiaisnotofthatkind：forthedifferentiaisgenerallyconsideredrathertopreservethatwhichitdifferentiates；anditisabsolutelyimpossibleforathingtoexistwithoutitsownspecialdifferentia：foriftherebeno’walking’，therewillbeno’man’。Infact，wemaylaydownabsolutelythatathingcannothaveasitsdifferentiaanythinginrespectofwhichitissubjecttoalteration：forallthingsofthatkind，ifintensified，destroyitsessence。If，then，amanhasrenderedanydifferentiaofthiskind，hehasmadeamistake：forweundergoabsolutelynoalterationinrespectofourdifferentiae。
　　Again，seeifhehasfailedtorenderthedifferentiaofarelativetermrelativelytosomethingelse；forthedifferentiaeofrelativetermsarethemselvesrelative，asinthecasealsoofknowledge。Thisisclassedasspeculative，practicalandproductive；
　　andeachofthesedenotesarelation：foritspeculatesuponsomething，andproducessomethinganddoessomething。
　　Lookandseealsoifthedefinerrenderseachrelativetermrelativelytoitsnaturalpurpose：forwhileinsomecasestheparticularrelativetermcanbeusedinrelationtoitsnaturalpurposeonlyandtonothingelse，somecanbeusedinrelationtosomethingelseaswell。Thussightcanonlybeusedforseeing，butastrigilcanalsobeusedtodipupwater。Still，ifanyoneweretodefineastrigilasaninstrumentfordippingwater，hehasmadeamistake：forthatisnotitsnaturalfunction。Thedefinitionofathing’snaturalfunctionis’thatforwhichitwouldbeusedbytheprudentman，actingassuch，andbythesciencethatdealsspeciallywiththatthing’。
　　Orseeif，wheneveratermhappenstobeusedinanumberofrelations，hehasfailedtointroduceitinitsprimaryrelation：e。g。
　　bydefining’wisdom’asthevirtueof’man’orofthe’soul，’ratherthanofthe’reasoningfaculty’：for’wisdom’isthevirtueprimarilyofthereasoningfaculty：foritisinvirtueofthisthatboththemanandhissoularesaidtobewise。
　　Moreover，ifthethingofwhichthetermdefinedhasbeenstatedtobeanaffectionordisposition，orwhateveritmaybe，beunabletoadmitit，thedefinerhasmadeamistake。Foreverydispositionandeveryaffectionisformednaturallyinthatofwhichitisanaffectionordisposition，asknowledge，too，isformedinthesoul，beingadispositionofsoul。Sometimes，however，peoplemakebadmistakesinmattersofthissort，e。g。allthosewhosaythat’sleep’isa’failureofsensation’，orthat’perplexity’isastateof’equalitybetweencontraryreasonings’，orthat’pain’isa’violentdisruptionofpartsthatarenaturallyconjoined’。Forsleepisnotanattributeofsensation，whereasitoughttobe，ifitisafailureofsensation。Likewise，perplexityisnotanattributeofoppositereasonings，norpainofpartsnaturallyconjoined：fortheninanimatethingswillbeinpain，sincepainwillbepresentinthem。Similarincharacter，too，isthedefinitionof’health’，say，asa’balanceofhotandcoldelements’：forthenhealthwillbenecessarilyexhibitedbythehotandcoldelements：forbalanceofanythingisanattributeinherentinthosethingsofwhichitisthebalance，sothathealthwouldbeanattributeofthem。Moreover，peoplewhodefineinthiswayputeffectforcause，orcauseforeffect。Forthedisruptionofpartsnaturallyconjoinedisnotpain，butonlyacauseofpain：noragainisafailureofsensationsleep，buttheoneisthecauseoftheother：foreitherwegotosleepbecausesensationfails，orsensationfailsbecausewegotosleep。
　　Likewisealsoanequalitybetweencontraryreasoningswouldbegenerallyconsideredtobeacauseofperplexity：foritiswhenwereflectonbothsidesofaquestionandfindeverythingaliketobeinkeepingwitheithercoursethatweareperplexedwhichofthetwowearetodo。
　　Moreover，withregardtoallperiodsoftimelookandseewhethertherebeanydiscrepancybetweenthedifferentiaandthethingdefined：e。g。supposingthe’immortal’tobedefinedasa’livingthingimmuneatpresentfromdestruction’。Foralivingthingthatisimmune’atpresent’fromdestructionwillbeimmortal’atpresent’。
　　Possibly，indeed，inthiscasethisresultdoesnotfollow，owingtotheambiguityofthewords’immuneatpresentfromdestruction’：foritmaymeaneitherthatthethinghasnotbeendestroyedatpresent，orthatitcannotbedestroyedatpresent，orthatatpresentitissuchthatitnevercanbedestroyed。Whenever，then，wesaythatalivingthingisatpresentimmunefromdestruction，wemeanthatitisatpresentalivingthingofsuchakindasnevertobedestroyed：andthisisequivalenttosayingthatitisimmortal，sothatitisnotmeantthatitisimmortalonlyatpresent。Still，ifeveritdoeshappenthatwhathasbeenrenderedaccordingtothedefinitionbelongsinthepresentonlyorpast，whereaswhatismeantbytheworddoesnotsobelong，thenthetwocouldnotbethesame。So，then，thiscommonplaceruleoughttobefollowed，aswehavesaid。
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　　Youshouldlookandseealsowhetherthetermbeingdefinedisappliedinconsiderationofsomethingotherthanthedefinitionrendered。Suppose（e。g。）adefinitionof’justice’asthe’abilitytodistributewhatisequal’。Thiswouldnotberight，for’just’
　　describesratherthemanwhochooses，thanthemanwhoisabletodistributewhatisequal：sothatjusticecouldnotbeanabilitytodistributewhatisequal：forthenalsothemostjustmanwouldbethemanwiththemostabilitytodistributewhatisequal。
　　Moreover，seeifthethingadmitsofdegrees，whereaswhatisrenderedaccordingtothedefinitiondoesnot，or，viceversa，whatisrenderedaccordingtothedefinitionadmitsofdegreeswhilethethingdoesnot。Foreitherbothmustadmitthemorelseneither，ifindeedwhatisrenderedaccordingtothedefinitionisthesameasthething。
　　Moreover，seeif，whilebothofthemadmitofdegrees，theyyetdonotbothbecomegreatertogether：e。g。supposesexuallovetobethedesireforintercourse：forhewhoismoreintenselyinlovehasnotamoreintensedesireforintercourse，sothatbothdonotbecomeintensifiedatonce：theycertainlyshould，however，hadtheybeenthesamething。
　　Moreover，supposetwothingstobebeforeyou，seeifthetermtobedefinedappliesmoreparticularlytotheonetowhichthecontentofthedefinitionislessapplicable。Take，forinstance，thedefinitionof’fire’asthe’bodythatconsistsofthemostrarefiedparticles’。For’fire’denotesflameratherthanlight，butflameislessthebodythatconsistsofthemostrarefiedparticlesthanislight：whereasbothoughttobemoreapplicabletothesamething，iftheyhadbeenthesame。Again，seeiftheoneexpressionappliesaliketoboththeobjectsbeforeyou，whiletheotherdoesnotapplytobothalike，butmoreparticularlytooneofthem。
　　Moreover，seeifherendersthedefinitionrelativetotwothingstakenseparately：thus，thebeautiful’is’whatispleasanttotheeyesortotheears"：or’thereal’is’whatiscapableofbeingacteduponorofacting’。Forthenthesamethingwillbebothbeautifulandnotbeautiful，andlikewisewillbebothrealandnotreal。For’pleasanttotheears’willbethesameas’beautiful’，sothat’notpleasanttotheears’willbethesameas’notbeautiful’：forofidenticalthingstheopposites，too，areidentical，andtheoppositeof’beautiful’is’notbeautiful’，whileof’pleasanttotheears’theoppositeisnotpleasanttothecars’：clearly，then，’notpleasanttotheears’isthesamethingas’notbeautiful’。If，therefore，somethingbepleasanttotheeyesbutnottotheears，itwillbebothbeautifulandnotbeautiful。Inlikemannerweshallshowalsothatthesamethingisbothrealandunreal。
　　Moreover，ofbothgeneraanddifferentiaeandalltheothertermsrenderedindefinitionsyoushouldframedefinitionsinlieuoftheterms，andthenseeiftherebeanydiscrepancybetweenthem。
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　　Ifthetermdefinedberelative，eitherinitselforinrespectofitsgenus，seewhetherthedefinitionfailstomentionthattowhichtheterm，eitherinitselforinrespectofitsgenus，isrelative，e。g。ifhehasdefined’knowledge’asan’incontrovertibleconception’
　　or’wishing’as’painlessconation’。Forofeverythingrelativetheessenceisrelativetosomethingelse，seeingthatthebeingofeveryrelativetermisidenticalwithbeinginacertainrelationtosomething。Heought，therefore，tohavesaidthatknowledgeis’conceptionofaknowable’andthatwishingis’conationforagood’。Likewise，also，ifhehasdefined’grammar’as’knowledgeofletters’：whereasinthedefinitionthereoughttoberenderedeitherthethingtowhichthetermitselfisrelative，orthat，whateveritis，towhichitsgenusisrelative。Orseeifarelativetermhasbeendescribednotinrelationtoitsend，theendinanythingbeingwhateverisbestinitorgivesitspurposetotherest。Certainlyitiswhatisbestorfinalthatshouldbestated，e。g。thatdesireisnotforthepleasantbutforpleasure：forthisisourpurposeinchoosingwhatispleasantaswell。
　　Lookandseealsoifthatinrelationtowhichhehasrenderedthetermbeaprocessoranactivity：fornothingofthatkindisanend，forthecompletionoftheactivityorprocessistheendratherthantheprocessoractivityitself。Orperhapsthisruleisnottrueinallcases，foralmosteverybodyprefersthepresentexperienceofpleasuretoitscessation，sothattheywouldcounttheactivityastheendratherthanitscompletion。
　　Againseeinsomecasesifhehasfailedtodistinguishthequantityorqualityorplaceorotherdifferentiaeofanobject；e。g。thequalityandquantityofthehonourthestrivingforwhichmakesamanambitious：forallmenstriveforhonour，sothatitisnotenoughtodefinetheambitiousmanashimwhostrivesforhonour，buttheaforesaiddifferentiaemustbeadded。Likewise，also，indefiningthecovetousmanthequantityofmoneyheaimsat，orinthecaseoftheincontinentmanthequalityofthepleasures，shouldbestated。
　　Foritisnotthemanwhogiveswaytoanysortofpleasurewhateverwhoiscalledincontinent，butonlyhewhogiveswaytoacertainkindofpleasure。Oragain，peoplesometimesdefinenightasa’shadowontheearth’，oranearthquakeasamovementoftheearth’，oracloudas’condensationoftheair’，orawindasa’movementoftheair’；
　　whereastheyoughttospecifyaswellquantity，quality，place，andcause。Likewise，also，inothercasesofthekind：forbyomittinganydifferentiaewhateverhefailstostatetheessenceoftheterm。Oneshouldalwaysattackdeficiency。Foramovementoftheearthdoesnotconstituteanearthquake，noramovementoftheairawind，irrespectiveofitsmannerandtheamountinvolved。
　　Moreover，inthecaseofconations，andinanyothercaseswhereitapplies，seeiftheword’apparent’isleftout，e。g。’wishingisaconationafterthegood’，or’desireisaconationafterthepleasant’—insteadofsaying’theapparentlygood’，or’pleasant’。
　　Foroftenthosewhoexhibittheconationdonotperceivewhatisgoodorpleasant，sothattheiraimneednotbereallygoodorpleasant，butonlyapparentlyso。Theyought，therefore，tohaverenderedthedefinitionalsoaccordingly。Ontheotherhand，anyonewhomaintainstheexistenceofIdeasoughttobebroughtfacetofacewithhisIdeas，eventhoughhedoesrenderthewordinquestion：fortherecanbenoIdeaofanythingmerelyapparent：thegeneralviewisthatanIdeaisalwaysspokenofinrelationtoanIdea：thusabsolutedesireisfortheabsolutelypleasant，andabsolutewishingisfortheabsolutelygood；theythereforecannotbeforanapparentgoodoranapparentlypleasant：fortheexistenceofanabsolutely—apparently—goodorpleasantwouldbeanabsurdity。