Itisanessentialpointtofixthenumberofcitizenswhoaretoformthepublicassemblies；otherwiseitwouldbeuncertainwhetherthewhole，oronlyapartofthepeople，hadgiventheirvotes。AtSpartathenumberwasfixedattenthousand。ButRome，designedbyProvidencetorisefromtheweakestbeginningstothehighestpitchofgrandeur；
Rome，doomedtoexperienceallthevicissitudesoffortune；Rome，whohadsometimesallherinhabitantswithoutherwalls，andsometimesallItalyandaconsiderablepartoftheworldwithinthem；Rome，Isay，neverfixedthenumber[3]andthiswasoneoftheprincipalcausesofherruin。
Thepeople，inwhomthesupremepowerresides，oughttohavethemanagementofeverythingwithintheirreach：thatwhichexceedstheirabilitiesmustbeconductedbytheirministers。
Buttheycannotproperlybesaidtohavetheirministers，withoutthepowerofnominatingthem：itis，therefore，afundamentalmaximinthisgovernment，thatthepeopleshouldchoosetheirministers——thatis，theirmagistrates。
Theyhaveoccasion，aswellasmonarchs，andevenmoreso，tobedirectedbyacouncilorsenate。Buttohaveaproperconfidenceinthese，theyshouldhavethechoosingofthemembers；whethertheelectionbemadebythemselves，asatAthens，orbysomemagistratedeputedforthatpurpose，asoncertainoccasionswascustomaryatRome。
Thepeopleareextremelywellqualifiedforchoosingthosewhomtheyaretoentrustwithpartoftheirauthority。Theyhaveonlytobedeterminedbythingstowhichtheycannotbestrangers，andbyfactsthatareobvioustosense。Theycantellwhenapersonhasfoughtmanybattles，andbeencrownedwithsuccess；theyare，therefore，capableofelectingageneral。Theycantellwhenajudgeisassiduousinhisoffice，givesgeneralsatisfaction，andhasneverbeenchargedwithbribery：thisissufficientforchoosingapr？tor。Theyarestruckwiththemagnificenceorrichesofafellow—citizen；nomoreisrequisiteforelectinganedile。Thesearefactsofwhichtheycanhavebetterinformationinapublicforumthanamonarchinhispalace。Butaretheycapableofconductinganintricateaffair，ofseizingandimprovingtheopportunityandcriticalmomentofaction？No；thissurpassestheirabilities。
Shouldwedoubtthepeople’snaturalcapacity，inrespecttothediscernmentofmerit，weneedonlycastaneyeontheseriesofsurprisingelectionsmadebytheAtheniansandRomans；whichnoonesurelywillattributetohazard。
WeknowthatthoughthepeopleofRomeassumedtherightofraisingplebeianstopublicoffices，yettheyneverwouldexertthispower；andthoughatAthensthemagistrateswereallowed，bythelawofAristides，tobeelectedfromallthedifferentclassesofinhabitants，thereneverwasacase，saysXenophon，[4]whenthecommonpeoplepetitionedforemploymentswhichcouldendangereithertheirsecurityortheirglory。
Asmostcitizenshavesufficientabilitytochoose，thoughunqualifiedtobechosen，sothepeople，thoughcapableofcallingotherstoanaccountfortheiradministration，areincapableofconductingtheadministrationthemselves。
Thepublicbusinessmustbecarriedonwithacertainmotion，neithertooquicknortooslow。Butthemotionofthepeopleisalwayseithertooremissortooviolent。Sometimeswithahundredthousandarmstheyoverturnallbeforethem；andsometimeswithahundredthousandfeettheycreeplikeinsects。
Inapopularstatetheinhabitantsaredividedintocertainclasses。Itisinthemannerofmakingthisdivisionthatgreatlegislatorshavesignalisedthemselves；anditisonthisthedurationandprosperityofdemocracyhaveeverdepended。
ServiusTulliusfollowedthespiritofaristocracyinthedistributionofhisclasses。WefindinLivy[5]andinDionysiusHalicarnassus，[6]inwhatmannerhelodgedtherightofsuffrageinthehandsoftheprincipalcitizens。HehaddividedthepeopleofRomeinto193
centuries，whichformedsixclasses；andrankingtherich，whowereinsmallernumbers，inthefirstcenturies，andthoseinmiddlingcircumstances，whoweremorenumerous，inthenext，heflungtheindigentmultitudeintothelast；andaseachcenturyhadbutonevote[7]itwaspropertyratherthannumbersthatdecidedtheelection。
SolondividedthepeopleofAthensintofourclasses。Inthishewasdirectedbythespiritofdemocracy，hisintentionnotbeingtofixthosewhoweretochoose，butsuchaswereeligible：therefore，leavingtoeverycitizentherightofelection，hemade[8]thejudgeseligiblefromeachofthosefourclasses；butthemagistratesheorderedtobechosenonlyoutofthefirstthree，consistingofpersonsofeasyfortunes。[9]
Asthedivisionofthosewhohavearightofsuffrageisafundamentallawinrepublics，sothemannerofgivingthissuffrageisanotherfundamental。
Thesuffragebylotisnaturaltodemocracy；asthatbychoiceistoaristocracy。[10]
Thesuffragebylotisamethodofelectingthatoffendsnoone，butanimateseachcitizenwiththepleasinghopeofservinghiscountry。
Yetasthismethodisinitselfdefective，ithasbeentheendeavourofthemosteminentlegislatorstoregulateandamendit。
SolonmadealawatAthensthatmilitaryemploymentsshouldbeconferredbychoice；butthatsenatorsandjudgesshouldbeelectedbylot。
Thesamelegislatorordainedthatcivilmagistracies，attendedwithgreatexpense，shouldbegivenbychoice；andtheothersbylot。
Inorder，however，toamendthesuffragebylot，hemadearulethatnonebutthosewhopresentedthemselvesshouldbeelected；thatthepersonelectedshouldbeexaminedbyjudges[11]andthateveryoneshouldhavearighttoaccusehimifhewereunworthyoftheoffice：[12]
thisparticipatedatthesametimeofthesuffragebylot，andofthatbychoice。Whenthetimeoftheirmagistracyhadexpired，theywereobligedtosubmittoanotherjudgmentinregardtotheirconduct。
Personsutterlyunqualifiedmusthavebeenextremelybackwardingivingintheirnamestobedrawnbylot。
Thelawwhichdeterminesthemannerofgivingsuffrageislikewisefundamentalinademocracy。Itisaquestionofsomeimportancewhetherthesuffragesoughttobepublicorsecret。Ciceroobserves[13]thatthelaws[14]whichrenderedthemsecrettowardsthecloseoftherepublicwerethecauseofitsdecline。Butasthisisdifferentlypractisedindifferentrepublics，Ishallofferheremythoughtsconcerningthissubject。
Thepeople’ssuffragesoughtdoubtlesstobepublic[15]andthisshouldbeconsideredasafundamentallawofdemocracy。Thelowerclassoughttobedirectedbythoseofhigherrank，andrestrainedwithinboundsbythegravityofeminentpersonages。Hence，byrenderingthesuffragessecretintheRomanrepublic，allwaslost；itwasnolongerpossibletodirectapopulacethatsoughtitsowndestruction。Butwhenthebodyofthenoblesaretovoteinanaristocracy[16]orinademocracythesenate[17]asthebusinessisthenonlytopreventintrigues，thesuffragescannotbetoosecret。
Intriguinginasenateisdangerous；itisdangerousalsoinabodyofnobles；butnotsoamongthepeople，whosenatureistoactthroughpassion。Incountrieswheretheyhavenoshareinthegovernment，weoftenseethemasmuchinflamedonaccountofanactorasevertheycouldbeforthewelfareofthestate。Themisfortuneofarepubliciswhenintriguesareatanend；whichhappenswhenthepeoplearegainedbybriberyandcorruption：inthiscasetheygrowindifferenttopublicaffairs，andavaricebecomestheirpredominantpassion。Unconcernedaboutthegovernmentandeverythingbelongingtoit，theyquietlywaitfortheirhire。
Itislikewiseafundamentallawindemocracies，thatthepeopleshouldhavethesolepowertoenactlaws。Andyetthereareathousandoccasionsonwhichitisnecessarythesenateshouldhavethepowerofdecreeing；nay，itisfrequentlypropertomakesometrialofalawbeforeitisestablished。TheconstitutionsofRomeandAthenswereexcellent。Thedecreesofthesenate[18]hadtheforceoflawsforthespaceofayear，butdidnotbecomeperpetualtilltheywereratifiedbytheconsentofthepeople。
3。OftheLawsinrelationtotheNatureofAristocracy。Inanaristocracythesupremepowerislodgedinthehandsofacertainnumberofpersons。Theseareinvestedbothwiththelegislativeandexecutiveauthority；andtherestofthepeopleare，inrespecttothem，thesameasthesubjectsofamonarchyinregardtothesovereign。
Theydonotvoteherebylot，forthiswouldbeproductiveofinconveniencesonly。Andindeed，inagovernmentwherethemostmortifyingdistinctionsarealreadyestablished，thoughtheyweretobechosenbylot，stilltheywouldnotceasetobeodious；itisthenoblemantheyenvy，andnotthemagistrate。
Whenthenobilityarenumerous，theremustbeasenatetoregulatetheaffairswhichthebodyofthenoblesareincapableofdeciding，andtoprepareothersfortheirdecision。Inthiscaseitmaybesaidthatthearistocracyisinsomemeasureinthesenate，thedemocracyinthebodyofthenobles，andthepeopleareacipher。
Itwouldbeaveryhappythinginanaristocracyifthepeople，insomemeasure，couldberaisedfromtheirstateofannihilation。ThusatGenoa，thebankofSt。Georgebeingadministeredbythepeople[19]givesthemacertaininfluenceinthegovernment，whencetheirwholeprosperityisderived。
Thesenatorsoughtbynomeanstohavetherightofnamingtheirownmembers；forthiswouldbetheonlywaytoperpetuateabuses。AtRome，whichinitsearlyyearswasakindofaristocracy，thesenatedidnotfillupthevacantplacesintheirownbody；thenewmemberswerenominatedbythecensors。[20]
Inarepublic，thesuddenriseofaprivatecitizentoexorbitantpowerproducesmonarchy，orsomethingmorethanmonarchy。Inthelatterthelawshaveprovidedfor，orinsomemeasureadaptedthemselvesto，theconstitution；andtheprincipleofgovernmentchecksthemonarch：butinarepublic，whereaprivatecitizenhasobtainedanexorbitantpower，[21]theabuseofthispowerismuchgreater，becausethelawsforesawitnot，andconsequentlymadenoprovisionagainstit。
Thereisanexceptiontothisrule，whentheconstitutionissuchastohaveimmediateneedofamagistrateinvestedwithextraordinarypower。
SuchwasRomewithherdictators，suchisVenicewithherstateinquisitors；theseareformidablemagistrates，whorestore，asitwerebyviolence，thestatetoitsliberty。Buthowcomesitthatthesemagistraciesaresoverydifferentinthesetworepublics？ItisbecauseRomesupportedtheremainsofheraristocracyagainstthepeople；
whereasVeniceemploysherstateinquisitorstomaintainheraristocracyagainstthenobles。TheconsequencewasthatatRomethedictatorshipcouldbeonlyofshortduration，asthepeopleactedthroughpassionandnotwithdesign。Itwasnecessarythatamagistracyofthiskindshouldbeexercisedwithlustreandpomp，thebusinessbeingtointimidate，andnottopunish，themultitude。Itwasalsoproperthatthedictatorshouldbecreatedonlyforsomeparticularaffair，andforthisonlyshouldhaveanunlimitedauthority，ashewasalwayscreateduponsomesuddenemergency。Onthecontrary，atVenicetheyhaveoccasionforapermanentmagistracy；forhereitisthatschemesmaybesetonfoot，continued，suspended，andresumed；thattheambitionofasinglepersonbecomesthatofafamily，andtheambitionofonefamilythatofmany。
Theyhaveoccasionforasecretmagistracy，thecrimestheypunishbeinghatchedinsecrecyandsilence。Thismagistracymusthaveageneralinquisition，fortheirbusinessisnottoremedyknowndisorders，buttopreventtheunknown。Inaword，thelatterisdesignedtopunishsuspectedcrimes；whereastheformerusedrathermenacesthanpunishmentevenforcrimesthatwereopenlyavowed。
Inallmagistracies，thegreatnessofthepowermustbecompensatedbythebrevityoftheduration。Thismostlegislatorshavefixedtoayear；
alongerspacewouldbedangerous，andashorterwouldbecontrarytothenatureofgovernment。Forwhoisitthatinthemanagementevenofhisdomesticaffairswouldbethusconfined？AtRagusa[22]thechiefmagistrateoftherepublicischangedeverymonth，theotherofficerseveryweek，andthegovernorofthecastleeveryday。Butthiscantakeplaceonlyinasmallrepublicenvironed[23]byformidablepowers，whomighteasilycorruptsuchpettyandinsignificantmagistrates。
Thebestaristocracyisthatinwhichthosewhohavenoshareinthelegislaturearesofewandinconsiderablethatthegoverningpartyhavenointerestinoppressingthem。Thuswhen[24]AntipatermadealawatAthensthatwhosoeverwasnotworthtwothousanddrachmsshouldhavenopowertovote，heformedbythismethodthebestaristocracypossible；
becausethiswassosmallasumastoexcludeveryfew，andnotoneofanyrankorconsiderationinthecity。
Aristocraticfamiliesoughttherefore，asmuchaspossible，tolevelthemselvesinappearancewiththepeople。Themoreanaristocracybordersondemocracy，theneareritapproachesperfection：and，inproportionasitdrawstowardsmonarchy，themoreisitimperfect。
Butthemostimperfectofallisthatinwhichthepartofthepeoplethatobeysisinastateofcivilservitudetothosewhocommand，asthearistocracyofPoland，wherethepeasantsareslavestothenobility。
4。OftheRelationofLawstotheNatureofMonarchicalGovernment。Theintermediate，subordinate，anddependentpowersconstitutethenatureofmonarchicalgovernment；Imeanofthatinwhichasinglepersongovernsbyfundamentallaws。Isaidtheintermediate，subordinate，anddependentpowers。Andindeed，inmonarchiestheprinceisthesourceofallpower，politicalandcivil。Thesefundamentallawsnecessarilysupposetheintermediatechannelsthroughwhichthepowerflows：foriftherebeonlythemomentaryandcapriciouswillofasinglepersontogovernthestate，nothingcanbefixed，andofcoursethereisnofundamentallaw。
Themostnatural，intermediate，andsubordinatepoweristhatofthenobility。Thisinsomemeasureseemstobeessentialtoamonarchy，whosefundamentalmaximis：nomonarch，nonobility；nonobility，nomonarch；buttheremaybeadespoticprince。
TherearemenwhohaveendeavouredinsomecountriesinEuropetosuppressthejurisdictionofthenobility，notperceivingthattheyweredrivingattheverythingthatwasdonebytheparliamentofEngland。
Abolishtheprivilegesofthelords，theclergyandcitiesinamonarchy，andyouwillsoonhaveapopularstate，orelseadespoticgovernment。
ThecourtsofaconsiderablekingdominEuropehave，formanyages，beenstrikingatthepatrimonialjurisdictionofthelordsandclergy。Wedonotpretendtocensurethesesagemagistrates；butweleaveittothepublictojudgehowfarthismayaltertheconstitution。FaramIfrombeingprejudicedinfavouroftheprivilegesoftheclergy；however，I
shouldbegladiftheirjurisdictionwereoncefixed。Thequestionisnotwhethertheirjurisdictionwasjustlyestablished；butwhetheritbereallyestablished；whetheritconstitutesapartofthelawsofthecountry，andisineveryrespectinrelationtothoselaws：whetherbetweentwopowersacknowledgedindependent，theconditionsoughtnottobereciprocal；andwhetheritbenotequallythedutyofagoodsubjecttodefendtheprerogativeoftheprince，andtomaintainthelimitswhichfromtimeimmemorialhavebeenprescribedtohisauthority。
Thoughtheecclesiasticpowerbesodangerousinarepublic，yetitisextremelyproperinamonarchy，especiallyoftheabsolutekind。WhatwouldbecomeofSpainandPortugal，sincethesubversionoftheirlaws，wereitnotforthisonlybarrieragainsttheincursionsofarbitrarypower？Abarriereverusefulwhenthereisnoother：forsinceadespoticgovernmentisproductiveofthemostdreadfulcalamitiestohumannature，theveryevilthatrestrainsitisbeneficialtothesubject。
Inthesamemannerastheocean，threateningtooverflowthewholeearth，isstoppedbyweedsandpebblesthatliescatteredalongtheshore，somonarchs，whosepowerseemsunbounded，arerestrainedbythesmallestobstacles，andsuffertheirnaturalpridetobesubduedbysupplicationandprayer。
TheEnglish，tofavourtheirliberty，haveabolishedalltheintermediatepowersofwhichtheirmonarchywascomposed。Theyhaveagreatdealofreasontobejealousofthisliberty；weretheyevertobesounhappyastoloseit，theywouldbeoneofthemostservilenationsuponearth。
Mr。Law，throughignorancebothofarepublicanandmonarchicalconstitution，wasoneofthegreatestpromotersofabsolutepowereverknowninEurope。Besidestheviolentandextraordinarychangesowingtohisdirection，hewouldfainsuppressalltheintermediateranks，andabolishthepoliticalcommunities。Hewasdissolving[25]themonarchybyhischimericalreimbursements，andseemedasifheevenwantedtoredeemtheconstitution。
Itisnotenoughtohaveintermediatepowersinamonarchy；theremustbealsoadepositaryofthelaws。Thisdepositarycanonlybethejudgesofthesupremecourtsofjustice，whopromulgatethenewlaws，andrevivetheobsolete。Thenaturalignoranceofthenobility，theirindolenceandcontemptofcivilgovernment，requirethatthereshouldbeabodyinvestedwiththepowerofrevivingandexecutingthelaws，whichwouldbeotherwiseburiedinoblivion。Theprince’scouncilarenotaproperdepositary。Theyarenaturallythedepositaryofthemomentarywilloftheprince，andnotofthefundamentallaws。Besides，theprince’scounciliscontinuallychanging；itisneitherpermanentnornumerous；neitherhasitasufficientshareoftheconfidenceofthepeople；consequentlyitiscapableofsettingthemrightindifficultconjunctures，orofreducingthemtoproperobedience。
Despoticgovernments，wheretherearenofundamentallaws，havenosuchkindofdepositary。Henceitisthatreligionhasgenerallysomuchinfluenceinthosecountries，becauseitformsakindofpermanentdepositary；andifthiscannotbesaidofreligion，itmayofthecustomsthatarerespectedinsteadoflaws。
5。OftheLawsinrelationtotheNatureofadespoticGovernment。Fromthenatureofdespoticpoweritfollowsthatthesingleperson，investedwiththispower，commitstheexecutionofitalsotoasingleperson。A
manwhomhissensescontinuallyinformthathehimselfiseverythingandthathissubjectsarenothing，isnaturallylazy，voluptuous，andignorant。Inconsequenceofthis，heneglectsthemanagementofpublicaffairs。Butwerehetocommittheadministrationtomany，therewouldbecontinualdisputesamongthem；eachwouldformintriguestobehisfirstslave；andhewouldbeobligedtotakethereinsintohisownhands。Itis，therefore，morenaturalforhimtoresignittoavizir，[26]andtoinvesthimwiththesamepowerashimself。Thecreationofavizirisafundamentallawofthisgovernment。
Itisrelatedofapopethathehadstartedaninfinitenumberofdifficultiesagainsthiselection，fromathoroughconvictionofhisincapacity。Atlengthhewasprevailedontoacceptofthepontificate，andresignedtheadministrationentirelytohisnephew。Hewassoonstruckwithsurprise，andsaid，"Ishouldneverhavethoughtthatthesethingsweresoeasy。"ThesamemaybesaidoftheprincesoftheEast，who，beingeducatedinaprisonwhereeunuchscorrupttheirheartsanddebasetheirunderstandings，andwheretheyarefrequentlykeptignorantevenoftheirhighrank，whendrawnforthinordertobeplacedonthethrone，areatfirstconfounded：butassoonastheyhavechosenavizir，andabandonedthemselvesintheirseragliotothemostbrutalpassions；pursuing，inthemidstofaprostitutedcourt，everycapriciousextravagance，theywouldneverhavedreamedthattheycouldfindmatterssoeasy。
Themoreextensivetheempire，thelargertheseraglio；andconsequentlythemorevoluptuoustheprince。Hencethemorenationssuchasovereignhastorule，thelessheattendstothecaresofgovernment；themoreimportanthisaffairs，thelesshemakesthemthesubjectofhisdeliberations。
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1。CompareAristotle，Politics，vi。2。
2。Declamations，17，18。
3。SeetheConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，9。
4。Pp。691，693，ed。Wechel，1596。
5。Bk。i。
6。Bk。iv，art。15etseq。
7。SeeintheConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，9，howthisspiritofServiusTulliuswaspreservedintherepublic。
8。DionysiusHalicarnassus，EulogiumofIsocrates，ii，p。97，ed。
Wechel。Pollux，viii。10，art。130。
9。SeeAristotle’sPolitics，ii。12。
10。Ibid，iv。9。
11。SeetheorationofDemosthenes，DeFalsalegat。，andtheorationagainstTimarchus。
12。Theyusedeventodrawtwoticketsforeachplace，onewhichgavetheplace，andtheotherwhichnamedthepersonwhowastosucceed，incasethefirstwasrejected。
13。DeLeg。，i，iii。
14。Theywerecalledlegestabulares；twotabletswerepresentedtoeachcitizen，thefirstmarkedwithanA，forAntique，orIforbidit；andtheotherwithanUandanR，forUtirogas，orBeitasyoudesire。
15。AtAthensthepeopleusedtoliftuptheirhands。
16。AsatVenice。
17。ThethirtytyrantsatAthensorderedthesuffragesoftheAreopagitestobepublic，inordertomanagethemastheypleased。——
Lysias，Orat。contraAgorat。8。
18。SeeDionysiusHalicarnassus，iv，ix。
19。SeeMr。Addison，TravelstoItaly，p。16。
20。Theywerenamedatfirstbytheconsuls。
21。ThisiswhatruinedtherepublicofRome。SeeConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，14，16。
22。Tournefort，Voyages。
23。AtLuccathemagistratesarechosenonlyfortwomonths。
24。Diodorus，xviii，p。601，ed。Rhodoman。
25。Ferdinand，kingofAragon，madehimselfgrandmasteroftheorders，andthatalonechangedtheconstitution。
26。TheEasternkingsareneverwithoutvizirs，saysSirJohnChardin。
BookIII。OfthePrinciplesoftheThreeKindsofGovernment1。DifferencebetweentheNatureandPrincipleofGovernment。Havingexaminedthelawsinrelationtothenatureofeachgovernment，wemustinvestigatethosewhichrelatetoitsprinciple。
Thereisthisdifferencebetweenthenatureandprinciple[1]ofgovernment，thattheformeristhatbywhichitisconstituted，thelatterthatbywhichitismadetoact。Oneisitsparticularstructure，andtheotherthehumanpassionswhichsetitinmotion。
Now，lawsoughtnolesstorelatetotheprinciplethantothenatureofeachgovernment。Wemust，therefore，inquireintothisprinciple，whichshallbethesubjectofthisthirdbook。
2。OfthePrincipleofdifferentGovernments。Ihavealreadyobservedthatitisthenatureofarepublicangovernmentthateitherthecollectivebodyofthepeople，orparticularfamilies，shouldbepossessedofthesupremepower；ofamonarchy，thattheprinceshouldhavethispower，butintheexecutionofitshouldbedirectedbyestablishedlaws；ofadespoticgovernment，thatasinglepersonshouldruleaccordingtohisownwillandcaprice。Thisenablesmetodiscovertheirthreeprinciples；whicharethencenaturallyderived。Ishallbeginwitharepublicangovernment，andinparticularwiththatofdemocracy。
3。OfthePrincipleofDemocracy。Thereisnogreatshareofprobitynecessarytosupportamonarchicalordespoticgovernment。Theforceoflawsinone，andtheprince’sarmintheother，aresufficienttodirectandmaintainthewhole。Butinapopularstate，onespringmoreisnecessary，namely，virtue。
WhatIhavehereadvancedisconfirmedbytheunanimoustestimonyofhistorians，andisextremelyagreeabletothenatureofthings。Foritisclearthatinamonarchy，wherehewhocommandstheexecutionofthelawsgenerallythinkshimselfabovethem，thereislessneedofvirtuethaninapopulargovernment，wherethepersonentrustedwiththeexecutionofthelawsissensibleofhisbeingsubjecttotheirdirection。
Clearisitalsothatamonarchwho，throughbadadviceorindolence，ceasestoenforcetheexecutionofthelaws，mayeasilyrepairtheevil；
hehasonlytofollowotheradvice；ortoshakeoffthisindolence。Butwhen，inapopulargovernment，thereisasuspensionofthelaws，asthiscanproceedonlyfromthecorruptionoftherepublic，thestateiscertainlyundone。
AverydrollspectacleitwasinthelastcenturytobeholdtheimpotenteffortsoftheEnglishtowardstheestablishmentofdemocracy。Astheywhohadashareinthedirectionofpublicaffairswerevoidofvirtue；
astheirambitionwasinffamedbythesuccessofthemostdaringoftheirmembers；[2]astheprevailingpartiesweresuccessivelyanimatedbythespiritoffaction，thegovernmentwascontinuallychanging：thepeople，amazedatsomanyrevolutions，invainattemptedtoerectacommonwealth。Atlength，whenthecountryhadundergonethemostviolentshocks，theywereobligedtohaverecoursetotheverygovernmentwhichtheyhadsowantonlyproscribed。
WhenSyllathoughtofrestoringRometoherliberty，thisunhappycitywasincapableofreceivingthatblessing。Shehadonlythefeebleremainsofvirtue，whichwerecontinuallydiminishing。InsteadofbeingrousedfromherlethargybyC？sar，Tiberius，CaiusClaudius，Nero，andDomitian，sherivetedeverydayherchains；ifshestrucksomeblows，heraimwasatthetyrant，notatthetyranny。